

THEORETICAL ESSAYS ON THE IMAGINATION IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY

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I TOTALITY AND ALIENATION IN MARXIST CULTURAL THEORY

A Marxist theory of culture, as with a Marxist theory of any phenomenon of social life, is concerned with the appropriation of reality in thought, on the basis of the fundamental epistemological procedures and ontological conceptions of a dialectical materialist method. Historically, this method was first consciously arrived at by Marx and Engels in their crucial confrontation with two German philosophers - Hegel and Feuerbach - who represented in extremely developed forms the two major methods evolved in western bourgeois civilization: idealism and mechanical materialism. A dialectical materialist method is not solely derivable from the critique of Feuerbach's critique of Hegel: but originally it was, and it is therefore valuable to reconsider continuously this moment in the development of Marx's and Engels' thought. By considering crucial aspects of that critique, whose consequence was an entirely new conception of thought and reality, issues central to a dialectical understanding of culture and aesthetic activity can be usefully approached.

Because Marxism was initially a wholly oppositional scientific method and ideology, it was naturally excluded access to the social resources which would have allowed it to develop in all its potential aspects. The circumstances of developing and expanding capitalism after Marx and Engels, and the social-historical contexts of the socialist revolutions that have so far occurred, have meant that in the fields of culture, psyche, and mind in particular, some of the most significant developments have occurred in the bourgeois human sciences. Inasmuch as a bourgeois scientific paradigm confronts reality, and discovers real attributes of reality, advances are made within it. But, existing as they do within a contradictory framework of interpretation, not only are the theoretical conclusions distorted, but the facts themselves are falsely constituted through observation. It becomes necessary for Marxism to assimilate and transform the findings of bourgeois science, and integrate them into a widened and growing Marxist science. What Marx achieved with respect to Hegel and the classical political economists – that is, an extraction of their “rational kernels”, must be continuously practised| in respect of bourgeois cultural thought.

This entails both deepening and developing Marxism, but also re-establishing it from its own premises. Thus, even in the writings of Marx himself (but certainly in Engels, Plekhanov and later Marxist theorists of culture), there are tendencies toward the reification of the notion of superstructure (which effectively, as Williams(1) has argued, reproduce the idealist distinction between material productive activity and intellectual, “spiritual” activity). If however the origins of the base/superstructure conception are revisited, in particular in *The German Ideology*, it is clear that it is framed within the perception of society as an active, structured totality. Feuerbach's critique of Hegel had inverted the relationship between thought and being; there

could be no “thought” other than human thought, i.e. consciousness, and this did not determine being (natural or historical), but rather, being determined thought. Marx and Engels took Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel further, in showing that “being” is not a discrete opposition, or static subject of thought as pre-dialectical materialism would have it. The fundamentally new conception is “social being” which denotes “man” as he really is, the ever-changing complex of real active relationships in real societies. This “social being” cannot be thought of as “society minus consciousness”, with the relationship between being and thought still formulated in terms of a simple determining relation between the poles of a duality. “Social being” refers to the varied concrete social relationships in which human beings always exist; consciousness is then also grasped historically. The categories implicate and penetrate each other; to ask in what way the first "determines" the second is to have lost the essence of Marx’s “going beyond" Hegel and Feuerbach.

“Social being” is history grasped on the level of active, structured relationships; it entails consciousness, just as consciousness entails history. If this is fully grasped, the categories later elaborated by Marx to investigate real historical processes – such as the transition from feudalism to capitalism in western Europe – are understood in such a way that the whole confusion surrounding the nature of the base-superstructure relation disperses.(2)

“Social being” is not a natural (i.e. biological, or material in an inorganic sense), static entity – nor is it a metaphysical abstraction. It is historical, indicating collective activity of real concrete circumstances. The relationship between social being and conscious is thoroughly dialectical; in engaging in particular economic activities, human beings think, desire, and are motivated in particular ways. Society, in producing its means of life, necessarily transforms itself continuously on all planes. The conception was never one that permitted the insertion of certain activities into the base, and others into the superstructure. This is to reify, to project the categories of thought through which reality is grasped, into reality itself. In this way the thought processes of empiricism and idealism are reintroduced under the cloak of Marxist terminology. It is only in metaphor, that one can speak of law, art, ideology etc. as “flowing from” or “resting upon” the material base. In fact social activity is always inseparably productive and intellectual, utilizing both tools and symbols: neither an “economic base” nor “consciousness” can exist as a discrete, phenomenal entity.

The relationship between the works belonging to the different periods of Marx’s life have rightly come to be seen as crucial to the interpretation of Marxist method in general. The attempt to make rigid separations between different phases of Marx’s life-work rests however, on premises which are not born out by any detailed examination of the development of Marx’s perspective. Thus it is frequently maintained that there is a separation between Marx as philosopher and Marx as economic and political scientist. But it should be clear that Marx’s method transcends all bourgeois conceptions of separate disciplines which are based, in the final analysis, on the conception of knowledge as ensuing from pure speculation. All thought, for Marx, is practical-critical activity. The all-encompassing “science” (not in the sense this word has in bourgeois

discourse) is that of history – since even natural science is a human activity occurring within history, in forms that co-exist with, interact with, and complement the modes of particular societies' mediations with nature.

Sometimes it is argued that Capital presents an historical determinism, based upon the relentless advance of productive forces. Human beings are mere agents of historical processes, and not conscious, active makers of history as they are, for example, in *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* of 1844. Alternatively it is held that the early works argue an idealism, namely that the alienation under capitalism is a mere illusion of the mind (mystification), and that its overcoming is implicitly to be achieved philosophically, from which there will result the return of man to his natural self.

In actuality, there is a deep continuity in Marx's thought.(3) Though there are elements of moral idealism in the *Manuscripts* ("species-being" is still partially conceived in Feuerbachian terms - as an "abstraction inherent in each individual"), as there are elements of determinism in later works, these are not however at the heart of Marx's method which was initially made possible by the critique of idealism and mechanical materialism. Henceforward Marxism could be a distinctly new method, in which society could be conceived as both historically structured and as an active totality. All of Marx's major investigations were predicated upon this breakthrough. Though the *Manuscripts* are one-sided towards experience and active consciousness (the detailed economic studies came later), nevertheless, except for certain needed corrections, their substance is sustainable as (among other things) an analysis of the forms of consciousness that emerge under capitalism, and as an indication of the changes which consciousness must undergo in the process of socialist transformation – conceived neither as purely an economic determination nor as the outcome of autonomous subjective (philosophically arrived-at) will, but as a dialectical process in which collective activity and consciousness, under the constraints of historical reality, transform themselves and reality through a knowledge of and gradual practical mastery of reality.

Thus it is that the determinist and the abstractly humanist interpretations of Marx (late versus early) have retreated to the positions of Feuerbach and Hegel respectively! In the first, history is the outcome of mechanism: as with Feuerbach's «being», fixed «economic laws», or historical inevitability, are effectively aspects of nature from which arise (inexplicably) human behaviour and consciousness; in the second, history is the outcome of thought realizing itself in society, which results in society being continuously re-ordered (cf. Marx's observations that the «active side» of history has been left to the idealists, and that Feuerbach's «educators must be educated», etc.)

Though in the *Manuscripts* Marx does not yet clearly see how the process of disalienation is located in the revolutionary practice of the proletariat, it is clear that alienated experience/consciousness is predominantly, though not without some inconsistency at this stage, grounded in the concrete structures of bourgeois society - in particular in the institutions of

private property. It is incorrect therefore to see the Manuscripts as subscribing to a view of disalienation flowing merely from philosophical criticism (a position that Marx specifically rejected in Feuerbach's critique of religion). Fundamental to the Marxist method is this definitive transcendence of the bourgeois modes of thought contained in the dualism of mechanical materialism and idealism (each exemplified in Feuerbach and Hegel). For Marx, the one ultimately entails the other as necessary sides of the same coin – the structure of bourgeois thought processes (ideology). For, where the roots (causes) of activity and consciousness are located in matter, conceived either as inorganic nature, or as biological (physiological) nature, or in the unhistorical individual human being – bourgeois ideology's fictitious "individual" (which complements the conception of "man" in the abstract) – there can be no explanation of social change. The latter is left implicitly to idealist interpretation, wherein a development in ideas (whether inside or outside the human mind – occurring in vacuum) brings about social change.

Thus, Feuerbach's critique of religion goes only so far as to see religion as the expression of alienated consciousness. Failing to locate this in real historical conditions, and therefore failing to recognize its transcendence as lying only in the changing of these conditions, he has to assume a religious disposition in man. The implications of this are that either religion cannot be transcended except by those few who undertake philosophical self-criticism, or that a whole society's going beyond religion rests upon its acceptance of philosophy purely as the result of subjective will, or thought (i.e. idealism).

Similarly, "vulgar" Marxism of determinist interpretations of Marxism that conceive of productive forces as non-human, acting outside of real human beings, are effectively Feuerbachian, since the "causes", of behaviour come from nature, not from within society. This is the tendency in some of Engels' formulations, wherein the "laws" of history are conceived as directly natural. At the heart of Althusser's, work similarly, history is seen only as the effect of structures undergoing change, i.e. the active dimension is dropped. Consequent upon this is the attempt to erect a "mature" scientific Marx and a "young" moral philosopher who is not yet Marxist. The theory of surplus value and exploitation is science, whilst the theory of alienation is philosophy. However, as already argued it can easily be shown that this rigid separation cannot be found in Marx himself. Though the term alienation is not extensively used in *Capital*, the concept is. Central to the entire Labour Theory of Value (through which the Theory of Surplus Value is made possible) is the concept of historically created needs; thus for example, the value of labour-power is the cost of satisfying the "necessary needs" of the labourer. These needs are historically relative, and can only be investigated if the subjective requirements, expectations and desires of labourers, as structured within real societies, are considered. This entails precisely the concept of alienation: it was the needs, urges, forms of experience, drives and sensibilities that develop within bourgeois society, that Marx was analysing in the Manuscripts through the term "alienation".

The critique of Althusserian theory is important on many levels: as a systematized rendering of historical materialism Althusserianism has had considerable influence on cultural theory within

Marxism, thus reintroducing old confusions in new forms (at the same time as revitalizing theoretical concern over many fundamental issues in Marxism. Ironically there is a "rational core" within the "mystical shell" of Althusser.) It represents once again the relinquishing of Marxism's transcendence of dualism - its fundamentally new synthesis that goes beyond bourgeois materialism and bourgeois idealism. It is well to locate Althusser's theoretical contribution in its historical context; it sought to combat both "Stalinism" and the supposed idealist tendencies in so-called "humanist" schools of Marxism (exemplified in the early work of Lukács through to the theorists of the Frankfurt School). What Althusser failed to do was to locate adequately and coherently the roots of such "humanist" Marxism in the historical attempt to react critically against mechanism: the economic determinism of both the Second International and its aftermath, and that of Stalinism. Instead of rediscovering the Marxian synthesis, Althusserianism creates a new formalist mechanism.

For the problem is not how to grasp simultaneously the "determination by the economic in the last instance" and the "relative autonomy" of the superstructures - in the abstract. Any actual society is a concrete totality of practices (symbolic and physical), which are specific and unique. In the conceptual elucidation of them, an abstraction into "levels" is utilized. Economic practice entails ideological practice: there is no chronological nor logical priority of one over the other. People do not produce without thinking and communicating. For Marx, a society is an active, organic whole: producing social values from nature, reproducing social forms, etc. To comprehend it, we must grasp it in terms ermine superstructures. The one does not change while the other changes or remains unchanged, etc. All of a particular social formation is implicated as one dimension of it changes (this recognition, for Marxism, does not entail a structural-functionalist organicism). In the analysis of a particular society however, we conceptualize its processes in terms of the interactions and contradiction operating between the economic and the political or the ideological, etc. But to project conceptual levels back into social reality, and to see interactions between separate entities externally bounded one from another, is reified, not dialectical thought.

On this, as well as other issues, Althusser's "break" in Marx is based on a misunderstanding of the early work, e.g. *The German Ideology* which does not argue a "direct" or "simple" correspondence between base and superstructure, but rather asserts that as a totality, all the practices in a society are related organically. This understanding remains in all Marx's work, which rests upon the recognition that history is human collective creative activity, and that the elucidation of determining relations between structures is a conceptual means to analyse particular societies, and cannot be discussed in a formal, abstract way. The particular "economic level", of a specific social formation is inseparable from the particular "political" and "ideological levels" of that formation: the formation is a concrete totality. Never was it a problem for Marx, for example, that a particular political form did not follow from an actual economic development; to conceive of such a problem is to make an economic system into a force of its own and to confuse the category "economic system" with the actual set of practices

conceptually dissected out in the analysis of a specific society. Thus, the "logic" of the "pure" economic system of capitalism is necessarily abstracted from concrete reality in order to comprehend it more deeply. It should not then be put back into "reality", such that it can be asked: what political structure should it determine? Because Althusser drops the active, humanly creative dimension of Marx's conception of history, he seeks only to comprehend passive relations of determination between "structures". The conceptual abstractions - the categories through which reality is appropriated - become social realities, "causing" historical change through their interrelationships.

The immensely complex interrelations between different dimensions of practice in any concrete social formation cannot be speculated upon formalistically. Real history must be continuously studied and analysed. The conceptual starting-point in the analysis of a particular social formation in terms of its dominant mode of production, informs the elucidation of actual, living history.

Because capitalist crisis does not "necessarily" bring about political revolution, is not therefore a problem for Marx's supposed "early" theory. If Marx expected revolution in 1848, it was because he believed successive crises become progressively deeper, and that 1848 would see the final cataclysm. It was never that he saw an automatic reflex mechanism in operation.(4) And if political revolution does not occur in times of crisis, it is not because politics has a "relative autonomy" - which is merely a more refined version of economism. It is because the society does not transform itself, or more specifically that the working class is not ideologically and politically prepared, or that it is less strong than the forces orientated to perpetuating capitalism. To wonder at the great "remoteness" of real politics from the process of capital accumulation under capitalism, is to have falsely considered in the first place that the abstraction "economic system" had an independent determining power as an actual entity in society. It is to have failed to grasp how complex a concept "mode of production" is, in both Marx's early works (where it is as yet only partially formed), and in the late works.

It is crucial to grasp, in the critique of Althusser as with other inadequate formulations of Marxism, that the loss of the dialectical synthesis leads to a falling back simultaneously into empiricism (or mechanism) and idealism. It is effectively an empiricist epistemology that reifies "levels" of social practice into the objective "givens" of reality, within a theoretical framework that is abstract in a pre-Marxist sense: that is, the complex interactions between levels are framed in terms of positivist causalities and speculated upon formalistically. Within Althusser's structural causality - effects of the whole on parts, parts on other parts, parts on the whole - there is no dynamic. Everything ultimately becomes an "instant" of something else: there is no active subject.

Related to this reification of the economic and ideological levels etc. is a narrowing and stripping of the power of these conceptions to grasp the richness of social life. Marxism is bleached of the aesthetic, imaginative, and creative dimensions in its theory and in its conception of human

existence. "Theoretical practice" occurs in "thought" alone; human emotions focussed on the transcendence of existing conditions, or the development of global ethical orientations for example, are necessarily elements of humanist metaphysics or religion and therefore "ideology". But this is not the case for Marx's world-view. There is a simultaneous evolution of science, ethics and precision of human activity in general in Marx's project - the kernels of validity in previous ethical systems, which were internally contradictory and rent from the realities they imagined they bore a relation to, come through, "dialecticized" into Marx. Indeed, it can be shown that on one plane, Marxism is the "system" or "method" or "practice" that succeeds in overcoming that duality of the "is" and the "ought" which impressed the young Marx as the core problem in German Idealism; and implicitly of all previous thought.

Ethical systems, like scientific theories develop inseparably from real social practices in historical collectivities. Marxism, grasping the historical relativity of all previous thought, emotion, political and spiritual aspiration, both explains it as ideology and takes over, transformed, those aspects which are appropriate to the widest degree of intelligibility possible at any present historical juncture. Marxism recognises of itself, what it sees in other forms of thought; that it is embedded in the totality of existence for a particular historical context. Althusser's "theoretical practice" is scientism: it alone gains objective knowledge, standing outside history, and like all scientisms, its only companions are the natural sciences. This completely evades the issue of the historical subject of knowledge, and fails to recognize that "natural science" is no unproblematical "knowledge of nature". It can be shown that the science of bourgeois civilization has been progressively developing its contradiction between a positivist, atomistic, mechanistic epistemology and ontology - and a dialectical, organic, dynamic-process one; to identify Marxism with the dominant theory and practice of natural science in Capitalism is to accept a bourgeois project of mystification and domination. It is interesting to note how similar is Althusser's conception of "science" emerging from "ideology" and becoming a fundamentally new practice (this occurring historically with the "break" in Marx's development): to the bourgeois notion of "modern science" coming to birth with Galileo and the Renaissance scientists. Previously there was scholastic theology - ideological, dogmatic, parochial - then "true knowledge" evolved which is objective, disinterested, unconnected to the rest of human history.

All these confusions in Althusser converge with his incapacity to grasp that Marxism, as a mode of thought that is practically linked to universal emancipation, is proletarian knowledge. This is obviously not a question of making an empirical, mechanical association between specific ideas and any actual proletariat or proletarian movement. It is to grasp the unity of reality and thought; that Marxism's superiority over other modes of thought in grasping reality (ie going beyond other theories in explanatory power) is connected to the structural contradictions in Capitalism which are the context within which Marxism emerges. Alone able to resolve the contradictions in bourgeois thought, this is because at the same time it identifies the proletariat as the agency that can - and eventually will have to - resolve the contradictions of Capitalism. The attempt to wish

away a "subject of history" is related to the need to identify ideology and science as utterly distinct practices; and the consequence is a notion of science as existing outside history, its only "interest" being reason.

For Marxism the subjects of history are human beings: not as empirical individuals or groups separately constituted and then joined together, but collectively, as classes acting within real social relations which are the cumulative accretions of, and the further development from, the entire prior historical process. The subjects are not simply specific groupings or institutions, which are transitory concretizations of relations always in the process of change. But, without the understanding that historical transformation, as the outcome of infinite complex contradictions, is simultaneously human activity - historical collective practices - all that remains is structures which are constitutive of other structures which are determined by structures. Because Althusser, in his desire to avoid an ill-defined Hegelianism or historicism, does not recognize that the subject of all thought is human (though not as individual minds), he cannot grasp that "science", like "ideology", synthesizes theories from social confrontation with reality (natural and social), within particular social (class) contexts. "Science" becomes for him a disembodied reprocessing of science itself.

Thus, the process of capital accumulation, or of thought, is not a ghost-driven machine that scoops up raw material, creates means of production, and pushes labour-power to set the latter into action on the former; it is the ongoing dynamic of a system that has been shaped by the entire historical past of man, reproducing its forms of labour-process in real human beings who enter into it as active sentient beings. Real human beings are shaped into structures of activity, ideological patterns of thought and feeling appropriate to the reproduction of capitalist relations, but simultaneously they confront the contradictions of which they are parts; by acting and thinking within such structures they collectively transform the structures, both in the reproduction of capitalist accumulation and in the development of tendencies toward radical transformation. Thus, activity orientated toward reproduction of existing social relations is praxis (though distorted and alienated); the internalization of dominant ideologies is contradictory, ie there is always tension between ideology and experience/reality, and where this is strongly recognized it can result in the adoption of oppositional ideologies/theories, and the initiation of collective oppositional activity.

Because the subject of history in its totality is society as a whole, or all the classes acting within specific social relations (thus the reaction of the bourgeoisie to the proletariat informs the proletariat's reconstruction of society - the proletariat acts not in a social vacuum), the consequences of collective action (before communist society) are not a concrete realization of the ideal conceptions of an empirical class of human beings, but a dialectical development from thinking, acting classes in interaction and contradiction with other classes and within themselves (in their constitution as classes shaped in conditions of particular forms of domination), within a total context of which they are parts.

From all this it is clear that dialectical materialism (Marxist "philosophy") is more than the theory of science ("theoretical practice"). It cannot avoid having an ontology as well as an epistemology – an ontology of society and therefore necessarily, of nature also. But this ontology is not a metaphysical speculation, a logical construction; it is the nature of "being" as process, which science discovers it as. That science also grasps scientific activity itself as historical process: part of the sensuous activity of man. This sensuous activity of man is rich in variety: there are any number of practices that could be delineated in it as distinct types, ie categories that can be developed to analyse concrete social reality. These include the aesthetic, the capacity to create form from reality/experience; dialectical materialism, making man aware of the historical bases of particular values, modes of aesthetic experience etc, points to such values as are appropriate to practice orientated to social transformation in the present, just as it does with ideas. It links the expansion of human intelligibility to historical self-transformation, and also links the expansion of human feeling, judgement and aesthetic appreciation, to this transformation.

The concept of "alienation" is as vital to Marxism as is "mode of production", and equally necessary for the appropriation of the concrete in thought. As already stated, the fact that the actual word is mostly found in Marx's early work, does not mean the concept is not implicit in the social-economic science elaborated in Capital. The concept is only partially developed in the 1844 Manuscripts, as is Marx's entire epistemology and ontology at this stage. As was suggested earlier, the elements of moral idealism in the Manuscripts can be analytically separated out from them in the light of Marx's later development: this does not mean the work as a whole is "pre-scientific", nor that there is a young "Hegelian" Marx on the one hand and a mature, "scientific" Marx on the other. Rather, one must see that Marx's entire writings indicate a complex development.

In the same way, the term "intercourse" (Verkehr) used in The German Ideology is a precursor to the later term "relations of production". In the framework of The German Ideology the former is consistently used and meaningful. This does not mean the work as a whole is either "pre-scientific" on the one hand or "mature" on the other.

The transformation from one mode of production to another is for Marx an active historical process; prior to Capitalism's becoming the dominant mode in the world, such transformation was not a self-conscious process, but very definitely occurs through the collective striving of classes or whole societies to overcome existing contradictions, which are experienced as impediments either to further existence at all, or to continued existence on terms which are subjectively perceived as necessary or tolerable. It is not a mechanically determined process, which it is necessarily conceived of as being if the dimensions of experience, of active transformation, are eliminated. Thus, the organization of labour and social life under Capitalism entails certain forms of experience (alienated experience), which restrict practical, intellectual, emotional, and sensual possibilities in precise and concrete ways. The opposition to such restriction, is as definite an historical tendency as is class struggle on the level of economic relations and with respect to the ownership and control of the means of production. Whether they

are consciously understood as such or not (ie through intellectual reflection), these tendencies are equally real and ever-existent aspects of any capitalist society. Alienation is as real as exploitation. Without its comprehension the real processes and tendencies of capitalist society cannot be fully explored.

Experience is always the link between social being and consciousness – the ever "present" medium of change. This denotes that human societies are simultaneously determined structures and active processes: men make their history as much as it makes them. But this is distinct from the question of authentic agency, ie the degree to which human beings have conscious mastery over social processes, the degree to which self-understanding is ideological or approximating to real processes. Even where processes are largely "blind" - the transformations from Antiquity to Feudalism, and from Feudalism to Capitalism - they are still "active" and "experienced" where experience means the "subjective texture of objective actions", and not merely the passing through any course of events in a passive sense.⁽⁵⁾ That is, even where human beings cannot understand or master the processes that structure their existence, they are still active in living out this existence. Conceptual terms like "processes of capitalist development", the "logic of capital accumulation", "structural determination of social forms" etc. should not be seen as denying that people enact these processes; that in confronting contradictory experiences people innovate (primitive communities make new kinds of pot, capitalists introduce new means of production in factories etc); though intention has never hitherto in history coincided wholly with actual consequence, even in socialist revolutions.

The extent to which experience can be meant in the second sense that Anderson uses it in *Arguments Within English Marxism*, that is, as learning from acquaintance with the world and thus modifying future actions, has hitherto been extremely partial and variable - though as he says, the increase in its extent is precisely the measure of achievement of world socialist development.

Just as class struggle is active, entailing real, more or less consciously understood activities of classes and not the mere clash of abstract forces expressed in human collectivities, so also is collective and individual experience which takes on specific forms in particular kinds of society. These forms will be associated, to a greater or lesser degree, with particular kinds of activity orientated towards the transformation of particular societies (just as, for example, capitalist economic relations are inevitably associated with some degree of struggle of labour against capital).

This does not mean that a pure essence of man is postulated, the re-appropriation of which is the goal of history; alienated experience under Capitalism is not contrasted with an ahistorical, unalienated "species-being". It is contrasted with the integrated experience of real primitive communities (just as class exploitation is contrasted with real historical examples of classless systems of production), and it exists in dialectical relation to a conception of unalienated Communist society (just as the critique of the capitalist economy indicates in general terms the

nature of, and furthers the movement toward, classlessness - where the production of exchange-values is replaced by the production of use-values through free association).

The Marxist analysis of history entails the elucidation of distinct forms of labour organization; modes of experience related to these must also be delineated - otherwise experience is assumed to be timeless and unchanging, or non-existent. Thus it is that those perspectives which reject alienation as a "moral", not a scientific concept, also turn society into a pure object - no longer simultaneously a subject and an object. They also impose a strict separation between science and ethics, fact and value, objective reality and active, experienced struggle - which is a return to pre-Marxist ontologies. The conception of society as process, i.e. both active and determined, both making history and being driven or constrained by history, is lost.

Just as class struggles under capitalism cannot be resolved through socialist revolution and the establishment of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" without a conscious understanding of capitalist relations of production on the part of the proletariat, so also the abolition of forms of behaviour and experience produced under capitalism cannot be achieved without consciousness of them arising through reflection, ie through the analysis of alienation and the active effort to overcome it.

The proletarian is freer (and in time may become materially better off) than the slave or the serf. But he or she does not compare himself to the slave or serf; capitalist society itself makes possible a higher conception of freedom and satisfaction which it cannot grant. Likewise potentialities of the senses, faculties of judgement, imagination etc are evoked under Capitalism whose expression or acting out it is unable finally to contain or assimilate.

Alienation is a concept orientated to the real ontological nature of social being, as is class. Just as different forms of society are constituted by differing class relations and forms of exploitation, so they are characterized by different forms of alienation (which are inseparable from the former) - forms of organization wherein the human collective subject is not in conscious control of social processes, wherein the division of labour is such that individuals as bearers of fragmented capabilities are unable to identify and experience their specific labours in relation to social labour as a whole, wherein the processes of social reproduction are understood and experienced as being extra-social. In fact alienation is deeper to the ontology of social being over its entire historical span than are class and exploitation, existing as it does in primitive cooperative production as well as in class society - inasmuch as social processes in the former are determined by feebly understood and minimally directable natural forces. The development of alienation from e.g. primitive, to ancient, to feudal, to capitalist forms, is a real ontological one, not an imposition of a moral or logical structure upon history. It is bound up with the dominant contradictions of these social forms, and therefore with the dynamic tendencies towards social transformation in these forms.

Analysis of the historical development of alienation draws into consideration dominant social experience, reflection upon experience, and the reorientation of activity in relation to experience and the reflection upon it. This is inseparable from a consideration of the formation of classes as objectively constituted components of specific societies; in relation to their class experiences, classes evolve ideological perspectives that define their historical predicament, and sometimes conceive the necessary activity that will transform that predicament: either from an oppressed or excluded class into a new exploiting class, or in the case of the proletariat from an oppressed class into a condition of social universality through the abolition of classes.

The labour process (in any social form, within any mode of production) is essentially a gearing in to nature. Natural forces are harnessed to do work on nature, to transform unhumanized nature into social values. Real, natural processes are progressively comprehended and appropriated, and directed, combined (but not created, i.e. they pre-exist their appropriation) into a humanly controlled transformation of nature. The natural forces are in man as a physiological being, in animals, in the propensities of natural phenomena (from flint to nuclear fission).

Under the capitalist mode of production, the process of society's metabolism with nature is a distorted, alienated mode of activity. The form of labour process is experienced not as a conscious working on and within nature (human and non-human), but as a domination of nature. Hence religion and philosophy conceive of spirit controlling matter (in Christianity, idealist philosophy, liberal political economy with its "Robinson Crusoe" myths, etc). The project of a bourgeois science of domination conceives of laws (Platonic, formal) on the one hand, and nature as unchanging mechanism - "passive" matter - on the other. Class domination and social alienation are evidenced in the control of mental labour over manual labour, and in the illusion that the capitalist creates values, that means of production are really "his own", rather than his property within an historically determined legal order maintained by class power. In Socialism, the labour process gradually would become conscious of its place within nature, as an efflorescence from nature that consciously regulates its own nature. What have been understood as "spirit" and "matter" are synthesized into a unity, not an antagonism; mental and manual activity are integrated; the labour process is experienced as social, not individual; means of production are understood as collectively appropriated means of transforming nature.

Likewise for cultural creation; from the symbolic experience encountered and internalized by individuals a coherence, a structured form is constructed. Symbolic experience derives from contemporary society and accreted historical experience - from the "public" (social, political, economic) dimensions, from the cultural-ideological forms within society, and from the unconscious (which is not individual, but social - though specific in content to a particular individual and his or her life experience). Under Capitalism there is the illusion that the "artist" independently, in isolation, creates an art work which is therefore "his own". What is in fact an objectification of the way he lives, i.e. how his social (and historically specific) existence is structured in a particular way, is distorted into possession and a false conception of personal

control. What is a social, and historically locateable, developmental process of social appropriation of experience, is seen as individual action within a social and historical vacuum.

Cultural creation, the social appropriation of experience, inevitably pushes experience to a greater or lesser degree beyond alienated forms, simultaneously to reproducing them. Cultural struggle against alienated experience is a dimension of class struggle unless class struggle is to be conceived as limited to the specifically economic or political spheres. But, even more than with anti-capitalist tendencies within the political sphere, cultural anti-capitalist struggle has a distanced and complex articulation with the economic. Thus its loci, or "movements", may be linked to age, sex, ethnic community and many other social groups in such ways that the fundamental class nature of the struggle - the growth and development of tendencies orientated toward transforming the capitalist system, which is based upon the extraction of surplus value from the labour of the working class - may not be apparent. However, because cultural oppositions at any particular time maintain mystifications or reactionary elements is no more a reason to reject their class significance than the fact that economic struggles of the working class are rarely free from sectarian or reformist elements; because cultural activities in advanced capitalist society may often be initiated within the "middle sectors", for example, is no more a reason to deny their significance to the working class, than is the fact that Marxist theories and particular leaders may come from outside the working class, as defined in terms of surplus-value production.

Thus, middle sectors may be able at particular moments to articulate the psychic revolt against alienation of experience in human relations, in the organization of work, in communities, more clearly than the working class. Aspects of this expression will be specific to the situation of these strata - hence for example the "intellectuals' vision of socialism", utopian communitarian anarchism etc. Other aspects will coincide with the reality confronted in working class experience (specialism, powerlessness against corporate decision-making, sterility of suburban "nuclear family" life etc). These must be assimilated by the working class, and be resituated within overall socialist consciousness and strategy.

The problem here is one that is clearly reflected in the simultaneous strengths and weaknesses of Frankfurt School cultural-aesthetic theory. The latter's recognition of the complex, distanced mediation between economic contradiction and practice on the one hand and cultural contradiction and practice on the other led them almost to a denial that "class interests" were reflected in cultural forms. The issue is clearer if it is understood that radical explorations of, reflections of, and imagined alternatives to alienated experience are expressions of the interests of the working class under Capitalism: as such they also represent the "emancipatory orientation" towards human existence in general, and for this reason cannot be reductively associated with a particular, empirical proletariat at any time - institutionally, practically or ideologically.

The cultural sphere is of particular significance in the symbolic laying down of the forms that Socialism will take on after political power is in the hands of the working class. Especially

because it represents accreted experience under alienated conditions, often articulated by strata not absolutely dominated by economic-material deprivation, it comes to the fore when the working class holds political power and has to transform itself in a process which is simultaneously the emancipation of society as a whole.

The collective will of a revolutionary movement is the certainty of the need for a socialized economy, an aspiration and confidence to lead a society into its own self-transformation (which is accepted and respected by strata other than the working class). It is also a creative aesthetic, an urge to impose a new form upon society, to implement a new conception of beauty and truth. A particular structure of sensibilities: (at the levels of self, group, class, and society in its totality) exists within the movement, with a contradictory continuity from the past into the present and future.

Just as the specific history of a capitalist nation's economy and politics shapes the form of the working class movement arising within it, and the form that an economic and political transformation takes, and also the form of socialist control that is created - so too the specific cultural traditions of a particular bourgeois society undergo a creative resynthesis, orientated to an optimally liberating form of socialist, cultural life.

Socialist revolution, and the struggle to create communist society after it, is the mass self-transformation from alienated social relations into classless, self-regulating social life - in which, as in primitive Communism, the political, economic, ideological and cultural "levels" of society are reintegrated into a unitary, complex totality. That is, a crystallization of authority and social regulation into specific institutions in the political sphere - the state in particular - ceases to exist. Social regulation becomes "automatic", that is, practised by each and every group and individual as integrated human beings. The economy no longer operates as a system which has laws calculable from "outside", but becomes the transparent, consciously willed and self-adapting means whereby society produces what it decides it needs. The activity of thinking is no longer encapsulated into specific spheres, and ideas are no longer reified systems: thinking becomes an organic part of self and society. Faculties and activities become generalized in an overcoming of reification on all levels. Socialist revolution and the creation of communist society (which latter is an "infinite" project, ie endlessly perfectible) is the redefinition of thought, action, and experience in all individuals, welded into a movement in continuous praxis. No particular party controls this, as if society were a raw material operated upon by a vanguard (such a notion maintains a mechanistic dualism as in bourgeois science). A party or parties may be coordinators of it: an inspiration of it, and a process which is affected and developed by it. A party does not of itself have, the "correct" ideas: the movement as a whole does. A party draws out the implicit ideas in a complex, contradictory historic process into self-consciousness; but it is each and every individual orientated to change - in ways depending upon the position held in the changing society that thinks, acts, experiences; rethinks, acts newly, and re-experiences. A party with a mass following concatenates the mass experience into ideas: diagnoses, prognoses, decisions - drawn from the mass movement itself, created by the mass movement itself. The form is

imposed not by a leadership over the mass movement, as an artist wrests form out of inert substance; rather the movement is an artistic collective creating an aesthetic form - a guiding impulse, a structuring principle - out of itself. Praxis is the overcoming of the subject-object duality.

Forms of sensibility, mental imaginings, are social practices that are carried on by individuals in the "private" sphere of existence. In artistic activity, a more deliberate and controlled form of symbolic practice transforms the various levels of emotional sensibility and imaginative experience into definite objects, or cultural products. The "raw material" from which these structured symbolic objects are constructed is the subjective activity of the individual or individuals who produce them - both conscious and unconscious. This subjective activity has its roots in the everyday interactions, efforts, labours etc. of the individual, and also in the culturally transmitted symbolic universe which is internalized by the individual at every point in his or her development. The latter informs the nature of, and the reactions to the everyday interactions, labours etc. whilst this everyday experience molds, channels, modifies and gives specific form to the more general orientations of feeling and thought which are assimilated from the "general culture" - a complex multi-layered and continuously transforming reality - within which the individual lives. The dominant tendencies within cultural expressions complement the dominant forms of economic activity undertaken by the individuals of a specific society - i.e. the mode of production dominant in the particular social formation. A mode of production consists of a class or classes actively orientated towards specific means of production in particular, differential ways, and performing labour, in differentiated forms, through them in and upon nature - thus producing specific forms of social values. Individuals occupy specific locations within this social labour process and these specific locations condition the form of interactions and experience, the form of historically accreted culture which the individual assimilates (in specific and individually unique ways), and also the mode of transmission of that culture. Although there are discernible distinctions in culture between the classes that constitute the social relations of a particular society, it is not the case that they are discrete and hermetically sealed one from another: there is a continuous interaction of experience and response as between classes, justifying the typification - on one plane - of a dominant culture, which is a complex, contradictory and multi-faceted process rather than a static monolithic entity. Artistic activity, or (more generally) cultural creation, draws upon real experience to construct from it an imaginative universe of symbols. There can be elucidated in the complex of symbolic constructions, in dominant forms of "private" experience and dominant forms of social interaction pertaining to a particular social formation, certain definite tendencies or structuring principles which, whether conscious to the performing individuals or not, wrest from the "raw material" of experience imaginative reconstructions that pull in certain directions rather than others. In the same way that social collectivities can be seen, historically, to be engaged in long-term processes of innovation in the technical problems of reproducing life (generally, at least up to the development of the capitalist mode of production, this has been a "blind", or unconscious, pragmatic step-by-step process), so can the transformation of social and political institutions be

seen as progressive efforts to reproduce themselves either in modified or in fundamentally changed forms, that remain appropriate to changes in the conditions of other aspects of the society's existence; and so can "cultural movements" be seen as the collective dreaming up, and the motion of bringing into being, transformed conditions in which the experienced contradictions of existence are partially or wholly resolved. In reality, there is no primacy attachable to any of the levels, or foci, in which such collective praxis occurs. Each affects and informs the others, in a complex totality, which is theoretically grasped in terms of a transition from one mode to another. From its "objective" side, the process is analysed in terms of dynamic contradiction and interaction between forces and relations of production, or between base and superstructure.

The dominant forms of a social formation's practice - on the economic, political and ideological or cultural levels - are internally contradictory. Whilst being orientated, inasmuch as they are under the domination of specific classes (and within this, of sexual and racial groupings, and of class "fractions" as determined by specific economic-political interests within the general, ruling interest), towards the reproduction of existing social relations, they harbour incompatible and conflicting impulses as to the necessary modifications in social practice required for the reproduction of existing relations. At the same time the dominant practices contain within them a larger contradiction: that between ongoing reproduction of existing relations, and those impulses orientated to overcoming completely the contradictions inherent in existing social relations. These latter orientations are traceable to the immediate economic interests and frustrated social, psychic, emotional and political aspirations of the exploited classes in society (whether the connections are consciously understood by such classes or not, and it is the more or less conscious intention of any ruling class to prevent such connections being made). Such orientations are continuously expressed, due to the very nature of the particular social formation, no matter how "stable" or well able is that social formation to reproduce itself. Thus, for example, throughout the history of industrial capitalist societies in all parts of the world there appear common cultural tendencies rooted in the alienated conditions of proletarian existence, just as there are patterns of proletarian self-organization inevitably brought into being as reactions to the labour-capital relation. But as we have noted, in the cultural realm the most significant expressions orientated to the resolution of alienated experience - the more organized symbolic ordering of a collective "dreaming" - can be produced in the most diverse "sites" of the cultural process. It would be unlikely - though not impossible - for proletarian trade unions to "learn" from the equivalent organizations of "professional" middle sectors in advanced capitalist societies, where economic dispossession leads such otherwise privileged and influential sections of society to organize in ways that are fundamentally necessary and inevitable for any grouping of people that must sell its labour-power (manual or intellectual/administrative) to Capital or its state. (Nevertheless, it can be the case that in certain fields and at certain times such sections see further - more "progressively" - than the proletariat, eg in ecological/environmental considerations). But in cultural spheres, the expression of anti-capitalist orientations in coherent, richly complex (as is the reality), widely-embracing forms - as opposed to expressing the mere

living out of them - frequently requires time, education, the development of particular kinds of mental faculty and discipline etc. which rest upon social resources more easily available to groupings outside the proletariat as defined in strict economic-productive terms. Furthermore, many forms of cultural expression require means and media of communication to which the proletariat has no access - the more so as Capitalism develops. Partly for this reason, to say that the "sites" of certain kinds of cultural innovation are for structural reasons frequently outside the proletariat (a condition, of course, which changes as proletarian cultural hegemony evolves within bourgeois society), is not to assert anything about the social origins of individual cultural performers; no matter what their class origins, the sort of activity under discussion here, entails that they are removed from "proletarian production" (such a term allows avoidance at this point of the fact that cultural products may well be commodities which realize surplus value, for an owner of capital, in exchange). Such groups, nevertheless, are still susceptible to alienated experience in its more general social, psychic, and emotional aspects.

The historical nature of bourgeois society has given rise to certain characteristic structures of experience, which are explored in art-forms in all their complexity, tension and ambiguity. From the explorations, not only are resolutions and alternatives implied and pointed to, but possibilities of experience are understood which might not have been (or not in the same ways), had history taken a different course - even, in fact, if socialist revolution had turned it radically from its actual trajectory and opened up realms that necessarily remained closed whilst society remained bourgeois. That is to say: all that has been gone through - globally and individually - during the bourgeois epoch, offers not only "lessons" in the sense of realizations of what must be negated, but potentialities - dimensions of existence which if reconstituted in different forms could be humanly enriching, enlarging of the senses' capacities and the emotions' sympathies, widening the horizons (rational, imaginative or intuitive, sensuous and emotional) of a multi-dimensional knowledge of nature and consciousness.

Marxist sociology of culture cannot avoid a conception of aesthetics. Whilst it must be free of idealist metaphysics ("formal essences" etc), a clear type of practice which sometimes results in a specific type of object is under investigation. It is correct to stress, as does Tony Bennett for example (6), that Marxist theory must not begin with a concept of e.g. Literature, inherited from bourgeois aesthetics, which requires an explanation as to what characterizes it in distinction to "other writing". Rather literatures i.e. the real, infinite variety of actual products in diverse social formations must be analysed concretely. However, in this analysis "value" cannot be ignored; if a cultural product is to be fully grasped historically and dialectically, the depth of its exploration, the quality of transcendence indicated in it, i.e. its nature as an aesthetic object, must be scrutinized. Because, as Bennett correctly observes, "value" is generated socially, in the process of reading and communicating and is therefore contextual and continuously changing according to transforming relations between "texts" and social relations of cultural activity, this realization must not result in a complete relativism - assertion that a text only has value vis-a-vis specific, concrete audiences . As Adorno(7) has argued, such a position limits a sociology art to

consideration of "effects", of changing modes of social assimilation of art works. As with the interpretation of philosophy and science, dialectical analysis must explore levels of meaning not necessarily comprehended by specific historical audiences - though of course a dialectical method recognizes the historical nature of analysis itself, recognizes that interpretation is a construction of knowledge in a specific "practical" context (i.e. that in a sense the investigator's structure of interpretation represents itself a particular historical "audience"). Finally, a Marxist aesthetics articulates with, from a particular angle the entire historical project of human emancipation.

The level of practice conceptually elaborated by a Marxist sociology of aesthetics, is in the dimensions of culture, psyche, mind and sensibility. In the writings of Marx, the levels of social practice are never formally "listed", as if the nature of aesthetic practice - or of any other - could be defined once and for all. Sometimes his theorizing works with the duality of base and superstructure, sometimes with the trinity taken up (and added to) by Althusser - economic, political, and ideological, and sometimes with a multiplicity of human activities mentioned together and followed by "etc". This is because the number of levels or types of practice is infinite; particular forms of investigation require their particular, appropriate typologies, always resting upon the understood interrelatedness of practices. The conception of a social formation being composed of three major levels of practice - economic, political and ideological, is a useful one for many purposes. When it is used however, it should; not be confused by implying that psyche and culture be inserted "into the ideological sphere". Obviously psyche and culture are close to what has been conceived in the analysis of ideology; but so do they also; implicate the economic and political "spheres", in that they always exist, and can only be understood, in relation to all social institutions.

In any real society, therefore, the various practices are inseparably mingled; from "real life" specific practices are analytically dissected out and investigated, but the methodology should not impose its structure onto the ontology of social being. (Thus for example questions as to whether property law under Capitalism is part of the base or the superstructure, or whether a concert pianist is engaged in economic a cultural activity, can be finally surpassed.) It is the lack of clarity about this that has made "definitions" of what constitutes cultural or aesthetic activity so-difficult and confusing: on the one hand there is no rigorous way of distinguishing "art" from other activities or social products, but on the other hand, something that impels us to call it art seems resolutely to exist in nearly all "complex" societies. The issue can be summed up by saying that a particular type of practice - here termed cultural-aesthetic - can be discerned in all social contexts. Its forms are distinct to the particular social contexts, and do not consist exclusively of activities resulting in specifiable "objects" - paintings, poems, songs, dances, plays or films. Cultural-aesthetic activity permeates the entirety of social life (from decorative clothing to lively conversation, from the appreciation of a sunset to the characteristic forms of childrens' play, from the placards made for a picket or demonstration to the choices of material used for

building houses). But for certain kinds of analysis it is the embodiment of cultural-aesthetic activity in specific objects that best allows insights into the workings of an entire society.

Lucien Goldmann has written that: "The fundamental problematic of modern capitalist societies...lies...in the contraction of the level of consciousness and in the concomitant tendency to reduce the fundamental human dimension of the possible."(8)

Of course it is not really by contrast to any specific past condition, but rather with respect to the present level of development of productive forces, and to the potential already existing in socially appropriated knowledge and capacity, and to the long history of capitalist social experience already behind western societies that make radical transformation according to real intentions more possible than has hitherto been the case, anywhere - in relation to this a "reduction" of consciousness is discernible. Goldmann points to the contradiction between the increasing competence of technicians in specialized skills - who represent increasingly more of the masses, both proletarian and "middle sector" - and their divorce from the arena of fundamental decision-making which is undertaken by a bourgeois technocracy. A crucial concern for a theory and practice of culture in advanced societies is the restriction of the psychic life of individuals in contrast to the capacities developed by society in its totality.

What Goldmann says of an individual creating a cultural product applies, in its essentials, to the practice of a mass movement - on the political, economic and cultural planes. He says that a literary work is written:

"...only in an overall perspective which he has not invented and which must exist in society so that he can subsequently transpose it in a coherent imaginary universe. This imaginary universe will constitute a valid work only insofar as it centres on the essential aspects of the social reality which has helped to elaborate the categories structuring it".

In literature it is:

"...no longer possible to address the great problems of modern society at the level of an immediately perceived story... Narration restricted to things and events at the immediately lived level risks remaining in miscellaneous fact with no essential meaning. Inversely, if the writer tries to address the overall problems he must place himself at a level which... becomes totalizing and increasingly loses relation with the perceived and the immediately lived... (but) because of the psychic and intellectual constriction the consciousness of individuals becomes less and less suited to grasping phenomena at this level of abstraction and generality". (9)

The contradiction laid bare here is between the necessary "complexity" of any literary work that is "valid" (as Goldmann terms it – his conception of validity need not be considered in the present discussion) and the actual forms of consciousness shaped in advanced Capitalism. This is inseparable from the wider, general condition of alienation itself; it is toward a resolution of the

distance between social knowledge and individual experience, between reality and consciousness, between potentiality and existence, that revolutionary practice is orientated. Revolutionary cultural-aesthetic practice within advanced capitalism is that which deepens and widens the range of conscious experience, drawing into being excluded or repressed dimensions of consciousness that cannot be responded to without a simultaneous questioning of existence under Capitalism as a whole.

What Goldmann says regarding “an immediately perceived story” being no longer an appropriate literary means for grasping the alienated reality in its totality and orientating towards its transcendence, is mirrored in the issues of mass organization and practice in advanced capitalist societies. Relatively straightforward tactical programmes of class practice (such as those offered in *The Communist Manifesto*, *Two Tactics of Social Democracy*, and *On Contradiction* - Marx and Engels, Lenin, Mao), that may have been appropriate to the conditions of their production, are no longer in advanced capitalist societies satisfactory models for a political discourse that can synthesize social reality as a totality into symbolic statement of intent, of advocated practical orientation towards transcendence. (This is expressed in the characteristic response to Marxist slogans as being clichés – over-abstract, dry, removed from experience – which they were not in the conditions referred to above). In advanced Capitalism – and this is to anticipate the discussion later on – formulations of a social programme must contain to a greater degree than hitherto, “suggestions of orientation” for a complex, mass practice that cannot be sketched out even skeletally in many areas without losing the shape of living reality. This is not to claim a necessary lack of clear direction – rather, the very opposite; it is to point to the increasing significance of self-examination and re-definition of reality on the part of the individual, the group, classes, and society as a whole in relation to each and every specific circumstance. The contradictory, alienated reality of advanced capitalism is able to reproduce itself, to contain transformative tendencies, precisely inasmuch as a specification of the necessary “tasks” to be undertaken by the proletariat and other revolutionary strata cannot be a simple statement; and when the assimilation of a complex “programme” is made impossible for the majority by a system of domination which is enacted through a particular kind of intellectual impoverishment (not for the most part, through laws, police, armies, starvation, exhaustion etc.). At the risk of simplification, it could be said that the problem is with the reception of an idea, much more than with the concrete obstructions which would block actions springing from the idea, were they initiated. A majority will for radical change in the centres of world Imperialism would not be faced with obstructions analogous to those which were confronted by the Vietnamese people.

People under advanced capitalism experience themselves as “free” to the extent that the forms of behaviour they consciously choose, do not greatly disturb the reproduction of Capitalism and therefore do not meet with direct (or other) repression. Due to the impoverished level of intellectual and other faculty-development (and it should be re-emphasised that this conception is dialectical, derived in relation to an exisating level of development of social potentiality – not as an élitist absolute), the channels of behaviour that are manipulated by the capitalist technocracy

(these are not created by the technocracy a priori, but rather are developed through responses to spontaneously generated social tendencies which are continuously steered into reified, non-challenging forms, patterns, ruts) are experienced as more or less voluntary. This is at the centre of modern capitalist control, expressed with immense clarity in modern Organization Theory – the technocratic social science whose concern is not with laws, physical coercion, the maintenance of labour discipline through threat of sacking or other sanctions, but with the engineering of consent, through establishing a “fit” between subjective aspiration, ego-ideal, expectation etc. and the objective possibilities offered to an individual in a specific locus within “The Organization”.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1 Raymond Williams: *Marxism and Literature*, Oxford University Press 1977, p.30
- 2 See the clarification of Marx's critique of Hegel and Feuerbach in Franz Jakubowski: *Ideology and Superstructure in Historical Materialism*, Allison and Busby 1976
- 3 On this issue, see Ernest Mandel: *The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx*, New Left Books 1971, especially Chapter 10 and Norman Geras: *Marx and the Critique of Political Economy in Ideology in Social Science*. Ed. Robin Blackburn Fontana 1972
- 4 This seems to be Stuart Hall's inference in what is overall a text that helps clarify much of the base/superstructure problematic. Stuart Hall: *Rethinking the Base-And-Superstructure Metaphor*, in *Class, Hegemony and Party*, Lawrence and Wishart 1977, p 55
- 5 See the discussion of this issue in Perry Anderson: *Arguments Within English Marxism*, Verso 1980, p.26
- 6 Tony Bennett: *Formalism and Marxism*, Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1979, especially Chapter 5
- 7 Theodor Adorno: *Theses on the Sociology of Art*, in *Working Papers in Cultural Studies 2*, Spring 1972, published by the Centre for Contemporary Studies, University of Birmingham.
- 8 Lucien Goldmann: *The Revolt of Arts and Letters in Advanced Civilizations in Cultural Creation in Modern Society*, Basil Blackwell 1977, p.58
- 9 Lucien Goldmann: *op. cit.*, p.59

II AESTHETIC IMAGINATION IN ADVANCED CAPITALIST SOCIETY

A capitalist social formation is an active, contradictory totality organised around the realisation of surplus value from capital's constant relation with labour-power. As with any social formation, one that is capitalist is an organic totality (in the sense of being a co-ordinated, if contradictory, unity) which is continuously transforming and recreating its structure, and enlarging the scale on which its essential process is carried out.

As an alienated form of society, a capitalist social formation is not conscious of its mode of metabolism with nature. Its form and direction of development is not perceived by society collectively. It is the antagonisms within it that continuously set its course; for example, the forms of technology that it develops are crystallisations of the contradiction between, on the one hand, the need of capital to increase the rate of surplus value and, on the other hand, labour's struggle to raise the cost of labour-power and to resist, to a greater or lesser degree, alienated forms of labour organisation.

Here it is argued that the imaginative faculty, in each stage of development of capitalism (and variously in the different particular formations), has grasped and expressed in microcosmic contexts the sensibilities and modes of being appropriate to the resolution of antagonistic experience within bourgeois society - to the disalienation of existence, which is socialism, (just as utopian political and economic theory has grasped, on some level or other, the conception of classless production for use-values.)

The imagination, it is claimed, is the faculty which grasps the complex whole of contradictory experience. Through a multi-dimensional, simultaneous, syncretistic experience, which operates in, for example, poetry through symbol condensations, resonances, associations etc, the imaginative faculty creates on an ideal plane the experience of a condition in which contradiction, chaos and antagonism, are resolved into a dynamic but harmonious form, in which tensions are ordered and controlled into an integrated texture, a meaningful patterned structure. In another work I have developed this conception in relation to the "aesthetic vision of nature".(1) The attempt there was to show that in those artistic tendencies which have expressed experience through the representation of, or exploration of, nature, at crucial phases in the history of capitalism, can be perceived imaginative resolutions to alienated experience under capitalism. The nature of the particular resolutions expressed, reflects the level and form of capitalism attained at the time of their production, and the mode of real resolution that might have been attained if social development had been able to break from the logic of capitalism at that point in time in order to assert a new logic of conscious, unalienated metabolism with nature. At each new phase in capitalism's development, a new quality of alienation evolves, and a new possibility of breaking from it in order to restructure society.

Thus, under the conditions of a prototypical capitalism in the towns of 15th century Flanders and Italy, an aesthetic develops which is centrally concerned with an harmonious interaction between "man" and nature. In Renaissance Italy Leonardo da Vinci typifies a specific kind of unification of concrete form and ideal harmony, whilst Flemish landscapists fused matter and divine spirit in a new, pantheist vision of nature.

With the Industrial Revolution came Romanticism, which constructed in the imagination an experience of free, equal human beings existing in dynamic processes of nature and humanly-directed history; fragmentation and alienation of experience is overcome through liberating struggle toward integration. Concomitant to the intellectual/scientific clarification of alienation and disalienating praxis in Marxism, in advanced monopoly capitalism there have been more conscious productions of aesthetic resolutions to alienation. A new synthesis of aesthetic imagination has accompanied new strategies to break into a logic of social self-transformation. Features of this synthesis are to be extracted from 20th century avant-garde movements (such as Surrealism which is considered in the work mentioned), and from the ways in which complementary currents have assimilated elements of non-western aesthetic and cosmological tendencies (such as Taoism). The view advanced in that work, which is maintained in its essentials here, is that it becomes appropriate at the present historical juncture, to develop a clear emancipatory orientation to nature, and a more rigorous revolutionary aesthetic, that are consciously integrated with scientific analysis and political strategy. This can begin with a re-working of appropriate features partially developed in a number of cultural tendencies, both from within the history of capitalism and from without.

The emancipatory orientation to nature is one which experiences it as organic process: a unity of material and ideal, grasped in thought through a dialectical unity of concrete and abstract. Society is felt as a part of nature, consciously metabolising with the rest of nature in a harmonious, dynamic interaction which is responsive to the needs of both society and nature; this is a continuous self-development in phase with the transformation of both nature and society. In such self-regulation and metabolism with nature is society's aesthetic - now become truly social; social relations are aesthetically structured within a nature that is perceived as natural beauty.

From the forms of aesthetic imagination's experience of nature that have evolved in partial ways at different stages of existence of capitalism (and in other systems), can be derived an orientation of sensibilities appropriate to a contemporary disalienation of self, society, and the forms of labour through which society transforms itself and nature. The implications of imaginative resolutions to contradictions in experience, can be integrated with a psychology of health, into a theory and practice of society orientated to the harmonious, collectively conscious appropriation of reality. Such a society is an organic whole, acting as a self-conscious entity, not a splintered multiplicity of actions which are internally antagonistic and destructive of nature. The individual components of society - self, group, institution etc are conscious as parts within the whole; knowledge and action are unalienated such that in each component is a consciousness of society's mode of being in general. This entails the overcoming of the subject/object duality

within society - the alienated mental control over productive labour and nature; the overcoming of fragmented capacities associated with which is a blind collective mode of activity; the overcoming of the projection of mind into spirit and the associated de-spiritualisation of labour and nature characteristic of class society. Self-conscious labour, as integrated intellect, emotion and physical transformation of nature into social values (goods, houses, cities etc), entails the re-integration of human faculties through the imagination concretised in each and every individual who is orientated as a complete self in a classless self-regulation of existence. This is no stasis, but a dynamic harmony.

Human history is always the creative self-transformation of society, but under class societies praxis is alienated and distorted and history is therefore interpretable as the outcome of necessity. Socialism is the progressive, collective appropriation of the powers to direct society through an organic social engagement and intellectual reflection, developing the means within which undistorted creativity can shape and mould the totality of life — thereby expressing the experience of aesthetic beauty (which is not a timeless, ahistorical category/experience, but is historically transforming like scientific theories, economic systems etc, and which therefore in its transformations and continual transcendances of previous forms takes over (transformed) the "kernels of validity" in previous forms - just as metaphysical notions are taken over into science, or as the achievements of capitalist accumulation are appropriated in the development of a collectively owned and controlled social surplus). This aesthetic is expressed in all dimensions of life: in objects, goods (portions of nature transformed through labour into social values); in the physical forms through which society metabolises with nature (cities, means of production, factories etc; and in the human relationships within society - which become free, beautiful, truthful, loving.

Epochs in which the social relations of production are relatively unalienated and non-exploitative, express aesthetic beauty in their forms of living, and in man-made environments which are in harmony with nature. For example, the urban communities of independent petty commodity producers in the late feudal period created beautiful objects through craft, and aesthetically ordered towns which were in harmony with their natural surroundings. The materials used for building came from nature locally, were not imposed from "outside", ie towns were not conceived away from the context of actual building as is the case with modern urban capitalist building. Similarly in primitive communities beauty and social utility are fused in folk art etc, in houses which are harmoniously arranged, which appear as springing, through human mediation, from nature. Where social relations are furthest alienated, under capitalism, commodities, towns, buildings etc are ugly, random. Beauty is encapsulated in the fragmented, isolated sphere called "art". In revolution and the creation of communism, this encapsulation is pierced and its "content" is tapped so as to inform society's self-regulation and metabolism with nature in its totality.

The point has already been raised that Marxist theory cannot do without a concept of aesthetic imagination, or cultural-aesthetic activity, but that such a concept has been exceedingly difficult

to clarify in a precise manner. Marx, in his own writings, did not attempt a specification of the aesthetic, though it can be argued that the basis for such a theoretical development is immanent in his work. This basis is to be discovered in the fundamental conceptions of historical materialism, as a method capable of comprehending the entirety of human life-activities as they are found in specific social forms, through the dialectical categories of structure and practice, base and superstructure etc. In the direct references to art and cultural products found in Marx however, three major characteristics of aesthetic structures are perceivable. The results of aesthetic activity are seen as a particular kind of reflection of the social reality within which they are found; they develop an implicit critique of social reality in a fictional, dramatic, or symbolic-imaginary universe; and they are embodiments of aesthetic experience, or beauty — an aspect which is quite explicitly referred to in, for example, the brief discussion on Greek art in the *Grundrisse*.

An exclusive, or predominating emphasis on the aspect of reflection, has been associated with a tendency toward determinist interpretation on the part of Marxist cultural theory (from Plekhanov to Arnold Hauser). In another tendency, associated above all with Lukács, the reflective and critical aspects are interwoven, but a major problem for the Lukácsian framework has been the clarification of the relationship between the analysis of actual art-works as products of specific social contexts, and questions of judgement as to what constitutes "validity" of significance in past and present works. A consistent, but highly limiting- solution to this question in relation to western capitalism is provided by Lukács in his conception of authentic art in Europe after 1848 necessarily taking on a revolutionary role; in order to maintain the functions of reflection and critique, art in developed bourgeois societies must be realist and also implicitly indicate the tendencies toward socialism active within social processes.

The limitations in the Lukácsian framework can be approached through its conspicuous inapplicability to the non-representational arts: "pure" music, lyric poetry, abstract art or design etc. It is no accident that Lukács himself confined his attention to the novel and drama, and that by limiting his aesthetic to fictional universes that reflect the totality of social contradictions and tendencies in a significant structure, he rejects "modernism" outright. There is no room in Lukács's aesthetic for the exploration of sometimes limited aspects of contradictory experience, or for experiment in form and medium in itself. There is, in short, no reconceiving in marxist terms of what for Kant was aesthetic "enjoyment": a closedness (finality), a satisfaction deriving from form created in a particular instance (as opposed to the abstract understanding achieved by science).

What is considered in bourgeois aesthetic theories, through notions such as "aesthetic quality", is clearly a problem for marxism. In different ways, marxist theorists from Plekhanov through to Lukács and Goldmann, have reduced specifically aesthetic qualities to the ideological. Thus even though, for example, Goldmann is concerned with "value", and goes far beyond a mere explanation of the genesis of art-works, in the final analysis "value" is to be related normally to

the richness, the degree of historical significance of any art-work's expression of a "mental structure", the world-view of a "social group".

The theorists of the Frankfurt School on the other hand, have attempted to specify the distinctive characteristics of the aesthetic. Thus, for Adorno and Marcuse in particular, the aesthetic dimension under capitalism represents autonomy and authenticity, an ideal condition of free existence as the negation of existing reified reality: this can be the case even when the "content" of art is in no immediate sense critical of society. From a different vantage point Della Volpe also seeks to analyse aesthetic structure itself, with the aid of semiotic consideration of the text as sign system. However, an assumption that the poetic image or musical sign is "cognitive", a type of thinking, means that he also finally avoids the aesthetic problematic.

One aspect of the problematic in marxist aesthetics can therefore be dissected out: the consigning of aesthetic structures to the cognitive-rational, the placing of social critique as the central role of art in a way which fails ultimately to distinguish it from philosophy or science. Thus, central to Della Volpe's perspective is an insistence that, for example, the poetic image is no "vague" intuition or sensation. It is to be understood as rational - whether it pertains to religious allegory as in Dante, or the conflict of cosmologies as in Goethe's Faust, or to the socialist realism of Mayakovsky or Brecht. As with Lukács, the type of poetry represented in Rimbaud, Breton, Dylan Thomas, or the lyrics of Bob Dylan, can only be understood as false. Dream imagery, vague or ambiguous association, poetry whose central capacity is to evoke sensations or feelings that defy exact verbal description, cannot be grasped through his aesthetic theory any more than through Lukács's.

Interestingly, in his discussion of music, Della Volpe argues that the musical sign (which, for him, is a relation) must signify something that is other than music, unless music is to be seen as autonomous, devoid of human, social significance. This he calls the musical idea. But to avoid defining what this is (ie transposed feelings, sensibilities etc, mediated experiential structures, affective schema or some such entity), he argues that thought need not be identified solely with language, ie that one can think in shapes, sounds etc. This simply evades the issue: what is it that music or abstract sculpture "expresses" or "conveys" that philosophy does not? Extending the word "thought" to cover this kind of symbolic activity in no way eliminates the fact that a specific human faculty is under consideration, whose activity is different from rational-cognitive symbolic activity. This faculty is active in all art, though it can be ignored by dogmatic theories of representational art and literature (in which rational symbolism is strongly represented, interwoven with the imaginative); it cannot however be ignored in consideration of "pure" music without denying the human significance of music.

For Kant, the imagination is that mode of perception which recognises a particular instance as one of a kind, whilst the understanding entails the application of a concept or general rule to a particular instance. Reflective judgement is the faculty which combines imagination and understanding, to enable perception of "finality" in the object. This occurs in science when a new

rule or concept is framed to account for a particular instance; scientific creativity rests upon the assumption of finality in nature - a belief in the existence of a rule in advance of its discovery. In aesthetics a finality of form is found in the particular instance itself, ie without the application or finding of a general rule for it. Such perception - which is pleasurable, beautiful - is of final form in the way the particular looks or sounds in itself, ie final form is internal to the object. This process is not purely intellectual, but "the harmonious interplay of understanding and imagination". The exercise of "reflective judgement" is enjoyed, according to Kant, in scientific creativity and in the creation and recognition of aesthetic objects. Creating aesthetic objects imposes a finality of form upon reality/experience.

There are elements of Kant's thought which are implicitly carried though into dialectical materialism - transformed, with their contradictions resolved. This requires an historicising of those Kantian categories which have a rational "core"; a theorising kept in tune with the implications of a materialist inversion of Hegel. Thus, the marxian synthesis of ethics and science achieves an overcoming of the Kantian dichotomy of "is" and "ought"; the ontology of marxism resolves the separation of reality into the phenomenal and the noumenal. A positive marxist critique of Kant is particularly necessary, because there are aspects of Kant which are superior to Hegel's absolute idealism, but which Marx never specifically subjected to a critique. Implicit in Marx's critique of Hegel, however, is an extraction of valid elements in Kant, with their contradictions (both idealist and empiricist), resolved. The task of extracting and dialectically retheorising Kantian aesthetics should be seen in this light.

Kant's *Critique of Judgement* holds that reflective judgement is the faculty harmonising understanding and reason, ie the worlds of phenomenal nature and human consciousness or freedom. Without taking over Kant's overall epistemology and ontology, this conception is a useful one for the understanding of imagination (which as used here is nearer to "reflective judgement", in Kant's terminology, than to his use of "imagination") as a fundamental human faculty which is historically structured and mediated, taking on therefore a particular form under capitalism. Because Kant could not see knowledge as socially produced, and because he could only see phenomenal reality as it was understood through 18th century mechanistic empiricism, a consistency could only be attained in his synthesis through considering the categories of understanding as transcendental - ie as unhistorical. He was bound therefore to see imagination similarly. A dialectical, historical reconception of Kant can utilise the notion of imagination as that which links thought to moral aspiration, consciousness to nature, in praxis. In bourgeois society, and in particular forms in its advanced, technocratic phase, imagination is restricted and suppressed in relation to the prevention of praxis, in the maintenance of what Sartre terms "pratico-inerte" existence.

As was suggested earlier, the Frankfurt School theorists are significant for their tackling the question of aesthetic quality directly. Quite compatible with marxism is a recognition that the aesthetic faculty is distinct from the cognitive; this is in fact implicit in Marx's own (unresolved) considerations upon Greek art's displaying a form of beauty which is felt as a perfect instance

even in modern bourgeois society. And some of the Frankfurt theorists made steps toward a dialectical re-theorising of Kantian aesthetics, in their attempt to grapple with aesthetic experience. For, if art explores final form in the particular, this is indeed a sublimated expression of unalienated labour, of an unalienated relationship between subject and object of labour, between subject and nature, subject and other subjects. Experimental development of form in the mediating media of art, indicates a liberation, a declaration of autonomy against the reification, the suppression of creativity, and the depersonalised relationships characteristic of bourgeois society.

Likewise, the Frankfurt School is right in seeing the need for a dialectical re-working of Freud's discovery of the unconscious, developing categories that allow specific forms of repression and therefore specific characteristic structures of unconscious process located in particular socio-historical contexts, to be articulated with a theory of psychic dynamics in general. For the linkage between unconscious psychic processes, and the faculty of aesthetic creativity and experience, is clear enough. It can also be suggested that certain insights within Jung's psychology should be so appropriated. For although Jung's "psychic functions" are conceived asocially and ahistorically, as an "abstraction inherent in each separate individual",⁽⁴⁾ his delineation of the relationships between psychic functions could be instructive. It could be developed into a theoretical grasping of the ways in which they are unintegrated and unevenly developed in the type of individual that emerges in bourgeois society. In particular Jung's schema allows a conceptualisation of the mechanism whereby intellect dominates over feeling, and sensation over intuition in the "bourgeois psyche". Jung's "intuition" overlaps to a considerable extent with imagination as it is conceived here.

As has already been suggested, important elements of a revolutionary aesthetic are to be found in early Romanticism: most impressively in the English romantic tendency in poetry of circa 1780-1830.⁽⁵⁾ The appropriation of what is valuable in this tendency requires a very clear understanding of the transformations it underwent in later Romanticisms, for these have imposed accretions upon the contemporary perception of early Romanticism. For early Romanticism sensuous and imaginative experience is inseparable from the total process of natural (cosmic), historical, and individual development. Creative effort of the self, imaginative synthesis of elements from experience and transcendence through continuous praxical transformation, were felt to be blocked by reified social forms – a repressive, alienated reality which should therefore itself be transformed. The aesthetic was seen as a strand of human existence/activity which, when and if taken into every dimension of collective and individual activity, could ensure the progressive emancipation of society as a whole. The enforced isolation and encapsulation of imagination into the aesthetic dimension was understood as being a consequence of present, transitory historical conditions.

In the late 19th century, a complex process of simultaneous re-affirmation, transformation, and negation of this aesthetic instated the alienated form of it, which had previously been seen as an undesirable but inevitable consequence or feature of industrial capitalism, into a principle of the

imagination as such. Alienated reality is then seen as untranscendable - an inevitable condition of existence (whether interpreted as the result of general inadequacies in human nature, or as the necessary price paid for technical and material progress, or as pertaining to the condition of the universe). Thus, when Robert Browning wrote about Shelley in 1851, he felt it necessary to apologise for and explain away Shelley's inclination to "change the world", in order to demonstrate that he was nevertheless a "great" poet. For Shelley's problem was that, unlike " ... an ordinary youth, who ... discovers falsities, incongruities, and various points for amendment ... (and) finds himself unawares arrived at the startling conclusion, that all must be changed - or nothing: in the face of which plainly impossible achievement he is apt ... to refer the whole task to another age and person ... , in Shelley's case the ... power to see was accompanied by ... a fertility to contrive: he endeavoured to realise as he went on idealising ... " However, " ... had Shelley lived he would have finally ranged himself with the Christians" and would not have expected of "His doctrine ... an especial solution of difficulties which are referable to the general problem of the universe".

Shelley's efforts at revolutionary agitation were "mistakes" due to "immaturity". Nevertheless Shelley's poetry is "the highest attainment,...to be known enduringly among men, and ... to be accepted of God, as human work may ..." eThus the aesthetic comes to be an interiorised subjectivity, a realm of transcendence (whether conceived religiously or not) possible in only certain individuals located in particular social contexts. In Victorian England, there is no better example of such an aesthetic than that of the Pre-Raphaelite movement. The real denial of creative and imaginative praxis and fulfilment in the social process as a whole (in both material production, the practice of the proletariat, and in the alienated mental and administrative practice of the bourgeoisie), is seen as untranscendable. The aesthetic is forced into an alternative imaginary dream-world of art. In Swinburne's poetry for example, even though the struggle of freedom against tyranny is a central theme, it is placed in a legendary world of Ancient Greece.

At the same time however, this dream-world is seen to have a "civilising" or "humanising" effect, as in Ruskin's and Matthew Arnold's social aesthetics. The aesthetic dimension is seen as holding out a hope which may diffuse through society in unspecified and unspecifiable ways. Effectively a utopian view is sustained, in which the "educator" is not seen as being educated in the total praxis of social existence. The fragmentation of human faculties characteristic of industrial capitalist alienation is pushed further on: the separation between the aesthetic and the rational-political is resigned to - that which early Romanticism had sought to unify.

The exception among the Pre-Raphaelites is William Morris, whose initial vision of a reinstatement of creative craft labour to produce objects of both real utility and unique, specific beauty, gradually developed into the conception of a transformation of social production into a condition of generalised creative production - on the basis of modern machinery - of use-values whose consumption (like their production) would entail progressive advancement of the personality. Self-determining production by freely associated producers, the consumption of use-values throughout society, the progressive aestheticising of sensation, the creation and

development of a beautiful, harmonious, humanly constructed environment, and the living out of creative, loving social interactions, become the meaning of the aesthetic for Morris, who was able to unify the original romantic aesthetic with marxist social analysis.

Morris's aesthetic implied that the interiorised, encapsulated aesthetic dimension of the other Pre-Raphaelites required to be turned outward to be re-integrated with the totality but without losing its quality. In other words, in the art of, for example, Dante Gabriel Rossetti, even if the content is mystified (eg in its particular kind of disembodied idealisation, in its vision of femininity, in its morbid sentimentality), and the form is constrained by bourgeois taste - nevertheless in its very imaginative construction of a transcendent reality it represents a residual, immanent negation of reified, inert existence, of alienated uncreative labour. As with the Frankfurt theorists' conception of authentic art as inherently containing an immanent negation of repressive reality, Morris implies that there is a quality to art which is not reducible to its content etc, and that this must be revolutionalised - both in art itself and life as a whole.

For Morris this residual value in art is distorted, appreciated inauthentically, even by the few with access to it. For it is not merely a question of social inequality, a participation in the aesthetic dimension of only an élite. Where the aesthetic dimension is resigned to alienation - both in art itself and in life, politics etc, even this {élite is unable to realise its significance, to experience the aesthetic authentically, as an omnipresent strand of human existence in its entirety:

" ... sham wealth, the invention of competitive Commerce ... enslaves not only the poor people who are compelled to work at its production, but also the foolish and not over-happy people who buy it to harass themselves with its encumbrance.

"Now if we are to have popular Art, or indeed Art of any kind, we must at once and for all be done with this luxury; it is the supplanter, the changeling of Art; so much so that by those who know of nothing better it has even been taken for Art, the divine solace of human labour, the romance of each day's hard practice of the difficult art of living.

" ... Art cannot live beside it ... This, first of all, we of the well-to-do classes must get rid of if we are serious in desiring the new birth of Art ...

"Do not think it a little matter to resist this monster of folly; to think for yourselves what you yourselves really desire will not only make men and women of you so far, but may also set you thinking of the due desires of other people, since you will soon find when you get to know a work of Art, that slavish work is undesirable ...

"Here then is one thing for us of the middle classes to do before we can clear the ground for the new birth of Art, before we can clear our own consciences of the guilt of enslaving men by their labour ... Can we escape from the corruption of Society which threatens us?

" ...There are of the English middle class today, for instance, men of the highest aspirations towards Art... men who are most deeply convinced of the necessity to civilisation of surrounding men's lives with beaut... but both the leaders and the led are incapable of saving so much as half a dozen commons from the grasp of inexorable Commerce: they are as helpless in spite of their culture and their genius ... ; and to speak plainly we know full well that under the present gospel of Capital, not only there is no hope of bettering it, but that things grow worse year by year, day by day.

" ... as a token of this stupidity of our sham civilisation, what foolish rabbit warrens our well-to-do houses are obliged to be ... No wonder our houses are cramped and ignoble when the lives lived in them are cramped and ignoble also.

"...one day we shall win back Art, that is to say the pleasure of life; win back Art again to our daily labour.

" ... the plunder of the weak by the strong! Now I say of this system, that it is of its very nature destructive of Art, that is to say of the happiness of life. Whatever consideration is shown for the life of the people in these days, whatever is done which is worth doing, is done in spite of the system and in the teeth of its maxims...."(8)

The importance of the romantic aesthetic lies in its emphasis on the transcendence of alienated reality/experience, as the very process of art. It is not merely concerned with art's specific content, its explication of reality, as is realist aesthetics. The romantic aesthetic, whether implicitly or explicitly, links art with creative labour in the broadest sense, ie. with the totality of human existence.

The significance of Morris lies in his maintaining the integrity of this aesthetic, and welding it constructively to revolutionary practice as understood by marxism. The achievement of early English Romanticism is sustained: the conception of poetic imagination as a human quality that is suppressed by industrial capitalism; its exercise, expressed in the entirety of social activity, would entail the negation of existing conditions. The particular form in which it is suppressed in industrial capitalism is the consequence of the latter's alienated relationship toward nature; the destruction of natural beauty in the rapacious grasping for profits, is complemented in exploitative social relations, and a division of labour that fragments human aptitudes, faculties etc. The poetic interaction with nature re-unifies the alienated separation of matter from Spirit; a pantheistic, mystical vision of nature is compatible only with an harmonious, anti-"calculative" orientation to nature. This imaginative orientation operates simultaneously as the counter to suppression of potentiality in human knowledge; if scientific and technical knowledge were applied imaginatively, for and by a free human collective, the consequence would be a continual growth in the creation of beauty on all levels of human existence. The activation of poetic imagination would be inseparable from the progressive integration of the human personality, the harmonious synthesis of thought and feeling, reason and sensuality.

The calculative rationality that sustains a destructive metabolism with nature and the creation of ugly, squalid cities, has as its counterpart a repressive domination of reason and reified morality over sensuality, feeling and intuition. The re-unification of matter and spirit in nature complements a reunification of body and soul in humanity.

Now as part of the first generation to experience the world's first industrial revolution, the early romantics found that their struggle for social and personal integration led them into a marginalised, alienated condition of existence; bohemianism, in some cases poverty, exile, social rejection and contempt for their efforts were the concomitants of a structured system of circumstances encountered for the first time. The later romantic aesthetic made into a cult the "unintended" consequences of the early romantic undertaking: the bohemian, isolated artist destined to produce for a miniscule appreciation came to be seen as the inevitable "type" for artists *per se*. Later Romanticism lost the aesthetic vision of integrated human existence within nature, grasping instead only aspects of the earlier aesthetic. Elements of romantic pastoralism, the "intuitive" exploration of non-utilitarian experience, an experience of social exclusion in those who pursued the aesthetic vision, the idea of creating for posterity (living among the "immortals") - these were retained in fragmented forms in an aesthetic which, though considering itself a re-affirmation, was in fact a negation of the early romantic aesthetic.

The central contradictions of capitalism (between capital and labour and their associated class interests; between the forces and relations of production; and between the human needs and aspirations developed within capitalism and the actual constraints on these) entail in all their aspects the constant maintenance, strengthening, and modification of alienation on the one hand, and tendencies to oppose, reject, move beyond such alienation, on the other. This is the dimension at which cultural struggle can be situated; in cultural forms is expressed the contradiction between commodity fetishism and authentic individual and collective aspirations, between the potentialities felt through experience and the limits to possible activity as presented in reality.

Marxism has come, in various ways, to consider it an essential aspect of significant art that it explore real historical processes, grasping the essential tendencies and contradictions in a social totality, and therefore bearing a dialectical relationship to that totality. The intensive, condensing expression of "typical" (ie significant, indicative, and dynamic) features from reality/experience in art is through a particular practice - aesthetic practice, which is distinct from theoretical practice (though in most real productions - "aesthetic" or "theoretical" - both practices are present) Thus it is that the artist's aesthetic achievement may far outstretch the conscious meanings he or she attributes to a work, and may actually contradict in implication the ideological conceptions of reality/experience that he or she holds.

This aspect of art does not only apply to social realism. Exploration of any dimension of experience/reality, such as emotional subjectivity, the unconscious, sensual contact with nature or human beings, or even "abstract" interaction with a medium ("pure" form, the concrete

possibilities of words, pure sound etc) may open out significant realities bearing a dialectical relationship to the totality. If it is significant, then such an exploration will inevitably indicate in complex and indirect ways, the direction in which experience must move in order to untangle confusions in experience, to resolve antagonisms, to open out experience into all-roundedness, eliminating distortion and repression (ie the restriction of real urges, the negation of positive features in all levels of experience), to negate all negative features in present reality that are potentially transcendable. Thus, not only Courbet's realism but Van Gogh's non-rational communion of self with nature, are valid and significant (their aesthetics both being inseparable from active societal transformation); not only Thomas Mann but Kafka, not only Balzac but Rimbaud.

For Lukács, one aspect of what constitutes significant art is its capacity to show how " ... certain crises in the personal destinies of a number of human beings coincide and interweave within the determining context of an historical crisis".(9) Such a capacity of art need not be seen as belonging only to social realism, with its characterisation of "typical" individuals, events, circumstances, surroundings etc. Such a capacity is not exhibited only in the realist drama or novel, in representational painting, or in music that deliberately expresses "typical" or historically significant collective emotions (as in much of Shostakovich's music, which deserves to be considered successful "socialist realist" music). It should also be seen as potentially active in the direct expression of aspects of experience in coherent form, even if these aspects of experience are incoherent, or partial, or fantastic, in themselves. Just as Lukács shows that "great" social realism is no "pure extension", or empirically complete chronicle of events and characters, but in fact often achieves its significance and meaningful coherence precisely through its selection of apparently unobtrusive events and personalities - so, much art that does not create a fictional literary universe, nor a realist pictorial representation, nor an epic, programmatic, musical expression of human emotion, may nevertheless deal in historically significant ways with a very narrow dimension of experience directly, may explore an apparently quirky, unimportant obsession, or may create form out of not-understood unconscious psychic elements. If such art is significant, the aesthetic faculty has grasped particular subjective experience in such ways as to throw open, externalise, hitherto unnoticed dimensions of experience pertinent to human history. It has succeeded in bringing from private inchoate recesses of experience that which when made public, ie symbolically mediated and transformed into a medium, deepens historical self-awareness and clarifies the very coincidence of personal and historical crises Lukács refers to. Such is the case, for example, when Alan Ginsberg's poem *Iron Horse* begins with frustrated homosexual urges in the fantasies of the poet, who is masturbating in a compartment of a train. The personal obsessions are significantly and powerfully interconnected with the treatments of American consumerism and the Vietnam War later in the poem.

Other examples could be provided by Max Ernst's graphic fantasies: depictions of a skeleton asleep among factory chimneys, a sort of Venus day-dreaming in the middle of a blast furnace, a

scientist lecturing to a well-dressed all-male audience whilst suspending a Pre-Raphaelite-like woman between two pointers.(10)

Or, when Rimbaud jumbles the senses and emotions, exploring domains of experience which are indescribable in previous conventional terms, and re-synthesises the elements of characteristic experience. Rimbaud could not consciously see where such a re-synthesis should go, and thus his rejection of "normal" characteristic experience threatened any stability at all. He very quickly doubted the possibility of a "transcendence" on the terms that he consciously understood, and this was probably why he gave up writing poetry. But in his aesthetic, a newly-synthesised, emancipatory experience is clearly indicated - a dialectical praxis of the senses and emotions.

The crucial debates between Lukács on the one hand, and such thinkers as Ernst Bloch and Adorno on the other, over an appropriate 20th century marxist aesthetic,(11) centre on two fundamental (apparently conflicting) aspects of a historical materialist conception of culture. Lukács, taking up the central features of dialectical epistemology, stresses the requirement that works of art (and implicitly any revolutionary cultural activity) reflect the social totality dialectically - ie not in an empiricist, naturalist fashion but in forms that grasp dynamic process, and which therefore enter that process as conscious shapers of cognitive and emotive orientations to reality. A marxist aesthetic is, therefore, realism for Lukács. As noted earlier, his particular studies are exclusively in the area of the drama and novel, but his method could implicitly be applied to film, photography, representational visual art, and others. It is difficult to see how Lukács's aesthetic theory, without a thorough reworking and development of its terms (such as was hinted at earlier), could be relevant to "pure" music, lyrical poetry, or to much non-representational visual art (eg decorative painting or mosaic, which dominates visual art in, for example, Islamic civilisation). And, again as noted before, the central thrust of modernist art-forms (from abstract painting to Surrealist poetry) is precisely one that removes them from Lukács's terms of reference, since their aesthetic roots lie in a welcoming of the disintegration of the representational image and rational narrative, and in an impulse to explore unconscious dimensions of experience.

Marxist theorists that have argued a revolutionary "moment" within modernism (from the Frankfurt School to John Berger), have stressed its power to explore potential experience. They have developed the fundamental Hegelian conception of culture - which is implicitly appropriated and set on materialist foundations in Marx - that cultural symbols illuminate historical contradictions by objectifying alienated forms of free self-conscious life.

Thus, while Lukács dismisses a revolutionary role for modernism, characterising it as "confining itself to reproducing whatever manifests itself immediately and on the surface"(12) in developed capitalism, Adorno can write that "art is the negative knowledge of the actual world", and that "as art it remains the antithesis of that which is the case". Elsewhere Adorno says: " ... a successful work ... is one which expresses the idea of harmony negatively by embodying the contradictions, pure and uncompromised, in its innermost structure".

Latterly, L Goldmann made some attempt to integrate the valid perceptions on both sides of this debate. Whilst accepting the fundamental categories of Lukacs's dialectical sociology of aesthetic form - totality, reflection etc - he tried to show that the novel in the technocratic phase of bourgeois society ("organisational capitalism"), reflects reification in social life directly in its content. Goldmann thus attempts to hold on to a Lukácsian view of literature as engaged in dialectical reflection of reality, but concedes that this need not (and in the period of "organisational capitalism", often does not) entail the depiction of human "types" in dynamic social contexts. Instead, the characteristic mode of experience in the advanced period of capitalism - reified or alienated experience - can be the immediate raw material of the novel, conditioning its style and its "narrative".

Goldmann's sociology of culture is still limited, however, to the novel, drama, and film. He recognises the two facets of aesthetic "negation" under consideration here:

"This revolt can be comprised and described under two different, complementary aspects. There is the formal revolt of an art which, not accepting a society, refuses it by finding new forms of expression unlike those which that society has created and in which it has traditionally seen itself ... it is a matter of refusing society, a revolt expressed through the invention of new forms; in the other, the problem of men's revolt in and against the society they refuse is treated in the work itself and forms its subject, theme, central concern and structuration."(15)

For examples of the former "aspect" of the aesthetic revolt he limits himself, however, to the novels of such writers as Robbe-Grillet.

In a sense then, it can be argued that dialectical sociology has not yet developed a framework for analysing the aesthetic exploration of direct experience: "experience" being understood in a way close to E P Thompson's characterisation of it, in the context of historical analysis, as "structure transmuted into process".(16) The drawing from experience within bourgeois society and the simultaneous pointing beyond it, is for non-Lukácsian marxists the essence of modernism. Yet for Della Volpe for example, though art is seen as mediating experience, and though unlike Lukács he can allow Brecht and Mayakovsky as socialist realists and can recognise Eliot as "valid" - nevertheless this is on cognitive grounds. It is as truthful reflections of reality that the works of these writers are seen as important - albeit that Della Volpe's central concern in poetry is for the "image", which allows a broader range of works to be considered than do Lukacs's criteria. But, as mentioned before, there is little that Della Volpe could explicate in Breton or Dylan Thomas.

Modernism expressed (in its authentic period and examples) - in its form and content - repression, alienation. But at the same time, it condemns this experience and the social totality which maintains it; it points in myriad complex ways to their overcoming. For the Frankfurt theorists, however, the "negation" of modernist art has no concrete correlate; there is no real, sensuous activity that can affirm the aesthetic vision since the theory of technocratic

totalitarianism (in its various forms) has rejected class struggle as the dynamic of history, and has rejected analysis of the political economy of capitalism as an indispensable to comprehending alienation and surpassing it. For Adorno in particular, but also implicitly for Marcuse (for Habermas structural contradiction remains), "reification" becomes a static, ahistorical category - a mode of social consciousness and activity that is "total", because imposed upon society in a unidirectional way from the pole of social power. Capitalist accumulation ever widens the spheres of activity and need taken over by the commodity form, without the actual form in which this occurs being affected by opposition, resistance; reified institutions are the outcome of a monolithic strategy of a technocratic bourgeoisie. But for Marx, class struggle itself figured directly in the categories of political economy; empirical forms of state, the value of labour power at any instant, the organisation of the labour process and the tendencies to capital concentration etc are expressions of the interaction and struggle between capital and labour, not merely the unmitigated determination of capital to extract surplus value and organise society to this end. Thus, that which is a changeable, temporally limited crystallisation of contradictions (reification) becomes for Adorno fixed, unsusceptible to a transformation resulting from self-induced dynamic processes.

Hence in Marcuse the affirmation of "truth" in the aesthetic dimension(17) is depicted as a quasi-mystical opposition to reality; the "essence" beneath "appearance" is not linked in any clear way to real historical forces for social transformation.

Tendencies exist, of course, in the work of many writers, in the direction of a framework of the kind postulated here. Apart from partial insights from the thinkers already considered, there have been John Berger's attempts to grasp the techniques of abstract art in both their "positive" and "negative" moments: as both reflecting the disintegration of coherence in bourgeois consciousness and as hearing the seeds of a new construction of revolutionary meaning.(18)

The attempt here is to further these tendencies; to develop a theoretical framework which can allow the integration of psychic struggle and aesthetic imagination with class struggle on the cultural plane, and situate this within the particular strategies for socialism which advanced technocratic, monopoly capitalism necessitates.

Many of the major forms of mass culture in advanced capitalist societies, from television comedy to rock music, require a theory and practice which is essentially analogous to the view of modernism presented here. Mass participation in much popular music expresses precisely an engagement in alienated normality, and a vibrant opposition to it: an indication of sensibilities incompatible with existence as defined by capitalist normality - sensibilities which, if explored and developed in their intrinsic relations to existence in its totality (ie without distortion allowing the repression of contradiction - such as the pseudo-rebellion of irrationalism or fatalism), would finally entail socialist revolution.

It is clear that for a dialectical epistemology the explanation and understanding of phenomena, knowledge, is part of praxis - ie inseparable from consciously directed activity orientated to transforming society. Thus, a marxist sociology of culture both explains the existence of particular cultural forms and analyses their nature, but is also engaged in developing evaluatively and practising a marxist aesthetic appropriate to the transformation of human reality on all planes, from the psyche to the social totality. This process entails not only constructing a dynamic aesthetic in theory, nor only the attempt to bring into being particular works or cultural activities which attempt to express that aesthetic; it must also involve scrutinising cultural phenomena of all kinds which come into existence outside of any particular conscious movement to create such an aesthetic, in order to grasp critically their "positive" and "negative" moments. Phenomena coming into existence outside of a conscious movement cannot be simply rejected; to do so is undialectical, as it implies that there may be no contradiction in a phenomenon that is part of a contradictory totality. Praxis would entail that critical analysis expose the revolutionary potential in a phenomenon such that participation in it could expand, deepen, and develop that potential.

This is again a crucial problem in Lukácsian aesthetics, which seeks to limit the expression of a marxist aesthetic to a specific type of artistic activity: realist reflection. What is often missed in Lukacs's critics however, is that his general aesthetic categories (which it is argued need not, with suitable modifications, be limited to realism) are among the most coherent yet developed within Marxism. His Efforts to construct a general aesthetic are far more systematic than those of eg the Frankfurt School who, for all their important insights, operate with a variety of categories only loosely related one to another. And, in the specific area which Lukács has investigated - the type of novel which he considers genuinely realist - his enterprise, notwithstanding its limitations, has been highly instructive.

This issue, of the critical evaluation of any cultural phenomenon arising within bourgeois society in order to penetrate its revolutionary potential, applies equally to social and political phenomena. Elsewhere in this work the point is considered that a retrospective analysis of the rise of Fascism in Europe in the 1920's and 30's, leads to a recognition of mistaken praxis on the part of the existing Communist Parties and revolutionary movements in general. A conception of the working class resting primarily on its economic location, ie as structured through the capital/labour relation in production alone, meant that when Italian or German capitalism was in deep crisis and bourgeois democracy was no longer able to maintain political rule, many sections of the populations concerned, who felt alienated from organised labour, were free to either identify with, or tacitly accept, fascism. More than this, it meant that the working class itself - even in its most strictly "economic" determination as productive labour-power - was vulnerable to fascism's pseudo-resolutions to contradictory experience in spheres outside of the production process itself. Fascism provided "answers" to problems in all domains of life, from sexuality to leisure activities; no area of life was ignored.

Thus, though the economic relation of capital to labour is the root of oppression under capitalism, and the particular form taken on by that relation at any time is the basis of the varying levels and types of social oppression experienced by the dominated classes, nevertheless it is not on this economic plane alone that oppression is experienced. For many sections of the society it is not even predominantly here: eg women, the petty bourgeoisie, ethnic and other minority groups, old people etc. The German Communist Party's ambiguous attitude to Wilhelm Reich's sex clinics - in which he sought to inter-relate psycho-analytical treatment for individuals' personal problems with an expansion of their understanding of the roots of such personal problems in the nature of capitalist society - and its subsequent dissociation from Reich, is instructive. Though the intention was to avoid "putting off" potential support against Nazism, in effect it was giving the area of sexuality over to fascist penetration. A similar judgement can be made about the French Communist Party's expulsion of the Surrealists; whatever shortcomings may have been present in the Surrealist movement, outright rejection of it cannot have been an appropriate revolutionary response.

A related mistaken orientation is to be found in the reaction to fascism itself in the early stages of development. Only when Fascism was in power in Italy, and Nazism was on the brink of power in Germany, did Togliatti in exile, and Gramsci in prison, begin systematic examinations of the origins of the movement and of its ideological forms before becoming an "extraordinarily" autonomous state form for finance and monopoly capital's rule during economic crisis, when the dominant blocs could not directly control the state. An earlier examination, of its origins and capabilities of mass appeal, would have led not to a simple view of it as an alternative reactionary force to bourgeois democracy, but would have recognised its special danger as a pseudo-fusion of populist, leftist ideas and aspirations, with the most aggressively, reactionary perspectives generated within Italian or German capitalist society. Such an examination should then have led not to a simple rejection of the issues and domains of experience addressed by fascism, nor simply to posing a counter-ideology to these, but to a dynamic participation in the very same realms, in order to "interpolate" a socialist practice precisely and wherever particular sections of the dominated classes experienced and perceived contradictions.

The necessity of revolutionary strategy being conceived and practised on all levels of the social totality is reflected in the more specific totality of the aesthetic dimension. Through grasping aesthetics as pertaining to all aspects of experience, a theory and practice can be developed which is all-inclusive with respect to different types of artistic tendency; at the same time the aesthetic dimension can be conceived as a strand of human activity represented in every social level - such that its development in every level is an essential concern for a revolutionary aesthetic. It can be seen then, that the reduction of aesthetics to the rational-cognitive has implications beyond a mere inadequacy of artistic explanation.

To some extent Goldmann's conception of "mental structure" is intended to overcome the distinction between aesthetic structure and ideological ('rational-intellectual) structures; the mental structure is formed from both a cosmology, a political philosophy etc and from a dynamic

structure of feelings, yearnings, aspirations in experience etc. However, Goldmann does not develop a coherent theorisation of this question; like earlier marxist theorists of culture, the emphasis is on the philosophical structure of a work (even if "imaginatively expressed"), and thus tends to be limited to the novel, drama, film, etc. Della Volpe on the other hand, as we have seen, whilst helpfully stressing that poetry, or music, has "meaning" and is no arbitrary or "mysterious" fantasy, does not grasp the aesthetic faculty as a particular mode that concatenates from feeling, experience, and perception, structures that are qualitatively different - in formation and in import - from structures of ideas.

The problem requires, for its resolution, a clear recognition of the distinction between the practice of rational analysis, and syncretistic (largely unconscious) aesthetic creation. In any actual activity - from philosophising to composing music - both practices occur simultaneously or in perpetual oscillation.(20) However, it is necessary to utilise an analytical distinction because the two processes operate differently. The particular mode of operation of each is peculiar to the specific form of society in which it is located. But it is a justifiable scientific assertion (deriving from history, anthropology, psychology) that in all societies the human psyche has definable "functions" or "faculties". Without accepting Psychoanalysis's unhistorical individualism, its positivism etc, the notion of distinctions existing between the cognitive, the emotive, the sexual, and non-rational symbolic activity (whether termed the imagination, the intuition, or dream-process), can surely be conceded as validly denoting a pan-human condition. (The question as to the "number" of such faculties or functions, eg four as it is for Jung, will not, of course, be a problematical issue if science is understood in terms of a dialectical methodology.)

It is precisely due to an implicit recognition of such distinctions that serious marxists have always considered aesthetic form and activity as the object of a specific kind of enquiry, and that the possibility of an independence of an artist's artistic product from his/her conscious ideological convictions, has been upheld. The aesthetic practice is not synonymous with philosophising; from Marx to Lukács Balzac has been regarded as a great novelist but a reactionary, mystified "thinker" (for Lukács the same applies to Thomas Mann).

Hence, at particular historical conjunctures, the most advanced scientific-philosophical theories may not coincide with the most significant aesthetic creation; for example, many of the most significant poets in the English language in the 20th century - such as Yeats, Pound, Eliot - have espoused essentially non-progressive, contradictory political conceptions. And although these conceptions are organically interwoven into their poetry, yet the poetic explorations of complex domains of characteristic experience are more powerfully, more "significantly", more instructively undertaken than in most contemporary poems written by marxists. Sometimes, it appears, the non-adherence to a progressive philosophy may heighten the creative process in areas which are likely to be neglected in a state of consciousness orientated to immediate transformation of the world, and optimism toward the future.

D H Lawrence can be taken as a further example of this phenomenon. His non-marxist view of "industrialism" as a lifeless, murderous machine that threatens every genuine human capacity for sensuality and mental vitality, associated with a quasi-mystical feeling for organic processes, could work as a leaven in his imagination as he explored relationships between individual women and men. It is possible to see that a novelist even partially influenced by the contemporary style of marxism, in the particular conditions of the inter-war period of crisis, might tend to direct his/her creative thrust into other realms - partly because of the belief that fundamental political change was an imminent possibility and was of pressing urgency, and that personal-psychic transformations, though still crucially important, could not be seen as the "only hope" for social renewal. In effect Lawrence's naive (also ultimately reactionary and sexist) social philosophy complemented a pioneering dedication for imaginatively understanding aspects of human relationships which the actual history of bourgeois society has since made enormously important to the struggle for socialism.

Without clear theoretical categories to grasp the different psychic functions, practices other than economic, political and intellectual (ideological) cannot be elucidated with the degree of clarity that has been developed in investigations of the latter. As has been suggested, certain particular marxist studies of cultural movements or "texts" have succeeded in synthesising aesthetic with rational-political insights, but in general marxist theory has succumbed either to absorbing the aesthetic into the ideological, or to affirming the psychic creative process, as distinct from intellectual reflection, in ultimately pre-marxist, metaphysical terms. Adorno and Marcuse demonstrate the latter problem, though it must be acknowledged that they are among the very few marxists who have faced head on the question of a social structuration of, and therefore the social significance of, aesthetic structures as such, - as in eg "pure" music - rather than limiting the consideration of aesthetics to "devices" for transposing reality into a fictional, dramatic, or symbolic universe. That is, they attempt to conceive aesthetic structure both as technique specific to art and as social expressivity - a totality situated within the greater totalities of consciousness and social formation. In this way, they can point to the crucial difference between thought and imagination and to the particular significance of the latter under capitalism; is that the exercise of imagination itself represents a revolutionary potential. (Of course, Marxist science is similarly a simultaneous explication of phenomena, and an evocation of collective critical thinking, but the articulation between these "functions" is different from the organic function of art as aesthetic exploration of specific experience and expression of contra-reified existence in general.)

Raymond Williams's conception of "structures of feeling", used in his analysis of British cultural movements, also represents an important advance in a marxist sociology of cultural form. The development of such a concept rests upon a theory that locates aesthetic structures historically as expressing individual and societal emotional, ideological, intuitive, and sensual tendencies. In real cultural processes, structures of sensibilities and ideas are organically fused, expressing the entirety of the particular psycho-social orientation in question.

Thus, it can be asserted that fascism in Europe in the inter-World War period constituted a comprehensive life-orientation: a complex pattern of ideological, sexual, and emotive "interpolations", an entire cultural experience (as well of course as political, economic etc practices). Goldmann's analysis of the thought of Heidegger(21) as the refined philosophical expression of Nazism's "response" to the real historical ontological problems of the period, succeeds brilliantly in dynamically inter-relating a significant theoretical structure with a concrete historical crisis in which the fascist "project" (in its totality of practices) was a self-contradictory pseudo-resolution. A further task would be to elucidate the corresponding aesthetic-cultural structures in relation to their associated emotive, sexual orientations, and these in relation to the totality.

As has already been indicated, such a development necessitates a theoretical grasping of psychic processes within marxism. This requires a recognition of the fact that none of the categories developed by psychoanalysis, either in the Freudian system or in its various offshoots such as Jung, are compatible with marxism. Yet there are discoveries and insights buried in Freud, Jung, and other schools of psychoanalysis.

In the first place, psychic repression must be regarded as a real social phenomenon. This requires that a distinction be made between conscious and unconscious, however this is formulated. A theorisation of repression entails a conception of something being repressed, and it is here that psychoanalytical frameworks have been hopelessly inadequate. Quite clearly no theory relying on "instincts" or mechanical conceptions of "energy" can be sustained. In general existentialism has rightly countered such an ontology of the psyche with a conception of authentic being-for-itself-in-the-world that is repressed in varying ways in all conditions other than when freely associated human beings co-operate equally in the collective regulation of their existence. Different forms of society hitherto have all entailed psychic repression: in primitive society the subjection of an internally unalienated society, alienated before nature, entailed repression of authentic individual development of potential in an overall way, ie without psychic fragmentation. In class/patriarchal societies, repression has entailed fragmentation, uneven development of "faculties", uneven repression or satisfaction of desires (eg the intense repression of sexuality on which psychoanalysis focuses).

A psychic theory requires a concept of the whole individual human being, actively engaged within a collective social being in the historical process of self-development of needs, faculties, senses, capacities. It must avoid any reduction of life-as-total-process to specific driving "instincts" or separated characteristics of human activity (such as sexuality, aggression, hunger etc).

A satisfactory marxist theory of the psyche is partially developed by Ann Foreman.(22) In her framework the unconscious is seen (a) as a concomitant of class society and patriarchy, and (b) as taking on a distinct form in capitalism - a specific type of class (patriarchal) society.

"With the emergence of patriarchy and class division the sexual act ... became more and more intertwined with the economic, social and cultural relations of a community. The tradition of marriage within a class, the development of a division of labour on the basis of sex and kin position within the community, removed the sexual act from one of spontaneous satisfaction into a highly structured social context ... tension, ... between the demand for rational explanation and the repression through reification of a level of reality from thought, explains the structuring of men's minds within capitalist society - the division between the conscious and the unconscious...

"Freud's theory claimed universal relevance, ours does not. In our understanding, the structuring of the psyche into a conscious and unconscious area is dependent on the process of reification in capitalist society. If men were to overcome reification then the dynamic for this form of mental structuring would cease."(23)

Foreman is not actually clear whether the structuring of the psyche into conscious and unconscious occurs in all class/patriarchal societies, or in capitalism only; the position here would be that it does occur, in different ways, in all class societies. Foreman is clear however, that the unconscious could not exist in primitive society, whereas here it is asserted that it does, although in a specific form. Furthermore, Foreman confines discussion of repression to sexuality, whereas here it is argued that sexuality is only one of the human attributes or functions that undergoes repression in alienated societies. But in spite of these differences, the conception of a marxist theory of the psyche as developed by Foreman is largely in accord with the position expressed here.

In primitive society there is immediacy of experience, therefore the unconscious is not a depository of separated tendencies, disparately repressed. Unlike in class societies, the psyche is not dichotomised around fragmented faculties. However, by contrast with Foreman's conception, the view taken here is that the unconscious exists in primitive society (as it must if there is repression) as a consequence of overall repression of all aspects of human being-in-the-world: from sexuality to cognition, the requirement for food and shelter, the urge for practical mastery of the world, etc. This form of repression is due precisely to the immediacy, the impossibility of a fully conscious self-mastery, which is characteristic of the primitive community. For example, sexuality is spontaneous, therefore not repressed as under patriarchal and class relations; but it is repressed in the sense of its maintaining animality. The humanisation of sexuality (which occurs in distorted ways in class societies, a really free spontaneity depending upon the existence of communist society) is limited, both because of natural constraints such as climate or disease, and because of constraint upon development of an "education of the senses", an imaginative evolution of sexual possibilities etc.

The form of repression present in primitive society is therefore a constriction upon consciousness as a whole; it complements a condition of lack of internal social alienation, within an overall alienation before nature. Socialism sees the progressive overcoming of the conscious/

unconscious dichotomy, in a fully integrated, unrepressed consciousness: this is simultaneous to, and inseparable from, the abolition of class exploitation and relations of oppression between the sexes.

The form of repression under capitalism is a specific fragmentation of consciousness - the forcing of sexual, emotional, and intuitive elements into the unconscious, in ways related to the separation of the economic sphere from the family, the sexual division of labour, the reified division of labour in production and the reified organisation of social administrative processes in bureaucracies of the state and the capitalist enterprise. The general form of psychic repression under capitalism is of course expressed in qualitatively different precise forms in the sexes, in ways orientated to perpetuating the subordination of women; similarly, the general form of repression is expressed in different precise forms in different classes.

The particular (general - in the above sense) form of repression under capitalism sees the domination of a reified, or instrumental rationality, over other "faculties" or tendencies of the whole being. Just as the conscious elements are reified, so when "spontaneously" released the unconscious elements are destructive or chaotic, or reflect the distortion through which they have been held in check. Thus, emancipatory praxis toward overcoming repression, is not only the liberation of repressed dimensions of the whole being, but the transformation, through a new synthetic integration, of both conscious rationality and distorted unconscious sexuality, emotionality etc. Through such integration, a balance of "faculties", aspects or tendencies of the whole being is achieved, allowing the de-reification of thought, and the development of truly conscious self-regulation of existence; sensuality and imagination (or "intuition") come to permeate all levels of human activity, whilst thought attains the capacity to grasp all facets of experience.

Integration of the "all-rounded social individual" entails thought being able to reflect upon all activities of the whole being - practical, mental, sensual etc. Imagination, itself an integrating synthesising "faculty", becomes operative in all activities as well as sustaining general psychic integrity. Feeling becomes capable of entering, and being complementary to, all levels of activity - overcoming the separation of experience into specific "spheres" only in some of which is feeling permitted, a condition- which also entails conflict between feeling and thought, etc. Likewise sensuality enters every domain of experience, overcoming disembodied "spirituality"; a so-called "polymorphous sexuality"(24) overcomes rigid compartmentalisation of sexual satisfaction into distinct contexts, forms etc - a condition associated with patriarchy and monogamy on the one hand, and the capitalist alienation of the labour process on the other.

Sensuality thus enters all perception and experience of nature, humanity, and the products of humanity's activity; such an aestheticising education of the senses is an awakening of the whole being to praxical exploration and experience of reality.

Art, like dream, presents characteristic psychic conflicts and "sublimated" resolutions to repression in non-logical form and "non-rational" temporal sequence. Like the unconscious desires expressed in dream, fundamental responses to the structured experience characteristic of a particular historical condition may momentarily attain concrete expression in art. Art can achieve a different kind of richness from science or philosophy, as the imagination, which operates in the unconscious under conditions of psychic repression, is multiple, dynamic, over-determining and condensing in its symbolism, "ambiguous" because so complex - by contrast to the "ego" and intellect, which necessarily dissects, and puts into temporal, logical sequence.

In the unconscious, which is socio-culturally generated and transmitted as are ideologies, languages, rituals etc, multifold currents are at work joining urges, elements, of widely divergent import. In artistic creation the conscious "ego" does not have to sift contents, analyse and present in logical relations (which loses "flimsy", insubstantial tones - necessarily so in science and philosophy which is ordered, precisely, as thought). Rather, a controlled unconscious process grasps and concatenates vast ranges, realms, dimensions of experience simultaneously, crystallises them into a structured microcosmic whole with a unique form which holds "beauty" and human power through its attainment of something near experienced perfection in its roundedness, exactness of form, but whose content is infinitely complex, over-rich for precise ordering. Art represents particular "dreams" of major poignancy for the specific human reality from which it arises, and also, through historically mediated transformations of experience, for all human realities (the "universality of art"). It bites the core and major "spines" or "tentacles" lying within a structured experience and pronounces them; the form through which this is done is experienced as "beautiful" as it is received as satisfying the "oceanic aspiration", through its opening up, mirroring, and working through particular experience toward intimated resolutions. It urges, moves, to a projected reality which demands and grips an active orientation - answering and pulling together the whole of experienced being.

Both the form and content of the unconscious are historically structured; aesthetic creation strains and struggles with contradictions and currents within specific repressions and possibilities of externalisation. There are no fixed psychic dynamics (as Freud thought); there are only the general "outer parameters" of human existence, as clarified by Marx on other planes. Thus: organised production within definite social relations is a universal characteristic of human existence - "human nature" is only the propensity to transform the mode of metabolism with nature, and therefore transform nature and society itself. A biological "substratum" never exists as such - it is mediated in specific social forms, though it entails certain ultimate constraints and limitations. The "species being" of man is collective labour and self-transformation, with the possibility of uniting social process to consciousness and imagination, ie collective liberation.

For a true science of the psyche, the structure of the unconscious, in specific historical forms, is variable and transformable, having no specific "laws" outside of particular socio-psychic contexts. As understanding of the unconscious grows, it is changed; and imaginative symbolic

activity is no longer identified with the unconscious; as conscious understanding and the unconscious become unified, the psyche is liberated.

It is clear, as implied above, that the history of art in all human societies indicates some degree of "universality" of experience. The common characteristics of art which, it has been argued by some, correspond to the common features of human existence in any society, may be approached in a variety of ways. Thus, the particular materialist slant of Timpanaro emphasises the biological basis of human existence - the common parameters of it which structure consciousness in every social form, though mediated variously according to the social form. Such recognition - of the fact that history must always occur within nature (both external and internal)- does not allow a reductionist assumption that any aspect of human activity or consciousness can be unmediated through historically varying social forms. Hence, in a sense, the "recognition" says very little. It cannot certainly allow an assumption that, for example, the psycho-analytical understanding of love and sexuality derived from the study of individuals in western societies reaches the "psycho-biology" of "man" in general. The requirement still remains of constructing a theory of the psyche which grasps the historical relativity of its structures, no matter how these are constrained by the "eternal" conditions of human existence. Thus, if ageing and death, are and always will be unchangeable features of human existence, they nevertheless occur, and are experienced, in fundamentally different ways in different social contexts. Communism would not remove them, but would universalise an understanding of, and an orientation to them, that was removed of fear; further - except for uneliminable congenital diseases, possibilities of accident etc - social conditions would prevent random disruption of these natural processes, and would allow a qualitatively new kind of controlled intervention in them.

With respect to art, it is doubtful whether this recognition (of "eternal" conditions) does in fact explain its apparent "universality" in distinction from other human products.(25) Equally, it could be conceded, philosophy is constrained by the capacities of the human brain, and reflects, in all circumstances, upon the nature of human and natural reality. It is not only as moments in the historical development of thought, for example, that Plato or Aquinas remain important: it is the fact also that they pronounce upon the "eternal" conditions of human existence.

Thus, the clear "transcendence" of works of art from the social conditions of their production, is not usefully pursued through reference to "eternal Biological or natural conditions of existence". To the extent that these conditions must never be forgotten, this recognition applies equally to any area of human activity. All aspects of human existence are always specifically mediated in socio-historical contexts and grounded in the human species and the natural world within which it lives (from the need for food to the capacity for aesthetic creativity). The characteristic of art, which lends it significance beyond the ideological structures of its social class (and "racial", and sexual) origins, is its capacity to explore areas of experience which are thereby appropriated by human history as a total process. Simultaneously, it is its constant construction of an imaginative transcendence of the conditions of its existence, which locates it in the overall process of human appropriation of new potentiality, and makes it thus capable of infinite re-assimilation.

Art, like dream, is partially a wish-fulfilment of what reality restricts. Cultural consciousness in bourgeois society struggles against repression in experience (and the assimilation of experience into the interpretations of bourgeois world-views) and attempts progressively to express experience more fully, make undistorted experience dominate "waking life" (as in psychoanalytical self-interpretation); it tends to transform reality such as to allow experience to become consciously integrated. This conception of "tendency" is present in Gramsci's analysis of the Turin Factory Councils of 1920; he argued that accumulated experience of partial control over capitalist production is the base from which real economic control develops.

"During the economic and political predominance of the bourgeois class, the actual unfolding of the revolutionary process takes place subterraneously, in the darkness of the factory and in the obscurity of the consciousness of the countless multitudes that capitalism subjects to its laws. It is not controllable and documentable: it will be so in the future when the elements that constitute it (the feelings, the desires, the mores, the germs of initiative and of habit) are developed and purified by the evolution of society and the new place that the working class comes to occupy in the field of production ...

"We say the present period is revolutionary precisely because we can see that the working class, in all countries, is tending to generate from within itself, with the utmost vital energy (if with the mistakes, gropings and encumbrances natural to an oppressed class which has no historical precedent, and must do everything for the first time), proletarian institutions of a new type: representative in basis and industrial in arena. We say the present period is revolutionary because the working class tends with all its energy and all its will-power to found its own State."(26)

The tendencies in cultural forms unfold similarly from unconscious, only slightly understood, dialectical responses to experience, that become progressively more understood and controllable. Alienated experience gives rise to images of, and a partial acting out of, its opposite: these are the founts of a socialist culture.

The deeper is repression, the more unrecognisable is the latent wish, the more hidden its expression. "Normal" consciousness is the more radically alien to the forms of unconscious experience. As self-understanding grows, the gulf is narrowed and consciousness is progressively enriched and transformed through influence from unconscious elements. Transformation is the unification of conscious and unconscious; life is shaped in order to complement the urges of real, "whole" experience, not to maintain its suppression and fragmentation through imposing a mystified interpretation which secures participation in alienated praxis. An alienated working class is the counterpart to the individual whose real experience is deeply buried beneath "waking life".

Cultural forms can be seen as analogous to dreams: a form of thinking- experiencing, "working" on waking life (material social activity) - transmuting, distorting in specific ways "normal" experience. The link between a conscious wish which, for psychoanalysis, becomes a dream-

instigator if it awakens an unconscious (eg infantile) impulse, is analogous to the relationship between any actual cultural expression (immediate impulse) and the "subterranean" historical pattern accumulated into the life of a society or a class, which may be "tapped" or opened out by it.

Cultural forms encapsulate areas of experience repressed in "normal life", expressing dimensions (resonances) excluded in "ego-perception"; simultaneously they condense wish-fulfillments, ie sublimated resolutions and alternatives to normality. But also, like structures of ideas they usually contain ideological elements that legitimate status quo reality. Freud's distinction between "manifest content" and "latent content" of a dream can frequently be seen as paralleled in cultural forms in the relationship between "surface" ideological representations and a deeper, dialectical expression of social experience.

As already stated, different social forms are associated with particular, characteristic psychic structures. "Laps of psychic dynamics", like economic "laws", pertain to the particular historical form of which they are expressions. All particular forms - of psyche, or economic system - nevertheless occur within the conditions of human existence in general.

The dominant form of psychic organisation in capitalist society consists of a conscious "ego", associated with specific modes of abstract conceptualisation, assumptions about reality etc which are compatible with the "normal" role of the individual within the whole society - which exists in a particular relationship to a characteristic form of unconscious. Both the natures of the ego and the "id" (or conscious and unconscious) are historically specific, and also the form taken by the conscious/unconscious interaction. This interaction is (a) contradiction: unconscious elements tending to pass into the conscious, the conscious tending to force back these elements and restrict the dimensions of the ego such as to secure a limited consistency, an unthreatened experience of normality; (b) mutual passage: the passing from unconscious into conscious of elements that can no longer be held unconscious, because historical transformations have given rise to circumstances in which such elements are too strongly developed to be constrained. Examples are found in the changing forms of sexuality under capitalism: advancing consumerism, urban atomisation, the requirement for female labour, both evoke new intensities of (fragmented) eroticism and also undermine the bases wherein limited means of satiation could formerly be sustained whilst holding sexuality otherwise in check - marriage, family, clandestine relationships, prostitution etc. These contradictory forms are analogous to the political and economic incorporation of working class aspirations in the Welfare State, legalised Trade Unions etc, and like these are constantly challenged by real historical urges that cannot finally be contained by them.

Simultaneously, conscious elements may pass back into the unconscious for opposite reasons: if they can no longer be incorporated into normality. Examples in the history of capitalist society may be "lost" rustic experiences of communion with nature (and against the claim that common rural folk do not know such experience need only be made a recommendation to hear the

"bardic" poetry of countless pre-industrial societies, or the songs of peasants from Italy, Mexico, or Ireland); or the reduction of satisfactions enjoyed in the creativity of craftsmanship in earlier phases of development in the social division of labour; or the sense of lost "aura" surrounding phenomena so central to modernist pessimism.

Historical change brings about shifts not only in the position of the barrier between conscious/unconscious, but in its qualitative contours. Repression as conceived by psychoanalysis is distorted into an ahistorical abstraction which is then seen to exist, like Feuerbach's "human nature", in each individual human being. Satisfactorily conceived, repression is the psychic counterpart to alienation. It is concrete, and its forms are qualitatively different in relation to the different historical contexts in which it occurs. Just as alienation in any specific form of society is to be understood in relation to the particular form of labour process etc that predominates in that form of society, so repression can only be interpreted in relation to the dominant psychic structure of individuals in a particular historical (and class, and sexual) context.

Where there is contradiction between conscious and unconscious (repression), this is related to social alienation and economic, class (and/or sexual) exploitation as constituted in that social form. For primitive society, where economic exploitation does not yet occur, repression exists in forms related to primitive alienation - an existence under the oppressive domination of an undirectable nature. Psychic struggle is therefore a real historical process, general to all (unfree) hitherto existing forms of society, but existing concretely in specific, historically demonstrable forms. Within a particular form of society, eg capitalism, psychic struggle takes on forms which, like class struggle, are sometimes orientated toward resolution of contradiction through psychic and social transformation and sometimes toward forms of rebellion which are undirected and unable to conceive themselves in relation to a potential, real resolution. Just as class-conscious proletarian politics can be contrasted with terrorism, anarchism, utopian or anti-technological quietism, crime or alcoholism, or even retrograde populist forms such as fascism - so, on the level of psychic contradiction imaginative resolutions to repressed psychic urges and experience in cultural and aesthetic pursuits (as in progressive "experiment" in life-style) can be contrasted with, for example, psychotic breakdown, a "false" resolution giving rise to complete disintegration rather than a movement toward higher integration.

This returns us to the point raised earlier: that spontaneous responses to repression, without a guiding impulse of emancipatory re-integration, may unleash unconscious elements in chaotic or negative forms. We can understand, in these terms, a central theme in literature and drama of the bourgeois epoch: the clash between individual self-expression and social conformity, between rebellion against repressive constraints and social responsibility. Thus for example, the tension in Mozart's *Don Giovanni* is between an individual's unleashing of desire, his satiation of erotic urges, and the consequent suffering of others. The giving of a free reign to sexual urges is inseparable from callous, exploitative relationships towards others; human decency can only be maintained through conformity to social norms. As in Freud's ideological psychology of

bourgeois civilisation, repression appears as inherently necessary for any social order; the "id" is inevitably, permanently anti-social. Thus, after the explosive eruption of the life-forces in the Don has been purged - in his being dragged down to hell, normality is bleached and insipid.

The only "conscience" which can check the immorality of the Don is that of the establishment, the normality of the existing class/patriarchal society. "Repent!" - "No!", "Repent!" - "No!": the excruciating tension of the conflict between a hypocritical normality and a callous rebellion is in no way resolved in the Condatore's morality.

The same phenomenon is there in Milton's *Paradise Lost*; the life-affirming forces are intertwined with Evil in the devil. God's realm of purity is devoid of struggle, or heroic affirmation in development - as both Blake and Shelley separately noticed. They both also cited Milton's poem as an example of the imaginative power of poetry transcending in implication the conscious ideas conveyed - a judgement that applies also to the relationship between the dramatic plot and the music in Mozart's opera.

In Dostoyevsky's *Crime and Punishment* the same essential reality is conveyed. Raskolnikov's rebellion is Nietzschean; the rejection of the existing order leads him to amorality. Pity for the suffering of humanity evolves into contempt for the mass of humanity - the "Napoleon complex". The implied resolution to Raskolnikov's crisis is a Christian resignation to punishment from society as it is, a reconciliation with an unjust world here on earth - and to a religion in which all contradictions are metaphysically resolved. Rejected existing rules can only be replaced by no rules, or rules created by the individual egotistically - subject to no constraints beyond himself. The overcoming of psychic repression is seen as possible only through the unleashing of repressed urges which are destructive, distorted, nihilistic, etc - as a result of their previous repression. The perceived necessity of removing all such expressions simply reinstates the repressive normality - purged and purified, only to reproduce the conditions for further convulsive explosions. But again, Dostoyevsky's literary imagination allows an exploration of fundamental aspects of the self in bourgeois society in spite of, even partly because of, his limited (from the viewpoint of late 19th century possibilities) intellectual-social world-view.

In R L Stevenson's *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* the dichotomy is again between repressive, Victorian, hypocritical normality, and repressed life-forces which, when released in the "alter ego", are aggressive - eroticism is expressed in sadistic cruel forms. In Oscar Wilde's *The Picture of Dorian Gray* the pursuit of sensual pleasure takes on forms that are corrupting to the soul. The choice presented in life is between attention to the soul, or an egotistical hedonism addicted to transient beauty, incapable of reconciliation with mutability or with human relationships based on mutual love and kindness.

The twentieth century has expressed in collective form these tendencies, that pervade literature during the whole bourgeois epoch: in fascism there is a mass rejection of bourgeois hypocrisy, and free reign is given to amorality, aggression, sadistic eroticism. In advanced bourgeois society

a real resolution is open however: the overcoming of repression, the full exploration of sensual experience, the rebellion against tyranny through revolutionary praxis - the simultaneous emancipation of self and society.

The psychic struggle in a particular form of society, such as capitalism in a particular period and location in its development, is an overall or omnipresent social phenomenon, though its significant expressions may be located in circumscribed contexts. For example, experiential explorations and partial resolutions to general conditions of the psyche under capitalism, in forms which pertain to and hold relevance for an historical reality beyond the context in which they came into being, can be seen as concentrated in Vienna between the 1870's and the First World War. Late classical-romantic music, Schoenberg's musical revolution, the birth of psychoanalysis, existential and phenomenological philosophy, the birth of modern physics, a genesis of European fascist ideas and sensibilities, and important contributions to Marxism: such a complex, contradictory structure of developments expressing crucial dimensions and processes of bourgeois civilisation as a whole, allows Vienna in this period to be seen as a sort of cauldron of bourgeois society, a concentrated microcosm of an historical totality. Paris in the period between the two World Wars contains a similar significance (with the final throes of Da-da, Surrealism, Cubism, the emergence of Existentialism, etc). These are instances of creative formulation of psychic and existential experience, struggle, and possibilities of resolution, in forms which though located in specific circumstances and therefore bearing the marks of the concrete contexts (class, locality etc) in which they emerged (the rapid development of urban capitalism in the particularly anachronistic conditions of the late Hapsburg Empire in the one instance), are significant expressions of general psychic conditions under capitalism. An analogy could be made with the 1871 Paris Commune as a particular event which, in its relation to the general characteristics and developmental tendencies of bourgeois society, has served as a crucially significant phenomenon for marxist analysis.

Psychic struggle gives rise to new integrative orientations of experience; the concept of cultural innovation entails a recognition of the inter-relation between artistic products, patterns of living, tendencies in sensual, intellectual, emotional and "spiritual" orientation - such that the link between political movements, cultural and artistic tendencies can be seen to be a deep and complex aspect of the structure of society.

Dramatic cultural innovation occurs most often under capitalism when "normality" is experienced as intolerable, impossible, or in fact non-existent (in crisis, social disintegration etc). Just as in science new paradigms have to be developed when old ones no longer fit what scientists see, so new psychic integrations are aspired towards when old ones are no longer felt. This process, although central to the nature of capitalist society, does not necessarily occur most evidently at those loci of the society in which the other crucial contradictions are being expressed - in particular at the labour/capital interface in the production process. At certain periods it may come to be associated more (in mass, immediate experience) with the contradictions of urban existence under capitalism - not primarily in production, but in "civil society", ie that dimension

of social existence contained in the notion of "the public". Or it may be most strongly related to oppression in the family and experienced patterns of socialisation; to sexual anxiety, conflict and frustration in monogamous marriage; to the oppressive, unequal relationship between the sexes and the particular oscillating pattern of "subjectivity" and "alterity" evolved in the sexual relationship.

The processes of social reproduction give rise to dominant character structures conceived by Wilhelm Reich as "armours", developed as appropriate forms for individuals to interact with alienated reality and to maintain the repression of urges, tendencies of perception and sensibility etc which cannot be incorporated into "normality". Bertell Ollman writes that;

"Marx had mentioned sex as a natural and human power, as a way of relating to nature, along with eating, seeing, working and many other human conditions and functions. He did declare ... that the quality of the sexual relationship offers the clearest insight into the degree to which man the animal has become a human being. Yet, the only power whose influence is examined in any detail is work."(27)

It might be argued that Marx analysed in detail not only work, but also at least thought, as human powers. For both categories of activity, his method allows the development of concepts which entail their being understood as general human activities which take on specific forms in particular types of society. Thus Marx's economic theory evolves general concepts such as use-value and exchange-value, surplus, exploitation etc, and concepts on varying levels of generality to analyse closely the mode of functioning of the capitalist economy. Similarly, his critique of 19th century philosophies, his conception of ideology etc and his considerations on method, contribute to an epistemology which is simultaneously an historical materialist analysis of thought; general characteristics of cognitive-symbolic activity are scrutinised alongside the changing forms associated historically with particular social forms.

As usual, Marx's analysis of these human activities (economic theory, theory of knowledge), are not mutually exclusive. They are seen as pertaining to the same reality. Work and thought are not separable activities in any real society; economics and ideology are not discrete entities in reality, to be studied by discrete and separate sciences. Hence, Marx's emphasis on work or thought does not entail a presumption that these activities are of greater importance than others; the recognition of totality as a fundamental condition of social reality precludes this - all activities entail one another in organic social processes. Other human activities, from visual perception to sexuality must be analysed through appropriate methodologies. The discoveries of various bourgeois sciences in these areas need to be appropriated in historical materialist terms. This entails an expansion and deepening of Marxism, not in itself an overturning of it. If the development of knowledge requires fundamental critique and re-working of Marx's formulations (as it frequently does), this is not because of a simple quantitative addition of new areas of knowledge which were not developed within Marx's work. It is not a question, for example, of "combining" Marx and Freud, nor of bringing about a synthesis. It is a question of the expansion

and development of that mode of social thought and practice which first emerged with Marx - and only began with Marx.

In fact, the general conception of "human metabolism with nature", and the concept of alienation related to it in Marx, are ones that provide a starting-point for the analysis of any human activity whatsoever. Human metabolism with nature entails all the human faculties, senses, and capacities for work and co-operation. Labour on this level is for Marx all-inclusive; it is the entirety of human activity and existence. Alienation, the degree to which human societies have hitherto never been in full, conscious control of their metabolism with nature, refers therefore inevitably to all activities and all faculties.

Revolutionary praxis in the spheres of sexuality, sensual experience, and emotion, must entail both an expansion and deepening of communication and understanding of how the existing forms of such activity are grounded in the repressive mechanisms of capitalism (by which is indicated specific class and patriarchal relations), and how their implications are reproduced on all planes of existence - but also a development of collective practices that allow deeper expressiveness, sensual enjoyment etc than do the alienated forms that exist. Not to do so is to leave control over urges connected with sexuality, sensual enjoyment etc, to commercial capital or to anti-socialist individuals and groups. Not merely the "consciousness raising" in discussion of "personal problems" is required, but the positive acting out of desires, urges, fantasies etc with the use of an imagination that is blended with critical, intellectual, revolutionary understanding. This is all, of course, necessarily harnessed to struggles to transform all existing institutions of capitalist society - from the economic system itself to the family structure.

A grasping of human activity as a totality, a dynamic but whole being-in-the-world, characterised as human by praxis or self-development and transformation, allows insights from eg psychoanalysis to be appropriated without reproducing its fragmented, hypostatized, biologised models of psychic processes. As already argued, such a development may be greatly enriched through a dialectical extraction from Kant, as well as Jung and psychoanalysis in general, which can help give rise to an historical materialist theory and practice of the psyche and its various aspects: emotion, sexuality and sensuality, imagination etc. Tendencies in such a direction have been anticipated by the Frankfurt School theorists, in particular Adorno and Marcuse, who have striven to show that under capitalism (and in different ways, perhaps in other social forms) the faculty that dominates consciousness is reason or intellect, and that therefore the others (emotion, sensuality, intuition - alternatively called feeling, sexuality, imagination) are repressed and distorted. Reason as an alienated activity, orientated towards control and domination over what is construed and expressed as chaos, takes on anti-human attributes ("technical reason" or "instrumental rationality").

Alienated organisation of the division of labour entails a "subjection to a particular single activity that is programmed into individuals at an early age, so that in other spheres they can at most participate in a passive way".(28) Thus the fragmentation of social labour in an alienated

collectivity entails a suppression of praxical, imaginative-synthesizing thought and activity - the constriction of consciousness to narrow horizons and the repression (and therefore the distortion) of all other faculties and orientations. This is paralleled by the channelling of more and more activities outside of productive activity into forms structured by the commodity form - ie "leisure" experience becoming "goods or services" produced as commodities for exchange, realising profit for entrepreneurs' capital. A continual development of complex means to control all areas of sensual and imaginative experience - channelling them into forms compatible with capitalist reproduction, engages contradictorily in an assimilation of urges, aspirations, curiosities etc that are themselves evoked and aroused by developing capitalism.

The urge to break out of the cycle of "inert existence" (material reproduction within relations of exploitation and domination, and mental activity in alienated form), where it cannot be expressed in reality, is crystallised in encased ideas, in myth, in isolated dreams and rituals, and in cultural-aesthetic forms (in which a praxis occurs in a specific medium). Here is condensed, often in isolated activities, what can only be really satiated in real-life activity in and upon existence, transforming it *in toto* in organic growth. This is only possible as a full collective process, where each individual feels himself a part of the collective process yet free (ie self-determining, spontaneous): a condition in which the collectivity and the self are not in mutual antagonism. In class societies, reproduction is through "inert" material activity and alienated intellectual synthesizing activity. Real praxis can only be in and through collective transformation; the global consciousness of philosophy etc, and the praxical exploration of experience in myth, art etc, are crystallised expressions of a praxis which can only be effected when individuals are socially integrated and also free - ie in collective praxis. One aspect of art is thus a sympathy, an identification of sensibilities, with transcendence through exploration of experience - from tragic drama to abstract "purs" form; art is thus a "congealed praxis".

In every epoch in every structure of society, the psychic structure of certain groups or individuals (and sometimes the entire collectivity) is such that a balanced "eruption" from the unconscious and conscious, or imagination and intellect, shapes forms of beauty within systems of understanding which "express the age" (ie condense the contradictory totality including intimations of tendencies toward resolution). This is the source of what may become dominant forms of architecture, poetry, religious ideals etc. The significant Expression of collective experience and aspiration, especially in differentiated fragmented societies, frequently occurs through particular individuals. In bourgeois society it is often a kind of "fissure" through the psychic "strata" of particular individuals that is responsible for such collectively significant expressions. The dominant structures of sensibility and ideology in a classless, primitive collective indicate the unity of natural and spiritual forces that is felt. Polynesian ritual and song for example, still suggests the orientation of a collective unity identifying itself within a natural process: an opening to the sun (light, happiness) and a driving down to earth (darkness, pain). A unified pattern of opposites expresses Man as within, and part of, the Cosmos. Simultaneously, the art of a primitive collective is characterised by the general features of aesthetic activity

delineated earlier. Lévi-Strauss's analysis of Caduveo art,(29) for instance, indicates that reflection, critique, and harmonious form (beauty) are applicable categories; research into the aesthetic criteria used by the Yoruba to judge their sculpture indicates a conception of art as achieving resemblance to reality simultaneously to significant abstraction or transposition, in forms that display luminosity, smoothness, symmetry, virtue.(30) A pantheist cosmology simultaneous to a sublimated resolution of social contradiction is indicated in the following:

"It is usual for the act of carving itself to be hedged round with rituals, since the tree which provides the wood is generally regarded as the home of a spirit which needs to be placated. In the case of sculptures which are to be a home for a spirit, such as the masks and ancestor figures of the Dogon, it is easy to see that a conflict between the two forces inhabiting the wood needs to be avoided. Among the Dogon the life force of the tree is controlled by driving little iron hooks into the mask, since the life force of the iron is more powerful than that of the wood."(31)

In class societies, ever more complex contradictions are expressed internally to aesthetic form. Antagonistic class bases may be intermingled in a unitary, but contradictory aesthetic experience; a contradiction between commodity fetishism and authentic anti-repressive ritual for example, is frequently at the core of popular cultural activity in bourgeois societies.

Inherent in the task of theorising a marxist aesthetic appropriate to advanced capitalist societies, is the drawing from the complex of contemporary sensibilities a consciously directed experiential praxis: an exploration and discovery of integrated, appropriate sensibilities in endless dynamic self-transformative process. A process of extraction and distillation, a selective appropriation from all cultural tendencies is required, as none are usually in practice wholly proletarian or bourgeois, wholly "retrograde" or "progressive". This entails recognition of how imaginative resolutions to contradictory experience under capitalism undergo transformations at different stages of capitalist development; historical "possibilities" expressed in cultural forms face the future from the point of conjuncture at which they arise. The future may not "take up" these possibilities; for example the vision of Socialism in 1848 Europe was not to be concretely practised - the reality of socialism in the 20th century, whilst being generically the same, requires ever new construction of appropriate visions.

Later we shall look at the conception and experience of nature that is pertinent to contemporary socialist transformation. Nature as dialectical, organic, dynamic, active "energy-matter", is a meaningful process within which society and self are orientated. Such understanding of nature is by society as a whole, which is in the process of becoming a unified, organic, conscious structure. Development of self-determined production is the negation of reified control over alienated producers and relations of domination in all forms; the negation of disturbance and disruption of nature and their replacement by harmonious metabolism. The practice of aesthetic form in social relations is complemented in the forms of society's mediation with nature: in goods, houses, cities, in social institutions and in forms of labour organisation. Conceptions and experience of natural beauty are translated, appropriated, into self-developed social forms.

Cultural movements are dynamic structures of aesthetic sensibility, conceivable analytically as a particular level of social practice but in actuality existing multi-dimensionally in the concrete social totality, or complex of practices. They are contradictory strands of experience, thought and emotion, intermingled and concatenated into specific works, performances, ritual activities, aesthetic tendencies, etc. Deriving from experience in all forms of practice in all classes and both sexes (though unequally and unevenly), and from contradictory moments of antagonistic social relations, their implications are dynamic and in continual transformation. Cultural tendencies are total textual patterns, bearing complex relationships to sexual and class-historical interests and perspectives (ie, orientating towards types of society).

The conception of cultural tendencies expressed here is of course one that is strained towards in the ideas of many theorists. As already said, Lucien Goldmann is one of these, an examination of whose insufficiencies helps to clarify a framework more adequate to grasping cultural-aesthetic practice. For Goldmann, literary structures in modern bourgeois society have been either: (a) representative expressions of specific class aspirations and experience (such as the tragic vision of the Noblesse de Robe in 17th century France), or (b) representations of the entire society's mode of existence as a type (such as the modern "declassé" novel, reflecting advanced capitalism on the level of reification). Now most artistic structures in bourgeois society require interpretation on a far greater complexity of levels. Examples to indicate this could be taken from any medium, but one from music may bring out the variety of problems associated with mono-dimensional explanations. The symphonies of Bruckner convey a mystic pantheism framed' within a Catholic religious structure of ideas, in a feeling-form moulded from traditions of religious music, 19th century classical and romantic music, peasant folk music etc. They express the sense of a necessary, momentous alteration of the psyche, which is related both to the dislocation of Austrian monarchic absolutism within modern capitalism, and also to the "modern" individual's trapped experience - which is also vast, but unsustainable by society. A complex of structures is entailed, multi-dimensional in nature, consisting also (just prior to Freud) of the discovery of the repressed unconscious in forms related to the traditional patriarchal repression of sexuality etc, opened up in a particular context.

Aesthetic structures of sensibility, like ideologies, do not have simplistically specific "class belongings". As Ernesto Laclau shows in his critique of Poulantzas's analysis of fascism (32), ideologies are socially generated by the entirety of a specific social formation's pattern of historically shaped relationships - ie its total process, though specific classes and class "fractions" may be the main bearers or agents for their expression. According to Laclau, "liberalism" should be seen as an ideology of bourgeois societies in specific contexts, not as the ideology of the bourgeoisie "in general". It is not the belief of a single class-subject, but rather the ideological means whereby a whole society is mobilised into actions orientated to reproducing its dominant relations. Thus "liberalism" in Britain was the historical outcome of specific antagonistic class relations (the ascendant bourgeoisie versus the aristocracy and artisanate, the bourgeoisie versus the proletariat) in the specific concrete circumstances of

Britain. An understanding of liberalism in Britain therefore, must include consideration of the particular kind of aristocracy opposed by, and the particular proletariat developed by, the bourgeoisie, as these affected the form of the dominant bourgeois ideology.

Thus, ideologies and structures of feeling etc are generated through total societal processes; they are not "predicates" of concrete collective "subjects". Registering this corrective, which should not however be seen as an elimination of the active human subject of thought, we can assimilate from Goldmann the idea that literary creations are structurings of collective consciousness that (a) help men gain awareness of themselves and of their own affective, intellectual and practical aspirations, and (b) afford the group's members a satisfaction on the imaginary plane which must and can compensate for frustrations, compromises, inconsistencies in reality. That aesthetic structures may be seen, on a certain level, as dual-faceted ("reflection" and "implicit critique" of social conditions of existence being concentrated into an experience of transcendence which can be called artistic beauty), is a tenet central to this work.⁽³³⁾ But for Goldman (a) is synonymous with the positive world-views of ascending classes or the pessimistic world-views of declining classes. His formulation of this facet is limited both by a reduction of aesthetic structure of sensibility to the ideological, and also by the restrictive conception of class-subject.

Goldmann's conception of (b) grasps the elements of structured escapism, or relevant fantasy, or significant yearned-for ideals, represented in literary expressions. But his formulation is predicated on the idea of a "great" literary structure realising a world-view at its most coherent and adequate, expressing the "maximum possible consciousness" of a social group. It cannot then penetrate the nature of artistic "transcendence". Connected with the recognition that imaginative structuration is analytically distinct from the elaboration of intellectual systems and doctrines, is the possibility of understanding how aesthetic "dream-ideals" go beyond the "possibilities" of specific classes. For example, the bourgeois ideology of unrestricted social mobility is inseparable from that of the "free" market. In reality the first is not guaranteed by the second; whilst intellectually the contradiction cannot be resolved within any ideology "possible" for the bourgeoisie, elements of an "ideal" state of freedom may be imaginatively expressed which do transcend the world-view identifiable with the continuation of existence of the bourgeois class. Similarly, the highest expressions of the bourgeois project of universality and individual freedom come into conflict with the reality of bourgeois society which, even in its idealised form, limits these even for the bourgeoisie. Logical contradictions in the complex of bourgeois doctrines can only be resolved through a self-conscious radical re-orientation of thought, as in Marxism; but in the "art of the bourgeois epoch" tendencies to resolution may be imaginatively conveyed.

Thus a "mental structure" or "structure of sensibilities" should never be seen as "pure" to a specific class, but as generated through a totality of class relationships in a specific social formation: this requires elucidation of how aspirations, values etc enter, fuse, interact between classes. In English Romanticism of circa 1780-1830 is to be found a complex dynamic structure of ideas, values, sensibilities, mediated experiences, indicating fusions across class

"perspectives" and presenting protagonists originating from all classes. We can distinguish in most tendencies within Romanticism elements of a "positive" bourgeois world-view: egotistical individualism; an enthusiasm for technology and natural energy as such, ie a lack of critique of these as alienated forces in the context of capitalism by contrast to an understanding of them as potentially human powers; an acceptance of 18th century materialism, rationalism, anti-clericism from a bourgeois secular standpoint etc. So also can aristocratic ideals be seen as periodically crystallising: such as a pining for fixed, unchanging "perfection" - a static Goodness or Truth; an associated feeling that the eternal is unreachable in life, frequently leading to a death-wish, or nihilistic melancholy, a detachment from concrete reality whose basis is to some degree the aristocrat's painful self-abolition in concrete reality. Time and change (which is pain), are set against an eternal truth whose experience is ecstatic, but unattainable concretely in life.

But simultaneously, we find the expression of a new, radical "proletarian" ideal, which is both an historically appropriate class view and a partial resolution of bourgeois, aristocratic, and artisanate contradictions in thought and experience. This is the striving to realise the universal in the concrete, to install "genius" as a characteristic of all human beings, to conceive progress not as an abstraction but as society's self-determination, to see the advance of technology and knowledge not as reified entities but as dimensions of the human appropriation of man and nature, to create "individuality" as integrated personality and a fulfilment of the non-egoistical self in a free, equal collective. Just as the "bourgeois" or "aristocratic" tendencies are never pure or free of their opposites, the radical "proletarian" thrust is affected by the "raw materials" of the former from which, to a considerable extent, the "progressive" resolutions are evolved. The ideals and structures of yearned-for experience present in the "romantic movement" are not static, but changing moments of a collective practice, an historical suppression, discovery and creation. Cultural processes, as praxes, entail action, thought, imaginative feeling etc in the structuring of new realities within which they are themselves changed in continuous complexes of interaction in the totality.

Seen from its "objective" side, capitalism is a process whereby capital derives surplus value from labour-power. "Subjectively", it is the activity, thought, experience, of social classes. In relation to all classes, it entails contradictory institutional, political, emotional, and aesthetic reactions and deliberate orientations to this process. Art and cultural tendencies under capitalism should be seen in this light: both as the product of specific classes (and sexes) produced by and acting out this process, but also as a continuous appropriation of developing feelings and needs, experienced alienation and the rejection of it - incorporated and worked through within it.

It has been said that forms of sensuous, emotional, and sexual repression are specific to particular types of society and to the particular constitutive classes. Similarly, the mode of liberation from such repressions is socially specific. The mode of release of unconscious elements in a process of social transformation is as crucial to it as are the types of political ideology dominating or the forms of social organisation involved. The interpretation of the rise of Nazism, for example, requires an understanding of the particular form of unconscious release

that was involved, integrated within the concrete process of crisis in German capitalism, the specific forms of nationalist and imperialist ideology generated, the particular form of recreation and transformation of traditional German collective organisation etc. Social movements are interacting complexes of such different levels of practice or structure in their very being; the historically conscious project of socialism is also. Socialism is a collective self-imposition of aesthetic beauty upon society, grounded in and inseparably interwoven with the proletariat as a class whose revolutionary potential is inherent in its very being as structured by capitalism. As with the relationship between revolutionary "intellectuals" etc and mass praxis, that between producers of aesthetic forms and the living cultural process is dialectical, dynamic, interactive, not a construction of "leaders", "educators" etc who, as subjects, act upon society as an inert object. Revolution is self-experimentation, not a "cold" observation and manipulation: it is a praxis of collective living. "Ideals" generated from previous alienated class-divided societies are seen as fractured and distorted since they have rested upon continuous exploitation. Socialism, for the first time in human history, strives not "for" particular reified "ideals" as "things", but is a struggle to be something.

Conceptual and affective structures, or "affective schema" (to borrow a term from Piagetian psychology), can be located in cultural "performances" or products which are related to complex, dynamic class perspectives and modes of experience. Such "schema" contain contradictions and struggle within themselves. Their pivotal expressions, in cultural products, bear complex relations to the "whole" of social phenomena, of significance far beyond considerations of their immediate, direct influence. As mentioned before, Goldmann's location of Heidegger's philosophy in relation to fascism, and Lukács's thought in relation to revolutionary socialism, is an instance of the analytical elucidation of conceptual schema within and as part of social processes.

As with "fascism", "bourgeois democracy", "liberalism", "reformism" etc, socialism is a project structured in the activity of specific social blocs within a social totality. Socialist movements in particular national contexts need to define their mode of experience on all planes, to evolve a complex of sensibilities - ethical, aesthetic, emotional - in dynamic interrelationships with intellectual theorising and patterns of political organisation and practice. Thus, the revolutionary process in the industrial monopoly capitalist, "anglo-saxon protestant" countries must take on forms of cultural-aesthetic practice pertinent to their particular psychic organisations of sensory repression and manipulation.

Historical materialism as scientific methodology and intellectual framework of analysis, must elucidate the appropriate emotive orientations of collective world-transformation and self-emancipation - urges toward new human relationships and practical ethics, and examine their relationships to a cosmology that conceives of human history as occurring within a natural universe which is experienced no longer as a bourgeois dichotomy of divine eternal spirit/mechanical static matter - but as process, uniting "spirit" and "matter" in a higher ontological synthesis. An experience of the self as a moment of intersection in an organic,

dialectical process of society, complements dialectically the experienced processes of organic and inorganic, self-transforming nature.

Each dimension of thought and experience in the transformative process is evolved within specific historical cultures - dynamic complexes which make possible different specific forms through which the redefinition can occur (cf the significance of Taoism to China, Romanticism to Britain(34)): just as socialism utilises and develops upon specific levels of development of productive forces, shaped in particular ways in particular national or regional contexts.

Dominant cultural symbolisms orientate the psyche and the social collective towards forms of existence complementary to the dominant mode of production established in a society. Under capitalism, the process of surplus value realisation requires a symbolism orientated to adjustment to psychic fragmentation and the production of ugliness in the physical and human environment. In the transition to socialism a new sensibility emerges, which draws from the historical accretion of oppositional tendencies within capitalism, and is given concrete efficacy under socialism. This sensibility complements a developing mode of production and distribution based on harmony and the creation and appreciation of aesthetic form: in objects (use-values), in social relationships, in the structure and form of labour, in nature and in the humanly constructed environment.

The development of the technology of communications in some advanced capitalist societies poses conditions of cultural struggle in which there exists a centralised, capital-intensive, almost "unitary" means of electronics-based communication. The question of class control and/or ownership of these, the struggle for access to the means of cultural production, becomes central to revolutionary cultural strategy.

In for instance the Britain of the early 19th century, oppositional culture and ideology expressed in the alternative radical press could use relatively simple means of production to challenge the bourgeois press. Bourgeois hegemony in the press was achieved, or sustained, through censorship and "market forces" which worked to create a popular appeal for sensationalism etc. In Russia, prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, a revolutionary press and the distribution of leaflets etc could "undercut" information issuing from bourgeois and tsarist sources. In advanced technocratic capitalism or state socialism, no such undercutting through forms reliant on simpler technologies is sufficient for establishing a revolutionary cultural hegemony. Cultural struggle is forced (the terrain of struggle is determined historically) to adopt a strategy of gaining positions within the "unitary" cultural and information network; favourable balances of social forces allow concessions to be wrested from the bourgeoisie in terms of access to existing media (in ways analogous to mass pressure affecting government policies; wages struggles etc). Before the electronic means of communication can be qualitatively and fundamentally changed through progressive revolutionary transformation (just as under socialism the means of production will be qualitatively transformed in relation to the transformation of the labour process), the struggle for better positions within the apparatus of mass culture must express the class struggle

simultaneously to cultural struggle outside this apparatus; working for positions more favourable for further struggle.

A marxist aesthetic for advanced monopoly conditions must therefore recognise that revolutionary aesthetic "techniques" cannot assume access to the media most preferred for their expression and use. By contrast, the debates within marxism in the 1920's and 1930's over the avant-garde movements(35) were still engaged in on the implicit assumption of an "open" technical-cultural network (though in fact it was probably already too late for this), in the sense that, for example exhibitions, dramatic productions etc could "compete" with their bourgeois analogues. The terms of reference were such that it could be seen as necessary for a marxist aesthetic to consider technique, form, and choice of content comparatively, in order to judge their degree of appropriateness to socialism. "High art" was still an important component of ruling class ideological coherence, and modernism, aimed at subverting it, could claim a potential relevance for direct mass cultural praxis (even if, for example, the Surrealists in Europe and the Constructivists in Russia were in effect unable to bring about a mass practice from their movements). Theorists such as Breton, Benjamin and Brecht do not yet recognise the distinction between mass culture, orientated to a saturating identification with commodity fetishism, and modernism - which has since become more clearly an exclusively minority concern. Thus, they envisage their techniques, practised on a wide societal basis, utilising advanced technological possibilities. The issue, for Benjamin, as to who controls the media technology, is not seen as crucial; he considers the "possibilities" of eg cinema without fundamentally exploring this.

In conditions of advanced capitalism, even when and if "modernism" or an avant-garde can be considered as significant or efficacious, it is encapsulated within minority circles unless for some reason it has access to the mass media. Furthermore, the mass media have already assimilated all the essential techniques of modernism in advertising, films, entertainment shows etc.

The central issues in marxist aesthetics now, concern therefore the debate over and choice between techniques, forms etc than power relations in the technology of communications and thus access to societalwide audiences, simultaneously to practice that draws out cultural and aesthetic mass potentialities. It becomes clear at this juncture that all techniques and all forms are potentially revolutionary: both realism and satire, both the lyric and drama, both representational and non-representational imagery, etc. Different forms are appropriate to different media and means of expression, and to different contexts. Thus lyric poetry can exist side by side with surrealist or realist film. All new, emergent tendencies should be consciously engaged in, in order to draw out from them their revolutionary potentialities, to steer them away from whatever retrogressive aspects they may carry over from the contexts of their emergence within bourgeois society.

The controversy within marxism mentioned above, in the inter-war period, can be situated within the general context of the shift in strategic thinking from "Leninist" to "Gramscian" conceptualisations. This issue, to be considered more closely later concerns a shift from

revolution conceived as a mass movement co-ordinated and led by a tightly-organised vanguard, to revolution as total societal self-transformation. There is a level on which Lukacs's insistence on realism as the mode for revolutionary literature complements a Leninist division between leaders/intellectuals/ educators and the masses: the socialist writer creates microcosmic expressions of the social totality for mass assimilation. By contrast, Gramsci insisted on the existence of multiple subjects of revolution, which were not reducible to the; working class: "the people", "women", "youth", "minorities", etc are some of these, which take on growing significance within advanced capitalism. Revolution as conscious mass transformation, requiring the development of a socialist cultural hegemony prior to the transfer of political power, indicates the necessity of a mass self-exploration, an imaginative "awakening" of all individuals within the collective process. Avant-garde movements of the 1920's and 1930's that defined themselves as elements within the revolutionary process - such as the surrealists - saw revolutionary art precisely in relation to this conception of culture. Art, for the surrealists, was not a question of the production of important "works", but involved the development of generalised cultural expression, expansion of consciousness, communication etc. Surrealism was to be an entire "life-style" - a mode of thought, feeling, and activity - which sometimes resulted in the creation of particular aesthetic objects. These were to be seen as part of the means of awakening others to suppressed experience, as means to invoke a mass self-exploration and discovery. Whatever the limitations of a movement such as Surrealism, its efforts should be seen in the light of a radical intention to go beyond marxist conceptions of art as pure "educator".

As suggested, a contemporary marxist aesthetic should be concerned less to elaborate appropriate forms, techniques, or contents for art, and to engage rather in developing the potentialities of all forms, past and new, within the crucial problematic of a mass appropriation of the media and means of cultural production and dissemination. With respect to the "modernism" versus "realism" debate, the points made by Jameson need to be well appreciated: as he argues, whilst Lukacs's realism may appear increasingly limited as a recommendation for relevant revolutionary literature, all the experimental techniques which Lukács attacked over time and which were presented as solutions to precisely the limitedness of his realist aesthetic, have been shown to be assimilable into bourgeois hegemonic culture. The limitations of either a Lukács or a Benjamin rest upon their attempts at exclusiveness: attempts at an aesthetic of specific techniques, or genres etc. By contrast to such "partial aesthetics" we now note that any form, technique or technology - from the novel to free verse to the electronic media - is progressive or otherwise according to the social and political context in which it operates and the characteristics it therefore takes on, the relationships evolved between performers and audiences etc. The possibilities of all forms and techniques, from past or present, must therefore be continuously re-explored in relation to changed conditions within collective praxis.

A marxist aesthetic cannot be an abstract determination or specification of the forms, content, or techniques proper to a "revolutionary culture". It is a theory of the specificity of the cultural-aesthetic in general and of the forms it takes on in particular social-historical contexts; it is an

engaged conceptualisation of the role of imagination in human emancipation; and a general delineation of the strategic implications for socialist cultural struggle deriving from real, concrete, specific conditions.

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- 5 See T CLOUDSLEY: *op. cit.*, Part III
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- 33 And also my other text: T CLOUDSLEY: *op cit.*
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III CONSCIOUSNESS AND EXPERIENCE IN AN ALIENATED DIVISION OF LABOUR

All forms of society have hitherto been characterised by the presence of, or structuring form of, both a social and a technical division of labour in production. Now production, in a Marxian sense, presupposes and entails real particular complex social formations; to speak of production in concrete circumstances means being concerned with the totality of processes in real societies. Just as "base" and "superstructure" are dialectical categories for grasping the contradictory whole of a society, so "labour" is not an activity that can be empirically isolated in any society, as rigidly distinct from "thinking" or "communicating", or carrying out "ritual" or "cultural" activities. Not only are there many forms of labour in most societies (theorised in terms of analytically distinct "modes of production"), but in no society - even one as compartmentalised as capitalism - is "labour" utterly distinct, in concrete reality, from other activities.

To speak therefore of the division of labour in production, entails consideration of the division and separation of all forms of activity, just as consideration of the contents and forms of labour entails concern for the contents and forms of thought, ritual, patterns of emotionality, dominant personality structures and even dreams. Material production is production of social life on one level of analysis, or production of use-values to satisfy a particular society's kind of needs, on another; it can never, reasonably, be exclusively intended to denote production of physical things. This in itself shows that, while analysis of a particular social system requires its being grasped in terms of its mode of surplus-creation and its mode of valorisation (if it has one), a non-empiricist understanding of labour demands conceptualisation of the social totality. Concern about a society's social and technical division of labour leads to a focusing on its forms of consciousness and culture.

It is in this way that the division of labour is to be considered here. The question of forms of division of labour, and the forms and degree of alienation concomitant to them, permeates any consideration of the characteristic forms of aesthetic cultural activity in a society, and of the nature of the social imagination.

The term "social division of labour", consistently used, should refer to the institutionalised separation and articulation of different kinds (and sometimes, forms) of labour which are habitually carried out by different social groups. In all forms of society, hitherto, metabolism with nature has entailed an ongoing and continuously reproduced separation of activities within the overall process of production of use-values, enduringly associated with specific social groups. In the earliest and simplest forms of primitive society the dichotomy of sex roles is the only form of social division of labour. Subsequently the social division of labour is expanded

with the development of classes (subdivided into complex strata), and the private or "minority collective" ownership and/or control of the means of production.

Another form of social division of labour, which sets in with the increasing size and territorial claims of individual social formations (and with the development of exchange), is a regional-geographical separation of different productive activities. Though different in kind from the division of labour according to sex or class, this is a true social division of labour, since it has historically entailed an ongoing association of specific social groups with particular productive activities, in ways that reflect (manifest) the forms of social metabolism with nature dominant in the particular social formations.

The technical division of labour should be conceived, on the most general plane, as the way in which the production of particular use-values is habitually subdivided within a particular social form, into specific, separate tasks. In effect, a technical division of labour may exist in an "invisible" form, when for example, an individual making pots in a primitive society, or a craftsman producing a chair as a petty commodity, subdivides his/her work into separate tasks in time, even though all of them are undertaken by the same individual. In forms of society in which the social and technical divisions of labour interlock, the separate tasks involved in production of a use-value are habitually allocated to different individuals, often on the basis of social group membership (eg through a mental/manual division, or via skill differentiations associated with different social strata, etc). At the same time, individuals may move from one technical task to another, as do slaves or wage-labourers, in their respective modes of production. Alienation, on the most general level (without entering an almost etymological type of discussion around the words used by Marx) indicates the degree and form in which a human society is estranged, in which reality (natural and social) confronts it as hostile and dominating, as something incomprehensible and/or untranscendable. At first, nature itself is alien in this sense, standing over and against human existence uncontrollable, only partially directable. It is the lack of social appropriation of nature that makes it alien, not nature "in itself"; thus, the alienation of primitive society - solely an alienation before nature - is nevertheless a social alienation. With class differentiations, the products of labour, the processes of production, the mechanisms of labour organisation as well as associated social institutions, rituals, ideologies etc become alienated: the consequences of human activity, and the forms of human activity themselves are externalised and confront human beings as alien forces. Objectification, the impress of human activity upon reality, becomes simultaneously alienation - its estrangement from human subjectivity. Alienation is then fully internal to society in addition to society's continuing lack of mastery over nature.

In relation to the division of labour in production, alienation indicates the degree and form in which human production is other than a collective, subjectively determined, conscious and transparent process. It should be emphasised that this provides the criterion for discernment of alienation, not the matching of realities with formal schemata of divisions of productive tasks in societies. Thus Braverman, in *Labour and Monopoly Capital*, is mistaken in exclusively

identifying the technical division of labour with alienation as against the social division of labour which is "innocent". Neither is innocent or guilty in itself; as argued shortly, even classless, unalienated society would not abolish all forms of either social or technical division of labour.

Primitive society is one in which all individuals engage in all tasks undertaken by their particular sex, and in which all social knowledge is appropriable by all. Apart from the alienation inherent in the sexual dichotomy, labour is unalienated "internally" to society. In the various forms of class society developed subsequently, both the social and technical divisions of labour have been expressions and sources of alienation. This is due to the fact that the overall process of social reproduction has been broken up into fragmented activities conducted by different individuals or groups, in such ways as ensure that none are in a position to control or comprehend the process as a whole. The knowledge involved in the overall social process is splintered, such that no-one is typically a bearer of the totality in his or her consciousness. In capitalism, the social division of labour takes the form of class divisions, sexist and racist demarcations, the determination of different spheres of labour by the movement of commodities and capital accumulation etc. It also manifests itself in regional, national and international divisions of labour. Simultaneously to the "anarchy" in the social division of labour, there is the ever-increasing technical division of labour, under increasingly conscious, capitalist planning, at the plant or direct production, level.(2)

Classless society, as the state of affairs in which alienation has been overcome in production as in all spheres of human activity, requires that the social synthesis as a whole is internalised by every individual, who is then capable of mastery of social and natural processes as an individual and as a member of an harmonious human collective, able to develop his/her self in reflexive praxis in production as elsewhere, and thus, without contradiction, to contribute to the process of creative, global human development. All forms of social division of labour which reproduce the "subalternity" of producers must therefore have been overcome, all forms which entail the separation of knowledge from execution - distorting the one and turning the other into mechanical act. Any remaining forms of social division of labour - such as those relating to different geographical conditions, differing availabilities of natural resources, or even to differing cultural-historical contexts - can only exist in forms that sustain the full comprehension of the whole of global production on the part of every individual, and in forms that allow full flexibility for individuals to move between different spheres of production, be they associated with geographical conditions or local tradition.

As for the technical division of labour, complex forms of technological production would not be inclined to abolish it; rather, production - technology and the labour process - under the full, conscious control of the producers, would utterly transform the basis upon which separations of tasks were made. No longer would a technical division of labour be determined by capital's "thirst" for surplus-value, under the contradictory conditions wherein, as described by Raniero Panzieri, " ... a growing capitalistic use of planning in the factory is capital's response to the negative effects of both the chaotic movements and clashes of the individual capitals within the

sphere of circulation, and the legislative limits imposed on the extensive exploitation of labour power".(3) Rather, under classless conditions, both the structure of technology and the work process are determined by producers who are self-rulers, such that all decisions and practices are informed by consideration of the social need for the use-value in question, the consequences for the harmonious metabolism with nature of any production process, and the quality of fulfilment achievable - both in creative activity and in human relations - by the direct producers in the work process. Thus, any technical division of labour chosen by the direct producers would not take a form which imposed rigidity or mechanical standardisation, so repressing self-development and the impression upon the products of labour of unique, concrete human intentions. It would not be allowed to banish flexibility in subjective determination of the work rhythm. A freely arrived-at division of labour would be flexible, and continuously alterable as if conducted as an ongoing collective "experiment". It would not allow any task to become an external power fragmenting the whole human being, who is then an atomised predicate of a reified process rather than an integral being expressing an involvement in the entirety of the productive process in his/her unique activity and general understanding of the whole.

The active overcoming of alienated division of labour under transitional socialism, the bringing into being of classless society - in which freely associated producers create such use-values as they consciously and collectively decide will optimally satisfy their real needs, authentically understood and fully perceptible - is simultaneously therefore the emancipation of labour from all forms of reified determination. For capitalism, and in social forms where capitalist "laws" and/or similar processes still operate, this entails an end to "the law of value" determining the social division of labour and the forms taken on by the labour process and technology, and an end to rewarding labour according to labour-time. The "abolition of bourgeois right", considered by Marx in *A Critique of the Gotha Programme* as the goal of "advanced" socialism, must nevertheless be embarked upon immediately socialism is established, as inseparable from the abolition of wage differentials, the overcoming of skill gradations, the division between mental and manual labour, and so on. The abolition of commodity production; the supercedence of the law of value as an objectified social law operating in spite of any conscious intentions of the producers (as distinct from a conscious distribution of social labour and direct reckoning in terms of labour-time - which does not determine anything of itself, but which is taken into account in decisions in production); the overcoming of abstract labour through the recreation of complex, multi-faceted, multi-skilled (and therefore individually unique), "total" labour: all these are inseparable facets of the process of disalienation which is the revolutionary praxis of socialist society.

The mode of interpretation of history which is here seen as marxist recognises the development of alienation from the dawn of human labour and consciousness through to the epoch of world capitalism, and the tendential movement towards its resolution, as a central ontological characteristic of human history. Just as history has displayed hitherto a progressive passage from social production of use-values to production of exchange-values, a general increase in the

quantity and variety of social values produced, and an expansion of productive potential, so has human development into the epoch of capitalism been characterised by a general deepening in the degree of alienation. The development of human abilities on the level of the social whole increases, but is expressed through an increased fragmentation of capabilities, such that the contradiction between real and potential social forces on the one hand, and the estrangement of these from human subjectivity on the other, has advanced (though not, certainly, in a linear fashion). As a limited but significant example of this we can take Taylorist "Scientific Management", whose intended consequences are an increased sophistication in productive methods on the basis of a lowering of the level of both mental and manual skills required in production. In general, the self-creation of man is ever more contradictory under capitalism, as it develops ever more needs in increasingly alienated forms.

Yet capitalism inaugurates a process of conscious negation of alienation for the first time in history. The emergence of labour power under capitalism necessarily broke traditional sanctions for unfree labour - slavery, serfdom etc - and gave rise to the notion of political equality; capitalism itself cannot realise this notion, but makes its coming-into-being possible through communism. Capitalism makes possible the conceptualization of socialised production, through the existence of labour power and abstract social labour. Similarly, the continuous development of faculties and needs under capitalism, which can be satisfied only in fragmentary ways, allows the conceptualisation of an all-rounded satisfaction of needs which develop in a harmoniously balanced relationship with changes in social production.

Some interpreters of Marxism have rejected this schema of history as entailing an essentially theological commitment to a telos. Here it must be asserted that the structural conception of history in terms of progressive advance of alienation and the tendential movement towards its resolution, does not necessitate what Jameson(4) has termed a "master narrative" or "narrative closure". If the marxist conception of history holds analogies with older allegorical or mythic interpretive systems, this is because those systems of thought themselves represented partial comprehensions of historical reality. The movement from Fall to Redemption, the bondage and deliverance of Israel, the descent of Christ into Hell followed by the Ascension are, like similar myths from other cultures, ideologically constrained perceptions of alienation experienced in its development, and expressions of a mere hope for its negation that cannot be grasped concretely for and by society.

But if marxism comprehends the movement of history through epochs of alienation, and the process of disalienation, in terms of science and real practice, this does not mean there are no problems with its idea of unalienated communist society.

The fundamental conception in Marx, of communist society, is that of an active, willed, self-determining, human, collective development. In some passages of Marx, all previous history is seen as "pre-history", because social transformation is alienated, not true praxis, the species-specific capacity of Man. Communist society is one in which theory and practice are unified in

social praxis; this is dependent upon the full individuation of all individuals relative to the stage of reality. Thus, theoretical knowledge would not be socially differentiated, just as there could be no "laws" of society beyond the conscious, transparent activity of society. This does not, of course, mean that a specific theoretical practice ceases to exist, but that it cannot be an activity concentrated in "groups", as then both the knowledge, and reality are alienated. Educators are continuously educated; hence science is unseparated from emancipatory collective practice whilst the object of science is no longer ideologically constituted as inert and reified.

However, there is another conception that comes through elsewhere in the Marxist tradition in which social development, like knowledge, is endlessly approximating a unification of the subject and object, but never possibly attaining it fully and in permanence. This idea appears in, for example, Sartre's theory of an irreducible tension and oscillation between on the one hand organisation and institutionalisation, and on the other spontaneous mass action which "thinks its experience as it presents itself, without institutional mediation".(5) Though addressed in the immediate to issues of revolutionary practice within capitalism, Sartre's argument can be taken as an instance of one strand in marxism's general position on subject and object:

"This means an open and irreducible relation between ... the political organisation of the class, and the moments of self- government, the councils, the fused groups. I insist on that word 'irreducible' because there can only be a permanent tension between the two moments. The party will always try, to the degree that it wants to see itself as 'in the service' of the movement, to reduce it to its own schema of interpretation and development; while the moments of self-government will always try to project their living partiality upon the contradictory complex of the social tissue."(6)

The dilemma also appears in marxist theorisations of freedom and necessity. Alfred Schmidt(7) shows that there are in fact two versions of this dialectic in Marx. In the one, communism and "true" history abolish the realm of necessity; implicitly, unalienated production is seen not as eliminating the need for work to reproduce society, but as making work free, creative and life-affirming. In the other version, necessity cannot be abolished; in a famous passage from *Capital*, Vol. III, the realm of necessity, identified as material production to maintain and reproduce life, is seen as something that can be driven back by "socialised men, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature". Only outside this never-disappearing realm of necessity is the realm of freedom; " ...that development of human energy which is an end in itself ... "(8)

To probe beyond such an impasse of two apparently conflicting versions of communist, or unalienated society (which is also manifested in the debate as to whether or not ideology will disappear wholly under communism), we may return to the concept of alienation.

Human alienation is composed of two analytically distinguishable components: first, the compulsions and constraints upon individuality and freedom (manifested psychologically in repression) imposed by the struggle for survival in nature. This is the only form of alienation in primitive society (though a problem must be noted here: is the sexual division of labour in primitive society to be regarded as an "internal", "social" alienation, or as imposed by nature?) which fact is manifested in primitive cosmologies which have no separation between the natural and supernatural. The power of nature is a unified one; human fears of nature are concrete and real. Projection on to nature of psychological responses to existence - compulsions, anxieties etc - directly complement the limited degree to which primitive society can understand nature and regulate social metabolism with nature. The carvings of "spirits" from primitive societies, which might just as well be seen as representing "natural" forces and phenomena, are thus precisely "paranoic".

Secondly, there is alienation stemming from class civilisations in which social metabolism with nature is split into material transformation of nature in social reproduction on the one hand, and the administration, organisation, and theoretical comprehension upon which the metabolism is based, on the other. The different modes of production based upon class relations manifest different complexes of alienating divisions of labour (the most extreme of which are expressed in capitalism); all are based, however, on this fundamental condition, and in all of them dualistic cosmologies dominate. Psychic repression in class societies (which are usually also sexist and racist) represents both dimensions of alienation. Emancipatory praxis, the self-transformative development towards communism, entails overcoming the psychic fragmentation and repression associated with both dimensions of alienation. The process on the level of the psyche complements, reflects, and bears upon the processes of change which systematically eliminate all those forms of division of labour that curtail the development of all-rounded human beings. Simultaneously, the growth of science and the development of the conditions under which its emancipatory potential can be expressed, push back the horizons of repressive constraints stemming from both the first, or "natural" source of alienation, and the second, "social" source.

It might seem doubtful if either source of alienation could ever be entirely abolished, ie a degree of alienating social and technical division of labour might always persist which an ideal community would wish to dispense with, due for example to adaptations in production necessarily being made in advance of a full assimilation of their implications, or to considerations of efficiency which would still remain (though on completely new terms) when production was under fully conscious social control. The residual alienation - which would only be separable into the two "sources" analytically - represents the extent to which communism, in marxist thought, is a Utopian ideal to which human history will always actively aspire as an ever-enrichable possibility beyond immediate lived experience.

It is when alienation exceeds what the potential within society at any time could achieve, due to an historically unjustifiable maintenance of power and privilege in vested interest groups, that alienation is "surplus ie not necessitated by collective need. Where society is undergoing a

genuine collective self-emancipation, the division of labour is voluntarily entered into and the reasons for its existence are universally understood. However, if the forms of the division of labour maintain residual alienative characteristics, their implications for real existence for human experience, cannot be ignored. Alienation necessarily implies relations of domination.

Furthermore, as a society undergoes transformation from a class formation toward communism, all sections of the formerly oppressed classes are not equally conscious and engaged in the process. Hence it is unlikely that residual alienation would ever be fully "voluntary" - and if it were, it might be supposed that it would not have to remain for long. (Equally, if it did, its effects would give rise to institutionalised reification such that the initially voluntary character of it would disappear.) In actuality therefore, the difficulties in attaining complete disalienation are related not only to "objective" or "natural" limitations of the sort considered earlier, but to this differentiation of consciousness and engagement, which constantly provides the basis for consolidation of privileged groups, and therefore the maintenance of historically unwarranted forms of division of labour.

In a sense, residual alienation which is not due to unjustified vested interests or to an unevenness of consciousness which could facilitate the emergence of vested interest groups, is synonymous with "natural" alienation. Perhaps one conclusion then, is that this must always persist, but is progressively pushed back, only for new levels of alienation to appear in relation to newly expanded possibilities. In this connection, it can be noted that at all stages of human history, the unconscious is the depository of repressed potential experience, and that its expression in cultural forms represents in symbolic, condensed images and associations the structures of sensibility whose full experience in reality continually necessitates the disalienation of present conditions.

Perhaps then, so long as "residual alienation" remains "natural" in the sense used here, society can respond to its own self-negating tendencies, to its own repressions, can face them from the orientation of intention to objectify potential expressed in the imagination. Ie, that so long as no "historically unjustified" relations of domination remain, society can open out organically its interiorised urges as they are evoked under changing historical conditions. And that therefore, differentiations remaining (uneven development of consciousness on all planes) are not met by responses that tend to reinforce them, since an advanced consciousness has transcended desires for "false" satisfactions such as wishing to be the "pure" educator etc, and is orientated to real satisfactions, that can only entail the movement toward ever fuller collective praxis, toward finding ever more unalienated forms for the division of labour. Under such conditions the individual only feels free if that freedom is essentially inseparable from existence in an organic collectivity - where "freedom" resting on an antagonism between self and collectivity is felt as negative and undesirable. As Raymond Williams has written in his review of Rudolf Bahro's work, the distinction that has to be grasped is " ...between drives to possession, consumption and power, which can be seen as partial substitutes for any certain and equitable share in human

needs, and those other non-exploitative orientations towards self-realisation and the collective realisation, recognition, of the essential qualities of others".(9)

Some further points can be made about the conceptualisation of communism - about the seeming paradox of a process that both tends to abolish the realm of necessity but which also recognises its continuous re-emergence, its existence as a substratum that continuously demands it be humanly appropriated into the realm of freedom. Methodologically, the conception of communism is necessary to Marxism as a dialectically emerging resolution to capitalism and to all accreted contradictions from the whole of history. It arises inevitably as a category from the appropriation of human history in thought. Thus, there can be no conception of health without the conception of communism - without it, health can only be derived from the statistical or ideological norm of one or other real (and therefore transitory) social form.

Now, communism is not "just" this, an analytical category: real processes work toward it (ie epistemology and ontology ultimately interpenetrate). But how it is worked toward in the future does not have to be wholly pre-known (which would be determinist and antithetical to Marxism's view of revolution as conscious activity), for the concept to be viable in analysis. This may seem like a riddle, but in fact it is no more so than many central scientific concepts. Thus, in physics it has long been accepted that energy can be conceived of both as waves and particles. The notion of "limiting terms", or paradoxical or unreal but necessary constructs such as "infinity", are fundamental to most sciences. Communism is like a reality that has not yet been discovered, but whose existence is known of by science, rather as in chemistry (without implying any direct analogy in method or ontology between the sciences of inorganic nature and human history), Mendeleef's table allowed the existence of certain elements to be predicted which had not yet been found. In time some were found in nature, others were created in the laboratory. In some cases, it appears, they had never before existed, at least on this planet.

In any particular moment of history, possible knowledge of society is circumscribed both for the reasons that apply equally to the natural sciences, and also because human history - as distinct from all other processes in the universe - is both a structured process and a conscious activity. Communism is something we must create as much as something we must know. The unification of subject and object is not merely a philosophical problem - it is one of human history in its totality.

Thus, we cannot fully concretise the concept in thought, at our point in history. And yet the comprehension of history from our point in it, requires the concept and necessarily expects its concretization in reality. We cannot put in the last full-stop as Hegel wanted!

It seems that those who are sceptical of communism's reality in the name of anti-dogmatism, object to it because they are (unconsciously) still committed to logical systems that complete all circles and appropriate reality finally - although they can no longer find any! It is precisely

because Marxism does not attempt to square the circle that it is coherent not because it achieves what Hegel wanted, but failed, to accomplish.

The "law of value", in the sense used by Marx, operates within a capitalist system to determine a specific but changing distribution of labour within the different branches of production, to determine the forms the division of labour takes on at any specific stage, and to structure specific hierarchies of different types of labour - different skills conceivable as varying "compounds" of simple labour which receive differential wages in exchange for their differentiated forms of labour power. This is the underpinning of the alienation and fragmentation of labour activities, and of the associated structures of consciousness and psyche, which are characteristic of capitalism. The fundamental economic processes involved need not be considered closely here - the works of Marxist economists are the places in which they are analysed; it is essential nevertheless to understand the general nature of the processes that underly the forms of alienation and their associated structures of experience, which are analysed here phenomenologically.

In the process of socialist revolution, the "law of value" is abolished, and its implications in all spheres transcended. This process is well described in its general outlines in An Outline Of Political Economy(10) by Lapidus and Ostrovitianov. Ronald Meek summarises this early, but still valid "Bolshevik" account thus:

"In all societies, they argue, the requisite equilibrium between production and consumption must be brought about somehow - ie, the distribution of labour among the different branches of production must somehow be made to correspond with society's needs. In capitalist society, this correspondence is achieved (in so far as it is achieved at all) through the elemental operation of the law of value. In communist society, on the other hand, the necessary "labour balance" will be regulated "not blindly by means of exchange on the market by independent commodity producers, but by the conscious will of all society... This law or proportionality in labour investment is a law of every society, whatever the form of its productive relations. The only difference is that in different social formations its operation is manifested in different ways. In capitalist production it operates independently of the will and consciousness of man, through the law of value; in Communist society it operates exclusively through the will and consciousness of the people and finds its expression in the planned measures of the organs concerned".(11)

Socialism is thus the progressive development of self-determined, co-operative social regulation, the overcoming of all reified structuring of social production. As Engels argued: "The useful effects of the various articles of consumption, compared with each other and with the quantity of labour required for their production, will in the last analysis determine the plan. People will be able to manage everything very simply, without the intervention of the famous 'value' ... (the) balancing of useful effects and expenditure of labour would be all that would be left, in a communist society, of the concept of value as it appears in political economy."(12) The achievement of such a balance between consideration of the useful effects of social products and the quantity of labour required for their production, entails that production is under the

conscious, collective will of society. The proportions of labour distributed among the various branches of production are determined by society as a whole. "Externally" determined, objectified, alienated divisions of labour are dissolved, and the hierarchies of different "qualities" of labour (related to differential levels of reward for equivalent labour-times) are abolished. It is the mass of producers themselves that "plan" production: no matter what the organs through which this is achieved, the necessity is that the masses are the authentic subject of the plan. The overcoming of alienation cannot be achieved if, instead, the state, as subject standing over and above society, determines the plan, prices of goods, rewards for labour etc. Thus in the Soviet-type system of production, though the law of value may no longer operate as it does under capitalism, planning cannot be seen as "the authority and practice of the entire Soviet people organized into the state".(13) However much Soviet planning may resist the operation of the law of value, it is a calculation from above, or from without, a reified social regulation, not an unalienated social self-regulation. (This is not due merely to the co-existence of a state sector, a collective-farm sector, and a private sector, which provided Stalinism with an explanation for the continuation - though restricted - of "commodity relations". An all-embracing state sector, on the Soviet model, would not entail disalienated production, whether the law of value continued to operate or not.)

Thus, although the Soviet form of "socialism" can preclude cyclical crises of the sort associated with the blind forces of capitalism, and can direct production along (bureaucratically) chosen lines, it transcends neither an alienated division of labour nor a hierarchy of labour skills and differential rewards granted to different "qualities" of labour, which are reproduced in forms essentially similar to those existing under capitalism. The implications of this state of affairs for consciousness, psychic structure, culture and experience, are analogous to those analysed here in relation to capitalism; the "Cultural Revolution" called for by Maoism or Rudolf Bahro in state bureaucratic socialism entails therefore an emancipatory praxis essentially the same as that necessary for revolution within advanced capitalism, notwithstanding the differences in structure, on other levels, between the two systems of society.

Reification in the production process has as its counterpart the economic rationality that Max Weber saw as the essence of capitalism. Capitalistic economic rationality presupposes a decision-making process (within a capitalist management or a technocratic state) in which the decision-maker treats labour as an inert resource, or as a commodity (a unit of simple labour-power has a definite average price etc). A subject seeks to act in a one-way direction upon the object. The human rationality towards which socialism aspires, by contrast, is a decision-making about and of oneself: self-directed and orientated towards self-emancipation (incorporating, in a higher form, the practical efficiency with which bourgeois rationality is concerned).

These different forms of rationality have their counterparts in scientific theory and methodology. For Weberian social science knowledge is seen as arising in an unhistorical mind that receives sense information from an unchanging object of study. The application of "neutral" knowledge entails a manipulation of and domination over reality. By contrast, dialectical knowledge

understands itself as sensuous practical activity. Thought about reality is seen as part of reality, brought into being through activity in and upon reality - which is thereby changed by it, so generating change in thought. If the object of empiricist epistemology is the counterpart to the inert object of capitalistic rationality, dialectical epistemology is the counterpart to revolutionary praxis in production as in every sphere of human activity.

Alienation is the suppression of creative praxis in the individual and society as a whole; the fragmentation of the labour process, reflected in reified forms of consciousness and the totality of practices in capitalist society entails the distancing of man from his "species being" - the capacity for self-creation (which is not a metaphysical or unhistorical conception). Creative praxis includes the operation of the imagination: as a synthesising dimension of this total self- and world-transforming human capacity, which distinguishes human existence from all other levels of reality. It is from imagination that comes the impulse within concrete activity and mental reflection, conceptualisation, hypothesising etc which is constantly "going beyond" itself, reconceiving the "project" of labour and existence, opening up in advance of concrete developments immaterial images and concepts of potentials inherent in reality.

Creative praxis within capitalism is the process of harnessing the vast potentials emergent in it - the active integration of what is fragmented, reified, and destructive within capitalism, the resynthesis of all that is developed one-sidedly and in alienated forms. It is the turning of cultural imperialism and the forced, contradictory unity of world imperialism into a genuine global community; the development of real co-operative, socialised production on the basis, transformed, of the abstract, alienated labour generated by capitalist commodity production.

In the *1844 Manuscripts* Marx depicts work under capitalism as being not an expression of human life-activity, but as reduced to a means of ensuring subsistence and of gaining compensation outside of work. The cost of reproducing labour-power is dependent on the structure of needs developed in a particular stage of a particular capitalist social formation - and these include non-work activities as (alienated) compensations for work. Increasingly in advanced, consumer capitalism work and non-work are divided through this means/ends separation, with its associated fragmentation of life-experience. Leisure consumption in the "cultural" sphere - both public and private - is thus an antithesis to work on one plane, but at the same time "leisure" is structured by the dominant forms of consciousness and experience imposed by the labour process, and by the increasing incorporation of leisure activities themselves into a fetishised commodity form.

Alienation in the capitalist labour process itself, ie labour as something whose form is "external" to the worker, a forced activity engaged in production of something which, as a commodity, dominates him or her, structures an alienated personality - one which is not in a process of becoming through its activities and interactions (with nature and within society) but on the contrary is habituated to non-becoming, to an inertia from the perspective of self-actualisation. This determination is not limited to direct experience of the labour process, since the structuring

effects upon personality are mediated (and react back) through the entire complex of activities, institutional and cultural forms, ideologies etc., making up a capitalist social formation. Thus the implications of the specifically capital-creating labour process are found in other forms of labour (unproductive, administrative, intellectual, domestic etc), and in the patterns of activity characteristic of non-labour spheres - leisure, culture etc. Similarly, the modes of reified consciousness that stem from adjustment to fragmentation, mechanical motion, linear repetition, and standardisation by an externally imposed framework of time and space, are generated not solely through the experience of selling labour-power itself, but "multi-modally". Characteristic modes of consciousness are grounded in the processes of socialisation, in the ideological self-conceptions of organisations and their forms of alienated, pseudo-cooperative activity, in the complexes of cultural processes etc. On the level of the social totality, habituation to a society whose motion is determined by the movement of commodities, and by the processes of capital accumulation, is engendered not only ideologically (ie through a reified "insertion" of subjects into practices, into an acceptance of, and active orientation according to, ideas that legitimate or render untranscendable the realities of capitalism), but through the structuring of alienated personality and reified consciousness throughout society generally.

These considerations should be seen in the light of the remarks made in Part I regarding the categories of base and superstructure. The crucial point is that real social formations are concrete, contradictory totalities in the understanding of which base and superstructure are dialectically inter-related abstractions. Thus, to say that the motion of capitalist society is "determined" by the movement of commodities is not to posit a one-way mechanism between a prime or self-mover and the rest of society. It should be clear from the start for Marxism that for capital to operate in specific ways other levels of the social totality must be at least minimally adapted to such processes. No economic process can occur without conscious, sentient social groups engaging in appropriate communications, reflections, institutional interactions etc. In no social reality can there be a "base" purged of "superstructural elements". The crucial importance given to the labour process in surplus value-creation should not be read as an attribution of "fundamental causality" to it. In the complex, interwoven totality of a concrete capitalist formation there operate infinitely complex relations of influence, interaction and contradiction between different forms of activity and consciousness, which compose in concrete reality an interwoven - if contradictory - unity.

Similarly, reification must not be construed as the "passive" consequence of a one-way determination from one or more "poles" in the social totality. Contradiction and struggle are expressed in the very form of reification; to say that the worker is "forced" into a reified activity is not to conceive of a passive robot adjusted to a supra-social power. Forms of labour-process, like technologies, are resisted by workers; their structures in any context and point in time are temporary crystallisations of contradiction. Indeed, if this is forgotten, it cannot be understood how capitalist society is never in static equilibrium.

Lukács wrote in his seminal discussion of reification: "The divorce of the phenomena of reification from their economic bases and from the vantage point from which alone they can be understood, is facilitated by the fact that the (capitalist) process of transformation must embrace every manifestation of the life of society if the preconditions for the complete self-realisation of capitalist production are to be fulfilled."(15)

As we have seen, the structure of reified productive labour is reproduced in other forms of labour, and in consumer capitalism's turning of leisure activities and also physical and even physiological processes into reified structures of experience (eg eating, sleeping, sex, recreation: the visitor to the Grand Canyon in Colorado gains his first glimpse of this work of nature, which is over a hundred miles from any human habitation, through the huge glass window of a cafeteria. He is then invited to take a pre-structured walk, along which are points where the guide-book recommends he meditate on specified "thoughts"). Activities are incorporated into the commodity form both as an economic or commercial process and as an "ideological" or "experiential" adaptation of the totality of social activities to the extraction of surplus value from alienated labour. Walter Benjamin examines the relationship between factory labour and gambling: "Baudelaire ... was captivated by a process whereby the reflecting mechanism which the machine sets off in the workman can be studied closely, as in a mirror, in the idler ... Where would one find a more evident contrast than the one between work and gambling? Alain puts it convincingly when he writes: "It is inherent in the concept of gambling... that no game is dependent on the preceding one. Gambling cares about no assured position... Winnings secured earlier are not taken into account, and in this it differs from work. Gambling gives short shrift to the weighty past on which work bases itself." The work which Alain has in mind here is the highly specialised kind (which, like intellectual effort, probably retains certain features of handicraft); it is not that of most factory workers, least of all the work of the unskilled. The latter, to be sure, lacks any touch of adventure, of the mirage that lures the gambler. But it certainly does not lack the futility, the emptiness, the inability to complete something which is inherent in the activity of a wage slave in a factory. Gambling even contains the workman's gesture that is produced by the automatic operation, for there can be no game without the quick movement of the hand by which the stake is put down or a card is picked up. The jolt in the movement of a machine is like the so-called coup in a game of chance. The manipulation of the worker at the machine has no connection with the preceding operation for the very reason that it is its exact repetition. Since each operation at the machine is just as screened off from the preceding operation as a coup in a game of chance is from the one that preceded it, the drudgery of the labourer is, in its own way, a counterpart to the drudgery of the gambler. The work of both is devoid of substance.

"There is a lithograph by Senefelder which represents a gambling club. Not one of those depicted is pursuing the game in the customary fashion. Each man is dominated by an emotion: one shows unrestrained joy; another, distrust of his partner; a third, dull despair; a fourth evinces belligerence; another is getting ready to depart from the world. All these modes of conduct share

a concealed characteristic: the figures presented show us how the mechanism to which the participants in a game of chance entrust themselves seizes them body and soul, so that even in their private sphere, and no matter how agitated they may be, they are capable only of a reflex action."(16)

As an example of the articulation between different forms of labour under capitalism, the interaction between productive and domestic labour can be taken, in order to explore their relationships with (both conditioning and being conditioned by), consciousness. From the point of view of the present discussion, it does not matter whether domestic labour is understood as "inside" the capitalist mode of production, in the sense of its contributing to the value of the commodity "labour power"; or whether it is regarded as outside-engaged in the creation of necessary use-values for immediate consumption. In an analysis of domestic labour by Smith, the domestic labour process is thought of as a pre-capitalist craft:

"While the commodity labour power can be seen as the product of domestic labour, it cannot be said that the commodity form of the product impinges on the domestic labour process...

"It is not Marx's theory of value which marginalises domestic labour, but the capitalist mode of production. The separation of the worker from his or her labour, and its absorption into capital as its variable component, entails the separation of individual consumption (the production of labour power) from productive consumption (the consumption of labour power): the reproduction of capitalist relations of production, then, entails the reproduction of the privatised, technically backward nature of domestic labour."(17)

The question for us is, if domestic labour is in a sense a pre-capitalist craft, are housewives in capitalist society subjected to a wholly different labour-structure than are other workers, with different implications for the structure of consciousness?

To some degree an element of personal craft remains in domestic labour, manifested in particular in the possibility of a self-imposed style and rhythm of work. This distinguishes it from all forms of wage/salary labour, except for certain "free-lance" professions and a very limited number of crafts that are waged rather than "self-employed". However, more significant for the present consideration is the commonality of reification between domestic and other forms of labour within capitalist social formations.

In the first place, the rhythm of the whole household is determined by the capitalist productive process, from the timing of the working day (including shift-work) for wage-workers, to the timing of children's entrance into and exit from the educational system, to the timed leisure activities dominated by the commodity form both inside and outside the home. This distinguishes domestic labour under capitalism from its counterparts in other social forms even where the individual tasks are similar (eg cooking, tending children). The structure of time experienced in domestic labour under capitalism tends therefore toward the linear repetition and segmentation characteristic of other forms of labour. A structure of time experienced as cyclical,

which as considered later, is a dominant characteristic of pre-capitalist agricultural and craft labour, is largely overlaid or supplanted. And certainly domestic labour under capitalism can be only in a very few elements a genuine creative unique labour, of the kind that is in part present in pre-capitalist craft, and which socialism would seek to universalise.

In the second place, the atomised, privatised context of domestic labour is analogous to that experienced by the worker in the productive system (even though the latter is usually in physical proximity to other workers); this generally distinguishes it from domestic labour in the collective household of pre-capitalist community or patriarchal family. Domestic labour under capitalism is thus subject, like other forms of labour, to an "inertness". It is a form of activity that cannot normally be experienced as a collective self-fulfilment and growth, a transformation and progressive development of self and the objective world through intended effort.

Thirdly, the progressive transformation of household utensils etc under capitalism into consumer goods, the availability of certain domestic services in a commodity form (eg launderettes, pre-cooked food, TV meals, home-delivered meals), entails a standardisation of these activities and experiences from "outside" as opposed to "common ways of doing things" arising from "within". There is a linking up of housework with commodity fetishism in leisure within the atomised, alienated, standardized "nuclear" family. The mystification engendered with respect to household goods, appliances, utensils etc. as commodities, allows control over role-identification and experience by the capitalist media, the penetration of standards and modes of activity, appearance etc. goods, appliances, utensils from sources close to surplus-value extraction.

Finally, housewives are structured into reified perception and experience in leisure activities, through the media, and sometimes in education, in the same ways as wage-workers. Furthermore, close proximity with wage-workers in the household entails a communication of perception and experience as structured through the reified labour process - quite apart from the necessary adaptation of the household to the time-discipline of the capitalist productive process.

These points by no means constitute an exhaustive analysis of the issue. They serve however to illustrate that domestic labour, like other forms of "non-productive" labour, and like other forms of activity and experience (including no doubt sleep - in the structure of dreams and adaptations of physiological cycles), is in its most essential characteristics, and bearing in mind its distinct features, structured analogously to surplus value-producing labour. It tends therefore to impose a corresponding structure of reified consciousness and to generate a corresponding countervailing tendency to go beyond reification.

The distinction between use and exchange, as Alfred Sohn-Rethel(18) shows, is that the one is individual, unique, specific to the consumer's experience, the other is abstract, reified. The rules of exchange are accorded to by the parties involved in identical fashion, but each subjectively enters into an exchange for "private" reasons, ie the uses to which a commodity received in exchange will be put. Similarly, in production of a use-value, an individual or co-operative group

creates a unique object in unique ways, which can express the personality of the producer(s) both in the method of production and in the specific characteristics of the object produced (though obviously this is not always the case, as for example with agricultural slaves). In production of a capitalist commodity (but not of a petty commodity in for example simple guild production, where conditions are the same as in production for use - exchange occurring only after production), labour power is abstract; exchange-values are congealed, abstract labour lacking any expression of distinctive personalities of particular producers; the methods of production are quite external to the efforts, intentions etc of the immediate producers. The division of labour in the capitalist labour process is a reified organisation allowing abstract social labour to create exchange-values for abstract, reified exchanges. The activity of labour on the part of individual labourers within the social division of labour is subjectively specific - ie the way the activity is understood, precisely how it is experienced by the specific personality, can remain subjective. But objectively, what transmits value to the raw material worked up into a commodity abstracts from all uniqueness, specificity of personality, and individual method of production (to the extent that any variation in the latter is possible). This corresponds to Benjamin's observations in the quotation about the lithograph depicting gamblers: wage-workers, like the gamblers, conform to a regulated reflex no matter what their individual states of mind.

Objectively, the production of use-values in classless society or in petty commodity production involved to a greater or lesser degree an integral organisation of all faculties necessary for production of the object in question, on the part of each producer: intellect (conception, scientific knowledge, planning of the production process etc); emotion (feeling toward the raw material, the product, the purpose of the labour; toward others involved in the process etc); sensation (the physical labour activity, specific perception and sense experience of raw materials, tools, product, human contact in co-operative labour, etc); and aesthetic imagination (imposition of form, syncretistic integration or balance of the whole operation, experience of transcendence in successful achievement of aims of production, development of capacities of self in the process - specific skills, creative experience of nature and human interaction in collective labour etc). The finished product is the result of, and expression of, this integrated, unique human activity. In the production of capitalist commodities, the faculties involved are both rent asunder from the objective creation of value - in the abstraction from individual personal faculty - and are fragmented. Thus, the aspects of conception, scientific knowledge, planning of the process etc are limited to specific segments of social labour only; likewise the sensation of production, the physical activity, is broken into multiplicities of activity separated from each other and divorced from conception. The emotional and aesthetic dimensions, for all but a tiny segment of social labour, can only be experienced in distorted forms or on the most abstract planes, distanced from the actual processes - as in the "satisfaction of the whole Company on completion of a contract on time". For each individual producer (and administrator, personnel manager, scientist-engineer, designer etc) only one faculty is normally engaged at all in production, and this as an isolated fragment of the total skill involved in the creation of the product even within the sphere of that particular faculty.

Thus, the active subjective experience of individual producers is such as to structure a fundamentally one-sided development of personality which stands in alienated relation to the reified process of production, to the socially abstract labour congealed in exchange-values, and to the differently one-sided personalities of all other types of producers. At the site of the actual labour process are reproduced therefore dominant capitalist ideologies, modes of perception and forms of sensibility (supported by all the complexes of institutions, forms of information communication, patterns of leisure and consumption etc in capitalist society). Scientistic-technocratic ideologies are predicated on the division of mental and manual labour, as is the "self-evident" perception that collective control over production and all social processes is impossible. Characteristic modes of feeling developed toward the self, society and nature are antithetical to an integral activity of a balanced individual within an harmonious society, within a nature felt as the "other" of an harmonious, dynamic metabolism.

The production of use-values within class societies (in slave-owning, feudal, Asiatic etc, modes of production) sustains an integration of the faculties required in the activities of co-operative production(19) in relative contrast to capitalism, since the direct producers are normally in immediate control of the production process. However, the fundamental rift, intrinsic to all class exploitation, between general administration of society and actual production, entails an ultimate fragmentation of faculties in forms corresponding to the level and kind of social alienation involved. Thus, even if direct producers "manage" their own labour, as slaves or serfs often do, and determine their own work-rhythm and distribution of tasks rather than confront them as external impositions, nevertheless the general division between rulers and ruled blocks an integral development of intellect co-ordinated with productive activity. Technical improvement is slow and limited. Dualistic metaphysical theologies form the dominant ideologies which militate against rational investigation of natural processes, and legitimate the prevention of direct producers from regulating the overall co-ordination of social production and of social life in general. In his analysis of Classical Antiquity, Anderson puts it like this:

"Once manual labour became deeply associated with loss of liberty, there was no free social rationale for invention. The stifling effects of slavery on technique were not a simple function of the low average productivity of slave-labour itself, or even of the volume of its use: they subtly affected all forms of labour. Marx sought to express the type of action which they exerted in a celebrated, if cryptic theoretical formula: 'In all forms of society it is a determinate production and its relations which assign every other production and its relations their rank and influence. It is a general illumination in which all other colours are plunged and which modifies their specific tonalities. It is a special ether which defines the specific gravity of everything found within it.' Agricultural slaves themselves had notoriously little incentive to perform their economic tasks competently and conscientiously, once surveillance was relaxed; their optimal employment was in compact vineyards or olive-groves. On the other hand, many slave craftsmen and some slave cultivators were often notably skilled, within the limits of prevailing techniques. The structural constraint of slavery on technique thus lay not so much in a direct intra-economic causality,

although this was important in its own right, as in the mediate social ideology which enveloped the totality of manual work in the classical world, contaminating hired and even independent labour with the stigma of debasement.

“Slave-labour was not in general less productive than free, indeed in some fields it was more so; but it set the pace of both, so that no great divergence ever developed between the two, in a common economic space that excluded the application of culture to technique for inventions. The divorce of material work from the sphere of liberty was so rigorous that the Greeks had no word in their language even to express the concept of labour, either as a social function or as personal conduct. Both agricultural and artisanal work were essentially deemed 'adaptations' to nature, not transformations of it... Technique as premeditated, progressive instrumentation of the natural world by man was incompatible with wholesale assimilation of men to the natural world as its 'speaking instruments'.”(20)

The fragmentation of activities and their associated faculties in pre-capitalist class systems takes on different forms from under capitalism, and entails different forms of structuration of alienated consciousness and experience. Hence the illusory, mystified nature of those forms of "anti-capitalist romanticism" which contrast reification and production for exchange in capitalist society, with the "organic" community and "respect" for unique essence and authentic value in the pre-capitalist organisations of society immediately prior to the modern epoch. Examples of this perspective are the conservative anti-capitalist romanticism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Germany(21), or the Agrarianism of the United States. Inasmuch as the yearnings for a lost golden age refer implicitly to feudalism or slave-owning society, they are conservative myths that see authentic values - theological in essence - as related to a pre-capitalist class system producing use-values in an "organic unity". In reality such societies were dualistic and alienated: capitalism, while instating a new form of social alienation, performed the function of abolishing use-value production within a context of exploitation and exclusion of the producers from control over the social surplus and general regulation of society.

The development of Taylorism and Fordism in twentieth century capitalist production entailed a new degree of "totalitarian" managerial control over the labour process, in order to extract maximum value from labour- power. This centralised control over the precise mechanics of the labour process accentuates a characteristic inherent in capitalist commodity production from its inception: a mechanical standardization of movement in space and time. Time experienced as unilinear repetition of equal, empty segments (that Sohn-Rethel(22) equates with the exchange relation but which is also a function of the labour process developed concomitantly with it), is reacted against in the twentieth century in irrationalist theories such as Henri Bergson's, whose "positive" elements are the presentation of growth in unsegmentable, "burgeoning" time - the negation of reified experience.

The post-Taylor capitalist labour process, whose development was concomitant to the emergence and diffusion of Bergson's philosophy, attempts with increasing consciousness to control

existence for the owner of labour-power in its entirety. The immediate recognition of Fordism was that a particular kind of character best accompanied a worker's adaptation of his labour-power to assembly-line production. But the wider implications of this tendency in advanced capitalism are to be found in the mirroring of reified labour in consumerised "leisure" activity, culture and education.

Bergson's cosmology, and the conception of "life" upon which it is based, takes the form of an unhistorical, irrational vitalism. It is an example of that species of philosophy which, in the context of the twentieth century, has lent ideological strength to movements adhering to blind anti-analytical force, conflating the cosmic, the biological and the historical into a single "mystical" process. However, there is an important core of validity in Bergson, partially grasped in Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness* and in the writings of Walter Benjamin, which is mistakenly seen as an idealist encroachment into marxist materialism by Colletti(23) and by the later Lukács himself. In an "unconscious" way, Bergson depicts the mode of consciousness characteristic of bourgeois society. His denigration of "intellect" is actually a critique of bourgeois science and philosophy, with its mechanistic cosmology resting upon presumed relations of cause and effect operating between isolated, atomised entities, in a static, three-dimensional empty space and in a linear, "calculus-like", homogeneous and infinitely segmentable movement of time. The refined expression of bourgeois consciousness in science and philosophy (to be more precise: non-idealist bourgeois philosophy) complements the dominant modes of experience engendered within bourgeois society: these can be approached through analysis of exchange-value, commodity production and money (as Sohn-Rethel does) and through analysis of the capitalist labour process. In the latter, motion is objectified and organised precisely through the tyranny of a repeated, standardised, homogeneous, segmented time.

In Bergson's "duration", or subjective becoming, is posited unalienated experience and a philosophy of self and consciousness appropriate to it. Also suggested is a socialist cosmology of reality as burgeoning, creative process - though Bergson mystifies his insights in his failure to distinguish the three major ontological "levels" of reality: inorganic nature, living nature, and human history; and their different, distinct modes of developmental process. In short, the attack on mechanistic materialism is totally confused in Bergson's vitalism.

The "unhistorical" aspect of Bergson's critique of reified consciousness and mechanistic positivism consists both in his failure to locate the latter in the structures of capitalist ideology and labour organisation, and in his assumption of one, single alternative mode of consciousness - that of experienced "durée". On a certain plane, this unhistoricalism is repeated in Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness* and in the Frankfurt School's overarching conceptions of reification and its "negative": the liberated, authentic consciousness engaged in praxis. Thus, neither in the early Lukács nor in the Frankfurt School theorists is there a rigorous, analytical framework for exploring the forms of consciousness characteristic of different historical epochs from primitive society, through the various forms of class society, up to capitalism. The

Frankfurt School habitually work with the simple dualism of reified/ authentic, use-value/exchange value, harmony/contradiction etc. This inadequacy may well tie up with an unconscious self-location of the Frankfurt School and the early Lukács (the former's concept of reification was derived crucially from the latter), as a radical intelligentsia bemoaning capitalist reification and struggling as individuals for authenticity in existence. Such represents a link, unexpurgated, with German romantic anti-capitalism: a pessimistic "pre-capitalist" stratum's rebellion against the inevitable. For of course, production of use-values and communal labour can take on very different forms, and are characterised by many different forms of non-capitalist consciousness. In particular, the revolutionary socialist orientation of consciousness to time, space, and the object cannot be identified with that belonging to feudal or primitive society, though both these - like communism - are based on use-value production.

Thus, we must discern historically varied structures of consciousness, experience, sense perception etc through examination of concrete human history. And in the development of revolutionary, socialist counterparts - in theory and in real experience - we must recognise both the common features and the distinctions between them and pre-capitalist forms. In this sense, dialectical cosmology has certain features in common with various pre-Renaissance organicisms for example; the free, co-operative labour of communist society will have certain features in common with pre-capitalist forms of craft production. And hence, certain clearly elucidated aspects of mystical cosmologies from different pre-capitalist cultures can be appropriated, transformed, and resynthesized in the context of world revolutionary socialist consciousness.(24) In this light, the experience of the "eternal instant" in the continuous dialectical process of a unified totality which is the core of Taoist, and Chan or Zen Buddhist aspiration, is a structure that can be appropriated and resituated, in a way analogous to communism's reinstatement of classlessness, statelessness, and absence of money. In this example, we have to understand why a particular cosmology (eg Taoism) arose in its historical context, which aspects are specific and limited to that context and therefore inappropriate, "metaphysical" mysticisms from the standpoint of marxism, and which aspects should be grasped and constructively redeveloped.

Thus, for example, time is generally experienced as a cyclical structure in agricultural class societies(25), sometimes intertwined with the dialectical, developmental form of cosmology mentioned above. The cyclicity is bound to the alienated structures of such societies: dominated by nature and by metaphysical systems intrinsic to class exploitation. Those characteristics of pre-capitalist cosmologies deemed compatible with communist metabolism with nature are ones which, for complex reasons, have represented tendencies toward unalienated experience, often in conditions which prevented their realisation in actual social processes. The creative intuition of Taoist-influenced art and poetry in China, represented just such an enclosed expression of dialectical development, within a class society dominated by cosmologies of cyclical time.(26)

The limitations in the Frankfurt School's conception of the negation of reified consciousness, mentioned above, indicate one part of the reason for Lukács's subsequent rejection of his mode of reasoning in *History and Class Consciousness*. In fact, there are fundamental problems with that work, some of which were amplified in the Frankfurt School thinkers' developments upon its findings. Aspects of its perspective are finally idealistic, particularly with respect to its radical (ultimately solipsist) thesis on the social construction of nature (a misunderstanding related to Lukács's failure to distinguish alienation from objectification); whilst reification is to some degree grasped passively, in that by inadequately situating active production, labour, at the centre of the social totality the picture that can emerge, and which the Frankfurt School tended to work on, is of an overarching, almost Weberian process of reified rationalisation progressively embracing society from without (thus ignoring struggle, contradiction, ie reification as dynamic expression of class antagonism). Nevertheless, Lukács's enquiries into reified structures of consciousness yield important results, which should not be rejected wholly as does Colletti for example, seeing only pure Bergsonianism in them. They should be re-explored (as should, of course, the theoretical insights of Adorno, Marcuse et al.). The judgement of Michael Lowy is worth quoting at length:

"...Lukács develops his famous theory of reification: of man's subjection to a world of things (commodities) governed by 'natural' laws independent of the human will ... it revives, within a new theoretical framework, the pre-war concern of Lukács and the German sociologists (Tonnies, Simmel) with the processes of quantification, hypostatisation, and depersonalisation characteristic of modern society. In 1923, however, Lukács analysed reification in strictly Marxist terms as an aspect of the capitalist mode of production rather than as a 'tragic destiny' of culture. Above all, he saw in the proletariat a class that tends, by its very condition, to rebel against reification and to reject its own commodity-like status.

"Now, various Marxist writers, particularly in Italy (Bedeschi, Colletti, Pietro Rossi), maintain that the chapter on reification belongs with the romantic critique of science and industry.

"According to Colletti, the most interesting and sophisticated of Lukács's critics, 'the focal theme of *History and Class Consciousness* is in the identification of capitalist reification with the "reification" engendered by science'. But in point of fact, Lukács never wrote that reification is 'engendered by science'; he merely argued that, by virtue of reification, human relations take the form of laws of nature, the form of objectivity of natural-scientific concepts. Colletti admits that Lukács was not simply a neo-romantic: for he explicitly dissociated himself from the reactionary struggle waged against reification by German romanticism, the historical school of jurisprudence, Carlyle, Ruskin, and so on; and he distinguished between the application of a natural-scientific epistemological ideal to nature itself (which can only 'further the progress of science') and its application to the evolution of society (which is 'an ideological weapon of the bourgeoisie'). Nonetheless, Colletti detects elements of a romantic critique in *History and Class Consciousness*: for example, where Lukács brackets together 'the growth of mechanisation, dehumanisation and reification', or where he refers approvingly to Tonnies, Simmel, or Rickert.

For Lukács, he argues, the problem is not the use to which capitalists put machines, but the very use of machinery itself.

“These arguments are unacceptable for two reasons. First, Lukács was not a continuator of Tonnies or Simmel: he carried through an Aufhebung of their views within an essentially Marxist problematic. His association with such thinkers should not, in any case, be used as if it were a crushing argument against him. For, as some of his followers have suggested, it could rather stimulate us to re-examine the relationship between Marxism and romanticism and to make a fresh assessment of the whole romantic tradition. Second, it is by no means clear that Lukács's critique of mechanisation, Taylorism, and the modern factory division of labour can be explained in terms of 'romanticism'. After all, there is a powerful Marxist tradition, running from Capital to André Gorz and Ernest Wandel, which denounces the workings of capitalism at the very heart of the technical process of production and labour.

“In a sudden flash of irony, Colletti writes that Lukács went into the factory armed not with Capital but with Bergson's Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience. This is suggested to Colletti by the fact that Lukács attacks the reduction of qualitative to quantitative time in the mechanised labour of the capitalist factory. But contrary to Colletti's assertion, the incriminating passage from *History and Class Consciousness* revolves not around nostalgia for Bergson's durée vécue, but around a Marxist critique of man's subordination to the machine directly inspired by The Poverty of Philosophy and Capital itself.

“In his struggle against 'the thing', and in his desire to reduce everything to a 'process' - the 'light-and-shade of Heraclitean becoming' - Colletti's Lukács refers beyond the

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The essence of both metaphorical and analytical thought is for Lévi-Strauss opposition, discontinuity etc. Assuming such a pan-historical mental functioning, the perception of space and time by reified capitalist consciousness cannot be distinguished clearly from other forms of intellectual discernment, separation, or making of distinctions in physical reality and in time. Similarly, for Lévi-Strauss there is only one form of non-intellectual, or immediate, consciousness: "For the anthropologist, Bergson's philosophy recalls irresistibly that of the Sioux, and he himself could have remarked the similarity since he had read and pondered Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse. Durkheim reproduces in this book a reflection by a Dakota wise man which formulates, in a language close to that of L'Evolution créatrice, a metaphysical

philosophy, common to all the Sioux, from the Osage in the south to the Dakota in the north, according to which things and beings are nothing but materialised forms of creative continuity."(29)

Experiences of reality as creative process, and time as something burgeoning, are for Lévi-Strauss the same in Bergson as among the Sioux; forms of consciousness belonging to primitive, other pre-capitalist, and communist society cannot be distinguished one from another.

Against the view of Colletti then, we can agree with Lukács and other marxist theorists of reified consciousness and culture, who have found a partial significance in Bergson's philosophy. Bergson's "intellect" unconsciously depicted the positivist or mechanistic science of bourgeois society, in its "project" of turning all reality - natural and social - into inert, "dead" matter, to be segmented and manipulated by a technocratic domination. The "problem" with Lukács is that he insufficiently distinguishes the marxist, from the romantic anti-capitalist position implicit in Bergson. Reification is contrasted with a state of affairs which conflates the historical distinctions between primitive, pre-capitalist craft, and socialist production:

" ... there is a breach with the empirical and irrational methods of administration and dispensing justice based on traditions tailored, subjectively, to the requirements of men in action, and, objectively, to those of the concrete matter in hand.

“This is the source of the - apparently - paradoxical situation whereby the 'law' of primitive societies, which has scarcely altered in hundreds or sometimes even thousands of years, can be flexible and irrational in character, renewing itself with every new legal decision, while modern law, caught up in the continuous turmoil of change, should appear rigid, static and fixed.

“... the objectively relatively stable, traditional craft production preserves in the minds of its individual practitioners the appearance of something flexible, something constantly renewing itself, something produced by the producers.

“... (with capitalist reification) objectively all issues are subjected to an increasingly formal and standardised treatment "in which there is an ever-increasing remoteness from the qualitative and material essence of the 'things' to which bureaucratic activity pertains."(30)

As already seen, it is not the case that any system of use-value production is "tailored, subjectively, to the requirements of men in action", or that the producers' experience of the "qualitative and material essence" of their products is the same in all societies engaged in use-value £ production. Though aspects of an emancipatory orientation towards the "quality" of objects are evidenced in pre-capitalist systems, the structure of experience that revolutionary praxis seeks to create is new and historically distinct. The position that can be derived from Lukács, and is implicit in Bergson, conceives of a "natural" pre-capitalist relation to things (characterised by flexibility, subjectivity, perception of material "essence" etc), which is destroyed in the historical "descent" into reification. We thus return to the weakness in Frankfurt

School theory: the failure to analyse pre-capitalist structures of alienation. The Frankfurt School "pessimism" hinges to a view of capitalism as a system that has eliminated the "soul" from the social totality. Though articulating a partial truth from the viewpoint of marxism, such a perspective, as already suggested, remains ultimately the expression of a pre-capitalist stratum being "sucked into" reification. This can be evidenced in Lukács's emphasis on the "unified" consciousness of capitalism, on the fact that the ruling class suffers from reification:

"For as long as the fate of the worker still appears to be an individual fate (as in the case of the slave in antiquity), the life of the ruling classes is still free to assume quite different forms. Not until the rise of capitalism was a unified economic structure, and hence a-formally-unified structure of consciousness that embraced the whole society, brought into being. This unity expressed itself in the fact that the problems of consciousness arising from wage-labour were repeated in the ruling class in a refined and spiritualised, but, for that very reason, more intensified form."(31)

It is not Lukács's assertion that a unified structure of reified consciousness spans all classes in capitalist society that is problematic, but his incorrect view that the ruling classes of pre-capitalist systems were exempt from the structures of alienated consciousness and culture inherent in the societies they dominated. To take a single example, we can turn once again to Anderson's analysis of Antiquity, to see that no ruling class is divorced from the mode of production through which it rules; though not necessarily involved in administration of production itself, its consciousness, mode of life etc are structured by the social totality of which it is (the dominant) part:

"In classical Greece, slaves were thus for the first time habitually employed in crafts, industry and agriculture beyond the household scale. At the same time, while the use of slavery became general, its nature correspondingly became absolute: it was no longer one relative form of servitude among many, along a gradual continuum, but a polar condition of complete loss of freedom, juxtaposed against a new and untrammelled liberty. For it was precisely the formation of a limpidly demarcated slave sub-population that conversely lifted the citizenry of the Greek cities to hitherto unknown heights of conscious juridical freedom. Hellenic liberty and slavery were indivisible: each was the structural condition of the other, in a dyadic system which had no precedent or equivalent in the social hierarchies of the Near Eastern Empires, ignorant alike of either the notion of free citizenship or servile property. This profound juridical change was itself the social and ideological correlate of the economic 'miracle' wrought by the advent of the slave mode of production."(32)

The preceding consideration points to weaknesses in the Frankfurt School's conception of the "aesthetic dimension". It is impossible to generalise firmly about their conception, because of the inconsistencies and contradictions both between and within the various theorists' writings. But for a determined strand of the School's theory reification is not grasped as permanent contradiction, as a process in struggle. Thus the immanently critical dimensions of culture in

reified capitalist society are not identified as aspects of class, and other definite social, struggles. Adorno in particular, does not usually see struggle as occurring within reified culture: hence popular music is seen often as wholly dominated by the commodity form (though sometimes a subversive erotic quality is granted it). The "negation" in aesthetic exploration of experience is identified with the "autonomy" of cultural forms: one reason Adorno gives for finding in Schonberg's twelve-tone music a high degree of "negativity" is that it withdraws into its own logic, thus protecting itself from the "external" forces of social reification.

Adorno's dominant view of jazz and popular music is echoed in a more recent discussion on rock music by Leon Rosselson.(33) As in Adorno's views on jazz, Rosselson implicitly places rock music as a mere mirror to the repetitive discipline and linear segmented time of the reified capitalist labour process. In addition, the dictatorial relationship of the rock performer to his/her audience gears into a reified rhythmic control over work and experience generally:

"Rock is a sound, its structure is predictable, its idiom mindless. It is incapable of laughter, it is incapable of development. It inhabits an unreal world in which everything is for show. Deprived of the sharpness, the stimulus, the subtlety, the allusiveness, the explosiveness of words, rock relies on volume and repetition to generate excitement. Yet, despite its surface energy, nothing actually happens in rock music, which is the most reassuring thing about it. Rock's sexism has often been pointed out, but that sexism seems to me to be part and parcel of a music that, in style, in mode of performance and sometimes in content, is fascist, obsessed with the elevation of supergods for the adoration of the passive multitudes."(34)

Though making some valid points, this is a limited view that misunderstands the condensation of contradiction in the cultural form itself. In their reply to Rosselson, Herman and Hoare address the issue thus:

"As Rosselson himself acknowledges, there is a stream of popular music that 'bubbles up from below'. Media companies might transmit songs and produce records of them, but the songs themselves are produced by workers within the industry or people outside it. Manipulation is a one-sided and inaccurate description of the operations of the media in this field. There is an important contradiction stemming from the record companies' need to expropriate the ideological products of a popular culture or subculture in order to reproduce them for exchange. This contradiction is specific to a society which mass markets ideological products, and it is at its most acute where song is concerned.

"There is a two-way relationship between the production of songs and the production of records. Not only do record companies expropriate ideological products and transform them, but the companies' products can themselves be transformed by the culture which receives them. A record may have one meaning determined by the social relations of its production - but its meaning is also affected by the social relations underlying its consumption. Because records are interpreted, because they stimulate song, their consumption is not merely passive."(35)

With respect to the actual musical structure of rock music, contradiction is expressed in the simultaneous reflection of and reaction against reification. André Breton and Leon Trotsky wrote:

"We believe that the supreme task of art in our epoch is to take part actively and consciously in the preparation of the revolution. But the artist cannot serve the struggle for freedom unless he subjectively assimilates its social content, unless he feels in his very nerves its meaning and drama and freely seeks to give his own inner world incarnation in his art."(36)

Much rock music explores real urban reified experience, rather than either avoiding it or uncritically reproducing it. It does this through an interiorisation, a partial mimicking or taking over of the repetitive, noisy, incessant strain of experienced existence. It "plays" with this structure of experience, turning it inside out: in authentic tendencies of rock music this is not a mere reflection of or capitulation to alienation. Rather it is an imaginative exploration of both present and potential experience: a progressive "education of the senses".

Clearly, in any case not any rhythmic repetitiveness in music should be seen as a mere reflection of reification. Rhythm and timbre are the bases of most indigenous African music (by contrast with harmony and melody which are the bases of most European music), and also of Afro-American, Afro-Caribbean, and other forms brought into being through fusions of European with African currents. For this reason alone, it can be seen that repetitive rhythm is not necessarily a capitulation to non-development in music. The crucial issue is to detect contradiction within reified forms, to sense the anti-reified tendencies within them, and to distinguish clearly between different possible modes of experience which are rebellions against reification. This latter cannot be done unless the unreified, creative aspiration of socialist consciousness is distinguished from other historical forms of non-capitalist consciousness. Lack of clarity on these issues has helped to give rise to the inter-related inadequacies of the marxist cultural thought just considered.

It has been established that in the capitalist division of labour is to be found the basis of the dominant structures of experience in capitalist society. This is not to be understood as a mechanistic causal determinism operating from the "base" to the "superstructure", since in the very instant of considering one, the other is implicated: a social division of labour includes structures of activity, consciousness, and experience. And nor is there a mirror-like homology between "base" and "superstructure" - a passive mediation between fixed structures, whether this is understood as one-way or two-way. For contradiction is of the essence of both "base" and "superstructure" in a class society: if reified labour expresses class contradiction, consciousness and culture in capitalist society are also the sites of antagonism and struggle in process.

The experience of time emanating from and associated with labour under capitalism (not only surplus-creating labour), is a linear, segmented, measured repetition of moments. As Lukács put it:

" ... time sheds its qualitative, variable, flowing nature; it freezes into an exactly delimited, quantifiable continuum filled with quantifiable 'things' (the reified, mechanically objectified 'performance' of the worker, wholly separated from his total human personality): in short, it becomes space. In this environment where time is transformed into abstract, exactly measurable, physical space, an environment at once the cause and effect of the scientifically and mechanically fragmented and specialised production of the object of labour, the subjects of labour must likewise be rationally fragmented ... the objectification of their labour-power into something opposed to their total personality (a process already accomplished with the sale of that labour-power as a commodity) is now made into the permanent ineluctable reality of their daily life."(37)

In the reified calculation of labour time, which creates a quantity of exchange-value that abstracts from the specific human personalities and efforts engaged in production, is the "secret" of alienated experience in capitalist society. Expressed in its extreme form, as it is in much western culture, alienated experience is a "waiting for Godot" syndrome, a futility of repeated moments, equally empty, where there is no transformation in a reified world that remains inert, external. Successive moments start all over again, as if from scratch, filled only with a variant of the same insubstantial thing, event, thought, or activity. The world changes, but only according to its own de-personalised logic; there is no development of the self-in-process, no praxis, no application of experience in adapting practice; life is accepted as repeated, busy cycles of inertia in a vacuum.

The organisation of experience under capitalism is through repeated units of time, at the beginning of each of which there is a completely new start. Just as the motions of labour are a continuous repetition in which any variation is from one equally meaningless action to another, so commercial culture tends to recycle unchanging myths, manipulated fantasies, distorted impulses and patterns of interaction in ever new styles. And the dominant ideologies are regenerated as ever new variants of the same underlying themes. For example, the basic postulates of western Cold War ideology have remained the same at least since World War II, yet its content is continuously modified in minor aspects in response to varying complex factors, giving rise to what appear to be new appraisals of new issues. Similarly, capitalism's permanent concern to hold down wage-levels as far as possible - whether in boom or slump - is presented as many different responses to topical situations. This ever-repeated instant of an empty now, is a structure common to the claims of revolutionary newness for commercial products, to the re-orderings of formulae for commercial entertainment in fashions, crime thrillers, sexual titillation, or sentimentality. Marshall McLuhan describes comics thus:

"They represent a new kind of entertainment, a sort of magically recurrent daily ritual which now exerts on the spontaneous popular feelings a rhythmic reassurance that does substitute service, as it were, for the old popular experience of the recurrence of the seasons."(38)

Wyndham Lewis had earlier written that:

"In the world of Advertisement ... everything that happens today (or everything that is being advertised here and now) is better, bigger, brighter, more astonishing than anything that has ever existed before. The psychology that is required of the public to absorb this belief in the marvellous one and only - monist, unique, superlative, exclusive fact (immediately obliterating all other beliefs and shutting the mind to anything that may happen elsewhere or tomorrow) is a very rudimentary one indeed...

"The world in which Advertisement dwells is a one-day world. It is necessarily a plane universe, without depth. Upon this Time lays down discontinuous entities, side by side; each day, each temporal entity, complete in itself, with no perspectives, no fundamental exterior reference at all. In this way the structure of human life is entirely transformed, where and in so far as this intensive technique gets apsychologic ascendancy. The average man is invited to slice his life into a series of one-day lives, regulated by the clock of fashion. The human being is no longer the unit. He becomes the containing frame for a generation- or sequence of ephemerids, roughly organized into what he calls his "personality". Or the highly organized human mind finds its natural organic unit degraded into a worm-like extension, composed of a segmented, equally-distributed, accentless life. Each segment, each fashion-day (as the day of this new creature could be called) must be organically self-sufficing."(39)

As in so much writing on alienation (including aspects of even Lukács's, as we have noted) capitalist reification is portrayed as "degrading" the "natural organic" experience of an unspecified past; nevertheless the identification of one fundamental structure of experience in advanced capitalism is achieved. A pure repetition of segmented time-units is filled with thing-like events, as atomised entities occupy Renaissance-Newtonian three-dimensional space. This structure encompasses leisure-hours, the work-day, the weekly serial or the family weekend, the annual cycle of festivals-work-holidays-work, through to the whole life-span of an individual or a generation.

Cultural forms and activities in advanced capitalism frequently express and contain in their very structure both an adaptation to this structure of experience and a resistance to it, a tendency to its negation; and sometimes intimations of its dialectical alternative. Such opposite tendencies urge development of self in praxis in-the-world, where time and space are experienced as a unified four-dimensional process. Instead of solid entities perceived as filling "empty" space outside time, reality is lived and understood as a single, inter-related complex of inorganic development and change, biological growth, personal and historical becoming.

The tension and contradiction between these powerful experiential forces is the crux of much western culture. In rock music (in its broadest sense) developments over the period of its existence have always held the contradiction in a "trapped" condition, whether it is the music itself that is considered, or the sub-cultures whose focus it is. The heroic struggle and yearning for authenticity in Pink Floyd's music is also a melancholic fatalism before inexorable alienation and external imposition of rhythm. Biting cynicism is simultaneously an oceanic beauty.

Similarly a discotheque is a wild underworld in which epic adventures are pursued in glittering darkness: though all is confined by the time-order and controlled sexual arousal of Capital and its laws of interaction. The keeping of rock music and its sub-cultures "safe" and susceptible to capital's control, corresponds in western capitalist societies to the level of containment of anti-capitalist revolt in general - whether in reactionary or reformist politics or in the engineered mass acceptance of major elements of the complex of dominating ideologies. But at every stage of rock music an alternative tendency and potential has been evidenced, which would and could break from its contained state in measure with the strength of mass militancy in the industrial-economic sphere and the sphere of urban civil society, in measure with the transformation of the structure of the family and the mass adoption of revolutionary conceptions and forms of sensibility.

Thus we return to the complex, contradictory nature of characteristic forms of aesthetic experience within capitalism, and to their articulations with all other spheres of social and psychological activity and experiential orientation. The Althusserian conception of literature being a production from the "raw material" of "lived experience", as developed by writers such as Eagleton or James Kavanagh, is a helpful one even though their form of Structuralism cannot grapple with the distinctions, and relationships between, ideology, aesthetic structures, and lived experience. James Kavanagh writes:

"The literary text ... , takes elements of ideology-elements of a "lived" relation to a given social formation — and uses them as raw materials for the production of a specific and determinate articulation of- ideology invested with specific imaginary satisfactions - a new pseudo-real "lived" relation.

" ... with a literary text as with much else, "living through" it may tell us what it is like, but only the distancing act of scientific, theoretical labour can tell us what it is. Such a scientific discourse takes the text, not as the coherent unit it presents itself as (least of all as some kind of organic form), but as a work that strains to hold together the contradictory, disparate elements from which it is fashioned: ideological raw materials, psycho-sexual fears and desires, aesthetic and linguistic conventions, etc. It is precisely as a very specific, peculiar, non-natural and non-organic constructed conjuncture of diverse elements that do not "hang together", but are "hung" together under the sign of a given problematic, that the text achieves its production of ideology."(40)

In spite of the confusion between ideological coherence and organic form- which do not, as is here implied, entail each other - a crucial aspect of cultural productions is pointed to in this passage. Cultural- aesthetic activity, in wresting some kind of experiential form - as opposed to theoretical argument alone - out of aspects of reality-as- it-is-lived, explores domains far beyond the ideologically given significance of the "raw material". Renaissance art, largely confined in content to a specified number of religious themes or "moments", was able to explore a huge range of experience: from everyday emotions to implicit social values, to transcendent, cosmic

orientations. As Benjamin shows for Baudelaire's poetry, an acceptance (on a certain level) and a living through of commodity superficiality, an experiencing of fetishised desire to the extremes of what capitalism implies, yields an exposure of contradictory reality and an expansion of feeling, understanding, and judgement; and also, inevitably, intimations of a reality with different contours and wider horizons. Likewise for our understanding of rock music and probably, on some plane or other, any cultural production within capitalist society.

Two further examples may be briefly considered here as they illustrate particularly well the aesthetic expression of growth and anti-bourgeois spatial and temporal experience, though structured within conservative forms and explicit meanings: the sculptor Rodin and the composer Bruckner. They are both roughly concomitant with the process of transition from liberal to monopoly capitalism, with the beginning of advanced capitalism's new degree of conscious control over experience, as is Bergson: the period in which Lukács feels "time sheds its ... flowing nature ... freezes into a ... quantifiable continuum filled with ... 'things' ... it becomes space." This experience is what a marxist analysis of advanced capitalist consciousness finds reflected in Bergson's view that "qualitative heterogeneity" is turned into "extensive homogeneity".

In the art of both Bruckner and Rodin, what is centrally conveyed is growth, by contrast to repetition - segmented existence failing to develop - the 'Waiting for Godot' circling in ether, in which no day, minute, year etc has a depth content different from any other. This returns us to the earlier discussion, whose implications may be drawn out further by a quotation from an article by Richard Gross:

"More recently, television has furthered the general spatialisation of experience in modern culture. As a visual medium it functions by condensing time processes into pictorial images, and what cannot be turned into images disappears as information.

Moreover, television frequently removes these same images from their time contexts; it is not able to deal very well with sequence, though it has no trouble compressing the sequential into the here and now.

"... if nothing is truly real but the frozen instant which is directly experienced, then the things we encounter in everyday life are no more and no less than the sum of what they signal. Their truth is simply their immediacy, their surface manifestations. What is missing in this is any notion of levels of meaning, all of which have evolved historically and still remain present underneath the surface."(41)

Six advertisements in a TV break; six informative documentaries in one week; six concerts in one season; six encounters and conversations at one party; six erotic relationships in one vacation: this is the fragmentation that empties out the potential for subjective growth for the individual, in a civilisation that grants a wider range of potentially rich experience for more of its people than any hitherto in history. Likewise a dehistoricising repetition of "issues" sets the

ground for a form of radical political engagement that tends to exhaust, or petrify, those who commit themselves. Gross continues:

"In fact, the most important aspect of things may lie below appearances, and this aspect is composed of historicity, duration, remembrance. To deal only with the immediately experienceable surface of objects is to forget both their temporal dimension and the numerous social relations that have constituted these objects over time, and in effect made them what they have become. Similarly, when spatialisation is the dominant mode of perception, the instant becomes not a moment anchored in time but a shifting point in space. Horizontal perceptions then replace vertical ones, and where time is dealt with at all it is treated as congealed duration. Under these conditions, existence seems to gather around points in space, as if each moment were independent of every other, or at most related serially but not immanently. Acts also do not appear to be brought about by what precedes them, but each act, like each instant, is treated as its own separate eternity. Again, only that which is immediate and simultaneous is experienced as real.

"... In the mass media, in education, in the official language of politics and advertising (is there any difference?) one can notice the effects of spatialisation not only on what is said but on how it is said, ie on how points are argued or connections made ... we now more easily conceptualise in terms . of the similarities between things in space, as opposed to the differences within the same things over time. We see identities and correspondences across a level plane much more readily than we grasp differences through a span of duration."(42)

Dialectical, organic growth understood in nature and history (as against mechanism and dehistoricised reification), and experienced in the self's becoming, entails a form of subjective time that is central to Bruckner and Rodin. This is a perception of the variability of time from experience to experience, and of variation in quality of experience - expressed through movement between contrasting rhythms of time, and through simultaneity of different time-rhythms representing different dimensions of experience. As opposed to feeling time as one, standardised, reified linear measure, when felt as development and fulfilment time moves from quality to quality, one state of existence in toto to another; existence is thus contradictory unity and struggle, activity, striving. The organicity of their works conveys the interrelatedness of all elements of experience in a complex whole, by contrast to the fragmentation of reified existence, and by contrast to capitalistically mechanised motion. Their organic development is an infinitely complex interlacing of 'spontaneous' tendencies: of the kind that in many cultural contexts (western romantic, Taoist, Eskimo, to name some) people have perceived in the way a tree grows, or in the movement of clouds in the sky.

It is of course impossible to address in any detail here the artistic means through which Rodin or Bruckner express such "strategies of life" in their specific works; such requires penetrating analysis in terms of the particular media. But even on the level of abstraction used here, we can see a contradiction between their essential aesthetic thrusts and their orientations in social

ideology, and sometimes in conscious artistic attitudes. "The idea of progress is society's worst form of cant" said Rodin, and there is no contradiction between the view of Rodin taken here and the conclusion of John Berger(43): that Rodin expresses - on a certain level - a compression of forms, a desire to dominate figures, a Pygmalion sexual obsession.

In Ionel Dianov's assessment, Rodin " ... does not think of movement simply as the transition from one attitude to another, a gesture or the shifting of an object in space. Movement is a way of expressing inner life, it is the emotional impulse that causes his sculptures to thrill and surge from within.

"'Grief, joy, thoughts - in our art all becomes action,' he said.

"Movement foments and exalts matter: it is the subjective drive that animates objective form. All feeling is expressed by an inner movement.

"Movement also signifies becoming. The concept of time joins that of space, giving a new dimension to the work of art.

"The fleeting impression of an ephemeral aspect, captured in all its freshness, is made permanent by the artist. The active character of artistic creation is the result of this conflict between opposites: duration and becoming.

"The conflict between permanence and becoming is matched by the conflict between substance and mobility. Rodin's contribution was to find a new balance between these opposites.

"In 1900, the German philosopher Georg Simmel noted: 'By inventing a new flexibility of joints, giving surfaces a new tone and vibration, suggesting in a new way the contact of two bodies or parts of the same body, using a new distribution of light by means of clashing, conflicting or corresponding planes Rodin has given to the human figure a new mobility which reveals the inner life of man, his feelings, thoughts and personal vicissitudes more completely than was ever possible before ... "

"To express in sculpture the new balance between duration and becoming, substance and mobility, Rodin used three processes which shocked his contemporaries: composition, unfinished form and modelling, from within.

"'Great artists' he said 'proceed as Nature composes, not as anatomy describes. They do not carve a particular muscle or nerve or bone for its own sake. They see and express the whole and by broad planes their work throbs with light or sinks into shade ... The expression of life, to preserve the infinite suppleness of reality, must never be frozen and fixed. '

"This concept of composition is best explained by contrast with construction. Composition leads to a balance of forces, construction to a balance of masses. One is like music in orchestration of harmonies and concordances, the other like architecture in disposition of volumes. In

composition a plane is seen in relation to the whole, in construction in relation to other planes. Composition suggests motion and 'the infinite suppleness of reality', while construction achieves the solid structure of finite static forms ...

“Composition assembles the diverse aspects of life according to the demands of inner harmonious necessity ... A movement is caught (through the technique of unfinished form) in its intimate process and we feel it will progressively unfold according to an ineluctable necessity ... (Rodin) endowed sculpture with a new poetic function by 'discerning between what was and what is to be'.

“(About modelling from within Rodin said) ... 'when you carve, never see forms in breadth, but always in depths ... Never consider a surface as anything but the extremity of a volume, the point more or less large it directs towards you ... Instead of imagining the parts of a body as more or less flat surfaces, I represented them as projections of interior volumes. I endeavoured to express every swelling of torso and limbs, the afflorescence of a muscle or bone extending deep under the skin. And so the truth of my figures, instead of being superficial, seems to blossom forth from within like life itself.'

“... To be true is to understand Nature and her laws and follow her example, so as to create forms that have a life of their own ... To achieve such truth, (the artist) must be free, able to see the world through his own eyes with 'uncompromising frankness': a piercing look that reveals 'the hidden meaning of all things', 'the inner truth reflected in the outer truth'. For art precludes all slavish copying of the visible world so as to reach the essence of things.

“... (in) communion with Nature ... this ... can ... be understood by discerning the particular character of each thing and its tendency to universality.”(44)

Rodin conceives and expresses material reality and emotional experience as concretely interwoven or interlocking dynamic totalities. Reality and experience are neither composed of isolated, static, atoms of time or matter-in-space, nor are they a single one-dimensional motion. The following extract from M Merleau-Ponty's Eye and Mind is pertinent to our interpretation of Rodin:

"Here Rodin's well-known remark reveals its full weight: the instantaneous glimpses, the unstable attitudes, petrify the movement, as is shown by so many photographs in which an athlete-in-motion is forever frozen. We could not thaw him out by multiplying the glimpses. Mavey's photographs, the cubists' analyses, Duchamp's *La Mariée* do not move; they give a Zenonian reverie on movement. We see a rigid body as if it were a piece of armour going through its motions; it is here and it is there, magically, but it does not from here to there. Cinema portrays movement, but how? Is it, as we are inclined to believe, by copying more closely the changes of place? We may presume not, since slow-motion shows a body floating among objects like an alga but not moving itself.

“Movement is given, says Rodin, by an image in which the arms, the legs, the trunk, and the head are each taken at a different instant, an image which therefore portrays the body in an attitude which it never at any instant really held and which imposes fictive linkages between the parts, as if this mutual confrontation of impossibles could, and could alone, cause transition and duration to arise in bronze and on canvas. The only successful instantaneous glimpses of movement are those which approach this paradoxical arrangement - when, for example, a walking man is taken at the moment when both his feet are touching the ground; for then we almost have the temporal ubiquity of the body which brings it about that the man bestrides space. The picture makes movement visible by its internal discordance. Each member's position, precisely by virtue of its incompatibility with the others' (according to the body's logic), is otherwise dated or is not 'in time' with the others; and since all of them remain visibly within the unit of a body, it is the body which comes to bestride time (*la durée*). Its movement is something premeditated between legs, trunk, arms, and head in some virtual 'control centre', and it breaks forth only with a subsequent change of place. When a horse is photographed at that instant when he is completely off the ground, with his legs almost folded under him - an instant therefore, when he must be moving - why does he look as if he were leaping in place? Then why do Géricault's horses really run on canvas, in a posture impossible for a real horse at the gallop? It is just that the horses in Epsom Derby bring me to see the body's grip upon the soil and that, according to a logic of body and world I know well, these 'grips' upon space are also ways of taking hold of time (*la durée*). Rodin said very wisely, 'It is the artist who is truthful, while the photograph is mendacious; for, in reality, time never stops cold.' The photograph keeps open the instants which the onrush of time closes up forthwith; it destroys the overtaking, the overlapping, the 'metamorphosis' (Rodin) of time."(45)

Writings on Bruckner frequently point to the 'paradox' in such an innovatory composer's conservative beliefs and unrebelling attitudes, especially toward social authority. This man, who volunteered to join the counter-revolutionary National Guard in 1848 was "a highly skilled craftsman, erecting to the glory of God huge cathedrals in sound".(45) As Deryck Cooke puts it, Bruckner "came from the most primitive stratum of European society - the Catholic peasantry. In Metternich's reactionary Austria, this class was unaffected by the growing liberalism and sophistication of European life in general, and its best stock had retained its original characteristics practically unchanged since feudal times - an earthy identification with the vast power of nature, a slow and massive natural strength of character, a genuine humility, and an unquestioning childlike faith in God ...

"In the fashionable Austrian capital he cut an anomalous figure, retaining the habits of mind, the manners, and even the clothes of the simple rustic; with his naive Catholic faith, he was utterly unaffected by the social and political currents of his time, and by the seething intellectual and emotional unrest of the romantic movement."(47)

Nevertheless Bruckner expressed contradictions and structures of sensibility characteristic "of the age" with intense significance, and assimilated in particularistic modes innovatory techniques

that were developing in contemporary music. Hence: "He was concerned only to honour God with awareness of the vastness of nature and the divine universe probably unconscious of being pantheistic since he was meticulous in religious practice."(48) What is unfailingly perceived in Bruckner, is the sense of cosmic creation, the way in which out of seemingly insubstantial mist wisps of sound are gathered up, develop and grow into rolling waves or clouds. There is both a mystery and a certainty in what for Bruckner would be termed "divine purpose", but which could be pertinently considered the creative, organic processes of inorganic nature, life, history and self-becoming. In other words the experience of cosmic development conveyed in Bruckner, whether it seems to be expressed through the sound-metaphor of the growth of a seed or a falling to the knees at an altar, does not necessitate an ontology of religion - on the contrary it demands a non-dualistic, developmental-striving ontology. Bruckner's musical means to convey this orientation of being is described by Cooke thus:

"This is Bruckner's characteristic way of beginning: the main theme does not appear straight away, as nearly always with other symphonists. There is (a) bon mot to the effect that Bruckner could not get a symphony under way without a string tremolando; and ... the shaft contains a partial truth. The mysterious opening of Beethoven's Ninth held a tremendous fascination for him: five of his nine symphonies do begin with a string tremolando - and so do several of his later movements. But the category really needs extending to embrace the whole idea of a background accompaniment, including a rhythmic figure or an ostinato (cf Mozart's Fortieth symphony); and then it is true that all but one of Bruckner's symphonies and most of his later movements begin in this way.

"... it is part and parcel of his personal vision that his music tends to emerge gradually out of silence, as a neutral background sonority evoking the mystery of creation itself. Then, against this background, the act of creation takes place with the presentation of the main theme.

"(In five of Bruckner's symphonies this is) what the Germans call an Urthema, or 'primordial theme' - a stark motif on the tonic harmony, revolving around the octave, the fifth, or the complete triad (cf the opening themes of Beethoven's Ninth and Wagner's Rheingold)."(49)

A crucial component of Bruckner's music is its relentless development and build-up, checkered throughout with breaks, the sensation of exhaustion in falling back. "No attentive listener can be unaware of the fact that tremendous emotional forces are at work (in the Eighth). The enormous crescendi which have a profound effect on the formal processes correspond to intensifications of feeling which rise to one or several climactic points and then fall away, often abruptly.

" ... (in the Ninth) the rich, extremely diverse harmonies are impregnated by "Tristan" chromaticism, although stylistic elements suggesting Wagner are always employed in the manner unique to Bruckner; the great symphonic crescendi are distinguished by a rapid build-up of power; the climaxes of the opening movement and of the Adagio, which tower above all the other climactic peaks of the Symphony by virtue of their tremendous intensity, are harsh, long

ustained and unresolved dissonances - unprecedented concentrations of sound shattering in their power."(50)

Returning to Cooke: " ... the characteristic Bruckner 'blaze-up' ... contributes much to the sense of primeval, elemental power in the symphonies it is greatly enhanced by the highly individual, entirely un-Wagnerian orchestration, in which each group of instruments stands out vividly with its own particular rhythmic figure."(51)

Unreified, multi-temporal burgeoning is at the heart of the dynamic structure of Bruckner's music. Derek Watson in his book on Bruckner also refers to " ... the concept of building up long harmonic paragraphs ... A Bruckner climax is a very individual thing, repeated phrases towering inexorably with almost cataclysmic effect. The real summit of each movement is enhanced by the way in which several pinnacles are averted and a new build-up started each time."(52)

The experiential structure, or strategy of sensibility in Bruckner, is also one which holds out an absolute certainty in ultimate attainment of transcendence. No matter how checkered the Odyssey-like ascent, no matter how agitated or exhaustingly up-and-down or filled with deviations and disillusion the route, nor seemingly blind and stumbling the progress in the immediate, an enveloping certainty and utter determination toward "Aufhebung" is always present from the first note. This indefatigability is like the slow rise of the sun, through dark, scattered clouds, to its zenith; it is Bruckner's "slow yet Herculean unfolding of his own originality".(53) The Bruckner conductor, Eugen Dochum, writes:

" ... I must ward against extreme accelerandi and ritardandi, such as the sensualistic music of the late-romantic era demands, in the case of Bruckner; his music evolves itself on the basis of "eternal peace in God the Lord", and a mystical sense of union with God such as can only be found elsewhere in modern European music, though in a totally different form, with Bach. Bruckner's music tolerates no nervous, "heated" crescendi; his crescendi almost always develop in a state of balance which only absolute uniformity of tempo can achieve."(54)

This conviction, or glowing certainty of direction, though consciously a statically determined, traditional Catholic faith, grapples in its aesthetic expression for a conception of dialectical process and emancipation. In reality, it is a Kantian self-determined morality and form of action that is urged toward; activity governed by autonomously determined "rules" arrived at subjectively, through one's own making, but according to reason - both the practical and ethical understanding of reality on all planes. When effectively historicised, Kantian morality becomes Marxian. As summarised by Whitebook:

"For Kant, to be autonomous is to be self-determining or, put more technically, self-legislating: one is autonomous when following laws of one's own making rather than being subject to the heteronomous laws of inner or outer nature. Self-determination, however, does not mean arbitrariness.

It is not liberty as classical liberalism conceived it. On the contrary, Kant maintained that one is truly self-legislating only when the maxims of action one gives oneself are in accordance with reason, which means in accordance with the laws peculiar to a community of rational beings. Kant introduced the distinction, which reappears in Hegel, between objective Wille and subjective Wilkur, often translated as caprice, to make this point. We are autonomous when the maxims of our will are brought into accordance with the demands of reason and see therefore objective (Wille) and not, as one might think, when they are determined arbitrarily (Wilkur).

“The categorical imperative is Kant's attempt to formulate a decision procedure for determining when maxims of action are in fact of one's own making, ie in accord with the demands of reason, and when they derive from heteronomous nature. As the Frankfurt School emphasised, however, while inner nature refers to biological drives, outer nature can be subdivided into the natural and the social environment to the extent that it is objectified and acts on the individual in a quasi-natural fashion. Examples of the latter would be the seeming naturalness with which traditional authority presents itself as well as the quasi-natural functioning of the "self-regulating market". Autonomy, in that it consists in an independence from the compulsions of inner and outer nature, thus presupposes the attainment of relative mastery over the drives, the natural environment, and the objectified social environment.”(55)

Such autonomy, situated within the consciously understood and appropriated dialectical processes of nature and society, entails self-determining, integrative labour, perception, and all other activity. Its developmental structure is the many-sided unfolding and appropriation of the essential powers of the human species occurring within and interacting with the undistorted growth and progressive movement from quality to quality, experienced in nature. The actual emotions conveyed in Bruckner or Rodin range from excruciating anguish to blissful identification with eternity; they are "characteristic" or "significant" structures of experience for particular phases and positions within bourgeois society - explored or "discovered" as in one sense recognisable sensibilities and in another as experiential realms newly brought into the language of feelings. In this discussion, the precise "contents" of the expressed emotions have been of less concern than the developmental structure of their aesthetic expression - though of course the emotions are crucial to the authentic self-becoming - through suffering and transcendence - which is the meaning of that developmental structure.

Thus, the idiosyncratically assimilated psychic dislocation of late nineteenth-century Austrian society, with its particularly intense contradictions - in a Bruckner who consciously looks backwards to traditional, peasant faith, results in an aesthetic expression positing a dialectical, self-determining ontology. The latter hinges to the crucial issue for twentieth century social transformation: cultural revolution. The ideas that germinate in varying degrees - in response to failed revolution in the west and "bureaucratic deformations" within revolution in the east - in Gramsci and Lukács, Mao-Tse-Tung and R D Laing, and more recently in Rudolf Bahro and Raymond Williams, are elaborations upon the project of bringing society's development into conscious organic self-control, ie real self-determination, where decision-making and the

knowledge on which it is based become 'de-specialised' and dispersed - taken into the active, outwardly directed subjectivity of all individuals. Thus society's practice toward 'economic' development becomes synonymous with human fulfilment. In a mode of production which is conscious, human metabolism has no rhythm determined by objectified productive forces; human control over production makes technology into the means for harmonious relations to exist between society and nature and between human beings within society. Technology and the labour process become the transparent and humanly determined forms through which society strives for its greater fulfilment; and thus, by contrast to the 'subalternity' engendered in individuals within an alienated division of labour, all social determination is automatically collective, all decisions being self-consciously socially structured - drawing upon integrated, individuated consciousnesses of individual selves that are globally "imaginative" and technically competent.

Genuine collective decisions are made by free individuals with integrated perceptions, consciousness, experience, embedded within conscious social processes in which knowledge and decision-making are diffused, since hierarchical structures and compartmentalised perceptions etc have been overcome. Since each individual's consciousness and activity is capable of appropriating the level of culture and capacity attained by society as a whole, individual self-becoming is no longer in contrast to collective need. Self-determined action is thus neither bourgeois liberalism's "individual liberty" nor capitalist atomisation; while collective self-determination rests not upon the suppression or denial of unique individuation (which is "totalitarian" collectivism), but on its growth and development. The genuinely free and individuated self is one which conceives imaginatively in terms of the collectivity, as by reflex: this is what Shelley meant when he claimed that poetic imagination "awakens and enlarges the mind itself by rendering it the receptacle of a thousand unapprehended combinations of thought ... The great secret of morals is ... a going out of our own nature, and an identification of ourselves with the beautiful which exists in thought, action, or person, not our own. A man to be greatly good, must imagine intensely and comprehensively; he must put himself in the place of another and of many others; the pains and pleasures of his species must become his own"(56)

As with morality, self-determined labour is conducted according to patterns imposed from the "inside" onto the world. Self-determined becoming in the world, and interaction with the world, is "spontaneous" in the sense of following the inner necessity of the self's own nature - which is a capacity and yearning to develop, and for fulfilment. "Spontaneous" labour cannot therefore be dominated by partial, reified laws or dictates of economic "efficiency", or by a "logic of technology". Self-becoming activity is "spontaneous" to "human nature", just as both inorganic and organic (but non-conscious) natures demonstrate their own forms of spontaneity. With respect to labour and cultural revolution, Williams writes in his discussion of Rudolf Bahro:

" ... the deep obstacles ... are the facts of the appropriation, expropriation, at many levels of general social and working processes, of skills, effective knowledge and powers of practical

decision. It is against this expropriation that the cultural revolution, much wider than that against the more immediately recognisable features of capitalism, is directed.

“... there is no reason to believe, from the experience of Eastern Europe, that any simple removal of capitalist property relations is sufficient to alter the realities of monopoly state power and the imposed authority of the plan ... It is then on this common site, if under radically different conditions, that the cultural revolution must be waged, and as something more than a series of local options.

“... The cultural revolution seeks a system in which there are still indeed many levels of generality - including levels of elected delegate assemblies - and in which decisions and relevant information necessarily move from the more local and specific to the more general, extensive and indeed in these senses determining, but in which, because the lines of communication and decision now flow the other way, 'individuals are equally and simultaneously present at all levels of subjective interest.

”... the cultural revolution insists, first, that what a society needs, before all, to produce, is as many as possible conscious individuals, capable of all necessary association .. Thus the material task which requires the work of sixty is developed, by capitalist logic, to the point where it requires the work of only six, and the other fifty-four become, in that deeply significant term of the current alienation, 'redundant' In an alternative logic, there would be the choice, from the beginning, of associating more workers than are necessary at any particular material stage, so that within the labour process itself there is room for other kinds of relationship and reflection, or of so redistributing necessary working time that other kinds of activity and relationship become the emancipatory centre rather than the compensatory margin of social life. It is of course clear that any such plan requires, absolutely, abolition of the current imperatives of capital, which exerts its quantitative dominance at just these points. And it is then deeply encouraging that, even within capitalist conditions, some trade unions are now moving strongly, if still in limited ways, towards these objectives, while at a more practical level (though still as often negativ"as positive) more and more people are actually treating work in such ways, as far as they can, of course to the outrage of all existing types of controller. What then urgently matters is the generalisation, extension and where necessary conversion of these existing tendencies, with the now conscious rather than defensive or shamefaced purpose of remaking the working order. For, so far from being impractical, the positive and conscious pursuit of these aims is now the only practical alternative to a new stage of division of humanity into the engaged and the redundant.

“What this really involves as a central task of the cultural revolution, in its necessary alteration of the nature of the productive forces, is a practical redefinition of the nature of 'work'. For while, within the inevitable material limits and within the rational decisions of a society seeking genuine economic maturity, the necessary material- tasks can undoubtedly be performed in less total time, any effective response to more general human needs, in care and relationships, and in knowledge and development, is in one sense genuinely limitless, and will make demands on our

energies which are at the very opposite pole from a relaxed and unchallenging utopia. Indeed, these now equally basic needs, as we can already glimpse from their pressures at the end of the old logic - pressures which seem actually to be increasing in conditions of advanced commodity development - compose the necessary processes of a new kind of active (and, in that new sense, working) society.”(57)

Such a condition requires of course, that no "law of value" continues to determine the distribution of average necessary labour-time, either with respect to producers or to units of value produced. It means that labour takes into account the entirety of human needs in its strategies, so that it is socially subjective and unalienated, free and unrepressive; thus the individual and collective labourer is subject of activity, and the psyche is unified, the conscious and unconscious having been integrated. Hence there is no contradiction between concrete individuality and genuine collectivism - indeed they are interdependent. Concrete individuality cannot develop harmoniously in one without it developing in all. Individual self-development at the expense of others, or even in the absence of self-development in others, is a contradictory impossibility; complex fulfilling labour for one requires that others are equally capable and desiring of complex activity and fulfilment.

Where the individual personality is a microcosm of the social totality, ie an integrated, all-rounded whole, expressing in itself the entirety of society's possibilities (ie not a fragment, deprived of all possibilities other than those pertaining to that fragment) in some degree, one whose consciousness bears an understanding of the social totality, and where all knowledge is appropriatable by every individual - there each individual feels all others as of absolute importance: "a pain to one is a pain to all" as in John Donne's poem, or "the pains and pleasures of (the) species must become (each person's) own", as for Shelley. In an alienated totality, fragmented individuals regard others as dispensable things - others' loss is thought of as unrelated to oneself (as in alienated orientations to poverty, war, or the destruction of people by society through alcoholism, homelessness, mental breakdowns, suicide, etc).

Once again, we can trace the inter-connections between disalienation and aesthetic imagination. "It is in the nature of dream and revolution to agree ..." (58) In the earlier quoted manifesto, written by Breton in collaboration with Trotsky, the issue is posed thus:

"True art, which is not content to play variations on ready-made models but rather insists on expressing the inner needs of man and of mankind in its time — true art is unable not to be revolutionary, not to aspire to a complete and radical reconstruction of society. This it must do, were it only to deliver intellectual creation from the chains which bind it, and to allow all mankind to raise itself to those heights which only isolated geniuses have achieved in the past.

“... The communist revolution is not afraid of art. It realises that the role of the artist in a decadent capitalist society is determined by the conflict between the individual and various social forms which are hostile to him. This fact alone, in so far as he is conscious of it, makes the

artist the natural ally of revolution. The process of sublimation, which here comes into play and which psychoanalysis has analysed, tries to restore the broken equilibrium between the integral 'ego' and the outside elements it rejects. This restoration works to the advantage of the 'ideal of self', which marshals against the unbearable present reality all those powers of the interior world, of the 'id', which are common to all men and which are "constantly flowering•and developing. The need for emancipation felt by the individual spirit has only to follow its natural course to be led to mingle its stream with this primeval necessity - the need for the emancipation of man."(59)

A number of threads already developed with respect to the concept of imagination may now be drawn together. The exercise of imagination urges a condition of universal, free individuality. For Kant "aesthetic pleasure consists in the exercise and entertainment of our mental faculties in a free and indeterminately purposive way by what we call beautiful ... A man who admires and loves the beautiful form of ... (a) product of nature may be said to be glad, in an entirely unselfish and disinterested way, that these things exist ... (He) cannot help being pleased by every indication that nature is so constituted as to cause disinterested pleasure to men through the affinity between it ... and his imaginative and intellectual faculties ...

"There is in fact a kind of analogy between natural beauty and morality, which is illustrated by our tendency to apply to aesthetic objects terms which belong originally to the assessment of moral character."(60) The inter-relatedness of imagination, integrated character, and morality is developed further in early Romanticism - to which we shall shortly return.

The Kantian notion that imagination creates final form in, or out of, a particular experience, or emotion, or perception can be related to the assertion by Breton and Trotsky, already quoted, that "the artist cannot serve the struggle for freedom unless he subjectively assimilates its social content ... and seeks to give his own inner world incarnation in his art." The aesthetic transfiguration of a particular experience, whether positive or negative, creates a form out of it which evokes a feeling of beauty. This connects with the Frankfurt School's conception of aesthetic imagination as posing a condition of transcendence of, negation to, negative experience through its treatment of it; or, if the experience is positive, thrusting it against real conditions in such a way as transforms them symbolically. A major example of the latter is in the artistic exploration of nature. What for Kant is "sublime" experience before the limitless and boundless, becomes for post-Frankfurt School aesthetic theory the expression of eroticism, the play impulse, the urge toward absolute freedom. Or, it is the oceanic dedifferentiation Ehrenzweig speaks of:

" ... creative experience can produce an oceanic state ... This state need not be due to a 'regression', to an infantile state but could be the product of the extreme dedifferentiation in lower levels of the ego which occurs during creative work. Dedifferentiation suspends many kinds of boundaries and distinctions; at an extreme limit it may remove the boundaries of individual existence and so produce a mystic oceanic feeling that is distinctively manic in quality. Mania in the pathological sense endangers the normal rational differentiations on a conscious level and so impairs our sense of reality ... But on deeper, usually unconscious, levels

of the ego dedifferentiation does not deny, but transforms reality according to the structural principles valid on those deeper levels. The reality of the mystic may be manic-oceanic, but it is not a pathological denial of reality."(61)

The summation of this accumulative historical insight is perhaps expressed in Marcuse. "A 'radical sensibility', he conjectured, that draws its images and experiences from 'the life-enhancing, sensuous, aesthetic qualities inherent in nature', would necessarily partake of the qualitative break with the repressive continuum of needs that is ... the substance of the next revolution. This conception (is) already operative in the most advanced demands of the radical opposition; movements for ecological harmony, cultural revolution, and the liberation of women envisioned ... an end to the exploitative domination of (human and external) nature, the restoration of the fractured totality of existence."(62)

Where it is wholly negative experience that is the raw material for artistic praxis, as in an Edward Hopper painting or a play by Harold Pinter, the imagination in one way or another depicts a specific (if "unreal") situation of alienation in a unique, not a generalising way. Pinter's plays explore the fragmentations of mind, behaviour, and reality; of self-absorption and an arbitrariness in human interaction (where apparent content is less important than the forms of behaviour - menacing, obsequious etc - that are depicted). It is with respect to this kind of art that the crux of the argument and debate within Marxist aesthetics has so often settled. Thus, for Marcuse and Adorno, "immanent critique" or an expression of "the beautiful image of liberation" were achieved through an art-work's interiorisation of the contours of experience within a reified social totality; whilst for Lukács, art must convey the totality-in-process, and for Brecht it must actively intervene in the global struggle of human beings to become historical agents. The former orientation is implicitly saying that reified experience is part of the reason why global struggle is not yet successful. Its exploration cannot of itself be the source of a new praxis, but perhaps its clarification is an essential prerequisite to a praxis that changes global societal structures and the deepest levels of inner experience. It is also saying that the beauty created even out of pain and loneliness through the activity of imagination, is an exemplar of liberating praxis and an image of transcendence, and is often more important than the specific, unique content of art. Thus Marcuse, from his -earliest writing, showed a "sensitivity to the 'underside' of the respectable tradition of European thought and culture ... His analysis describes the artistic existence being carved out of the opposing forces of an expanding bourgeois world and the unrestrained protest against that world in ... lyricism.

"Marcuse ... interpreted the domain of the aesthetic as the non-repressive meeting-ground of reason and sensuousness, creativity and receptivity, subjectively (human) freedom and objective (natural) necessity ...

"In the 'aesthetic dimension' ... a critique of the prevailing reality could find concrete sensuous embodiment in the image of a qualitatively different and better one ... This intrinsically

antagonistic quality of the aesthetic form is ultimately more subversive than any particular artistic content or style ...

“... the work of art preserves its negative character even where it affirms, decorates, or advertises the status quo ... 'the radical qualities of art ... its indictment of the established reality and its invocation of the "beautiful image" of liberation "are grounded precisely in the dimensions where art transcends its social determination and emancipates itself from the given universe of discourse and behaviour while preserving its overwhelming presence'."(63)

The music of Pink Floyd has already been mentioned as one kind of example of this; both the record and the film The Wall are imaginative transpositions of a particular, unique structure of emotions, in which melancholic pain in alienation is simultaneously pleasurable, erotic and oceanic yearning. The "content" of The Wall depicts through biographical fragments of one individual how capitalist socialisation operates on the whole personality, bringing into being a flawed structure of language, gesture, physical "character armour", tendencies and habits of motion, thought, feeling: consciousness in the widest sense. Its import is that reification pertains not only to social practices and institutions, nor only to ideology, but also to a structure of experience and character, psyche, mind-body being. The tragic pessimism conveyed in The Wall's overwhelming universe of fear, alienation, unanswered need for affection and power over destiny, and in its depiction of the scars caused by history and personal biography which make liberation as authentically desired unattainable, is experientially countered by the excitement and rebellion of the music, by its rough beauty and "dedifferentiated ecstasy".

Thus art is not engaged in general expressions of "typical" emotions as in, for example, an essay on love, or a discussion of religious ecstasy. Rather, the notion explored by Suzanne Langer, L.A. Reid and others, allows of a conception of musical imagination working on specific, unique feelings, sensibilities, states of mind and mood, such that they become communicable whilst remaining unique (unlike philosophical or scientific generalising concepts, laws and theories) - entering the realm of all humankind. They become potentially assimilable by all, uniquely and differently, yet at the same time remain recognisable as historically specific instances of general human experiences (transcendent ecstasy, love, hope, despair etc). Some of these ideas are expressed by Sidney Finkelstein: "Music ... evoke(s) states of internal life that also involve states of human relationships, through objective means, or socially created languages and forms ... These are not the ideas that may be found in a scientific tract but commentaries on a society showing what it means to live in it. They embrace developments in sensitivity, in the human's awareness of his own powers, and in the situation of internal freedom ...

" ... In creating a work the-artist draws more or less upon his entire personal and social experience. What results is therefore not merely a random mood but a set of concentrated psychological states that represent an attitude toward life ... shaped by the body and mind, able to be repeated and to stand forever as an embodiment of a stage of human sensitivity.

“Aesthetic emotion, or recognition of beauty ... is a special kind of joy. It is a reaction to a leap in knowledge of the kind that transforms the human being by opening up new possibilities of life ... discovering a new common tie among people ... becoming aware of new powers ...

"It does not rest on the particular moods or emotional complexes that can be described as belonging to a musical work. It rests on the dual nature of music, of every art; its relation to interior life, and its artifice, or objective existence embodying thought about life; the individual's discovery of how society has shaped him, the relevance of this discovery 64 to all members of a society."(64)

The history of culture as an uneven, but progressive accumulation of potential in perception, experience, feeling, is a history hitherto alienated. As Marx said of religion, art has been the "fantastic realisation of man, because man possesses no true realisation". Associated with the alienation of imaginative potential into artistic form, is the practice of art as a specialised skill, like religion which is monopolised by a priestly caste. Hence, once again we arrive at the recognition that in order to extract the emancipatory potential of art, and in order to develop a fully revolutionary art, the alienated division of labour must be abolished in art as elsewhere (this does not mean abolition of individually-created art-works) heralding a condition in which the entirety of the human collective creatively explores its experience (including those aspects, like death, which are untranscendable) and continuously posits the transcendence of presently-existing reality - an 'aufhebung' analogous to that which must occur in philosophy and science.

Now whilst Marcuse and Adorno explore the deeper emancipatory and transcendent qualities of art - by contrast to much other marxist aesthetic theory - their conceptions have certain limitations, as we have noted. By failing adequately to see reification as itself a dynamic contradiction, a latent struggle-in-process rather than a monolithic, fixed, total objective and subjective suppression, the "transcendence" of art cannot help taking on at times a metaphysical, idealist-spiritual strain. Instead of art being seen as expressing contradiction - reification and the struggle against it - it comes to be thought that art has a permanent quality of transcendence regardless of, or external to, content. But in fact, in much bourgeois art there is a real contradiction between reactionary content and liberatory form, or vice versa. The emancipatory dimension is not eternal, separate, or autonomous from the concrete work it is embedded in the contradiction grasped imaginatively. The confusion can be more clearly seen if we take "thinking" as an analogous activity to aesthetic creation. Intellectual reason is necessary to liberation, but not all "rational" thought is progressive; likewise not all authentic art is progressive. As with bourgeois (contradictory) philosophy and science, radical criticism extracts the rational or emancipatory elements from within it. With respect to a revolutionary view of art from any present conjuncture, the explosion of the confines of "art" into creative praxis does concern the content of art. This is not to assert any desire to control the content of art in a legislative sense; the autonomy of art in that sense is undisputed. It is to recognise that aesthetic creativity is at the core of self-integration, expression of unique personality, of labour as a relation to materials as unique things of intrinsic use and particular quality (Kant's creation of

final form in the particular instance); that the significance of aesthetics entering into all dimensions of life is the valid insight of Romanticism (cf Shelley: " ... poetry in a restricted sense, has a common source with all other forms of order and of beauty according to "which the materials of human life are susceptible of being arranged, and which is poetry in a universal sense."(65)) But it is also to wish that the art-work itself rationally indicate the direction of the process whereby the aesthetic dimension is taken into social praxis. Certainly, this need not necessarily be through "realism" or indeed any preconceivable artistic genre, type or tendency. It would mean, for already existent works such as those of Rodin, that we understand the anti-reificatory thrust as being expressed in conservative moulds. Future revolutionary art concerned with subjective growth would wish to be societal, not as in Rodin, expressing a growth of the IMietzschean individual or a mystified cosmic nature. In other words, revolutionary aesthetic thought that faces the future cannot be content with the idea that "all authentic art is inherently revolutionary" - though there is much truth in the phrase, nor with asserting the necessity for art to be independent, open end free experiment, autonomous - though this is also true so far as it goes.

This question, of what it should mean to theoretically determine the nature of "revolutionary culture", faces two responses from the legacy of revolutions hitherto. The point is rather clearly made in an article by Carl Gardner:

"The positions advanced by Trotskyist and Leninist orthodoxy (that the direction of artistic development can only be determined from within art itself) - although far preferable, obviously, to the exclusive prescriptions of the Proletcult or socialist realism - do not enable revolutionaries to participate or intervene consciously in the processes of cultural production ... implicit within this position is a refusal to elaborate a materialist analysis of the relations between specific modes of cultural production and the development of the revolutionary process within the social formation as a whole. Surely we need some sort of materialist analysis to orient ourselves in a world of myriad artistic/cultural currents and ideas?"(66)

This issue was considered at the end of Part II, and cannot be dealt with exhaustively again here. But in the context of the present concerns, certain points can be made. First, our understanding of the art of past and present bourgeois culture cannot be concerned solely with judgements as to its "orientation". Artistic development must also be seen as a kind of exploration, analogous to scientific development but not as resulting in rational conceptualisations of processes of nature, history, or self. Rather, it is a history of the imaginative grasping of experience and perception, a finding of form in any (socio- historically constrained) quarter. Second, our orientation to present tendencies must involve not a schema of rejection and embracement, but a steering within existing currents in order to optimise positive potential and to encourage the negative to discard itself - within a framework of general theoretical understanding. Third, within established socialism active cultural revolution should be seen as a simultaneous re-appropriation of old, and a creation of new, cultural forms - directed by the entirety of developing understanding on psychic, social, and cosmic planes. But in addition to the creation of new cultural forms which in

turn urge for further social change, is the requirement to recognise cultural presence in the totality of activities. As constantly reiterated in this work, the necessity is to see revolutionary praxis as a mass, decentred disalienation, a Gramscian multi-faceted and multi-subject strategy. This entails imaginative self-transformative praxis to create new structures of sensibility and to integrate the psychic faculties in the individual, as inseparable from the bringing into being of a collectively conscious social totality. The development of an aesthetic orientation on the part of the masses is the crux of Rudolf Bahro's revolutionary project for state bureaucratised Soviet-type societies; it concerns levels of cultural and psychic change, and transformation of alienated division of labour, so deep as to be pertinent to all advanced industrial societies, and increasingly to the revolutionary project on the global scale.

" ... (in state-bureaucratic 'socialism') we cannot see the least affinity with Chekhov's answer to Tolstoy, that man needs not just six feet of land, nor even a little farm, he needs the whole earth, the whole of nature.

"... the cultural revolution that overcomes subalternity is the condition for a break with the extensive (ie productivist, alienated growth-expansionist) economic dynamic, and for the re-arrangement of man in his natural balance. But in order to discover the concrete directions in which to aim, the feasible lines of action and the necessary practical steps, for the circumstances of today, we must remember the positive preconditions for the appropriation of culture by all individuals, and investigate how they are to be brought about. These are at the same time the preconditions of genuine social equality, which as history has sufficiently shown in the meantime, are "not to be found in the dimensions of distribution of income, social security, or any form of consumption.

"All people must obtain the real possibility of access to all essential realms of activity, and moreover right up to the highest functional level. For cultural goods are appropriated only as far as it is possible to share in their creation - either oneself, or by the mediation of other individuals with whom one can communicate on an equal basis. In principle, everyone must be able to raise himself to the level of the scientific and technical means which our society uses in its relationship with nature, and especially to the level of social regulation and institutional functioning. Social equality also demands in emotional and aesthetic life certain mental structures which allow a graduated reaction both inwardly and outwardly, one which corresponds with the degree of abstraction of the more general connections represented by higher levels in the hierarchy of information processing.

" ... Knowledge of human affairs that is taught and accepted without aesthetic emotion must be basically untrue, and particularly so for the individuals involved. Aesthetics, as a method of education, means simply the attempt to present all knowledge that man requires in such a way that it appeals to his own self, and receives a subjective meaning for him ...

“For the whole of early and middle childhood, up to the onset of puberty, the powers of rational abstraction are not yet "so developed that the abstract concept can be the guiding means for organising one's own experience and establishing its connection with the overall whole. Where our rationalistic concept of education has led to the stunting of emotional motivation and fantasy, where therefore the immediate aesthetic reflection has been abandoned before rational reflection even begins, a gulf is already created which separates one section of children from the creative life, for creativity does not exist without contact at the level of synthesis. The entire educational process must be organised in such a way that the youthful development of all people leads up to the summit of art and philosophy, the emotional and the rational bridges from the subjective microcosm to the totality.

“... What is involved is rather the 'basic training' of modern social man, who should be able to say without the devil's pact of privilege: 'Whatever is the lot of humankind/I want to taste within my deepest self', (Faust).

The essentially aesthetic motivation, oriented to the totality and to the return of activities to the self, will enable man... to appropriate for himself in a meaningful way the fundamental instruments of spirit and feeling: language (more than one) for mastery of the qualitative aspect of the world, mathematics for mastery of the quantitative, cybernetics for mastery of the structural aspect and the technical capacities for the artistic expression of the self.

" ... people could be in a position to specialise in whatever creative branch of work they chose, and to choose in connection with this the shares in work at the simpler functional levels most suitable for them ... There is a great difference between someone who among other things has also specialised narrowly in some kind of complex performance, and the specialist stratum as a form of social existence.

“... (the reified study of history) enables young people to answer questions without having the slightest understanding of a single historical event in its human substance. This is even the case with the history of music and art. In these aesthetic and historical disciplines, everything depends on making the human whole shine through in the intensive cross-section, and arousing the passion for greater knowledge ... It is simply necessary for the systematic character, the overview, to be made comprehensible. This whole field must be pervaded by the freedom of self-education and ruled by aesthetic form, enjoyment of self-knowledge via knowledge. Only in such a way can we link up with the human essence of all other peoples and times without which solidarity must remain an empty word.”(67)

Crucial to this idea of imagination are the inter-connected conceptions of: a capacity to perceive every particular and simultaneously envisage its self-surpassing; a capacity to syncretise complex wholes; an evocation of praxis on all levels including the struggle for self-integration; an urge to impose aesthetic form on human relations, on society's metabolism with nature, on the humanly created environment. As in Shelley to Breton the imagination is that which breaks

through reification, allowing knowledge to become part of creative praxis: living, feeling, thinking, acting to transform, feeling and thinking again.

The imagination may be considered a human mental faculty distinct from understanding. Contrary to Kantian epistemology, neither is an immutable, unchanging function, but a mental activity that takes on various forms according to socio-historical context. However, the tendency to create a finality of form in the particular, would appear to be an underlying feature of imagination just as the intellect always tends to find explanatory schemata for phenomena. In the extraction of significant structures from early Romanticism, we find that the imagination takes on a form that is counteractive against experience within an alienated capitalist division of labour. The general characteristic of imagination as synthetic, whilst fusing unique symbols or actions from experience in any medium (material or otherwise), is the essence of other facets of imagination as given by Shelley. Imagination in industrial capitalism finds the "poetry concealed by the accumulation of facts and calculating processes", taps "the generous impulse to act that which we (know)", allows the transposition from one's own particular experience to the predicaments of all others. It urges for the creation of beautiful objects for consumption, and a harmonious environment. It clothes what is perceived with clusters of "higher", universalising meaning, lifting the "film of familiarity" that shrouds the world's inherent beauty with alienated gloom. It guides toward the acting out of unique, specific relationships authentically, in confrontation with the reified, calculative, exploitative patterns of relation characteristic of bourgeois society. Imagination identifies particulars as containing the whole, and the whole as a real, complex, concrete totality - not a metaphysical abstraction. Thus in the tasks of production, the individual identifies himself as a unique particular in relation to overall social labour which is internalised in his consciousness; in political praxis each individual identifies his unique, specific location and role within the process of social transformation and development, which is nevertheless internalised in his consciousness.

We will dwell here a little more upon the early romantic conception of imagination, as it helps to render more coherent the several lines of thought that are being pursued simultaneously. We are concerned with a general theory of imagination, with elucidating the dominant form it takes on under capitalism, and with the historical development of its understanding through certain thinkers within the concrete history of capitalism. Simultaneously we find ourselves requiring to re-explore the meanings of creative praxis, and the issues confronting a marxist theory of aesthetics, but in ways which orthodox approaches will not allow. If we are correct in seeing the first signs of an explicit understanding of the form taken on by imagination under capitalism - as opposed merely to insights concerning art or glimmers of thought about creativity "in general" - in early romanticism, then it can provide points of reference for the multi-dimensional nature of this enquiry.

Within early romanticism the idea took root that imagination enacts a deeper perception of the ordinary world than does either science or "common" perception. This special perception is quite distinct from penetration to a transcendent realm, or from invention of phantoms (which are also

to be found in Romanticism, but which are not new to it).(68) Even for William Blake, Celestial Beings though beyond sense perception, are Visions of Reality. As Prickett says, "though Keats's 'Imagination' is in some sense Platonic, like Blake's, its function is to transform our vision of this world rather than point to another". For Shelley the imagination lifts the "film of familiarity" from the real world; in this connection Lord Karnes's theory of the image as "ideal presence" is important in the development of the early romantic conception."This represents a significant attempt to account for art without reducing it either to imitation or to make-believe. Kames gave a dialectical account of ideal presence. 'In contradistinction to real presence, ideal presence may be termed a waking dream', but ideal presence has also to be distinguished from reflective remembrance. Thinking of an event as past without forming an image is barely reflecting or remembering that I was an eye-witness; 'but when I recall the event so distinctly as to form a complete image of it, I perceive it as passing in my presence; and this perception is an act of intuition; into which reflection enters not, more than into an act of sight'."(70)

The imagination neither imitates nor makes-believe; it transcends the real/unreal distinction as given by empiricist materialism and idealism. Nor is it so much a form of reflection than intuition. Developing upon Kant's theory of imagination finding form in the particular rather than in general laws, Alexander Gerard distinguished between the depiction of general, indefinite characteristics as in science or philosophy,, and the depiction of specific individual actions as in art:

"Tell us that a man is generous, benevolent, or compassionate, or, on the contrary, that he is sordid, selfish, or hard-hearted, this general account of his character is too indefinite to excite either love or hatred. Rehearse a series of actions in which these characters have been displayed, immediately the story draws out the affections correspondent."(71)

The idea is germinating that whereas science, as rational explanation, involves essentially one faculty - intellect (though scientific discovery itself entails imagination) - the aesthetic orientation draws on all the faculties of perception and psychic orientation. Imaginative perception grips in active movement the entire human state, and can thus engender opposites, alternatives, and rich transformations of its ostensible object, as it dialectically integrates all the major mind-body functions: sensation, thought, intuition, and feeling. As Blake wrote:

"If it were not for the Poetic or Prophetic character the Philosophic and Experimental would soon be at the ratio of all things, and stand still, unable to do other than repeat the same dull round over again."(72) Prickett describes this view: "Logical reasoning, in the Lockean sense, is completely enclosed. It is unable either to provide values or to provide certainty. Without imagination, or what Blake here calls 'the Poetic or Prophetic', it is sterile and useless. It cannot create, it cannot innovate, it cannot satisfy."(73)

This conception of science has had a complex history since these formulations were laid down in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, not least within the relationship between

marxism and romanticism. The question takes on a self-conscious philosophical form in Sartre's attempt to use the phenomenological method in relaying the foundations of dialectical materialism. As André Gorz writes of Sartre's mission:

"Scientific praxis, by failing to question its own status, and by claiming to put lived experience in parentheses, has become opaque to its own practitioners. Man absents himself from the science he produces and it sheds no light on him. The sciences that study man take him for their object, ignoring the fact that the object is itself the subject (as a man of science) inquiring into it.

"... Husserl sought to rid scientific thought of objectivism - and the psychologism, epiphenomenism, dogmatism and skepticism which resulted from it - by restoring the original experience of the world as we live it. Sartre's efforts to provide a foundation for dialectical reason are close to those of Husserl, at least at first sight: the dialectic has no foundation unless it first experiences itself "as a double movement in knowledge and in being."(74)

Early romanticism also evolved Kantian conceptions of the aesthetic perception of the sublime. Imagination bursts beyond the constraints of what can be "understood" through intellectual categories, emulating Reason's attainment of pure ideas: " ... it is what Blake calls the 'Poetic' or 'Prophetic' which mediates revelation to man, showing him that his perceptions are not finally bounded by the limitations of sense, but as his desire is infinite (and ultimately for the infinite), so the possession of that' desire and he himself, the possessor, are 'infinite' ...

"This meaning of the word 'imagination' is in some ways extraordinarily close to Kant's 'Reason'. Not, it is true, as Kant himself intended the word, but as subsequent German Idealists and Coleridge came to use it. In spite of Kant's warnings that Reason was regulative only, they seem to have interpreted him to mean that it was possible to perceive God by direct mystical intuition.(75)

Hence we can see that the "pastoral mysticism" in early romantic poetry occupies a place bearing complex relationships to the movement's entire dynamic (and contradictory) structure of ideas and sensibilities. Its progressive and integral meaning within early romanticism is lost in later appropriations, which wrenched pastoralism from the totalising aesthetic-political orientations of Blake, Wordsworth, Keats, or Shelley. The latter's affirmation of ecstatic experience in the "beautiful place" deliberately took a conventionally conservative genre, re-presenting it as a Marcusean "beautiful image" of truth and liberation. The visionary perception of nature's "issness" is linked to a unification of science and ethics in praxis, and to the negation of all forms of psychic and social reification.

Implied by these features of imagination, is the crucial conception of it being a synthetic function by contrast to the separating, dissecting operations of analysis. Shelley's A Defence of Poetry begins with this distinction, and his concept of poetic imagination is built out of the implications of creative synthesis as a principle of all activity orientated to overcoming fragmentation, chaos, disunity, in order to attain organic wholeness, harmony, integration - whether this be in the

spheres of art, perception generally, personality, society or society's metabolism with nature. Such is the essence also of Coleridge's famous definition: "The primary IMAGINATION I hold to be the living Power and prime Agent of all human perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM. The Secondary Imagination I consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, and in the mode of operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealise and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead ...

"The poet, described in ideal perfection, brings the whole soul of man into activity ... He diffuses a tone and spirit of unity, that blends, and (as it were) fuses, each into each, by that synthetic and magical power to which we have exclusively appropriated the name of imagination. This power, first put into action by the will and understanding ... reveals itself in the balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities: ... of the general with the concrete; ... judgement 76 ever awake ... with ... feeling profound ... "(76)

In the chapter called "The Creative Mind" in The Long Revolution, Raymond Williams calls attention to Shelley's drawing an analogy between the imagination in human beings (and in the poet in particular), and an "active" lyre that could organise the impressions made upon it " ... by an internal adjustment ... It is as if the lyre could accommodate its chords to the motions of that which strikes them ... "(77) Williams connects the romantic conception of imagination synthesizing harmony out of sensations, with the psychoanalytical recognition that creative synthesis of perceptions or experience entails a "stream of pleasure", and catharsis, both for creator and receiver. Williams quotes Freud to the effect that the artist:

" ... turns away from reality and transfers all his interest, and all his libido too, on to the creation of his wishes in the life of phantasy. But the way back to reality is found by the artist thus: he is not the only one who has a life of phantasy ... A true artist ... understands how to elaborate his day-dreams, so that they lose that personal note ... he possesses the mysterious ability to mould his particular material until it expresses the ideas of his phantasy faithfully, and then he knows how to attach to this reflection of his phantasy- life so strong a stream of pleasure that, for a time at least, the repressions are outbalanced and dispelled by it. When he can do all this he opens out to others the way back to comfort and consolation of their own unconscious sources of pleasure ..."(78)

Here there is a new emphasis on the idea that satisfaction in creative synthesis of harmony is a transference of attention from reality, and only a temporary (and indeed disguised) compensation for repressions. The hint given by Coleridge in the passage quoted earlier is unfolded: " ... where this process (ie of real integrative synthesis) is rendered impossible, yet still ... (imagination) struggles to idealise and to unify." In other words, from the early romantic conceptions through to contemporary theories, the tendency to consider imagination as common to all activities, and

in all people, goes hand in hand with a growing insistence that it is most strongly present in artistic activity. Eventually it comes to be thought that in art, imagination provides an "ideal" compensation for unchangeable reality or an harmonious escape from untranscendable repression. Unhistorical discussions upon what is common to artistic and other activity, and what is distinct, are unable to reconcile a theory of imagination as present in all activity with a theory of the distinctive features of art. This is because the acute modern contrast between artistic and other activity is a characteristic of capitalistic (or similar) reification in society. A component of this phenomenon is the contradiction between artistic creation and an "aesthetic mode of living" on the one hand, with "normal" activity and experience on the other. As the first develops in an individual or group (without concomitant, related developments occurring in society as a whole), the more it tends to "leave behind" the inert normality. But without roots in the reality of society art and the creative individual or group become meaninglessly esoteric. Thus, a theory that grapples with imagination as an omnipresent characteristic of human existence, as it must, and which also grasps the particular forms in which it develops in different historical contexts, including capitalism, is driven inevitably to the realisation that imagination is an indissoluble crux of revolutionary praxis and unalienated activity in communist society. It sees that imagination resynthesises its object and simultaneously imposes the form of beauty upon it.

The early romantics anticipated fundamental features of dialectical materialist ontology and epistemology, and also much marxist aesthetic theory, in viewing a work of art as a "living" totality, an organic whole not an aggregate of contingent elements, informed by a principle of life in the same way, according to Shaftesbury, as is a tree. The conception of reality as Heraclitean flux, as dissolution and dynamic, unitary reconstruction, is understood as meaning that on the deepest, real levels thought is also structured movement and interrelated process. As the faculty that integrates and synthesises, imagination most completely perceives and expresses reality as dynamic process and also humanises it by informing it with development and purpose. Coleridge distinguished imagination from fancy in that the latter involves contingent aggregation, whilst art entails integrated totality. He criticised empiricism for being unable to conceive of a faculty active in art other than fancy; it is no coincidence that empiricism is in general unable to recognise reality and thought as dynamic, self-transforming processes.

An important aside might be made here, especially in the face of contemporary structuralist thought, which has criticised conceptions of organic totality as entailing ipso facto an idealist "essentialism". Thus Macherey and Balibar " ... propose that literary productions should not be studied from the perspective of their illusory semblance of unity, but from the perspective of their material diversity. One must not look in texts for signs of their cohesion, but for traces of the material contradictions (historically determined) which produced them, and which reappear in them as unevenly resolved conflicts".(79) If this is taken as an assertion that an art-work will rarely, if ever, express a single, coherent ideology or life-orientation then no objection can be made to it. It is certainly the case that the organic form of art-works usually condenses contradictions, or resolves conflicts of ideology and sensibility in imaginary and often also

impossible ways. But this realisation, which is not new to structuralism, does not of itself contradict a Lukacsian view of aesthetic totality, nor the view considered here to be both answerable to marxism and an effective, critical re-appropriation of the romantic aesthetic. Starting from an a priori, rigid distinction between science and ideology, structuralism cannot solve the problem that has always faced bourgeois thought: what is distinctive about aesthetic activity and experience? Instead it rejects the question as a bourgeois problematic, but then proceeds to inquire into the nature of "literature", "art", or "music". It denies that they are reducible into ideology, morality, or religion, yet finally the art-work always comes out to be an ideological structure. This is inevitable if a Marxist analysis of how imagination synthesises form out of experience is abandoned: since art is clearly not "lived experience" itself, and nor is it a scientific examination of it, it can only be relegated into "ideology". The perspective adopted here however, shares with Lukács or Adorno a conception of aesthetic totality arising from the synthetic, syncretistic process of artistic creation; aesthetic activity wrests from material experience a concrete unity in the art-work, no matter how contradictory, diverse, or even rationally incoherent that unity and form may be.

Thus, as Prickett shows, Wordsworth's poetry "moves in a series of tensional or dialectical statements", yet "his relationship with nature is not merely one of part-creation, but one that grows through creation. In Book II of The Prelude he described this process of growth as one of active interchange between the self and external world. This growth of the mind... is described as 'poetic', which, for Wordsworth, is a way of saying that it involves the whole person, intellect and feelings alike. Man's participation in nature ... involves both intellect and feeling ... It is neither a process of simple 'projection', nor one of passive receptivity, but one of progressive and ever more complex confirmation and discovery."(80) For early Romanticism dialectical, developmental, organic growth is quintessentially conveyed in aesthetic form: its significance is that such growth is the basic reality of the mind's creativity, human history as a whole, and the processes of nature.

The Romantics followed Kant in rejecting a parallel between aesthetic judgement and "tastes" in entertainment, or in the enjoyment of wine. By contrast to the empiricists' account of poetry as being the outcome of fancy constructing a mere association of thoughts, imagination for them conveys its products to others because it requires the activation of all powers of the mind. As for Kant, judgement is something other than arbitrary subjectivity, and involves the idea of a moral ordering of experience. Aesthetic experience is a humanising, moral synthesising of what is fragmented - it integrates the knowledge that for Shelley is "concealed in calculating processes". Poetry is implicitly or explicitly associated with creative labour and authentic, equal human relationships; alienated division of labour and callous human interactions are equated with chaos, ugliness, "immorality", fragmentation.

Through unification of self and nature, the subjective and objective, the Romantic imagination entails the idea of a unitary reality. Whether the self is projected into nature, or nature is the mirror in which the self is seen, or whether the creative power of nature is the same as that of

human perception and poetic creation (and ultimately all human life): the implication is always that dichotomies into real/unreal, empirical reality/world of fantasy, or into profane nature or physical matter/spiritual truth, are false. Romanticism anticipated intuitively, and to a partial extent in considered argument, marxism's later overcoming of the radical distinctions between mechanistic matter and spirit, concrete and abstract, practice and theory, science and ethics. The processes of nature, society, and psyche are felt to be different but ultimately parts of one reality which is indivisible, and neither material nor ideal in the senses entailed by dualist cosmologies, or by-dualist epistemologies with their false, arbitrary separations between mind and material reality. The different domains of reality are felt to interact with one another, actively not passively: nature on society and vice versa, individual on society and vice versa, the individual self with nature and nature's power on the self in communion with it. Perception is an active integration, an imaginative synthesis from sense information.

At the same time the different domains of reality reflect one another: the processes of nature, society, and psyche are felt to mirror one another - are analogous, though not homologous. Again the distinctions between the different orders of "Nature as a whole" are recognised, but each is seen as organic in the broad sense. That is: inorganic nature is not "living", and non-human life is not capable of conscious self-determination. But all domains are in their own right active totalities (within wider totalities), in growth and creative development. Hence metaphors and symbols refer simultaneously to "empirical" nature, history or psychic processes: Wordsworth's The Prelude or Shelley's Epipsychidion are concerned equally and simultaneously with nature and the human mind, without thereby producing a problem for interpreting their "real" meaning. Likewise dichotomies between transcendent and concrete or mundane are supplanted, as are notions of art either "imitating" objective reality or creating a higher "imaginary" alternative to objective reality. This latter dichotomy, expressed for centuries in controversies between classical aesthetics or naturalism versus aestheticism and formalism, is still seen as an unresolved issue in a recent book on Aesthetics:

"The question is still being debated: one side holding that poetic truth consists essentially of a revelatory insight into how things are, the other maintaining that poetry, in so far as it is creative, embodies an imaginative meaning which is something added to all reality outside the poem and is not to be gauged by its correspondence with that reality."(81)

It is not only in "bourgeois" aesthetics that this dichotomy is clung to; already in this work we have seen controversies within marxism that have hinged on the question as to what "valid" art's relationship should be to the "real", on the validity or otherwise of "fantastic" or "vague" constructions. Whilst for post—structuralism it is "empiricist" heresy for art to attempt any correspondence with reality, its function being to lay bare the mechanisms and conditions of its own effects. It can be suggested that a coming-to-terms with the positive insights of the early romantic aesthetic is still of central importance for marxism.

Extraction of significant structures in early Romanticism can thus be seen as an aspect of a marxist re-appraisal of cultural revolution. In the attempt to develop pertinent characteristics of such an aesthetic, we can pursue once again certain vital features of Modernism: to what extent for example, was Modernism a further evolution of the romantic revolt in the context of the beginning of the epoch of "advanced capitalism"?(82)

With simplification, Modernism's central impetus can be resolved into two alternative and conflicting aesthetic—political tendencies. The first is an overall rebellion against bourgeois cultural forms, and therefore against the dominant structures and processes of bourgeois society. This is in a period when "high art" still functioned - through the mediation of dominating ideologies and institutions (and thus, in spite of "oppositional potential" within it) - as a maintainer of self-identity, confidence, sense of moral purpose etc for a ruling-class more culturally cohesive than it has subsequently become. The modernist rebellion could be either conservative-reactionary or radical.

In its other version, Modernism is a deeper-than-rational recognition that the "liberal" phase of bourgeois capitalist civilisation is in disintegration. It therefore sought the replacement of "high" bourgeois cultural forms with "modern"ones appropriate to the era of state monopoly capitalism, which is characterised by an ever-more intensive and continual innovation in all techniques, a civil society lived out in large, atomised cities, etc.

Thus, in modernist cultural tendencies that demonstrated similar, or certainly related techniques, there operated very divergent and contradictory political impulses. Yeats, Pound and Eliot rebelled against modern capitalist experience, but treated it as raw material for a new "pure" art. The Waste Land's "I had not thought death had undone so many" is not meant to shake up the alienated commuters on London Bridge - cause them to question their existence, challenge and change it in revolutionary praxis (as, for example, Breton and Brecht wanted of their art). Eliot wants a poem for a cultured elite to experience as pure art; its scholarliness and aesthetic refinement is an adventure for the few who alone would (or could) understand its references, associations etc. For such a poetics the assimilation of experience is not a prelude to or a part of practical-critical activity, but rather a tragic catharsis (suffering in the modern world), an aloof appraisal of life's folly (the inevitability of "fallen" civilisation). As Cairns Craig(83) has shown, its associationist basis makes it a myth-maker: both evoking memory of and recreating old myths whether Celtic, Greek, or Ancient Chinese, and creating new urban myths (furthering Baudelaire's project of discovering "urban" beauty). It is not consciously intended as a synthesis from bourgeois fragmentation (of perception, experience, knowledge, labour, faculties of feeling and thought etc), orientated to revolutionary recreation of reality - which John Berger sees as the potential of abstract art such as Cubism. Of course it could be argued that such a potential is there in the poetry of Yeats, Pound and Eliot, in spite of their ideological positions. But consciously - and due to their aesthetic, not merely philosophical principles - these poets seek a place for their "pure" art in a society that can value it in their terms, and allow artists a celebrated

"organic" role. For them this society would have to be stable, aristocratic, hierarchically ordered and capable of forging new "traditions".

Perhaps this cluster of impulses can be seen at its most exemplary in Wagner's music-drama and social-aesthetic theories. At once the high-point of a late-nineteenth century, transfigured romanticism, and also standing on the threshold of atonality with his chromaticism, Wagner's movement from 1848 revolutionary to Nazi archetype could scarcely be more revealing. His conception of a "total art", uniting all historically developed art-forms and working on all the senses simultaneously, might well be compatible with an emancipatory praxis of the senses and a transcendence of fragmentation (in both the collective and the individual). But his thematic allegiance to an unresolved pain in unutterable, choked love, to an inevitable, timeless tragedy of loss, separation, betrayal; and his dedication to an aesthetic of calculated effect upon an audience presumed "inferior" to the artist(84), turn his modernist anticipations in a reactionary direction. Like the poets considered above, the organic community he urges for is not a free, self-determining, conscious collective. It is the present order pressed into pseudo-organicity; the main social act required to achieve it is the removal of groups displaying difference, otherness, from this potential "Volk": above all the Jews. Like Adolf Hitler, for whom his life seems almost to have been a trial run or dress rehearsal, Wagner has experienced oppression and exclusion from the underside: but rather than feel sympathy and solidarity for the oppressed and excluded, bitterness leads him to contempt. Direct experience of the "shabbiness" of bourgeois market-mechanisms and the commodity's control over experience leads not to a conception of socialist transformation, but to a wish to dominate these processes only superficially reformed, from a position above them.

The conscious project of poets like Yeats, Pound and Eliot was a desperate grasp for a new high art in the name of the past, providing an infinite tunnel of memory backwards through history, in rebellion against the present, in anger with the "liberal" bourgeois epoch for allowing the decay and destruction of "Culture" (through the First World War and technocratic modern "democratic" capitalism). Theoretically they were against Romanticism and for Classicism, but in reality they held a secret envy for the Victorian poet who, as they saw it, could still address a relatively coherent audience through an aesthetics of "art for art's sake", and from an exalted status. But, as already suggested, it might be argued that the technique of poets like Yeats, Pound and Eliot, and much of their actual poetry, could be appropriated by a revolutionary praxis. Against Craig, who sees their technical-aesthetic principles and social ideologies as indissolubly knotted into each other, it would be claimed that in spite of themselves there lies within them an alternative significance.

What if we consider, for example, the works of Jean Genet? Here, similar techniques in poetic "jumbling" of word, meaning, memory and feeling, working upon an experience of oppression, exclusion, fragmentation, and bitterness at injustice, are able to open up dimensions of humanistic, progressive transformation. Similarly therefore it is not extraordinary, in a different

context, that Futurists were Bolshevik in Russia and Fascist in Italy, or that many modernist elements are common to Surrealism and Futurism.

Then there is the "new sobriety" dimension of modernism, expressed in Constructivism, Bauhaus design, Brecht's theatre, Eisenstein's cinema etc. Among these tendencies there were strong links with Americanism, technicism, productivism. This aspect certainly seems to represent an accommodation to advanced capitalism (or advanced capitalist methods). It is not a "worshipping of the machine", but it tends to see productive forces as socially and politically neutral; it is unable to distinguish with sufficient theoretical clarity between capitalist and socialist forms of mass production or "modern technique" (such as electrical or electronic means of cultural production). As Bolshevism embraced Taylorism without an adequate grasp of its inherently reificatory nature, so there is a technicism in Eisenstein's conceiving of actors on stage or screen as technicians. Similarly, the robot-like motion in Meyerhold's theatre is a Taylorist technicism, even if simultaneously there is a positive quality in its demonstration of how the body can develop new potentialities, and in its Brechtian-like concern to replace characterisation and theatrical roles by gesture and movement, to allow "actors" to be simultaneously acrobats.

Soviet "reformist" socialism, undertaking the industrialisation of backward Russia through an anti-capitalist but not a socialist state (in Marx's sense), had its counterpart in mechanistic materialism, economism, bio-mechanics etc and in technicist-orientated or naive naturalist art (the latter culminating in Zhdanovism). These tendencies do not of course exhaust the Russian Revolution, but inasmuch as the latter did not inaugurate a mass, decentralised, collectively determined development, so the reificatory elements within it could grow in significance. In Western Europe the corresponding technicist sobriety had its socio-political counterpart in social-democratic reformism: accommodations to the logic of capitalism, attempts to humanise and ameliorate existence for the working class within the constraints laid down by capitalism.

Just as therefore, the central notion of 'imagination' in Romanticism was (between 1750 and 1900) variously interpreted in relation to aesthetic theory and socio-political orientation - from conservative reaction to accommodation to liberal capitalism to revolutionary socialism (in respectively reconstruction of myth, art as escape or compensatory experience, or as creative transformation of the world), so the complex of processes inherent in 'modernism' - non-representational image, exploration of the unconscious etc - could articulate in multifold ways with aesthetic theories and political orientations. If Romanticism was a crucial concomitant to, reaction against, and spur within the Industrial Revolution (as "Renaissance culture" had been for the emergence of early capitalism), modernism held an analogous significance for the early twentieth century transition to advanced capitalism. Similarly then, the revolutionary potential of modernism's resynthesis can be grasped, extracted and continuously re-explored.

A crux of modernism in its various forms was the perception of a reified structure generated by anarchic, blind forces within which individuals, family units, or small and dispersed groups live out an atomised existence. The condition of existence for owners of labour power in the

capitalist production process is mirrored in the experience of the individual in urban, civil life. This perception was not new to modernism; the latter could look over its shoulder to Wordsworth, to Francis Thomson, to the German anti-capitalist romantics, or to Baudelaire.

"Of all the experiences which made his life what it was, Baudelaire singled out his having been jostled by the crowd as the decisive, unique experience. The luster of a crowd with a motion and a soul of its own, the glitter that had bedazzled the flâneur, had dimmed for him... Baudelaire battled the crowd - with the impotent rage of someone fighting the rain or wind. This is the nature of something lived through (Erlebnis) to which Baudelaire has given the weight of an experience (Erfahrung)."(85)

The "crowd" is the metaphor for the city. In the street, the square, the station or the airport, the personnel are perpetually changing yet the form and dynamic of the crowd remains always the same. The fragmented individual faces ever-new fragmentary experiences, confronts ever-new strangers, new events, new fashions; in him/her are evoked ever new erotic desires, yearnings and excitation for suggested experiences or possible adventures. As with the seductions from commodities in shop windows, few if any possibilities can be explored: there is a continuous feeling of what is missed or unattained. In the ever-changing Erlebnis of the crowd, individuals and groups find a need to affirm themselves, to themselves and to the crowd as a whole. The individual wants to be part of some group, at the same time wants to know the whole. A vague anxiety is stimulated before impossible yearnings; their lack of satiation wastes the urge to self-affirmation, the individual is slapped back into passivity as he/she vents his desires in a slow trickle into unattainability. For Baudelaire the individual is "hurrying across the boulevard ... amidst this moving chaos in which death comes galloping at you from all sides at once ..." (86)

For each individual the oscillation between alienation and identification, the monstrous split between public and private experience, sustains the fragmentation that allows perpetuation of the reified whole. Whether through the electronically created "crowd" of television, or from glances at dark doorways or glittering lights, the fleeting arousals of expectation sustain an experience of outsidership. As with Der Ring Des Nibelungen that is "wanted by all but enjoyed by none", the object of commodified desire, the ambition for power, wealth and status, are cursed. Like the fatal erotic desire for unknown women or men in the City - the hook that grabs over and over again - it cannot be renounced without falsity, repression, concession to lifeless security and balance; but nor can it bring satiation. The Thing dominates humans, as Benjamin showed for the "Trauerspiel". The yearning and hunt for the object of commodified desire cannot be renounced; like the Will to Power, it is. Merely to exist in capitalism means compromise with the commodity and money, and becoming worn down to an adaptation to mundaneness - the alternative is the Romantics' youthful death. And so comes the absolute agony of Wagner: entreaties to renounce Obsession in favour of genuine love and integrity go unheeded, as inevitably as the Norns spin destiny.

In the capitalist City the different levels of the person's sociality, the different experiential life-worlds, are broken up and separated. Each is expressed in only one or a few of the multifold of different interactions that make up the totality of any one individual's experience. The complex of faculty activities, mood-orientations or "feeling-tones", the many sides and levels of the personality are rarely, if ever, presented in an ongoing, single interaction or situation; rarely is the dynamic totality of an individual grasped by another as a totality. The separations, disjunctions, rejoinings, changings of gear happen as "smoothly" as a railway junction; the inner experience is that of a potential hero or heroine converted into an unrecognised puppet.

The individual feels isolated with his or her desires for erotic satisfaction, for recognition, for influence, feels unable to gear into the reified urban reality "outside" him or her. He seems to revolve in his own ether, inner anxieties and vague yearnings being constantly stimulated by outside suggestions, commodity seductions, perceptions of images that meet no-one's real experience. The urban world, brought into being by nothing other than the cumulative historical activity of human beings, seems - like the hierarchically ordered division of labour - to be an external "nature". From Wordsworth and Shelley onwards the feeling emerges that in the City the senses are faced with haphazard stimuli, incapable of being ordered into coherence. It is poetry that seems able to harmonise the chaos, that lifts "the film of familiarity" - an experience that comes to be associated with nature in a new contrast with urban reality.

Anarchic forces of capitalist accumulation and the market shape the physical layout of the City, in which alienated individuals must play their parts in the drama of reified civil society. In the crowd, as metaphor of this structural reification, individuals are anonymous; in pub, discotheque or restaurant, individuals' experience is irrelevant to the process of capital's realisation of profit, just as sellers of labour power are divested of their personalities in the objective process of value-creation. Imagination provides the impulse that counteracts fragmented calculation in the creation of the urban environment, the obstruction of collective praxis in civil society, and the external control over experience that emanates from the commodification of culture and leisure - the channelling of satisfaction of needs and desires through commodified forms.

As capitalism develops, the "crowd" becomes larger and larger, from London in 1800 to Paris in the late nineteenth century to New York in the twentieth, until with modern electronic media it becomes global. But the process of the crowd remains the same; the personnel and the bombardment of disparate stimuli are forever changing within an unchanging kaleidoscope, in which the individual's inner feelings are evoked, caught, unable to extend around the sources of excitation. As if in a changeless sea with ever-different waves the individual steers a fragmented passage through the crowd. This is the civil context within which a Gramscian "proletarian hegemony" needs to be created. Clearly it involves more than "values" and "culture" as usually understood: what is entailed is a collective praxis concerning the structure of experience, both "inner" and "outer", of the individual in relation to the whole in urban civil society.

The experience of urban alienation often engenders a particular form of melancholy of Time - a sense of sadness at the fact that nothing lasts, (which is of course, of itself not something new to urban capitalism) whether it be love, moments in nature or whatever. Every experience in time and space is acutely felt as being only one from an infinity of alternatives, all the others being irredeemably lost.

From Shelley's The Triumph of Life to Baudelaire's "Spleen", a dominating image is of a crowd flooding by, in which each individual is in pursuit of his own anxieties, hopes etc. Sometimes, as in Shelley, this experience leads to a withdrawal into Eternity (in spite of the active radicalism that never recedes); waking life is the dream, an unreal eclipsing curse of birth, where the white light of eternity is stained by coloured glass. It is time, change, and matter that are illusory: imagination is thus tempted into withdrawal into the self, into the timeless Oneness. As one (conservative?) response to alienation, this hovers as an under-shadow to the imagination's struggle with experience in industrial capitalism.

In the capitalist City, in advertising etc, satisfaction of needs or desires is suggested as being available through commodities. Certain experiences are identified with the ownership or consumption of particular commodities. The need to assert one's status, or improve it, or affirm a particular identity is addressed; anxiety is aroused by the suggestion that it must always be done again, or in a new way. Thus commodities are glittering promises of satisfied desire, to be opened like wrapped sweets; everyone is cheated of full satisfaction, but without recourse to redress. Instead there is only the treadmill effect of repetition, like addictions. Like the segmented, reified time of the labour process ever new meaningless contents are required to fill the time-form of repetition of instants; a continuous reshuffling of images, myths, and suggestions presents repetition as endless novelty.

It becomes increasingly true that the "commodity is its own ideology", as more and more of "everyday life" entails exchange of money for a commodity, living through commodities in eating, drinking, sleeping, sex, wearing clothes, sociality, leisure, travelling. As in the crowd, the individual is jostled by the myriad of stimuli from commodities, and experiences disorientating fragmentation, evocation of anxiety and desire: in the glimpses of strangers in cars shooting by, in the hints of "lives" in the windows of blocks of flats, or on a motorway at night where only sound, movement of machines, and lights remain of the impersonalised "crowd" for the alienated individual in his car. In the sexual alienation of the City, desire is evoked for the unattainable; excitement is generated from all directions, turning into anxieties and yearnings that hollow out the individual's potential for inner contentment. This is Baudelaire's "spleen": excitement and moroseness affect the individual in the crowd or confronted with multitudes of commodities. The sense of unattainability ultimately saps optimism from the personality, helps to make his or her reaction to crises erratic, fragmented, irrational and emotionally uncontrolled, or nihilistic.

It is not enough to understand ideology as a complex of ideas or manipulated modes of understanding about life in general or specific issues. Ideology must be seen in relation to a

deeper formation of the personality, a bringing into being of perceptual and affective modes of orientation to the world, a structuring of the psyche that interpolates individuals as fragmented subjects acting out their lives in conformity with alienated social-experiential structures. The fragmented personality gears in to atomised competition between labour-powers, into sexual competition and mutual exploitation, into the striving for externally decreed statuses, into the competition between entrepreneurs and nations. As the obverse of a universal development of the self and the world, there is War: God is on our side, "their" death is less important than "ours".

Each personality is fragmented and therefore manipulable, and each is a fragment - not a conscious microcosm of the whole. Therefore the System determines all, not vice versa. Alienated individuals, groups of workers, corporations, nations and blocs jostle against each other within the overall processes of capitalist reproduction: helpless before these processes, but all engaged in a more or less hostile, impersonal battle with others. Because fragmented, the different faculty-orientations of the personality can be separately manipulated. The intellect can be constricted in its activity to specific, limited spheres, emotions can be unleashed into meaningless "system-serving" chimeras such as nationalism. There is a suppression and distortion of all faculties, not merely emotions or sexuality as implied by psycho-analysis. The directing of thought, aggression, passivity, or "spiritual" uplift into channels appropriate to the needs of capitalism prevents resynthesis: thinking about the whole, directing aggression towards the real sources of oppression and expressing passivity where it is authentically desirable, turning spiritual yearning toward personal and historical transcendence.

In the face of this experience, a marxist understanding of Modernism would look for signs of struggle toward imaginative integration. It could not, necessarily, accept the conceptions of many leading modernist innovators. Thus, Eliot saw the task of modern poetry as unifying in tone and poetic form, the "disparate experiences" of urban existence.

Yet in the end for him the poetic synthesis is really no more than a rich source of associational imagery, ideas and symbols, clustered into a unified aesthetic experience which is then evoked deep within the isolated, contemplative subjectivity of the reader. Though Eliot's poetics led to an active elitism and a fascistic sympathy, his earlier modernist poetic struggle with disparate experience is in the immediate sense vague in social meaning, suggesting no specific direction for yearning and hope, offering mere "mood".

This non-orientation is characteristic of so much in contemporary culture. The use of brilliant technique in much film, advertising, visual accompaniment to popular music etc adds up to a "meaningless" collage. Suggestions sparked off by imagery are arbitrary, infinite in potential for subjective projection, as the arbitrary constellations of ever-changing, pure "style" in sound, movement, dress etc ensure that fashions mark time with a detemporalised, dehistoricised, repetition of an empty now. It is insufficient to say that such amalgamation of disparate experience points nowhere because it is pure associationism rather than imaginative synthesis.

For what would be "meaningless" to sentient human beings living in self-determined growth, has very real implications for fragmented beings in a reified world. Just as nihilism is not neutral in the sphere of ideology, arbitrary amalgamation or association of imagery can be harnessed powerfully to the steering of behaviour into forms suitable for capitalist reproduction. Thus advertising, as one feature of the pervasive commodification of activity and experience in the civil society and culture of advanced capitalism, operates through stamping every moment, station or aspect of everyday life, and also the more abstracted levels or dimensions of life-as-a-whole (birth/death, love, optimism/disillusion, etc), with a plethora of images and identifications. These are highly various and changing, ambiguous and contradictory, yet through certain linkages with powerful manipulated drives and with elements of taken-for-granted "normality", they can symbolically sustain structures of contradictory "normal" activity, dominant ideology, and patterns of expectation and sensibility.

The possibility exists in the potential of an average household in western societies, of integrating an orientation of sensibilities and understanding from the fragmented ruins of history upon which we can so easily gaze, which would be answerable to psychic-cultural revolutionary praxis. Through books, magazines, journals and newspapers, radio, records, telephone, television and video, the fundamentals of all hitherto developed human knowledge and cultural experience can be immediately available. Communication can be potentially opened between all individuals', groups', or nations' activities and aspirations. The possibilities in existing media - if transformed as dimensions of human relations - are so enormous that the left-wing political practices which remain at present the dominant possibilities in most western societies, seem against them like children wishing to change the shape and function of a sky-scraper by throwing stones at its walls from the ground. What is now the privatised and atomised world of media culture and home, could be the psychic-cultural power-house of revolution. This is not to say that demonstrations, picket-lines, or public meetings in town halls will lose all efficacy; rather it is to see that the "symbolic" must and can be thoroughly concrete. The conception of collective force as physical should not recede to nothing, nor should the importance of collective physical proximity. But their relative significance to socialist revolution in advanced capitalism diminishes. What is being spoken of is a reconception of revolutionary praxis, in which psyche and technique are imaginatively integrated. The diagnosis and prognosis for this western reality have been portrayed thus by Jameson:

" ... in the extreme that it has reached in the United States today ... the continuity between the present and the historical and prehistoric past ... seems to have been definitively sundered by the new modes of production and organisation of postindustrial capitalism. The reality with which the Marxist criticism of the '1930's had to deal was that of a simpler Europe and America, which no longer exist. Such a world had more in common with the life forms of earlier centuries than it does with our own. To say that it was simpler is by no means to claim that it was easier as well: on the contrary! It was a world in which social conflict was sharpened and more clearly visible, a world which projected a tangible model of the antagonism of the various classes toward each

other, both within the individual nation-states and on the international scene as well - a model as stark as the Popular Front or the Spanish Civil War, where people were called on to take sides and to die, which are, after all, always the most difficult things.

“It is this visibility and continuity of the class model, from the daily experience in the home and on the street all the way up to total mobilisation itself, which is no longer available today. Its disappearance is of course a relative and national matter. Thus France retains a class character which the Germany of the Wirtschaftswunder has long since lost ... particularly in the United States, the development of postindustrial monopoly capitalism has brought with it an increasing occultation of the class structure through techniques of mystification practised by the media and particularly by advertising in its enormous expansion since the onset of the Cold War. In existential terms, what this means is that our experience is no longer whole: we are no longer able to make any felt connection between the concerns of private life, as it follows its own course within the walls and confines of the affluent society, and the structural projections of the system in the outside world, in the form of neo-colonialism, oppression, and counterinsurgency warfare. In psychological terms, we may say that as a service economy we are henceforth so far removed from the realities of production and work on the world that we inhabit a dream world of artificial stimuli and televised experience: never in any previous civilisation have the great metaphysical preoccupations, the fundamental questions of being and of the meaning of life, seemed so utterly remote and pointless.

"In such a situation, within the United States itself, there is no tactical or political question which is not first and foremost theoretical, no form of action which is not inextricably entangled in the sticky cobwebs of the false and unreal culture itself, with its ideological mystification on every level. Not whether the street fighter or urban guerrilla can win against the weapons and technology of the modern state, but rather precisely where the street is in the superstate, and, indeed, whether the old-fashioned street as such still exists in the first place in that seamless web of marketing and automated production which makes up the new state: such are the theoretical problems of Marxism today, at least in what might be termed the overdeveloped countries.

“For it is perfectly consistent with the spirit of Marxism - with the principle that thought reflects its concrete social situation - that there should exist several different Marxisms in the world of today, each answering the specific needs and problems of its own socio-economic system: thus, one corresponds to the postrevolutionary industrial countries of the socialist bloc, another - a kind of peasant Marxism - to China and Cuba and the countries of the Third World, while yet another tries to deal theoretically with the unique questions raised by monopoly capitalism in the West. It is in the context of this last ... Marxism that the great themes of Hegel’s philosophy - the relationship of part to whole, the opposition between concrete and abstract, the concept of totality, the dialectic of appearance and essence, the interaction between subject and object - are once again the order of the day.”(87)

Generalisations such as these can always be disputed on details, nevertheless we have here an agenda for an advanced capitalism in which the production of things is displaced from the centre by the production of symbols and consciousness, where the "traditional" marxist separation of the working class into productive and unproductive labour can no longer be simply made, and where in any case the interlocking between production of surplus value and maintenance of conditions necessary for its production becomes so ubiquitous and complex as to render archaic all determinations concerning revolutionary "vanguards" etc, where revolution can only be a multi-temporal synchronisation of an immensely complex global transformation. That process concerns the dialectical interplay between the following structures: the dominant forms of reified, exploitative social process; the dominant psychic or personality structures with their characteristic fragmentation and unintegrated organisation of faculties; the dominant structures of experience on the sensory, emotional, intuition/imagination, and intellectual planes; and the characteristic, contradictory dimension of aesthetic structures in advanced capitalism. In the understanding of the last it has been seen that the epistemological, ontological and phenomenological problems with which bourgeois aesthetics has been concerned cannot be simply discarded as false by marxism. Rather than relegate aesthetic to ideational structures, marxism needs to historicise aesthetic experience and to develop a dialectical aesthetic phenomenology.

In analysing philosophies of the past or present, marxism simultaneously historicises (sees them as specific ideologies) and enters into ontological and epistemological critique - generating an ever clearer marxist view of reality, and of how there can be knowledge of reality. This is a process in which marxist thought interprets and appropriates other thought. But when marxism concerns itself with art, this is a process in which thought is interpreting and appropriating an activity that involves sensation, feeling, intuition or imagination, and also thought. The relation of subject to its object of knowledge is of a different order, even though there is a process of historicisation, and also an equivalent to ontological and epistemological critique. In place of developing solely its theoretical view of reality, and of the cognitive knowing process, marxist analysis of art must emerge with an understanding of phenomenal experience and its relationship to structural reality, understanding a process that synthesises from all dimensions of experience in an activity that draws on the totality of psychic functions, involves the whole human being.

If epistemology since Marx has become a science - a science of how and in what forms social collectivities arrive at laws, theories, and concepts to explain the world, so also should there be a science of the ways in which the imagination explores reality, mediating between existence and experience. If a dialectical epistemology illuminates the changing forms through which knowledge understands itself throughout history, and indicates the modes through which knowing can become self-conscious in praxis, ie through which active transformation of reality can be united with non-ideological understanding of reality, so too a dialectical science of the imagination should indicate how the aesthetic exploration of experience and perception, of

beauty and transcendence, can be united with an active, authentic growth and development of feeling and subjective orientation to reality on every plane.

The development of aesthetic imagination cannot be directly "legislated" by theory, any more than scientific development can. For in both, the mode of exploration itself discovers its object: theory (in the sense of the philosophy of science, cosmology, and social ontology) cannot predetermine the object of science, but rather grasps the nature of the subject/object relationship, and formulates general ontologies on the basis of what direct exploration discovers. In art and cultural form, a general theoretical perspective can orientate the appropriation of past and present productions, and also indicate tendencies for present and future developments. As with science, no direct "legislation" can externally determine research (as Lysenkoism willed). Changes in theoretical orientation, and in the social bases, class interests etc which inform research, will be reflected within the project of science. In respect of art, analogous notions are present in the manifesto of Breton and Trotsky considered earlier. All genuine art tends on certain levels to be revolutionary inasmuch as it opens up domains of the "inner life" of man: appropriation entails re-experiencing it in such a way as ensures its significance for society is liberating. Art must be "independent" in the sense that only through art itself can art discover what it can explore and find form in, in the immediate concrete situation.

The difference between the history of cultural form, as developing structures of sensibility, and the history of science and cosmology, rests upon the former's essential character as exploration of specific experience. Susanne Langer tries to express this point by arguing that art is a language of emotions, and as such does not use elements which have their own independent significance, as words have their meanings; rather each work of art is a unique symbol. The nature of cultural cumulative development and transformation is thus different from the development of ideas: in particular with respect to the notions of historical stages and progress. The point is particularly clear when one considers art that concerns itself with the fantastic or uncanny. As Rosemary Jackson(88) shows, such genres can be considered as metaphor or metonym for psycho-social forces. The criteria of truth/falsity are necessarily quite different from those pertaining to science's concern to conceptualise. In its exploration of particular experience, some genres must by their nature go "beyond reality", go "over the edge", in a way that is quite inappropriate for a theory of society. This does not mean however that there are no criteria for determining the "truth" of an art-work, but that such criteria are in a sense specific to particular works. The elucidation of the "truth" of accomplished works, and of the desired attitude with which to actively face the future, is a process different from the critique of science.

A complete relativisation of art, which regards any consideration of aesthetic quality or of the experience evoked by art-works as "essentialist", is left with the investigation of mechanisms of transmission and social consumption, and of the ideologies which mediate between works and is particular socio-historical totalities. This is like a sociology of science that limits itself to consideration of the processes whereby specific paradigms are accepted or rejected by the dominant knowledge-processes in particular social formations, and is unconcerned with science

as a human appropriation of reality through intellectual categories and theories. The difference is that in the history of science, from any present vantage-point, development can be seen as a progression (however complex and non-linear) with respect to evolving intelligibility. With art (aesthetic-imaginative activity by contrast to cognitive-rational) the achievement is in finding of form in particular objects, experiences, perceptions, emotions, in relation to specific social contexts so that any notion of historical progression must be much more complicated - including issues of changing perceptions, experiential expectations and sensitivities, and ideological mediations. At the same time must be grasped the apparent paradox of what is often conveyed in the idea that art tends toward universality, and is thus capable of communicating truths to societies far removed from those within which it arises.

The complex, interconnected processes of art work/subjective response/ changing social context can be understood without any metaphysical essentialism so long as no one dimension is isolated. Such occurs when, for example, the work or text is seen as a self-contained entity possessing an "aura", an immanent spiritual quality, or in some tendencies in structuralist semiotics that conceive the text as a signifying system in isolation from history. A similar isolation is practised if the individual's experience or response to the art work is erected as a non-social, psychologistic object of study. On the other hand, if "social context" is taken as the sole "material" reality, reductionism or complete historical relativism are the consequences. Underlying a genuinely dialectical understanding of aesthetic process within history, is the necessity to regard aesthetic creativity as one mode of human activity, present in all human collectivities and in most types of specific practice to a degree that is more or less intensive or concentrated, but in historically variant forms: in the same way that economic production, political organisation, or cognitive activity are understood. Such a conception also views aesthetic process within the framework of an overall project of conscious mastery over human subjectivity. Thus, the greater significance of Mozart's music over that of his contemporary Kozeluch must be seen in the depth of its exploration of pertinent experience. This is different from the evaluation of one theory as truer than another within a particular historical conjuncture; both because there is no single vantage point from which to judge whether one aesthetic exploration is more "valid" than another - as when two theories of the atom or of the mechanisms of the market are compared, and also because experience at any conjuncture for an individual or a social totality stands as something "inner" to explore and work or play upon. It is infinite in possibility, not a presumed "outer" reality which must be mapped according to an already accepted criterion of truth. Aesthetic exploration of experience can go in at any angle, choose any detail, focus on any aspect; it can challenge experience, invent alternatives, pursue beyond existing limits of possible experience - as in the realms of fantasy or ambiguity. It can go to "the edge" of reality, upset all fixed conceptions of truth - even those that may be thought the moral or intellectual correlates of liberation. This brings into play what is often portrayed as the "mysterious" quality of artistic experience, and also its tendency to act as "gadfly" to all certainty, to play "devil's advocate" against, or satirize, even the most sacred and assured beliefs about the universe and ethical truth. It is this aspect that has so often been misunderstood by the

leaderships of social movements - in many historical periods up to and including the epoch of socialist revolution. So often this real and necessary feature of authentic art has been confused with "reactionary ideology" or lack of progressive conviction and determination.

Each significant cultural product must be understood in relation to its specific achievement, and also as a moment in the historical emancipation of feeling. Such evaluation is different from the analysis of a moment in scientific history, such as for example a development in the theory of light. This makes it no less social however, and does » not entail metaphysical assumptions and beliefs about aesthetic "essence" or "mystery".

On a certain level of generality one might identify three artistic tendencies in advanced capitalism (often interrelated in concrete examples). There is art of resistance, which is "positive" to the extent that this is reasonable in a "contained" capitalism where a self-conscious revolutionary movement is a minority. Whether in traditional folk or new forms, this is an art that is not yet able to be part of a real, overall drive to a changed future: it is orientated to evoking a greater mass involvement and to resisting the total suppression of the presently existing revolutionary movement. Then there is the art for which exploration of alienated experience is the central dynamic; these forms are often thought of as pessimistic, elitist, individualised, or subjective etc. Thirdly, there is the art that points to utopia in the promesse de bonheur of its form, thematic content, or experiential inclination, expressing hope and intention toward freedom. The Lukacs/Goldmann type of categorisation and periodisation fails in its attempt at inclusive delineations of homologies between overarching styles, forms, characteristic themes etc, and historical epochs, and hence grasps inadequately the problem of what art is "appropriate" to socialist aspiration. Thus Lukács wants a positive, progressive realism in reified capitalist society, whilst Goldmann accepts the novel or film centred around the absence of the individual as adequately expressing this reification. This mode of framing the "problem" is reflected in the tension in Soviet society, between adherence either to some version of "socialist realism" or to "avant-garde" experimental techniques. Here it is suggested that such apparent "choices" between alternatives, and the associated difficulties of periodising different genres etc according to their assumed efficacy, stem from a problematic that dissolves when cultural practice is looked at on a deeper level. If art is seen as one kind of manifestation of the entire contradictory complex of psycho-cultural processes, fundamental features can be discerned which are present in at least some examples of all the cultural forms, genres, techniques, media etc existent in any particular phase of capitalism.

For the perspective that attempts periodisations from the "surface" of history, heroic and/or realist art corresponds to the progressive bourgeois period. Once socialist revolution becomes an historical possibility and indeed the only real solution to those contradictions in reality/experience which are explored in cultural forms, culture separates out: into either a positive humanism through which socialism is approached, or into subjectivised experimentalism where reification is experienced as insurmountable. The latter forms are variously evaluated in, for example Lukács, Goldmann and Adorno.

But on a closer look the heroic/realist period of culture can be seen as thoroughly contradictory. It contained elements of popular humanism reflecting the mass dimension of the bourgeois revolution - the extent to which all subordinate strata were mobilised behind the bourgeoisie as "the people". Simultaneously it expressed a purely bourgeois anti-autocratism, and also a specifically bourgeois individualist egotism. Similarly, twentieth century art demonstrates a complexity that is unsusceptible to the typologies considered above. Early Soviet society demonstrated spontaneous tendencies in both revolutionary experimentalism and "progressive humanism" using forms continuous with older traditions. The subsequent enforcement of "socialist realism" is also contradictory: whether it is seen as a bourgeois naturalism (as in Lukács or John Berger), or as a basically valid socialist humanism which was too narrowly conceived (as does Finkelstein), it continued in fact to express genuine popular aspirations, whilst at the same time it was appropriated into the state's determination of a loyal passivity. Thus, neither pro-Soviet apologetics nor wholesale rejections of post-Stalinist culture succeed in grasping the process. In the West, almost every actual cultural movement has been ensnared in internal contradictions between resignation/resistance, or didactic closure/ progressive realism; alienated elitism/authentic rejection of false totality, etc etc.

Thus we return to the conclusion that concern for exclusivity with respect to form, medium, or technique has impeded both marxist analysis of culture and progress in revolutionary artistic creation. The attribution of revolutionary potential to one form exclusively, corresponds also to an implicit acceptance in aesthetic theory that one part of the human psyche dominate over others: reason for Brecht, intuition for Marcuse, for example.

We have seen that in alienated societies, cultural forms express condensed structures of alienated experience in such ways as convey, simultaneously, a resolution to alienation and, sometimes, the direction, form, and thrust of human effort required to achieve it. In both advanced capitalism and the state socialist bloc, this real function of authentic culture must become increasingly self-conscious: culture must become aware of itself as a unity of "ideal" hope and present "material" limitation.

The overcoming of reification in both rational-instrumental scientism and in a "pratico-inerte" labour process, is inseparable from the overcoming of psychic fragmentation and repression. The construction of a dialectical, emancipatory reason in science (transcending the form of abstraction correspondent with commodity production) entails the integration of science and ethics in praxis, and a new psychic interfusion between the rational and other faculty-activities (emotional, intuitive, sensory). The new organic, dialectical cosmology is not merely a change of rational world-view, it entails a transformation of the entire orientation of human being to existence, to nature and humanity. Harmonious metabolism between society and nature is predicated inseparably upon an unalienated, conscious, humanly controlled labour process, a transcendence of alienated division of labour (especially mental/manual), and an integral life-orientation concerning not only a cosmology and a social philosophy but an experienced

structure of sensibilities(that are pertinent to a return of social being to its own potentialities.
sensibilities(that ±s pertinent to a return of social being to its own potentialities.

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IV CULTURE IN SOCIALIST STRATEGY FOR ADVANCED CAPITALISM: SOME CONSIDERATIONS FROM THE HISTORY OF MARXIST REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS

For marxist theory the transition from capitalism to socialism is an active intervention in the self-reproducing system of capitalism. Marxism insists that capitalism is not a 'closed' system, ie that it cannot be capable of endlessly reproducing itself within its own modifications (as was, it seems, the Asiatic mode of production prior to western intervention). Rather, like western European feudalism, capitalism is an 'open' system: the development of its forces of production

generates contradictions which are finally unassimilable and must lead to the formation of a new mode of production. However, the mode that will replace capitalism is not teleologically pre-given, nor is the time-span within which the transition must occur: indeed there is no guarantee that human history will continue long enough to see the disappearance of capitalism. The transformation of capitalism into a new system is not a passive process; it occurs only as and when conjunctures both allow and result in active socialist strategy that intervenes and transforms social reality successfully.

At different stages and in different capitalist formations, the form of such appropriate, fundamental intervention varies. In nineteenth century Europe, and especially in the Bolshevik Revolution, marxian strategy was predicated upon revolutionary organisation of the 'productive' working class (ie the producers of surplus-value) based on the enterprise: workers' councils, Soviets etc are coordinated nationally and internationally in political organisations for the seizure of state power. A new state is to be formed immediately and all essentials of the old disbanded. Workers at the point of production might first monitor the capitalists' running of industry, then gradually come to control it directly. But the direction of economic and social development is to be abruptly changed; development of the productive forces within socialism is a gradual construction of forms of organisation that allow voluntary cooperative production of use-values.

The first formulations of Marx and Engels themselves on revolutionary strategy were generated within the first major crisis/revolutionary upsurge of industrial capitalism in the 1840s. They were developed during the following period of -* stabilisation then deepened and modified in the second major crisis/revolutionary period of industrial capitalism beginning about 1864. From the present vantage-point, we can separate out some features of their formulations that are of lasting significance; some that represented unresolved problems for their time and which were later to take on catastrophic practical implications; and some that represent a 'modell of revolution pertinent only to a limited socio-historical context.

In the *Communist Manifesto* Marx and Engels state an aim which marxism would always want to uphold, that is to arrive at "theoretical conclusions (which) express the actual relations springing from class struggle (Communists) do not set up sectarian principles of their own by which to shape and mould the proletarian movement".(1) They also stress that the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' makes progressive inroads into bourgeois relations of production which, if 'correct' (ie viable, effective) necessitate further actions. The effectiveness of measures is always relative to the context; the conception developed very much further after experience of the 1871 Paris Commune is that the dictatorship of the proletariat is an active, conscious, experimental process. It succeeds to the extent that it understands what it must do: 'The great social measure of the Commune was its own working existence'.(2)

In Marx's analysis of the Paris Commune the tasks of transforming bourgeois society are not seen as simply requiring the application of will, the satisfaction of yearnings, the imposition of ideals nurtured under oppression (though these are necessary); rather they are objectively given

and inevitable tasks which the proletariat confronts and discovers it must accomplish, if counter-revolution is not to force society back into the bourgeois mould. Thus, whilst requiring class consciousness, historical understanding etc on the 'subjective' level, the process is an 'objective' one, emerging as a real positive tendency from within capitalist society.

These are some of the ideas of lasting significance (though often ignored since) stemming from nineteenth century marxist political strategy. Among the problems in marxist strategy at the stage of *The Communist Manifesto* is an adherence to an over-mechanical view of the 'order' for class action. In the German revolution of 1848 the bourgeoisie is expected to take power, neatly followed on by the proletariat. Certainly, reflection after the failures of 1848 led Marx and Engels to more sophisticated views on class struggle and a greater recognition of the flexibility of capitalism (replacing iron-logical stages with a conception of simultaneous, mutually interacting and sometimes mutually annulling tendencies: rising productivity and colonialism for example, offsetting tendencies to increasing immiseration). Nevertheless, there always remained in their thought, if not an inevitable unfolding of deductible stages, then something like a 'master narrative', an insensitivity to unevenness and multifariousness in development.

Another problem is that of democracy. In *The Communist Manifesto* no great attention is paid to the issue raised by a proletariat in a minority leading society, as to how it can be ensured that other exploited strata rally voluntarily around it. Nor is any anxiety expressed at the negative possibilities opened up by the centralisation of production, communication etc. In *The Civil War in France* certainly, the dictatorship of the proletariat is seen as direct, mass democracy. All previous states are crystallized organs standing over and above society, usurping society's functions and carrying them out in forms compatible with exploitation. The dictatorship of the proletariat, the socialist state, exists in organic, fluid interrelation with society; it is the means whereby and through which the proletariat and its allies directly regulate society. The most significant innovations of the Paris Commune - recallable delegates, equal wages for all workers and functionaries, replacement of army and police by the proletariat armed, direct democracy in decision-making, abolition of autonomous state organs etc - are seen as both form and content of the process of emancipation towards classlessness. The antagonisms of bourgeois society (and those 'remaining' from earlier forms of class society) are progressively overcome in the most 'rational and humane' way possible. The ends of abolition of all classes, the overcoming of alienated forms of the division of labour, the withering away of the state and bureaucracy etc are inseparable from the means for their accomplishment: radical, mass, direct, egalitarian democracy. In spite of Marx's fine general vision however, there are many questions with respect to ensuring revolution is a mass, social self-determination which remain unposed in nineteenth century marxism.

Marx and Engels were never to solve (even theoretically) the problem posed by the polarities: spontaneity/organisation, variety of ideas/'correct' theory, loose incoherent movement/effective tightly organised party. In the 1840s the Communist League was so small that the problem was still almost hypothetical; during the revolutionary period of 1847-51 Marx had a variety of ideas

about the relationship between leaders and the mass of workers. As Karl Korsch argued, the highly sophisticated theory of Marx and Engels first evolved as part of a 'revolutionary movement and proletarian class struggle on a narrower basis'.(3) The problem came to the fore in the much broader workers' movement of the First International. Here, Marx and Engels welcomed broad alliances embracing a wide spectrum of perspectives. Yet, whilst accepting a necessarily 'loose' organisation, they struggled in sectarian fashion against Anarchism, Lasalleism etc. Though their instinct was toward mass, direct participatory practise, they saw it as necessary to undertake prophylactic action against leaders and ideas that might instil a different view from their own into the working class, respecting what such mass participation should mean. In his *Critique of the Gotha Programme* Marx may rightly condemn a 'confused, fragmented, illogical and disreputable Programme', but there is contradiction in his claim that marxism is 'nothing other than a general expression of the real historical movement'. He has no grounds to accuse the programme of 'monstrously violating the views held by the Party masses'(4); in fact the empirical movement was diverse and unclear about many things, such as the relationship between insurrection and activity in Trade Unions, Parliament, etc. These dilemmas of the First International have pervaded all revolutionary movements since, and remain unsolved.

In the period when Marx and Engels were alive therefore, questions of viable revolutionary strategy were by no means wholly solved, even for the conditions obtaining in that period. Both the First and Second Internationals were broad movements displaying a plurality of outlooks and practises. However, the only actual revolution of the period - the Paris Commune of 1871 - indicated that a single insurrection could mark the inauguration of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It may be that if the revolution had succeeded in France as a whole, a more complex pattern of 'stages' would have emerged; but as far as *The Civil War in France* is concerned - the main expression of marxist revolutionary political strategy for this period - a single political event inaugurating revolutionary transformation is the 'model' employed.

It was in the epoch between the Marx-Engels period when the 'single insurrection model' was (probably correctly) seen as applicable in Western Europe, and the period after World War I when Gramsci was the first explicitly to reject it, that 'economism' and 'mechanistic determinism' came to dominate western marxism. It can be argued that the basic reason for the split between 'reformism' in Bernstein and later in Kautsky on the one hand, and the uncompromising 'leftism' of Luxemburg and Lenin on the other, was that neither they nor anyone else at the time properly saw how, or with what implications, western conditions had superseded the viability of the earlier insurrectionary model of revolution.(5) Bernstein and Kautsky correctly sensed that abrupt breaks of the nineteenth century kind were no longer possible. Though their mechanistic, evolutionist fatalism - 'history is on our side' - underpinned a disastrous reformism, they were in tune with reality in seeing that real working-class gains through the bourgeois-democratic regulative state entailed a fundamentally new situation.(6)

In the period of the Second International, as Korsch(7) argued, the mass parties and Trades Unions were in reality predominantly reformist. And though Rosa Luxemburg wrestled with the question of an appropriate relation between reform and revolution, she could not find a solution. It was not a case of practice lagging behind or betraying 'correct' theory, nor of theory lagging behind or betraying the masses. The leaders of these movements were incapable of responding adequately to post World War I situations where crises temporarily removed the appeal of reformism for the working class: but the 'answer' to those failures cannot be found through hypothesising what might have occurred if any of those practises argued for at the time, by anyone, had won out. If Marx and Engels were 'right' for 1848 and 1871, the 'only problems' being the lack of mass adherence to their theories, and insufficient organisation and coordination (and this is by no means certain) - no one was 'right' (in Western Europe) through from the 1890s to the 1920s and 30s. The problem was not only reformism but the inadequacy of the 'single insurrection model'.

Between 1871 when revolutionary strategy based on this model was still possible - providing the model for Lenin in the conditions of Tzarist Russia - and the early 1920s when 'Leninist' revolutions in Western Europe all failed, western capitalism had undergone transformations which precluded the possibility of what Gramsci termed the strategy of frontal attack. (To be exact, one should say that such transformations in historical fact prevented the success of revolutions based on existing strategic thought. It cannot be asserted with certainty that such revolutions were inherently impossible; but their failure can certainly be attributed to differences between this period and conditions in contemporary Russia on the one hand, and in western Europe in the 1870s on the other.) These transformations include changes in the state and civil society, expansion and multiplication of urban centres, new forms of ideological control and transmission of information, 'Taylorist' differentiations of the working-class, technological innovation and continuous fragmentation and dispersal, new military means in the hands of the ruling-class; hence the 'betrayal' of leaderships in unclear terrains of struggle. At what point 'frontal attack' had become objectively impossible or very unlikely to succeed is unclear; one can only say that 1871 was the last date it definitely was possible (the defeat of the Paris Commune was not due to intrinsic problems in frontal, insurrectionary strategy), whilst by the period 1918-23 it was almost definitely not.

In his reflections from prison upon both the failure of revolutions in the west and upon the bureaucratisation of the Russian revolution, Gramsci went explicitly beyond strategic conceptions of a single, crucial political break.(8) He saw the failure of Second International marxism as above all a theoretical and practical incapacity to confront the conditions of advancing capitalism - not as due to Hegelian deformations of marxism as does Althusser, nor to a supposed 'immaturity' of the working class as does Ernesto Laclau: "When you don't have the initiative in the struggle and the struggle itself comes eventually to be identified with a series of defeats, mechanical determinism becomes a tremendous force of moral resistance, of cohesion, and of patient and obstinate perseverance."(9)

Gramsci saw that 'Leninist' revolutionary strategy had already become impracticable for western Europe by the post World War I period (though Lenin himself should not be simplified - he did not assume the Bolshevik revolution was a paradigm for all Europe). Gramsci was also concerned with the division between leaders and masses and between the subject and object of social change in the 'Leninist model'. This 'anti-Jacobin' aspect of the Gramscian perspective is not however itself new. Marx stresses notions of process, total societal self-transformation, whilst for Lenin the tendencies toward 'Jacobinism' before and after the Bolshevik revolution were seen - correctly or not - as necessary tactical adaptations to the conditions of Russia, without which there could be no revolution at all.(10) Revolution as mass self-transformation, the dialectical unity of subject and object in praxis, is not therefore the main feature distinguishing Gramscian from Leninist or previous European marxist strategy; it is the emphasis on protracted process, the development of revolutionary social relations and culture before, during, and after political power is taken into the hands of the proletariat - which is not a single, or focal 'event' - as being particularly necessary given the nature of the state and civil society in advanced capitalism. And even here it should be recognised that the theoretical change is not total: Lenin by 1920 grasped a good deal of the need for proletarian cultural hegemony to be established before political revolution in the West and of the necessity for political activity within bourgeois democratic institutions (as against 'ultra-left' abstentionism).(11)

Gramsci arrives at a revolutionary strategy for advanced capitalist societies which stresses both the need to replace insurrection/ frontal attack conceptions with the 'war of position', and an uncompromising insistence on mass self-transformation. As we have seen, these orientations do not necessarily entail each other: for Marx in *The Civil War in France* revolution is conceived in insurrectionary terms and also as a mass praxis. Gramsci's critique of Leninist technicism, its tendency to a party/masses dichotomy, and his incipient critique of state-stratified socialism is therefore 'true' to Marx rather than novel; his insistence on mass, organic praxis takes on a reformulated significance however in the context of the continuous, protracted, multi-faceted struggle seen as necessary in advanced capitalism.

Germany and Italy in the immediate post-World War I years were industrial capitalist societies in crises (economic, political, social, moral-ideological) as deep as could be imagined, with proletariats as open to revolutionary change as could be expected. Victory in these years seemed impossible not to attain, yet though apparently so clearly in sight and so near it proved elusive, like a Grail on the other side or an invisible, impassable veil. It proved impossible to coordinate insurrectionary surges separated in space and time, without either exacerbating the inevitably uneven development of workers' (and other dissatisfied groups') militancy, or on the other hand letting the moment, the opportunity, slip. This was the reason (certainly helped after 1923 by incipient 'Stalinisation' of western parties, but not solely explicable in terms of it) for the despairing splits, the sudden changes of course (and leaderships), the feeling gained from reading histories of the period that over and over again 'mistakes' led to perhaps the most important opportunity in human history being missed: no one yet saw clearly what revolutionary practise in

advanced capitalism would have to mean. Explanations in terms of reformism, Stalinization, inadequate leadership, the non-existence of an appropriate party at crucial moments, all hold partial truths but cannot get to the crux of the social reasons that made these facts possible, and which probably made revolution in the terms understood by all contemporary marxists actually infeasible.

The initial nineteenth century marxist revolutionary strategy was reliant upon the possibility of a rapid urban insurrectionary seizure of state power. This model had become inappropriate for the more developed capitalist societies by the 1920s. It remained the basic conception in the theory and practise of the Bolshevik revolution, though it developed in certain distinct ways summed up in the term 'leninism'. These concern the distinctly leninist conception of the relationship between a mass base and a tightly organised, disciplined party leadership. The leninist model proved 'successful' - though not certainly, free of problems - for the conditions of Tzarist Russia: a weak bourgeoisie, a peculiarly autocratic, anachronistic, centralised state in which there was no scope for reformism.

Quite probably the first socialist revolution had to be a fast, insurrectionary seizure of state power, and it quite likely required to be in a large country where foreign counter-revolutionary intervention is made difficult. (One thinks of Prussian intervention in the France of 1871, western intervention in Hungary in 1920, as counter examples.) Russia, as a large, mainly agricultural society with few urban centres which displayed highly focussed, concentrated power was a good candidate for a first 'successful' revolution. In the event, subsequent successful socialist revolutions have not followed this model: sometimes, as in the West and probably elsewhere, because structural developments have superceded its applicability. Elsewhere counter-revolution learned tactically from 1917; at any rate Third World revolutions have been guerrilla/peasant rural civil wars progressively conquering 'liberated zones' before taking state power, and their success has partly depended on the prior existence of the USSR - both due to its assistance and to its partial counterweight against intense foreign intervention. A third 'type' is perhaps seen in Eastern Europe, where the Soviet military 'shield' could allow revolutions to occur (however problematical their substance was in practice) which otherwise would have been crushed. The fourth 'type' - protracted, internally determined transformation - becomes globally more significant though hitherto unsuccessful, as industrial modernization continues. The existence of a large 'socialist camp' - though split and thoroughly problematical in respect of its claim to the label 'socialist' - creates a world balance of forces more favourable to this kind of revolution than was the case before 1917.

In Italy and Germany after the First World War there were well-developed 'civil societies' which could maintain a precarious bourgeois rule even with the state in crisis. Furthermore, the state was more developed, diffuse and multi-dimensional than those of nineteenth century Europe or Tzarist Russia. Proletarian uprisings in one or several cities were unable to coordinate a seizure of state power. Revolutionary movements were feeling their way with a theory and practice that was inappropriate to the reality - and this was not only due to Comintern domination. Lightning

breakthroughs were not possible, but a Gramscian re-thinking did not come in time; instead fascist movements took over the idea of a party seizure of power.

With the development of competitive into monopoly capitalism is evidenced the growth of corporate bureaucracy: in the enterprise, the state (national and local) and all civil organisations. Within such a system of interlocking organisations, a counter-praxis must establish revolutionary cultural hegemony before the definitive transformation of state power - which is itself enacted in a series of complex stages.

Social control under capitalism shifts from an ideology and practise that treated the subject population as an inert mass to an integrative orientation, constituting individuals (as workers and citizens) as 'active' participators in the system that alienates, exploits and dominates them. The object of revolutionary practise (the abolition of capitalism and all its institutions and their replacement with communism and its appropriate conscious, cooperative institutions) can no longer be conceived as something that is initiated by a sharp, physically precise 'overthrow' of now very large, bureaucratic organizations. The state (national and local), the enterprise, Trades Unions, the education system, churches, mass parties, other public bodies, cultural processes and media, must be significantly transformed before definitive control of state-power can be taken into the hands of the working class such that major institutional changes can be directly initiated by the new state (with the democratic support and continuous active involvement of a social majority). The state itself must be transformed in a complex series of stages beginning before the establishment of socialism, when the capitalist class still holds ultimate state power. Once in the hands of the working class, some parts of the state apparatus are abolished entirely and completely new destatified socialist counterparts created; others are progressively and radically transformed. No dimension of the capitalist state continues unchanged, but nor can it or should it be 'smashed' outright.

This organisational counter-praxis entails disalienation of humanaction and dereification of consciousness. From a conception of stasis in society and its component organisations, must emerge one of willed transformation. From a passive adaptation to given changes and returns to equilibrium, must evolve a notion of collective human subjectivity determining the Organisation. The implications of the changed conception of organizational reality will be manifested in every dimension of living - constantly exploring and experimenting in efforts to disalienate practises, to draw decisions taken by organizations (based upon clearly posed goals) into closer relation with the actual majority wishes of their members; to humanise and de-bureaucratise relationships between members of organizations.

The transformation of organizations entails two analytically separate components: first the extension of 'empirical1 democratic control, making institutional decisions actually reflect immediate majority wishes. This is a radical extension of bourgeois democracy (which in itself can come to challenge capitalism and bourgeois rule), and represents in essence the horizons of most non-marxist visions of socialism. Secondly, revolutionary transformation entails the

development of a qualitatively new relationship between individual and organization, with a consciousness of class perspective (meaning also, of course, perspectives that are non-racist and non-sexist). Democratically arrived-at decisions are not merely the summation of an arbitrary, numerical majority opinion, but are the concrete, specific consequences of the development of a new conceptual framework within which choices are now understood and made. Thus, ecological concerns necessitate decisions which allow a non-destructive relationship with nature. Within bourgeois horizons, ecological imperatives are seen as necessitating constraints on free economic decisions; this leads to an assumption that centralized political authority must be extended if such imperatives are recognised and acted upon. It is assumed that conflict exists between social (survival) necessity and immediate majority interests.

But for marxism, as class power changes so does consciousness and the conception of self-interest; empirical reality changes - it does not remain the same within a changed 'outer set of circumstances'. In the socialist project, a new consensus area arises within which choices are seen and made. Wide democratic involvement and individual autonomy of expression are not seen or experienced as conflicting with 'state decisions' governed by social imperatives.(13) In a non-alienated praxis of individuals, consciousness internalizes historical necessities. Society becoming conscious of itself as an organic whole (not as a mere conglomeration of empirical individuals) arriving at decisions upon which it acts, does not entail a lessening of either individual autonomy or divergence of opinion. Because opinions can be based upon genuine understanding of reality ('objective' to the extent made possible by the existing level of scientific and other understanding), divergences exist within an area of real, actual human choice - not in the forms of mystification and utopian illusion. While bourgeois rule (and technocratic decision-making) appears as policy following empirical majority opinion, it is in actuality policy governed by bourgeois interest and world-view (not of course without concession to or compromise with pressure from 'outside' and 'below'); the subordinated majority is divided between a multiplicity of manipulated 'non-opinions' based on mystified perceptions of reality. The development of proletarian interest and world-view brings in the project of society's self-guidance toward a condition of harmonious relations within itself and with nature; majority opinions are arrived at through well-informed discussion and debate.(14) They are both empirically democratic in the terms of the moment and exist within the bounds of historical possibility. They are based upon rational understanding as part of a self and consciousness that is harmoniously integrated. A transformed, individuated all-rounded personality is one whose self-fulfilment is in harmony, not in conflict with the popular will. An unrepressed, creatively developing psyche is one in which ethical imperative, intuitive feeling (in this case toward nature experienced as the 'other' of harmonious interaction), material need and rational enquiry operate in dynamic interaction: ethics, desire, and 'economic development' are interwoven dimensions of human society's totality of self-developing activity. Such a process is incompatible with the domination - in any sense - of one group over others; the fulfilment of one is the condition for and dependent upon the fulfilment of all, just as for 'higher rationality' to prevail, intellectual awareness must be dispersed and active throughout society.

This state of affairs has generally not obtained in socialist states hitherto. Whether for historically justified reasons or not, it has been thought that necessary decisions cannot conform to empirical majority expressions of opinion, and have thus issued from ruling elites operating as the 'intellect' of the proletariat; such elites have sought to convince the majority of the correctness of their policies after they have been arrived at. There have of course been experiments in going beyond this form of 'socialism'; Maoism - notwithstanding its own contradictions - represents the most thorough-going one hitherto. It recognized that if capitalism is replaced- by mere technocratic state planning, new contradictions are generated in the tendency to lapse back to private ownership and market mechanisms, and in the continuing urge toward progressive disalienation: labour against state control, struggle for worker control, struggle against inequality and restriction upon freedom of thought and expression, the general urge to overcome an alienated division of labour (convoluted and 'disguised' as the forms taken by these tendencies may be).

Civil society meant for Hegel the sphere of private activities including economic ones, which is contrasted with public activity - the realm of political society including the state. Marx in his critique of Hegel's political theory shows that the apparent separation and harmonious co-existence of private, self-interested activity in bourgeois civil society with public activity in the bourgeois state (which for Hegel expresses society's collective will), is illusory. Rather the bourgeois state - consisting as it does of individuals who are simultaneously citizens with private interests - reflects in its activity the predominant common interests of these individuals. For capitalism as a class society (and it is only in class societies that the state as a crystallized bureaucracy exists) these are the economic interests of the ruling class, the bourgeoisie. Thus for Marx, civil society is dissolved into the economic, or the social relations of production which condition the state form. In bourgeois society this unseparated social totality is not harmonious, but contradictory.

Gramsci's use of the term 'civil society' is concerned to focus consideration on a particular dimension of social reality which is certainly dealt with in Marx, but whose significance is under-stressed; and whose importance has become greater owing to the transformations undergone in capitalist (and state bureaucratic socialist) reality since Marx's time. It denotes the sphere of social interaction, collective endeavour and 'personal experience' outside the state and the economic productive process. It is both conditioned by, and reciprocally conditions, the economic process and all other levels of the socio-economic formation (conceived dialectically, ie as a totality in which 'elements' or 'levels' are not discrete entities but rather conceptual categories that appropriate the real processes of the social totality).

This concept is the lynch-pin of Gramsci's original development in marxist theory (though parallel concerns occupied the thought of others contemporary to him, for example the Frankfurt School theorists). Through it Gramsci is able to pin-point crucial aspects of revolutionary strategy that had hitherto been either understressed or considered in inconsistent and unsystematic forms. Though civil society (and its implied concern with 'social character' etc) is

of importance in all societies, Gramsci's analysis drives toward the recognition that praxis within it becomes, in advanced capitalist societies, of such immense importance that new formulations are required: these represent however an expansion and development rather than an essential revision in marxist thinking. With respect to Lenin, Gramsci's reformulation expresses both continuity and discontinuity. Here it is those aspects of leninism that are fundamentally surpassed that are important - those aspects in which the change of emphasis effectively gives rise to a qualitative change in the theory of political organisation and strategy.(15)

The shift from leninist to gramscian conceptions therefore reflects the failure of western revolutions next to the success (but also problematical nature of) the Bolshevik revolution; the appropriateness of leninist strategy for Russia side by side with the incapacity of revolutionary movements to apply it successfully in the west. It also reflects the tremendous jolt to marxism provoked by the rise and initial success of fascism: a mass movement that succeeds in ousting revolutionary socialism from its presumed historical role of leading society out of a general crisis of capitalism.

The concept of civil society allows Gramsci to focus on social institutions in the 'public sphere' - those which are neither part of the state apparatus nor of private capitalist enterprise. Like the important contemporary work of Wilhelm Reich that undertook to analyse the processes of capitalist reproduction at the level of sexuality, sex roles, individual character formation and the structure of the family in bourgeois society, the work of Gramsci altogether deepens and enriches theory and practice on levels other than the 'economic' and 'political'.

Gramsci is able to conclude that after a certain stage in the consolidation of bourgeois forms, revolutionary transformation leading up to the dictatorship of the proletariat becomes more complex and more protracted in time: in particular the notion of a critical, momentary political break, upon which the other dimensions of revolutionary transformation are dependent, no longer serves to grasp reality. In such a protracted, sustained coordination of mass practice, where power is not centrally located yet where struggle cannot progressively liberate one area after another, the great majority of society must support socialism as the desired solution to the contradictions of capitalism - due both to practical necessity and to a desire to ensure the healthiness of socialism after revolution: to ensure, that is, that a process of statification does not put power in the hands of a bureaucratic elite and that capitalistic forms of division of labour are not perpetuated even though private economic ownership is abolished and society is reorganized on the basis of economic planning. The proletariat must establish cultural hegemony in society before the political break is achieved - not least because the political break is unlikely to come in any sudden finality. A continuous revolutionary pressure from a social majority must be sustained over a long period of complex, multi-dimensional advances, retreats, partial victories etc.

The growing importance of struggle within the cultural sphere is also a consequence of the increasing significance of bourgeois cultural hegemony in maintaining the reproduction of

capitalism. This binds into Gramsci's distinction between ideological generation of consent on the one hand, and coercive force on the other. This concern reflects the fact that an independent, autonomous proletarian culture, developing with the initial formation of the class and prone to radicalism - carrying aspects of previous rural folk orientations which interact with the first sharp confrontation with exploitation by industrial capital - is gradually integrated into capitalist ideological forms unless a conscious alternative proletarian culture is practised. The existence of the proletariat side by side with, or rather, under the bourgeoisie (and other classes) over long periods leads not to a homogeneous common culture, but to a public sphere of interaction between elements - a process in which the bourgeoisie strives to steer 'popular' culture into forms compatible with its dominance.

With capitalist development lifting the lid from conditions of absolute material impoverishment in the advanced countries, and with the shortening of the average working day, the significance of extra-economic social practises in the proletariat grows. Simultaneously, capitalist forms come to penetrate ever more deeply into all social spheres, transforming more and more social values into commodities : more and more goods are drawn out from independent or domestic production into the general production of commodities. Likewise more and more kinds of service, pleasure activities, and indeed all areas of experience become drawn into the commodity form.

Underlying these considerations which pertain to revolutionary strategy in capitalist societies that have developed strong, consolidated bourgeois forms, in which the state has grown in structure, taken on new functions, and whose power is ever more extensive and omnipresent (but not decentralized in the conventional or democratic sense), and in which bourgeois hegemony through cultural forms becomes ever more important, is one which pertains to bourgeois society in general, and distinguishes it from many other types of class society with their various forms of repressive state. This is the way that in most bourgeois societies, class rule is largely effected through mechanisms that are not parts of the state, though their conditions of existence are maintained by it. It is precisely due to the real separation between the immediate operations of the economy, the state, and civil society (except on a deep level of connection) that the emergence of revolutionary consciousness is so complex in the proletariat, and not at all spontaneous or 'natural' and inevitable. The means of opposing and overthrowing the oppressing class, and indeed the correct identification of what that class actually is, are far less apparent to the proletariat than is the case for oppressed classes in previous types of society - even though in most previous types of class society the oppressed class has been historically unable to transform the system of society even if it has risen and endeavoured to eliminate the causes of its exploitation.

The implications of a gramscian analysis then, are the need for conscious practise on all levels of the social whole - without a priori priority being given to any one over the others. What is entailed is a comprehension of the mutually effecting nature of all levels, resulting in the recognition that strategy as a whole will be as effective as its weakest link. The essential insight -

which has been worked out in relation to many different dimensions of social reality by different groups and individuals, more or less satisfactorily - is that revolutionary practice cannot be seen to be based exclusively, nor even essentially, on the capitalist labour process and the state. It needs to be all-pervasive, located in each and every dimension of the social totality in its varied appropriate forms, conscious of the inter-relation between specific practices and all others, and each with the total process. Gramsci himself was led to theorize on the spheres of collective and 'private' activity outside the state and economic production as such: the orientations of thought in the intellectuals who represent social classes, the functional role of 'autonomous' institutions not directly concerned with economic production - the church, education etc. For advanced capitalist societies such as Britain now, the significant areas of civil society are still the educational system, the family and the agencies that generate the sexual division of labour and social roles; but of more and more concern are the media and the commercial organisation of non-work activities: physical, intellectual, spiritual, aesthetic, sensual and sexual. This is the sphere which a marxist sociology of culture has more and more to penetrate.

The gramscian outlook has allowed recognition of and conceptual clarity on major features of capitalist society in its advanced monopoly phase. In essence the point for marxism is that the complex, multifaceted, diffuse state in monopoly-welfare capitalism necessitates that its transformation occurs on all dimensions simultaneously and that it is no longer an apparatus capable of being 'seized' suddenly or abolished/transformed abruptly *in toto*. A state which reflects the conditions of class struggle in advanced monopoly capitalism, as a dynamic crystallization of adaptations in structure and function for intervention in the economic and social processes of production and reproduction, and of concessions and compromises forced from capital - such a state requires a highly complex, multifaceted set of practises to transform it: and to recognise this has nothing to do with 'reformist gradualism'.

Similarly the development of working class organizations on a national scale, such as the Trade Unions which represent and express the labour/capital antagonism on a supra-enterprise level, entails a subtle and dexterous set of interrelated practises, from the 'high' levels of organization through to the most local situations 'on the ground'. In a related way civil societies which have evolved through long periods of capitalism no longer present purely 'bourgeois' civil forms confronting 'proletarian' ones. The contradictory, hierarchical but relatively more unified (though fragmented, in another sense) civil society requires sustained and multi-levelled transformative praxis. The forms of alienated but nevertheless real and concrete participation of the working class in popular culture and civil institutions, as in national and local government, make it meaningless to call for 'pure' opposition, as if from the 'outside'. Practise must work within and through existing institutions in order to intensify whatever real participation the working class experiences, thus helping to develop recognition of the gutted, distorted nature of supposed popular sovereignty in consumer culture and bourgeois democracy, disalienating the purely formal forms of participation and tending toward conscious transformation. This of course goes hand in hand with the creation of new revolutionary organizations in response to the needs of

struggle, outside of and sometimes in clear conflict with established organizations. In a similar way the technical development of electronic media as shaped within bourgeois social relations has created a capital-intensive media system that is necessarily more or less unitary. As noted, unlike in earlier periods of capitalism, a separate bourgeois culture does not face a relatively sealed-off popular culture. Whereas in the period in which the press was the main medium of communication an establishment and a radical press could compete for hegemony if not 'equally', then at least on a common terrain, the centralized complex technologies of modern media, requiring specialized knowledge and skills in their operation, cannot be 'undercut' or challenged by the simple construction of radical alternatives. Whilst 'external' alternatives should always be attempted and experimented with, it must be recognized that as long as the major media are owned and/or controlled by the bourgeoisie, and given the all-pervasive, saturating nature of the media in the everyday life of advanced capitalism, cultural practise must seek gradual advances and footholds in them, wresting more and more concessions from the bourgeoisie as the balance of forces moves against it.

The overall international system of surplus value realization necessitates a hugely complex metasocial practise which has to be grasped and internalized synthetically by all groups and individuals for localized struggles to effect coordinated, meaningful change. Unique, specific conditions require unique, appropriate practises, but this means that the general overall process of transformation must be properly grasped by each particular group and individual at the same time. Revolution in an advanced capitalist society could not abruptly change the direction of economic development *as a whole*, ie in each and every respect. For some aspects a reorientation would be gradual: but of course the purpose would still be to undertake it as quickly as possible! Clearly, for sustained radical reorientation of this kind, always reflecting upon changing conditions and monitoring effects of earlier decisions, a high level of mass involvement - practical and intellectual - would be essential in order to avoid chaos and the probability of capitalism being restored by counter-revolution, or ossification into reformism and bureaucracy, ie 'incomplete' or 'unfinished' revolution.

Thus, necessarily gradual revolutionary change in huge structures is not the same as 'gradualism' - the reformist illusion that cumulative reforms by themselves mysteriously lead to a new form of society. Nor does it reflect a fear of rapid change, nor a desire for slow 'peaceful' change rather than sharp, radical breaks. On some levels breaks would be radical; whilst the issue of peacefulness or otherwise is not usually one where the choice lies with the revolutionary movement: naturally revolutionaries would prefer no violent confrontation. The argument is concerned with what is objectively feasible in advanced capitalism: effective revolutionary strategy can only stem from accurate analysis of the specificities of a particular social form. The development of radically new productive forces in an advanced industrial society would entail a decisive element of restructuring and de-forming of accretions from long periods of capitalism. Coping with the 'deformations' produced within capitalism (eg urban chaos, destruction of nature) would require that past development be retraced, dissecting out those features that cannot

be 'built upon', ie features that are entirely negative (eg the hugeness of some cities or over-sized buildings). Nuclear power as a source of energy is another example of something that must be consciously 'gone back on', and many such changes could hardly be sudden.

Post-gramscian marxist strategic thinking places a new emphasis on culture, in ways related to the perception that former images of revolution as well as practical theories are outdated or inappropriate particularly for the West. It remains contentious to what extent earlier schemata were inadequate even for their own times, generally underestimating the complexity of successful revolution. Thus Gramsci's thinking is novel in explicitly scrutinizing the question of timing in a revolutionary process, in its concern with the syncopated phasing of movements' activities and the integration of advances in position with transformations in consciousness: an inadequacy in earlier marxism is pointed up at the same time as structural changes in advanced capitalism are shown to require a new temporal orientation to revolutionary strategy. Marxist thought concerning ideological domination is developed in sophistication: the shaping and control of culture, symbolic negotiation, conflict, adaptation and hegemony are conceptually sharpened. As with other 'unorthodox' marxists of the period Gramsci perceived and reacted to the prevalent tendency in contemporary marxist movements to relegate the dimensions of culture and personal interaction and experience to a 'non-political' limbo: either ignored, considered to be outside of history and hence unsusceptible to theory or practise, or merely attributed secondary importance. A combination of economism, economic determinism, and sheer conservatism led to the Bolsheviks ignoring Kollantai's concern with sexuality, to the German Communist Party's rejection of Wilhelm Reich's marxist-psychoanalytical sex clinics. Leninism's lack of sympathy with cultural avant-gardism and then Stalinism's suppression of it; the general lack of attention paid to the 'quality of life' (even the quality of work): these interrelated blind-spots in Marxism were to be left more and more to bohemian counter-cultures as the twentieth century unfolded. Parts of the post-sixties Left have tried to reclaim them for marxism, and this can be greatly helped through recuperation of Gramsci.

The ineffectiveness of marxism's theories and strategies in the spheres of civil society, culture, and personal psychological experience has meant that the progressive commodification of experience in advanced capitalism has been weakly resisted, whilst its effects on class organization and consciousness have been dimly perceived. This realization was of course at the crux of the Frankfurt School theorists' concern with psycho-sexuality and commodification. What perhaps is becoming clearer now, is the extent to which the process was underway in the very period during which those other crucial changes already noted were occurring, ie between the 1870s and the First World War. Work done by the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in particular has traced the commodification of popular culture in nineteenth century Britain; more recently attention has been paid to analogous developments in Wilhelminian Germany. The rapid industrialization of Germany after the 1870s was accompanied by a characteristic 'fadishness' in the styles of a commercialized 'high' culture, alongside a massive growth in popular (working class and petty bourgeois) literature. The latter,

represented in pamphlets and the 'colporteur' novel, already demonstrated many of the characteristics of commodified literature (and later film and television) so prevalent in advanced capitalism.

Sensationalism - "strong doses of gory thrills and heart-throbbing romance"(17) - operates a double-edged psychological function: as escape, consolation and compensation for dissonance and conflict in experience, a buffer against general insecurity, rationalization and quantification, alienation. Simultaneously it reinforces (to unrealistic extremes) conventional values concerning the home, sex roles, social hierarchies, glamorous heroes etc.

The commodified novel and drama mitigate against an audience coming to comprehend its real situation; they do not assist an assessment of what restricts needs and desires and of how social relations might need to be changed in order to satisfy them better.

Though socialist political literature in Germany - mainly that of the Social-Democratic Party - enjoyed wide circulation it had been quantitatively surpassed by commercial entertainment literature long before the First World War. Not only is this in itself significant for our present concerns; the response of the SPD to this 'threat' is also instructive. On the one hand marxist leaders condemned 'trashy' literature but failed to provide desirable alternatives - indeed, with certain exceptions, no serious attempt was made to consider what these might be or to create them. On the other hand they continued to advocate the 'official' conception of socialist culture. In essence this strove to incorporate and transcend the best of bourgeois - capitalist classical culture: socialist culture could take the Schilleran message of a new mankind and proclaim its coming in the future socialist society.

In itself, such a view of classical culture is not a negative one: but it cannot suffice as a mass cultural strategy. Not only is it a limited and partial answer to the question of revolutionary culture, but it is almost inevitably inclined to ensure a schism between the 'cultured' marxist leaders and committed political activists on the one hand, and the rest of the masses on the other who, even if in support of socialism, may have only a tenuous understanding of its implications in many areas of cultural experience.

The growing complexities of cultural strategy within advanced capitalism's increasing commodification of experience will be considered more closely later. It is clear that an emancipatory struggle has to be waged by individuals and collectives 'within' cultural products as commodities, to hegemonise a demystified, non-exploitative perception and enjoyment of them at the same time as creating cultural forms as use-values directly, outside of the culture industry". The latter cannot however be simply rejected or ignored.

Revolutionary praxis in culture - conceived as both the pattern or flavour of a whole way of life and as focussed aesthetic expression requires that attention be paid to the whole psycho-physical being of the individual. Not just a new ideology, but a new morality and a new structure of sensibilities are at stake: for self-determined existential praxis to bring into being a new kind of

person, desires and yearnings generally encompassed by religions or 'spiritual philosophies of life' must be scrutinized and reorientated in the context of a dialectical materialist outlook upon society, the self, and nature, and thus be relocated in the process of opening out an unrepressed, integrated, autonomous human being.(18) This concern is highlighted by that other crucial premise of post-gramscian strategic thinking: that revolution as a non-dualist process necessitates all of the masses being seen as creative, responsible individuals. This means surpassing the split between parties, leaders etc and a more or less monolithically conceived mass: surpassing the separation in mentality between 'activists' and the 'non-active'. Such is not to demand that everyone engages in an equal degree in all levels of activity - which is plainly an impossibility. It means simply that if all levels of socio-psychological change are really understood as mutually interactive, dis-allowing that priority of importance be given to some activities over others (except perhaps at particular moments) - then the traditional marxist conception of revolutionary activity has to be reconsidered. The deeply entrenched conceptual distinction between 'activity' and 'inactivity' - as between people, and as dividing the different aspects of an individual's life - needs to be surpassed. For not only are the spheres of 'politics' and 'economics' - within which marxism has often delimited 'serious revolutionary work' - interdependent with all the other spheres of life in society: it needs to be remembered that in capitalism these spheres are separated in ways that are integral to its exploitation and alienation. The distinction between work that is economically productive and waged and that which is not, the capitalistically determined conceptions of rationality and efficiency, and the restriction of 'public administration' to state bureaucracies, are crucial facets of capitalist society that must be overcome in a society of freely associated producers regulating their own undivided existence.

The limited notion of 'political activity' that developed historically within marxism rests upon an elision of the ends of revolution - an emancipated existence - into the means, whilst these means have prioritized some spheres of social reality over others. The identification of social revolution with party activity and organization in particular is paralleled in a mental operation that conflates marxism as a theory and conceptual methodology, with reality. Thus, marxist theory cannot be a 'culture'; it is a theory of culture and cultural transformation. Theory is an abstraction from life: it is in all real experience from the 'trivia' of everyday (and night) activity to the 'great' or 'transcendent' experiences of love, nature, art, sexual ecstasy etc through to the processes of the state and the labour process that 'practice' happens.(19) Culture should therefore be seen as an actual living through of experience, as praxis, a dynamic equilibrium of feeling, thought and activity. Marxism as analysis understands it rationally 'afterwards', but is also involved in shaping perception, feeling etc 'as it happens' - ie in present, open-ended exploration. Marxist science is not, like bourgeois science, an attempted 'pure' rationality; it is also indissolubly aspiration and ethical orientation, concerned with the integration of different human faculties, activities and modes of being in creative life-development. The recent debate between E P Thompson and Perry Anderson concerning the relation of William Morris to Marx addresses this issue:(20) the view maintained here is that Morris, and the type of 'utopianism' he represents, entails a developing of and not a fundamental addition to or negation of marxism. It is quite in

accord with the inherent impulse of Marx who was not, like so many subsequent versions of marxism, scientific.

Relatedly the historical contradiction between necessity and freedom in human existence, between the realms of material and spiritual need of humanity, is resolvable only into creative, conscious praxis, the continued expansion of needs and the seeking for their satisfaction. It is not resolvable into static harmony and unity, an impossible utopian abolition of necessity in 'pure' freedom; but nor is necessity 'pure', eternal and unalterable, that which comes 'first' while spirit - freedom comes 'second', 'outside' or 'after'. Necessity (labour, death, pain etc) can be pervaded, permeated by liberating praxis which urges toward a metabolism with nature that is open-ended and expanding. In classless society dynamic contradiction is within a new context of collective self-determination.

Though largely due to historical necessities stemming from the conditions of revolutions hitherto, leninism has been responsible for a bringing of alienated hierarchies into marxist practise and theory. The emphasis on a disciplined, centralized, decision-making centre of socialist revolution has its psychic counterpart in a domination of intellect and strict, rational morality over emotion, imagination and sensation. Lenin's own orientations towards art and sexuality were marked by fears of temptation to diversion, deflection, loss of focussed self-control;(21) not only stalinism but most other currents of global communism have subsequently been pervaded with various mutations of this 'character-orientation'. It is not surprising that of all the dimensions of the original marxist vision, that which has tended to be most thoroughly jettisoned historically is the demand that socialist revolution bring into being an all-rounded, harmoniously integrated individual - an individual capable of internalising the life of the social totality into his consciousness and thus able to engage cooperatively in a society that has overcome alienated divisions of labour and fragmentations of activity, thought, and sensibility.

This turns consideration again to the requirement that revolution be seen as a non-dualistic process. One part of society is not transforming the rest: all of the masses, collectively and as individuals transform reality and themselves. Going beyond a conception of a vanguard party crystallized out from a monolithic mass, leads not merely to a conception of a monolithic mass as both subject and object of transformation. The masses are a multi-subject: this recognizes not only differentiations in 'the working class and other exploited strata' but the other potentially anti-capitalist groupings, movements and tendencies which criss-cross the social strata - women, ethnic and other minorities, ecology movements etc. It recognizes also that contradictions between capitalist and socialist tendencies exist within the practices and attitudes of groups and individuals: revolutionary praxis must be internal to them, not only upon the ruling class and the system it maintains, conceived as if external.(22)

The rejection of a single party and a monolithically conceived mass has found theoretical expression recently in post-structuralism's rejection of 'master narratives' and its insistence on 'decentring' thought. However, the kernel of validity in the post-structuralist enterprise is lost in

a welter of confusion. The just critique of single, 'imperialistic' interpretations of history - whether they be those of the ruling class or the 'master-narratives' of the Party - flounders into a disintegration of the very attempt at rational historical interpretation. The problem of marxism's historical failures - its absences and exclusions - and its intrinsic tendency to edit and select from the infinite complexity of reality (something inherent to all cognitive activity), is not solved by an explosion of all rationality. For rational interpretation to become non-oppressive would require that theories be seen as temporary approximations situated in specific historical circumstances, as the symbolic counterparts to collective mass praxis. De-scholasticizing knowledge entails that thought be reintegrated with all other human activities and faculties; a 'non-authorial' form of knowledge and rationality would be a continuous movement and development emanating from dialogue between groups and individuals. Interaction, contradiction, and cooperation between the multi-subjects of a global collective engaged in transformative praxis would ensure a real 'deconstruction' of monolithically imposed interpretations - interpretations that are euro, ethno, masculine, etc '- centric'. This requires the projection of women, Third World peoples, people who want a safe world etc into conscious political praxis.

A real 'decentring' lies therefore not in the subjectivism of the individual historian - an intellectual rejection of 'episteme', 'being' or 'essence' in history, a giving up on attempts to find a metatheory capable of embracing the multiplicity of fragments of knowledge, angles of vision etc, but in the interactions, contradictions and influences operating between different 'discourses'. The multiplicity of discourses emerges from all people, not just 'intellectuals', each of which recuperate the past and appropriate the present in different ways or with differing emphases. Of

course, 'history' is always reconstructed from the vantage-point of the present, and in terms related to the particular concerns of different groups engaged in the overall desired change in global society. Of course, therefore, 'history' is multifaceted and complex, never 'finally' understood; as post-structuralism insists, there is no single, solid Hegelian 'essence' lying beneath particular appearances, nor a clear series of stages unfolding a telos, an inexorable progress. Historical development cannot be assumed to accumulate or accrete the sedimented 'essences' of previous epochs, guaranteeing that all contradictions and potentials are transcended or unleashed in higher 'syntheses'. Like Walter Benjamin's later preoccupation with historical 'disruptions' and a 'lost' past, post-structuralism insists that 'thesis' and 'antithesis' lead to no inevitable 'synthesis' or 'identity'. But if it starts healthily with the problem of the knowability of history - and of who it is that is knowing - post-structuralism ends with the unknowability of history. Marxism by contrast must continue to recognize that real history occurs, within nature that is also real : whether either are properly understood or not. All thought occurs within history, including the attempt to understand overall patterns in history. Post-structuralism on the other hand, rather than subject the 'authorial subject' of knowledge to real (theoretical and practical) critique, enters a relativistic subjectivism - one of sceptical unknowingness for the individual. Marxism should recognize that the Aufhebung of Hegel rejects historical essences - fundamental causes, hidden

inner logics, teleological master-plans etc - but this does not entail abandoning the search for patterns, tendencies, etc on the level of the social totality. The marxist thinker tries to reconstruct absences, bring back lost voices, trace continuities within fragmentation etc, though always aware of the relativity and limitedness of all interpretation. He/she is aware that bias and a hierarchy of priorities implicit in a thinker's concerns infuse the pattern traced in history: critical reflexivity is attained through thought being conscious of itself as part of collective praxis, rather than an individual's 'system-building'.

But the rejection of an Hegelian 'essence' should not, as for Foucault, limit all understanding to the 'folds' and 'surfaces' of an unknowable reality. This bears directly upon the gramscian notion of the organic intellectuals of 'proletarian hegemony': who think as conscious parts of the masses, aware that thought develops in relation to practise in and upon the world and through dialogue and interaction. Thought does not develop, as for bourgeois epistemology, in isolated abstraction: such was the nineteenth century philosopher criticized by Marx, and equally the twentieth century 'expert'. And by contrast also to the leninist conception of educator/leader who stands in a relation of authority to the masses, the organic intellectual is embedded in and moves with the masses, not over them, as a bearer in microcosm of a new culture. Such a 'leader' regards all workers as intellectuals, and thus works to overcome such distinctions and prevent organizational habits that allow divergences between 'centre' and 'masses' to emerge. All individuals must be straining toward a new psychic organization, a new character that entails new (integrated, dynamically harmonious) sensibilities and modes of rationality: a new link between thought and feeling, thought and ethics. This means a psychoanalytical overcoming of the restriction that confines rationality to only certain fragments of experience, other fragments being repressed into an unconscious irrationality as the consequence of mechanisms directed to the avoidance of anxiety (which are then free to erupt in crises in uncontrollable forms).

The breaking down of repressive forms of rationality results not therefore in the rejection of rationality *per se*, but in its transformation into a form that is integrated with feeling, intuition, sensuality and sexuality, into a new consciousness. Analysis of the social world is inseparable from sympathetic feeling for the welfare and emancipation of humanity; analysis of the natural world is inseparable from a mode of experience of nature that urges for non-destructive harmony in metabolism with it; analysis of art is inseparable from the collective struggle to deepen authentic, sensual and imaginative pleasure. Such a rationality is one no longer hinged to a pseudo-authoritative suppression of 'other voices' and other experience (globally or within the individual). It is understood as an aspect of collective praxis within an integrated totality, rather than a 'totalitarian' taking of others into 'my' narrative. An authentic 'deconstruction' means mass self-determined emancipation by the majority of the human race: a single collective comprised of a multiplicity of groups (classes, nations, races, sexes, ages etc) and individuals engaged in complex interactions as thinking, feeling, acting subjects. It means overcoming 'ideas' as dislocated abstractions, making them part of a transparent practical world. It means a new kind of thinker who knows as he/she thinks that he/she is one (equal but unique) individual among all,

who feels, intuitively, senses and acts as well as thinks and who therefore knows that thought is never a finishing, a 'pure permanence' distilled from the totality of existence. For a liberated rationality what is needed is a decentring of thought in all individuals as 'educators who must be continuously reeducated': individuals whose rationality does not rest upon exclusion, relegation of what cannot be faced by the ego into the unconscious such that it evokes fear, aggression etc. Limitations placed upon what can be faced by the rational ego are dependent upon an alienated fragmentation of the whole being: that which challenges or is incompatible with the 'normal' and 'acceptable', thus evoking anxiety, is repressed. The authority of the Party and the Theory are related to a conscious cognitive ego that excludes all that it cannot appropriate within its limited rationality. Thus, it is not post-structuralism that poses a radical emancipatory alternative to bourgeois (or stalinistic) rationality, but the dialectical unity of thought and practise in collective praxis and in an individuality that consists of dynamic integrative activity - overcoming the separation of thought from all else in experience of self and life.

Post-structuralism has made all historical periodization problematical. There is of course a healthy core to this project, a desire to expurgate historical interpretation of master-narrative, teleology, or the turning of the contingent into the ordained and necessary. But in its onslaught against a single linear 'episteme' in history, post-structuralism 'deconstructs' and 'decentres' so totally that it merely reproduces the contemporary dehistoricization and fragmentation of social experience and ideology, within its methodology. It is as if post-structuralism (like Althusserian structuralism before it) undertakes a belated reconsideration of a central, problematical crux of marxism, summed up in the wisdom - but not a definitive solution - of Marx's aphorism : "Men make their own history but not in conditions of their choosing." How to conceive, and more importantly to act out a viable relationship between history as structural determination and also as human agency: whether to grasp the historical development of the capitalist system as an unfolding of its contradictions between forces and relations of production, or as the ebb and flow of active, conscious class struggle. It has been all too clear for more than a hundred years that *The Communist Manifesto* pinned a false faith upon the 'episteme' of a linear, all-embracing march of history: capital accumulation leads to massification of workers, increasing scale of production, intensification of exploitation; and therefore increasing solidarity. The development of rational knowledge sweeps away parochial mystifications, allowing the growth of recognition of what constitutes necessary and desirable practise; in consciousness there is a progressive development of the contradiction between the universalist promises of bourgeois civilization and the realities of oppression, inequality, conformist standardization, etc. Instead: capital accumulation gives rise to unevenness and variation of development, increasing differentiation of the working classes in the hierarchical labour process; produces new strata, separates society into ever more complex and shifting groupings on the basis of age, ethnicity, religious identity, sex, style of existence and what could be termed subjective temporality. The breaking down of regional and national boundaries in market terms is accompanied by the increasing significance of nationalism; the 'falling rate of profit' tendency is offset by rising (average) productivity of labour, imperialism, expanding markets, 'cheap' Third World labour etc, etc. Hence all the

consequent complexities in forms of consciousness, in modes of resistance, of global wage-labour.

All this does not warrant abandoning conceptions of dominant phases, stages, periods in the development of capitalism, though a certain arbitrariness in any periodization needs to be recognized, as does a certain simultaneity of different 'phases' depending on the level of global generalization under consideration. Thus we have the phases of mercantile capitalism (accompanied by petty commodity production), manufacturing capitalist industrial capitalism: within the latter, to date, we have four major phases of expansion followed by crises (in the latest of which we find ourselves): during which crucial transformations are undertaken in the dominant forces of production, forms of labour process, state organization, hegemonic structures of ideology and culture, etc. At another level however, it can be argued that there has been one major transition subsequent to the industrial revolution, that important meshing of transformations dating from the end of the nineteenth century through to the 1920s and 30s. This entailed the shift from liberal, colonial to monopoly, imperialist capitalism; from 'limited' government to the bureaucratic, interventionist-regulative, 'welfare' (or for a while, fascist) state; from forms of geographically centralized, focused power to generally militarized, dispersed power associated with modern communications and a new space-time instantaneity and new depths of surveillance. The Victorian metropolis of muddled, jostling street-life and 'multiple contact points'(23) becomes the atomized megalopolis, the new modernity of 'cold steel and regimentation',(24) gradually suburbanized into the technocratic highway and shopping centre 'global village' that is urban, but no longer 'the city'. Romantic-classical 'high' bourgeois culture is shattered into the fragmentation, abstraction, unconscious psychic expressionism, and multi-temporality of modernist art-forms; whilst popular nineteenth century working class culture is progressively transformed into the commodified 'mass' culture industry. Generally, the fin de siècle and pre-World War I malaise in Europe heralded not the end of capitalist civilization, but a violent convulsive transition to a modern, advanced form of it. In this sense, post-World War II developments may be seen, for all their novelty, as extensions of the modern phenomenon, rather than as a 'post-modernism' - a notion that can slant our understanding in mistaken directions as does the idea of 'post-industrialism'.(25) This is not to suggest that post-World War culture – during the 'affluent' 50s and 60s and in the subsequent new-style 'stagflation' crisis - is a mere continuation of culture in the preceding cycle: it does display radically new characteristics, but I would suggest that they entail essentially an intensification of commodification on one level, and endless recycling of or constructive developments from, earlier avant-garde impulses on another. Hence I would not disagree with Jameson who in a recent article defends the idea of postmodernism, when he writes:

“If the ideas of a ruling class were once the dominant (or hegemonic) ideology of bourgeois society, the advanced capitalist countries today are now a field of stylistic and discursive heterogeneity without a norm. Faceless masters continue to inflect the economic strategies which constrain our existences, but no longer need to impose their speech (or are henceforth unable to);

and the postliteracy of the late capitalist world reflects, not only the absence of any great collective project, but also the unavailability of the older national language itself.”(26)

However, it seems to me that the contemporary culture of repetitive commodified dehistoricized reification has been in the making since the early decades of the century; it was the reflection on this in Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness* of 1923 that made the latter so novel and seminal. I do not want at all to downplay the monstrosity of contemporary “private temporality, whose 'schizophrenic' structure suddenly releases this present of time from all the activities and the intentionalities that might focus it and make it a space of praxis”,(27) nor to dismiss the significance of fundamentally new features of contemporary capitalist culture - which Jameson calls 'postmodern'. It is a matter of periodization and emphasis.

Gramscian thinking addresses this general, interwoven complex of transformations in twentieth century western capitalism as it is expressed in the sphere of civil society. The historical image of revolution as spontaneous surges of more or less monolithic masses, coordinated by conscious, organized, waiting leaders is no longer appropriate. Instead multifarious groupings intersect and self-integrate as simultaneous subjects/objects, developing and expanding awareness, capturing positions in all economic, political, ideological-cultural spheres; irreversibly deepening socialist hegemony in protracted, dynamic, complex development. Revolution entails a creative use of gramscian analysis to inform a new kind of historic bloc, an oppositional movement that unites not merely the working class, and that with other non capital-owning strata, but also all kinds and levels of struggle. This mass, decentred, determined disalienation confronts a state and capital that is less and less manifested in physical entities in the old sense: supra-national metastates and national states need to be tackled as relations, geographically and hierarchically dispersed; surplus value more and more taking the form of knowledge, information and symbols as well as things requires a wholly new imaginative restructuring of processes: economic, political, intellectual, psychological. This is not an eclipsing of earlier marxist analysis of class struggle and surplus value extraction; it is a recognition of the multi-levelled or decentred nature of the process. No one dimension of the anti-capitalist struggle can transform the system alone. The infinitely more complex relation of productive to unproductive labour in advanced capitalism; the intertangled relationship between the dispersed and hierarchical labour process (manual and mental) with the totality of institutional, cultural, psychic-experiential processes of reproduction of social relations in their totality no longer allow an image of a single interface, site, point, locus, focus, arena, terrain etc where capital faces labour, the state faces the working class, or ideologies clash. Struggle in these conditions is ever more cultural, requiring as it does that all groups and individuals can grasp the basic processes involved in aggregate transformation, can in^aaBalize them and relate them to their immediate demands and perceptions. Rather than an army mobilized and led successfully in battle, revolution resembles the coordinated, collective self-determination of dance, or any group-artistic activity in which each individual as a unique part must be conscious of the whole; where the whole is created by unique individuals in collective activity. This

requires more than a highly developed intellectual understanding of the 'social synthesis', as Rudolf Bahro terms it. It demands the kind of psychic transformation that allows a huge crowd in a small area to be warm, creative and civilized; it necessitates a depth of change that cannot be reversed or swamped by counter-tendencies. Here one thinks of the German working class before Nazism: how could a mass of people who had really undergone a socialist transformation on the level of psychic reintegration and sensibility be bludgeoned, in large proportions though not totally, to support that?

The qualitatively new dimension of praxis in culture and psyche necessary for socialist transformation of advanced capitalist society was recognized, more or less coherently, by a number of strands of the early twentieth century 'avant-garde'. The Surrealist impulse in particular was not only a rebellion against bourgeois 'high' art; it wanted a revolutionary integration of the human being, liberating his/her creative 'species being'. In the movement of dream into reality and vice versa, it urged a praxis to overcome the split between conscious and unconscious, instating all individuals as free and world-transforming. As indissoluble from the revolutionary transformation of capitalist forms of production and bureaucratic domination into a classless community in conscious, collective control over social life, Surrealism conceived a new psychic organization, in which unsuppressed and undistorted sensibilities blend in a dynamic harmony with an unreified cognitive rationality. Science should be integrated with an ethic of emancipation through the imagination - the faculty that synthesizes knowledge and experience. A liberating development of the senses and experience in all activity and relations, is inseparable from a consciousness that transforms science from reification, in human abstraction, domination and scientific specialization, into knowledge as part of organic praxis in dynamic harmony with nature.

This impulse to integrate art into life, to put 'the imagination in power' resurfaced in the radicalism of the late 1960s - May '68, the 'counter-culture' etc. It was an important impetus for the subsequent attempts of socialism to incorporate sexual politics, ecological critique, the experiential-psychic 'politics of everyday life' into class and ethnic movements. It cleared some space - for all its amorphous, contradictory nature - for a new open-mindedness in the Left: an openness to the unique and different contributions that can come from different groups and individuals; an ethos that contrasts with sectarian intolerance and its tendency to judge and dismiss others; a recognition that genuine mass praxis does not require a unitary 'line'. Work and pleasure could be seen as both absolutely important; all spheres of activity should be seen as both 'political' and 'aesthetic' in a new, broad sense. It sparked off that aspect of modern feminism - not the only one - that recognizes the need for a 'feminization' of the public sphere, drawing from historically suppressed female experience in the immediacy of nature. The reproduction of life, the socialization of infancy, caring for the sick, tenderness and the positive forms of passiveness, because associated with the oppressive roles of women could come to challenge a capitalist culture seen as aggressively and competitively masculine.

Marx depicted work under capitalism as being not an expression of human life-activity, but as reduced to a means of ensuring subsistence and of gaining compensation outside of work. The cost of reproducing labour-power is dependent on the structure of needs developed at a particular stage in a particular capitalist social formation - and these include non-work activities as (alienated) compensations for work. Increasingly in advanced, consumer capitalism work and non-work are divided through this means/ends separation with its associated fragmentation of life-experience. Leisure consumption in the cultural sphere - both public and private - is thus an antithesis to work on one plane, but at the same time it is structured by the dominant forms of consciousness and experience imposed by the labour process, and by the increasing incorporation of leisure activities themselves into a fetishized commodity form.

In the reified calculation of labour-time, which creates a quantity of exchange-value abstracting from the specific human personalities and efforts engaged in production, is the 'secret' of alienated experience in capitalist society. It is a futility of repeated moments of equal interchangeable, standardized value; instead of creative transformation in multi-dimensional subjectively experienced time, the reified world is confronted as inert and external. Each successive moment is a new start, filled with a variant of the same insubstantial thing, event, thought, or activity. The world changes, but only according to its own de-personalized logic; there is no development of the self-in-process, no praxis. The linear, repetitive progression of segmented, externally quantified time-units in production is mirrored in commodified cultural consumption: the recycling of myths, manipulated fantasies, fetishized patterns of interaction etc in continuously modified but essentially repetitive fashions, styles, formulae. This ever-repeated instant of an empty now - the infinity of nothings in consumer choice - tends to turn experience into a pure surface in which the multiplicity of styles and enjoyments have hollowed out of them authentic content, meaning and uniqueness - all that allows enjoyment to be an aspect of constructive self-development, integrated into the totality of human being-in-the world. However, the consumption of a commodity in capitalist society entails a contradiction between the satisfaction of an existing desire (which may be positive, self-affirmative, and potentially subversive) and the manipulation of activity, experience, sensibility and self-identification, into conformity with the needs, values and world-views of capitalism. The uniqueness of individual experience and the urge for authenticity cannot be totally suppressed, just as labour always rebels in more or less diffuse ways against technocratic, reified forms of work organization, an urge for free collective control over use-value production never being wholly dispelled. Marcuse's one-dimensionality is never complete; there is tension and contradiction in the commodification of experience(28), or otherwise put, a cultural struggle not merely over values, world-views etc but over the forms of pleasure experienced. A struggle for the hegemony of emancipatory, socialist forms of pleasure - the 'politics of desire' - has necessarily to work with commodified forms as well as outside them.

Recent analyses of youth subcultures undertaken by associates of the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies have pointed up some useful ways of conceiving this kind of

struggle. Though ultimately limited to symbolic or 'magical' resolutions to contradictions in experience, a subculture like that of the 'mods' is seen as inverting the 'given' meaning of commodities. As the offspring of manual workers, the 'mods' in their supposed non-proletarian occupations (such as department store assistants, estate agent messengers) were a generation newly meeting the promise of consumer-commodity happiness. No more autonomous or creatively fulfilled in labour than their parents, they dreamed their erotic and aggressive fantasies into the collective style of their leisure activities. Their form of rebellion did not become radicalised, but it did indicate a new kind of struggle over negated needs. The parody or pastiche of smart upper-classish clothes created a new 'argot' of style; scooters were not mere status symbols, but menacing emblems of disallowed excitement. Such subcultures helped open up the potential for a more conscious exploration of personal, sexual, cultural experience for youth: they suggest that how you live now, even through commodities, affects how you change the world and what kind of new world would be brought into being.

A liberating politics of desire is the negation of flat, uncritical hedonist pursuit of commodified pleasure with its inherent acceptance of market forces' reified determinations of style; it also negates 'puritanical' restraint and abstention from contemporary forms of pleasure. It is a creative praxis in commodified experience, working on it, challenging, transforming, ingesting and unafraid of desire for colour, expression, enjoyment. It constructs, not in static images or theoretical utopias nor in intuned 'perfect' microcosmic communities but in dynamic experience, the possibility of authentic, free, socialist culture. It negates religious or other moral attitudes that are hostile to pleasure, seeing it as evil, dangerous, inherently shallow and undermining of integrity and depth of character, or as deflection from serious concerns - or at least as time taken out from serious concerns. These orientations, stemming from the interests of classes in power who wish to repressively channel eroticism, curiosity, urge for adventure etc. into alienated labour and civil conformity, have as their obverse - not opposite - the commercial capitalist hedonist impulse. The latter is an egotistical search for individualized pleasure whose experience is divorced from the world 'outside' - divorced from its real relations to society and its implications for society and nature, disconnected from philosophical or ethical concerns, eschewing a questioning of the meaning of sensuous or aesthetic pleasure. Associated with a compulsive individualistic consumption of commodities, it is permeated with images of status, power, gaining of admiration, and envy: implicit in 'conspicuous consumption' is the fact that others cannot or will not consume the same thing.

Socialistic 'material' and 'spiritual' pleasure is the resolution to this dualist alienation: an egalitarian, cooperative, sharing pleasure, a pursuit of world understanding and an exploration of each individual's unique capacity for enjoyment. By confronting even the darker desires and fantasies, the sympathetic understanding of others' experiential contexts - both individuals and whole cultures - is enhanced. Through not simply repressing problematical desires, the possibility of personality integration is greater: the self and society is more capable of conscious, transparent self control, rather than resting on suppressed and poorly comprehended desires that

serve - as irrational and ungovernable - the alienated forces of the market, class rule through division, the capitalist system of nation states and blocs.

In the struggles within and against commodified experience, that concerned with capitalist forms of sexuality is crucial. Feministic-marxist analyses have achieved much understanding of the political economy of women's subjection, of the mechanisms of gender construction (in roles, forms of self-identity, ideologies), and of the public sphere's saturation with imagery of patriarchal/ macho domination. What have been less effectively pursued are the real needs that are repressed in both sexes, through their channelling into fetishized forms of action and fantasy; whilst the (correctly recognized) general domination of women is often allowed to obscure a multifold complex of power/manipulation relationships which is not experienced solely (by either sex) as a monolithic male domination. Certainly, the commodification of sexual experience and interaction is predicated upon images, created expectations, and actual possibilities that reinforce patriarchy, that conveniently coincide with dominant divisions of labour, family forms, and imposed patterns of public activity in capitalist society. But it must be asserted that they are real desires that are channelled into fetishized forms: restricted and mythically manufactured images of what constitutes an attractive man or woman, an exciting type of interaction or pattern of seduction, a satisfying mode of erotic expression and consummation. The object of commodified desire continuously disappears: just as a real use-value (a product of labour and a means to satisfy a need) is mystified in the commodity which is worshipped as a power, appreciation of its use being diverted into possession and into inauthentic satisfactions (as status symbol, 'sex appeal' etc), so woman's desire is fetishized into imitation of images to attain an imaginary man, whilst man's desire is fetishized into unreal images of woman. Neither meet where the commodity controls: satiation is endlessly suspended in mutations of imaginary objects of desire. Where there is real satisfaction of concrete individuals with others (whether heterosexual or homosexual - the specific issues relating to the latter are not of crucial concern to the argument here) eroticism has broken out from commodification) but it is constantly restricted again, distorted, threatened with erosion.

In capitalist society all urges tend to follow the form of commodity-desire; sexuality does so particularly strongly and thus provides a powerful 'allegory' for it in general. Walter Benjamin saw the commodity as like a whore: it comes alive because so many desire it, and only one can have it at any time. It allures, causes addiction to fantastic excitement, but does not properly satisfy the real urge that is aroused. The crowd focusing on it (each individual of which is isolated, alone) is bewitched and the commodity/whore is excited by its power of entrancement. It is a fetish, an 'unreal' power - something taken from the estranged crowd (their labour, their fantasies, desires, their 'souls') and as something over and above though coming from them, dominates them and deflects their capacity for creation, authentic use or satisfaction, into a mere chimera. But this very fact excites them: it is, in Adorno's words 'the absolute reality of the unreal'.(29)

The marxist critique of mystification must not spill over into a fruitless (and undesirable, indeed dangerous) condemnation of the human capacity for and attraction towards mystique, danger, excitement, adventure, vulgarity, disturbance, transgression. The response to pornography, prostitution and other forms of commodified sexuality(30) cannot viably be an absentionist puritanism: apart from the transformations on the level of capitalist political economy, patriarchy etc. necessary to eliminate the exploitative dimensions from capitalism's sexuality, a transformatory exploration of sexuality, excitement and fantasy is required. This is practise as opposed to moral utopian retreatism. As with the necessity of emancipatory practise in other institutions, the goal is not the elimination of the need due to which the existing (alienated) form exists. Thus, qualitatively new egalitarian relations between male and female (or between male and male, female and female for those who wish) need not become 'anti-romantic' or bleached of mystique.

Adorno, in a letter to Benjamin, criticized the latter over his study of Baudelaire for supposedly treating the phantasmagoria of commodity fetishism as 'visions' rather than as an 'objective historico-philosophical category'.(31) The point is really that neither one-sided extreme can be followed exclusively: either that fetishism is mere false consciousness, a misunderstanding that can be blown away by scientific analysis and simply replaced by 'honest', authentic behaviour; or that as an objective transformation of social relations into things, it is an inescapable fact. For the second, even a marxist analysis of capitalist society would be impossible, as all people objectively live out universal exchange and commodified experience. Rather an emancipatory praxis recognizes the necessity of 'living through' commodification, but as a continuous attempt to de-fetishise experience, reorientate enjoyment in interaction with critical intellectual reflection. This entails the dialectical transcendence of both puritan absentionism and uncritical hedonism.

Phantasmagoric experience in commodified society constructs a curious sense of suspended timelessness within the endless change and repetition of reified, quantified, abstracted form. A circling within an ether, a permanent 'waiting for Godot' is the structure of endlessly repeated tasks in standardized production of exchange-values, the latching of compulsive desire into feverish yet bland, glittering yet gloomy new 'revolutions' in commodities. The fragmented individual in a fragmented society is more or less entranced, addicted and obsessed with hollow ruts of ritual, his/her desire unconsummated finally even in inflamed fantasy. Praxis in both 'base' and 'superstructure' urges to creative development in labour, human relations, sensuous enjoyment; to experience as stemming from activity originating on the inside and working on the 'outside' in multi-dimensional subjectively-imposed time, in rythms of work as in human interactions and cultural life. Once again, post-structuralism's fetish of 'decentreing' represents a hazy recognition of the need for creative practises in all spheres of life, each with their unique, appropriate characteristics, by contrast with monolithic (expecially stalinist) conceptions of transformations in the base predetermining 'correct' superstruetural forms. And it confusingly reflects the reality of a working class in the capitalist megalopolis that is multi-dimensional in

the senses discussed earlier, and also in the sense of being a superimposition of multiple social relationships and experiences in differentiated 'space-times'. The deepening of traditional marxism's consideration of the working class as a single collective subject that does things to the state etc., requires reconceptualisation of a multi-dimensional subject which develops unevenly, within which dialogue between different subjects allows continuous relearning and understanding of differing perceptions of reality, and thus of the priorities of social change. The complexity of the transformational process in advanced capitalism involves recognition of multifaceted and varied 'social characters' - forms of consciousness, value-orientation, feeling and activity - on a depth dimension, not merely in terms of a left-right linear spectrum and polarization. Complex interactions and contradictions are at work within groups, even individuals, and within movements, institutions and cultural forms. Relatedly, the question as to whether a particular position taken in any specific situation is 'correct', or reformist, or ultra-leftist, is finally a matter of judgement, not of pure 'scientific' accuracy. This should be the meaning of decentring and deconstruction - not an endless deferral of statement and judgement into an ultimately solipsist and almost Zen-like scepticism: endless explosions of totalising assumptions that leave nothing in their place.

Contemporary reconsiderations of marxism need to come to terms with negative legacies of leninism, which was constructed in particular circumstances but was able to find a self-generated echo in western conditions: a form of economism that downplays other 'levels' of the social totality, and tends to see productive forces, technique and science as neutral processes of development; a tendency to hypostatization of leadership, party, state centralized authority, bureaucracy substituted for the real empirical people; a tendency for rationality to subjugate feeling, imagination, initiation, sensation and sexuality. A distorted, limited rationality stemmed from the contradictory predicament of the Bolshevik revolution, which culminated in a rupture with reality.(33) Ultimately stalinism suppressed even limited rationality: the fury released in anti-Trotskyism for example was a 'return of the repressed'. An authoritarian rational ego suppresses the other faculties, pushes them into the unconscious along with all thought that threatens its precarious stability - the psychic mirror to political and social oppression. A real mass self-emancipation must embrace the totality of experience and difference undogmatically: must embrace the entire complex of attitudes, ideas, patterns of activity and behaviour of individuals, including those that are unconsciously determined and which may therefore appear spasmodically and contradict what is rationally adhered to as 'normal'. The positive features of the Chinese Cultural Revolution can be drawn upon: emphasis on transformation from below; the intention to overcome alienation in the division of labour, between town and country, between state and people etc; all being seen as inseparable from 'economic' development.

Cultural activity and production wants to be part of, and embedded within a collective movement (not merely a 'political' movement, but a movement in life as a whole); 'organizing' complexes of response, orientation and action - not merely making available an object, work, public. It is not therefore the medium, content, or form or style as such that supply the criteria of radical import,

but whether the objects or activities serve as 'instruments' of collective praxis. Any area of experience warrants negotiation, there being no aspect of 'personal' experience or introspection that is not socially situated, and communicable to others. The radicalness of any negotiation lies in the degree to which the personal or collective fantasies, sensations, moods, anxieties, pleasures and joys, fears and pains as well as thoughts are worked through from the vantage point of wanting to learn from and go beyond them, to transcend the contexts that induce and generate 'negative' experience, and block the further development of 'positive' experience.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- (1) Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels: *The Communist Manifesto*, Pelican 1967 pp 95-6
- (2) Karl Marx: *The Civil War in France*, Foreign Languages Press Peking 1977, p81.
- (3) Karl Korsch: *Marxism and Philosophy*, NLB 1972, p 104.
- (4) Quoted in Karl Korsch: *op. cit.* pp 101, 102, and 130
- (5) Isaiah Berlin: *Karl Marx*, Oxford University Press 1963, p 155 sees late nineteenth and early twentieth century reformism as 'the legitimate product of Marx's analysis of the causes of the catastrophe of the revolutionary year 1848' meaning chiefly, the rejection of adventurism and recognition of the need for broad mass revolutionary consciousness before socialism can be achieved (and it is true that, for example, Marx advised beforehand against the Paris insurrection of 1871). There may be truth in this with regard to German Social Democracy's eventually mechanical insistence on building mass support (and avoiding anything - even standing out

against war - that might jeopardize it), but it does not explain the institutionalization of reformism as its exclusive practice, and into its theory.

(6) See Stanley Aronowitz: *The Crisis in Historical Materialism*, Praeger 1982.

(7) Karl Korsch: *op. cit.*

(8) Cf. Carl Boggs: *Gramsci's Marxism*, Pluto Press 1980, p17: "Gramsci insisted that socialist revolution should be conceived of as an organic process, not an event (or series of events), and that consciousness transformation is an inseparable part of structural change...."

(9) Quoted in Carl Boggs: *op. cit.*, p 22

(10) See Mosche Lewin: *Lenin's Last Struggle*, Pluto Press 1975

(11) See Jack Woddis: *The State - Some Problems*, Marxism Today Nov. 1976.

(12) See for example the Introduction to *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, Lawrence and Wishart 1976, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith

(13) Cf. Agnes Heller: *Marx's Theory of Revolution and the Revolution in Everyday Life*, in *The Humanism of Socialism*, Allison & Busby 1976, Andras Hegeciuri et al. (Eds) pp 44, 46, 47 and 48: '... the split between the development of the species-being and the individual person (the individual person from a whole group or class of people) 'can be overcome' ...precisely because the individual has a conscious relation to conformity with the species, he is capable of "ordering" his everyday life too, on the basis of this conscious relation (of course, this happens under given conditions and possibilities). The individual is a person who "synthesises" in himself the chance uniqueness of his individuality with the universal generality of the species The individual organises his everyday life in such a way as to impress upon it the mark of that individuality which has sprung from the synthesis between his individually given elements and that which conforms with the species.... Thus the individual is capable or rather becomes capable of discerning, in the already given structures of everyday life, those factors and demands which hinder his development in conformity with the species, which have become pure formalities, or which conceal aspirations and interests with a negative value-content: it is these things which he rids himself of, rejects or by-passes."

(14) For a discussion of the distinction between an alienated relationship between society and natural environment, and one that is conscious, coherent and dynamically harmonious, see The London Group of the Union of Socialist Geographers (Eds) 1983: Society and Nature: Socialist perspectives on the relationship between human and physical geographical, pp 60-62: "Although hydrologists are engaged in assessing water resources and water demand, rarely are they concerned with the social ramifications of the original problem or their solutions. As is typical of this bourgeois conception of value-free science, such ramifications are left to planners and politicians, thus depriving the problem of its social, physical and historical content... Failure to

find long-term solutions to such problems often lies in the form of social response to natural hazards, which often follow a cycle of the form "Drought-Awareness-Concern-Panic-Rain-Apathy"... Dividing such problems into "physical" and "human" aspects therefore denies the dialectical relationship between natural and social processes which determines the social response to environmental problems” .

(15) Cf. Jorge Larrain: The Concept of Ideology, Hutchison & Co 1979, p82: “In contrast with Lenin, who thought the primacy of Marxism was based on its scientific character, detached from class contradictions, Gramsci bases the superiority of Marxism on its being the ‘most conscious’ expression of contradiction. For Lenin, Marxist science came from without, carried by the party, in order to overcome a spontaneously deficient consciousness. For Gramsci, the philosophy of praxis, as well as the party or Modern Prince, represents a collective will. Lenin holds the traditional conception of the educator which Marx had criticized in the Theses on Feuerbach; Gramsci holds that the Modern Prince is an educator who needs to be educated. It is the proletariat itself which produces its organic intellectuals”.

(16) See New German Critique, Number 29 Spring/Summer 1983

(17) Ibid; p 64

(18) Cf. Stanley Aronowitz: op cit., p 131: “... if religion is the only place where the expression of and protest against emotional suffering (which is grounded in both exploitation and sexual repression) is possible, it will survive the creation of a new society. But alongside established religions that hold to the existence of a deity, a new secular theology is in the making. Like liberation theology in the Catholic and Protestant religions, this secular theology believes that the spirit moves through human liberation and domination. Like liberation theologies, it insists that morality is objective, rooted in unfulfilled needs. Rather than ascribe these needs to transcendent causes, however, it naturalizes them in the biological and historical constitution of human nature”.

(19) Cf. Sarah Benton: Eurocommunism and the British Road to Socialism, in Socialist Strategies, David Coates and Gordon Johnston (Eds)., p 117: “It can be argued that the ancient myths, human needs and aspirations that go to create religion must inevitably reappear in modern political form, and that communism would have better pleased the people had it, in recognizing this, had more to say about death, pain, loss, love, sex, joy.”

(20) See E P Thompson: The Poverty of Theory and other essays, Merlin Press 1980 and Perry Anderson: Arguments Within English Marxism, Verso 1980

(21) Is this also true of Marx? Were his tendencies to condemn everything meretricious, many personal 'feelings of the soul', and his tendency to attack personalities as unseparated from their ideas against which he polemicized, connected with a lack of spontaneity, sense of humour, joie de vivre, and lack of sympathy for 'difference'? Isaiah Berlin (op. cit., p233) argues so:

'Such crises of faith as occurred in the lives of the gentler spirits among his friends...received from him no sympathy. He looked upon them as so many signs of bourgeois degeneracy which took the form of morbid attention to private emotional states.... frivolity and irresponsible self-indulgence criminal in men before whose eyes the greatest battle in human history was being fought. This uncompromising sternness towards personal feeling and almost religious insistence on a self-sacrificing discipline was inherited by his successors....' But the rather sensitive and highly idealistic temperament of the youthful Marx, and the excruciating hardships and suffering of the middle years - all described by Berlin himself - tend to suggest that bitter, suppressive and purist characteristics were not inherent to Marx's temperament, even if in part experience made them so. This is important, as I would argue these characteristics are not present in Marx's fundamental ideas, nor in his view of the concrete revolutionary process.

(22) See especially Guiseppe Vacca: Intellectuals and the Marxist Theory of the State, in Approaches to Gramsci, Anne Showstack Sassoon (Ed)., Writers and Readers 1982

(23) See Michael Peter Smith: The City and Social Theory, Basil Blackwell 1980, p 189.

(24) See Marshal Berman: All That is Solid Melts Into Air. The Experience of Modernity. Verso 1983.

(25) See Ernest Mandel: Late Capitalism, NLB 1976

(26) Frederic Jameson: Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, New Left Review No. 146, Jul - Aug 1984

(27) Ibid

(28) I disagree with that part of Douglas Kellner's argument in Critical Theory, Commodities and the Consumer Society Volume 1, Number 3, 1983 which suggests that some commodities satisfy real, natural needs whilst others represent more of less wholly alienated satisfactions of false needs. Rather the contradiction is present in the consumption of almost any commodity.

(29) "... what separates Wagner from earlier Romanticism is that his music no longer contains 'real spirits'. By locating the miraculous in the human soul, he endows it with truth in the artistic sense and intensifies the world of saga and fairy-tale into the illusion of the absolute reality of the unreal...

"It sums up the unromantic side of the phantasmagoria: phantasmagoria as the point at which aesthetic appearance becomes a function of the character of the commodity." Theodor Adorno: In search of Wagner, NLB 1981, p 90.

(30) Cf. Walter Benjamin: Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism, Verso 1983, pp 56-7: 'Baudelaire was a connoisseur of narcotics yet one of their most important social effects probably escaped him. It consists in the charm displayed by addicts under the

influence of drugs. Commodities derive the same effect from the crowd that surges around and intoxicates them.... When Baudelaire speaks of 'the big cities' state of religious intoxication', the commodity is probably the unnamed subject of this state. And the 'holy prostitution of the soul' compared with which 'that which people call love is quite small, quite limited, and quite feeble' really can be nothing else than the prostitution of the commodity-soul - if the confrontation with love retains its meaning. Baudelaire refers to 'that holy prostitution of the soul which gives itself wholly, poetry and charity, to the unexpected that appears, to the unknown that passes'.... Only the mass of inhabitants permits prostitution to spread over large parts of the city. And only the mass makes it possible for the sexual object to become intoxicated with the hundred stimuli which it produces'.

(31) In Ronald Taylor (Ed): Aesthetics and Politics, NLB 1979 p 128.

(32) Cf. Laing's consideration of the alienated social group as a series: 'The series is a type of human multiplicity in which no person is essential, where everyone is quantitatively interchangeable. Yet the members of the series are united in a negative unity, by their reciprocal qualitative indifference to each other, and, simultaneously, by their quantitative concern....' R D Laing: Series and Nexus in the Family in Peter Worsley (Ed): Problems of Modern Society, Penguin Education 1976, p239.

(33) See Ronald Aronson: The Dialectics of Disaster, Verso 1983.

V SCIENCE AND COSMOLOGY IN CHINESE AND WESTERN CIVILIZATIONS, OR: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURATION OF TIME IN THOUGHT AND EXPERIENCE

Time is a fundamental category of any cosmology or philosophical ontology. As the sociology of knowledge shows, structures of ideas and beliefs - including scientific theories - always exist in complex relationships with the dominant structures and forms of process characteristic of the society in which they emerge. The concept of time as it is formulated in cosmologies can therefore be analysed in its interaction with time as it is experienced in economic production, in social institutions and relations, in prevailing forms of political organisation, and in dominant forms of culture and consciousness.

The dominant cosmology in western civilisation from the Renaissance until the early twentieth century was neo-Platonic. It rested upon a dualism between mechanistic matter and the Idea (the latter being seen as God and/or the laws of nature). For the Galilean-Newtonian world-view, laws of cause and effect explain the interactions between isolated, atomised entities in a static, three-dimensional empty space and in a linear, infinitely segmentable movement of time. Such a perspective has its counterpart in the prevailing art-forms of the period; a multi-faceted correspondence can be traced between this and the fundamental social and economic processes of urban bourgeois society.

In classical China by contrast, one of the dominant world-views (and that which was most importantly related to developments in art and science) saw reality as a unitary, organic, dialectical process; every "point-instant" in the universe was seen as interrelated with all others. The reasons for such a cosmology coming into being in Chinese society are complex, but they can be elucidated.

It has been noticed by many that post-Einsteinian science sees reality in ways that bear a remarkable resemblance to Taoist or Ch'an Buddhist cosmology. This chapter will seek to demonstrate the social significance of this historical convergence, and consider the implications of a new, dominant and single cosmology in the world in relation to global social transformations.

Human societies can be seen as so many varied structures that actively metabolise with the rest of nature. In the process of working on portions of nature to satisfy historically varying human needs, human societies are continually transforming themselves and nature. Human history is distinguishable from all inorganic and all other organic processes (ie those studied by physics, chemistry, biology etc) in that it entails creative labour and the conscious symbolic ordering and changing of reality. Unlike other forms of life, for which the forms of metabolism are essentially fixed for any particular species, changing only in relation to genetic change, human existence is by its nature a social *praxis*, a continuous recreation and transformation of institutions, ideas, social relations and modes of economic production.

Any particular society, then, undertakes its metabolism with nature using a particular form of technology embedded within a particular dominant structure of social relations. The latter may be seen as including a particular economic system; such is an objective structure but not a mere determined nor determining mechanism - it entails the active, subjective consciousness of human beings. Thus the characteristic forms of socio-economic process present in a society are reflected in, and expressed in, institutionalised structures of ideas and sensibilities and in the psychic and personality structures characteristic of that society. This conception of a social totality should not therefore be thought of as entailing an economic determinism of ideas and personality structure, but as insisting on the interrelatedness of the different levels, aspects, and forms of human existence. In a given social form, the relations of interaction and influence are infinitely complex and operate in all directions. Nor should a society be seen as a static structure of homologous processes; as already noted human societies are always in active transformation and one manifestation of that fact is that no one economic structure or set of beliefs is ever absolutely pervasive. Economic systems generate conflicts which lead to their change, whilst dominant mental conceptions germinate alternative and opposing views of reality. The understanding of a society as a complex whole, characterized by multi-faceted contradictions, tensions and tendencies to developmental change, is crucial to the view of cosmologies adopted here.

The specifically human metabolism with nature entails simultaneously co-operative, creative physical labour and a complex of psycho-social orientations or activities. These include "rational" interpretations in what we call science and cosmology or in its precursors, aesthetic-intuitive modes of synthesising experience, particular modes of sensuous activity that represent different levels of development of the senses, and affective orientations to all levels of reality - self, others, society as a whole, nature. The institutionalised, collective expressions of these activities are represented in the individual psyche, which can in a certain sense be seen as a microcosm of the social totality. C. G. Jung's notion of four basic functions - thinking, intuition, sensation and feeling - which are interdependent and comprise in their totality the human psyche, is a useful one but it requires to be historicised. For these different functions, though present in all humans, take on forms specific to the particular type of society in which the individual lives.

A psycho-social system, then, is a structural whole never in static equilibrium; it will express more or less powerful contradictions and conflicts, between and within levels and functions. These it is which engender change - not to be seen as a mechanical or passive process, but as involving more or less conscious, active human beings as its agents. Here we are concerned above all with systems of belief about nature in its totality - cosmology. The formation of cosmologies in individuals and societies may be seen as an aspect of cognitive- rational activity. In any particular society, there can be discerned a significant relatedness between dominant cosmologies and dominant psychic structures. Cosmologies and characteristic forms of cognitive activity are symbolic counterparts to the ways in which people work on nature in their collective metabolism with it - in social production. We are interested in how these vary in different societies; in the ways that cosmologies change historically; and in the significances of such changes to other dimensions of a society's whole mode of being. We attempt to look at the ways in which cosmological transformations both reflect other changes in a social system, and also in turn affect, inform, or influence social change.

We must now try and see whether we can construct a rudimentary historical typology of cosmologies. Such an endeavour must obviously rely on observation of real societies past and present, in order to make generalisations about which forms of cosmology seem to co-exist with which types of psycho-social process. Such a task is immensely complex for reasons already suggested: the variations that exist within cosmological and social structures in any given context, and the fact that societies manifest contradictions and especially in epochs of transition, display residual and emergent tendencies that can only be comprehended over time. It must also be recognised that in any individual's or society's thought about nature there is what J T Fraser terms a hierarchy of temporal levels: not a single ontology but a multiplicity of beliefs referring to different levels of reality. It is necessary at minimum to distinguish the levels of the inorganic universe, biological life, and human consciousness or history, though the essential processes on these different levels are always seen in ways that are deeply connected in the thought of particular societies. In relating characteristic features of cosmologies to other processes in a society, it is necessary in an analogous way to recognise the multiplicity of levels of human activity and consciousness. These range from the most immediate characteristic experience of individuals, through to their experience of society as a whole and to their active experienced relation to the cosmos.

We will now consider some of the key aspects of cosmologies which can be separated out in order to help our analysis. First, whether the basic ontology conceives of a unitary or dualistic reality; underlying the hierarchical differentiations that exist within cosmologies, there seems always to lie a belief either that the universe is one, or that it is a duality of spirit and matter, God (or gods) and nature. For the first - whether primitive pantheism or dialectical materialism, there can be no fundamental dichotomies between thought and reality, mind and body etc, whilst for the second such dichotomies are fundamental. Second, how a cosmology conceives of reality in time: whether it is static, cyclic and repetitive, or developmental (the last can be either a linear

motion or more like qualitative growth through dynamic structural, transformation). Third, a cosmology can be atomistic, seeing reality as composed of fundamental discrete entities, or as an organic, structurally interwoven web. Fourth, a cosmology or fundamental world-view always has a conception of causality, which at bottom tends either to be mechanistic and determinist or dialectical and process-like.

Now let us look at the forms of activity and experience of individuals in society which influence and in turn are guided by dominant cosmologies. From the infinitely complex, interrelated structure of human experience, we may discern three analytically distinct levels. First, immediate activity and experience, most clearly expressed in the forms of labour undertaken, but reflected in patterns of social relationship, political organisation, culture etc. Second, experience of the social process in its entirety, most clearly indicated in the mode of overall production and distribution, in which general system all members of society are necessarily parts. This general form in which a society reproduces itself characterises its wider social and political institutions. Third, experience on both the individual and social levels in relation to nature: the form and degree of mastery of nature enacted by a society's mode of production, its ability or otherwise to comprehend and therefore predict and use natural processes in its metabolism.

With the use of these conceptual distinctions it is possible to see significance in the kinds of association that are found between forms of cosmology and types of society. Let us first consider those social forms in which economic strata and state structures have not yet evolved. In so-called primitive societies dominant, cosmologies are unitary, organic, dialectical and cyclic. The cosmos is inseparably matter and spirit: for primitive pantheism there is no distinction between physical forces of nature and supernatural spirits. Benjamin Whorf(1) argued that Hopi language indicated a perception of reality as unitary, unboundaried, and unseparated into form and content. It can be suggested that this is due to the lack of division between mental and manual labour in classless societies. Labour is not yet split into the mental activity of planning, inventing, administering on the one hand, and the physical activity of production on the other. The separation of knowledge from execution, and their habitual exercise by different social classes, has not yet led to a projection of mind into Spirit, Absolute, God or gods, and of physical activity into matter which then seems mindless, inert, and passive. The primitive community engaged in co-operative production without distinctions between managers and producers; the knowledge entailed in most activities is held in the minds of all individuals. Production is unalienated in the sense that its real processes are transparent to the whole society; it is not fragmented in such ways as ensure that the majority of producers cannot grasp its reified nature. Hence reality is organic burgeoning process, not a multitude of atoms obeying external laws. The experience of work in primitive societies is one in which its rhythm, motion and form are subjectively determined, emergent from the labouring individual, not objectivised and imposed by an external order. The flexibility of rhythm and method, and the fact that according to Marshall Sahlins hunter-gatherer societies conceive of no rigid distinction between work and other activities, seems to be reflected in cosmologies of dialectical flux. Time is not objectified

as something external, segmented and numeral, but as a "subjective duration-feeling".(3) Reality is a perpetual "eventing", a movement into later time from within the reality in movement.

However, though the primitive collective is socially unalienated in the senses suggested, and immediate activity in it is subjectively determined leading to perception of flexible *durée*, it is fundamentally alienated before nature which it can comprehend and control hardly at all. Hence the almost "paranoic" quality of much primitive "art" - concerned primarily with magical placation of nature. Hence also the fact that primitive cosmologies, whilst unitary, organic and dialectical, are not developmental as are the more sophisticated forms of this kind of cosmology such as Taoism. Primitive society is in duration, but it cannot develop. In particular it is locked into the cyclicity of seasons, trapped in this moment of this year, which is a re-appearance of the same moment last year. Though flowing, time is repetitive and cyclic; organic flux is always in now. We may summarise by saying that primitive societies are organic co-operatives engaging in unalienated labour within an uncontrollable nature, and that they tend to see the cosmos as an organic dialectical unity in cyclic non-development.

From primitive society there developed an enormous variety of civilisations, characterised by complex hierarchies of economic classes and organised forms of state. The dominant systems of belief in these societies resting on a fundamental and pervasive division between administration and labour, rulers and ruled, thought and physical activity, have nearly always been dualistic. Matter is ruled by spirit, the divine, or by mathematical laws. The cosmologies of such civilisations have variously been organic or atomistic, or a combination of these, reflecting many differences in other spheres of social structure. Very often an aspect of dialectical process and flux has remained, perhaps because the immediate experience of labour and social interaction has remained flexible, unlike for the bureaucratised, reified activities of modern industrial societies. Prior to modern capitalism, civilisations have been predominantly rural and agricultural, and this surely explains the prevalence of cyclic cosmologies which take on exceedingly complex forms in the religions of Egypt, Mesopotamia and India, the calendar rhythms of the Aztecs, or the Stoicism of Antiquity. Simultaneous with the cyclicity that ensues from a productive existence ruled by the seasons, pre-capitalist class societies have on other levels embraced static cosmologies and timeless myths, conceptions orientated to maintaining the status quo in society. And simultaneously again, some pre-modern civilisations have held to a developmental conception of time, a linear progress such as the Greek or Nordic fate which is a spun thread, or the destiny of Judeo-Christian eschatology. This reflects the fact that civilisations have a history, consciousness of which is central to their fabric, in spite of the dominant classes' wish to preserve the status quo. Hence in feudal Christian civilisation, we find Zodiac, cycles, the linear advance of God's purpose, and the static being of Aristotelian and Dantean hierarchies side by side.

This brings us again to the issue of seeing contradictory tendencies within a society's cosmologies, which reflect contradictions in social processes. These may subsist in a contradiction between for example, everyday life and labour rhythms and the rhythm of the

totality, or between the divergent perceptions of different classes . As we will see when considering pre-modern China, cosmologies are syntheses generated from social relations in dynamic complex ways, giving rise to variations and mutations rather than a single, monolithic conceptualisation, though within any specific social form these variations occur within certain parameters. Thus we see that western capitalist civilisation up until the twentieth century generated a huge variety of natural ontologies within the general duality of idealism and mechanistic materialism. Joseph Needham shows how dialectical developmental conceptions interlocked with linear and cyclical ones in traditional China. Part of our concern is to elucidate the circumstances in which cosmologies reflect a struggle between different social interests, between different views of reality that imply wholly different modes of social existence. It will be suggested that in both traditional China, and in the twentieth century revolution in physics in the west, are to be seen conflicts between a cosmology orientated toward a progressive transformation of society into a condition of unalienated self-regulation, and one that is integral to the exploitative and alienated structures of the status quo.

Let us look now at the cosmology that predominated in western urban capitalist society for over three centuries, which has been negated by twentieth century science. It came into being in gradual, uneven stages from the Renaissance on, and is associated with certain crucial names like Copernicus, Kepler, Francis Bacon, Galileo, Descartes, Newton, and Dalton, but I shall simply - term it the Newtonian world-view. It is clearly associated with the transformation of western feudalism into urban capitalism. As the hierarchical feudal order crumbled and germinated pockets of a new market economy, a new urban civilisation, a new mode of production, so the fragments of medieval Christian and secular systems of thought were dropped or transformed. By way of a holist pantheism, exemplified in the ideas of Giordano Bruno and in the visionary,,mystical landscape painting of the Northern Renaissance, the dualistic, organic, and mainly cyclical feudal cosmology was replaced by a dualistic, atomistic, mechanistic and in a sense static bourgeois scientific world-view. Galileo's revolution lay in the neo-Platonic conception of a material universe whose laws were written in the language of mathematics, by God. Organicism and the temporary, intermediate pantheism were dispelled. Instead there was an inert physical world, whose dead activity could be observed and measured into mathematical laws. Alberti's architectural ideal of reaching the divine through the perfect mathematical proportions of spheres, is mirrored in Newton's idea that objects act in accordance with the laws thought by God. The other side of the Platonism is the mechanistic matter emptied of spontaneity, of feeling, colour, and direct experience. The laws of the universe and their Creator are its driving force since matter is passive and simply reacts to other matter. Original motion is unexplained and attributed to God. The universe is a three-dimensional, infinite, empty space with time external to it, in which identical, indestructible atoms and the larger masses compounded from them attract and repel each other according to fixed, deterministic, external laws of causality.

This cosmology is the counterpart to a developing economic system in which commodities move and exchange according to market laws that abstract from their uniqueness or use-value and render them interchangeable according to their monetary exchange-value. Similarly the specific, variable labour of the artisan and the locally organised co-operative labour of the medieval peasant is replaced by the wage-labourer, who sells his capacity to work to owners of capital, as an interchangeable fragment in a production system that has become abstract and reified. The new formal equality of urban civil society creates a citizenship regulated by universalistic laws. The impersonality of the market nexus is paralleled by the anonymity of the urban crowd, where each individual constantly encounters large numbers of other individuals in fleeting interchangeability. The atomised, self-interested individual is the subject of Locke's political philosophy, of *laissez-faire* economic theory, of the bourgeois conception of the individual in general. The new naturalism of Renaissance art, resting on the techniques of perspective, presented an empty three-dimensional space containing objects and people in fixed places, viewed from a specific fixed point, and in a single simultaneous instant, felt as one moment in a flow of external, objective time.

This cosmology holds in common with most dualisms a dichotomy of Creator/ Created, but now created matter, and for Descartes biological life also, is a machine. The rigorous bureaucratic organisation of mental labour, and the rationalized cog-like organisation of manual labour, see economic laws and the dissecting, calculating mind as in control over a machine-like body. Christianity - in both Protestantism and such Catholic sects as the Jansenists - experiences God as hidden or withdrawn, once having laid down inexorable laws from those of gravity to those of the market. Just as capitalism breaks up, reassembles and exploits labour power, it treats nature as a mere thing to exploit. In science and production nature is suppressed of its unique, variable qualities. Reality is reduced to matter and motion, to be interrogated, as Bacon put it, like a harlot to chase it into order. What has been looked at as the de-feminisation of nature has its counterpart in a scientific epistemology that strives to purge perception of intuition, feeling, and sensuousness. The domination and manipulation of external nature is reflected in the psychic structure of individuals, where the rational-cognitive faculty is required to subjugate sensuality, imagination and emotion. The individual comes to be seen as a conscious ego enclosed in a physical body that it must control, just as production must control nature and labour. Christopher Small(5) has argued that western classical music has as its basis a forcing of raw sound into formal hierarchies of tonality, a project analogous to that of western science and the psychic orientation of western man.

For western capitalist society time comes to be a linear, segmentable, external, homogenous advance. Each segment is an identical form, to be filled with any content. Each unit of time of equal measurable value is commensurable with any other, as are commodities. And like the capitalist labour process that breaks down work into identical tasks to be repeated in identical segments of time, the experience of time is a linear, repetitive reification. In urban bourgeois society what has been described as a "commodification" of space and time occurs.(6) Whereas in

pre-capitalist, towns individuals belonged to very specific locations by analogy with the attachment of rural communities to their land, the capitalist city breaks all such organic bonds, releasing rootless, fragmented individuals into abstract space and reified time.

This linear repetition, so extremely developed in modern factory labour, bureaucracy and in the worlds of fashion, advertising and entertainment, co-exists on another plane with an alienated time of linear progress. At first the unique one-way history of religious eschatology, the spirit-in-progress gradually comes to mean national, economic, technological or social development. As with the overall development of capitalism, which is dynamic but blind - driven by forces outside the control of collective consciousness, this developmental time appears as external to the human history which it concerns. The counterpart to advance in civilisation - felt more strongly than in any previous form of society, but as an alienated logic, unaffected by human intention - is the emancipation of Newtonian time from cyclicity and mystery; G J Whitrow(7) shows, this "scientific" time became external to reality, rather than inherent in the patterns and processes of reality, as twentieth century physics once again finds it to be.

The dominant cosmology of western capitalism was at all times challenged by alternatives - most impellingly perhaps in the Romantic revolt, but its internal contradictions began to emerge within physics itself in the nineteenth century. The concept of a force field, made necessary by discoveries in electricity and magnetism, anticipated Einstein's overcoming of the separation between forces and matter. The metaphysical concept of an "ether" held to by some Victorian physicists,(8) of which all phenomena were thought to be properties, may be seen as precursor to the unitary cosmos of the New Physics. The second law of thermodynamics and the concept of entropy replaced Newton's static universe with one that must run down in time, anticipating modern physics with its "arrow of time". Though there may still be uncertainty as to the form it takes - infinite expansion or alternate expansion and contraction - for modern physics the universe has a history.(9)

Outside physics, advances in nineteenth century geology and biology also engendered a concern for becoming rather than static being. Perhaps most powerful was the ontology of Hegel, developed in no small part from a study of Taoism, for which reality was a structured, organic whole in the process of becoming, a dialectical development through contradiction and flux, engendering new qualitative structures in creative growth. The Hegelian ontology was transformed by Marx into a conception of history as a process at once structured and creative, in which forms of society develop and transform in dialectical development,. Engels interpreted the materialist inversion of Hegel to mean also a dialectics of nature: stripped of its idealism, for which the concrete world is mere objectification of unfolding spirit, Hegelian ontology could become dialectical materialism. Engels sought to show that nineteenth century science was already moving toward a dialectical organic model of reality.

For Marx and Engels contradictions in thought were embedded within contradictions in human existence, in society. Their critique of dualisms - both mechanical materialism (which always

requires a spirit) and idealism, was seen as implying practical criticism of reality, that is social transformation. The central contradictions of capitalism - between the interests of capital and labour, between formal equality and real inequalities, between the potentials made available by advances in technology and knowledge and their anarchic, uncontrolled use - were seen as being resolvable through a conscious transformation into a classless, unalienated society, a state of affairs in which all-rounded, free individuals would be in collective control over an harmonious metabolism with nature. The cosmology appropriate to such a society would be a unitary, organic, dialectical developmental one, by contrast to the dualistic, atomistic, mechanistic stasis of the capitalist world-view. It can be suggested that post-Einsteinian physics has experimentally confirmed the essential principles of such a dialectical materialism, and that in resolving the contradictions inherent in classical physics, what is emerging is a cosmology of post-capitalism, of a collective self-emancipatory process.

The cosmology made necessary and desirable by discoveries in the New Physics can be considered in terms of both its epistemology and ontology - these becoming, in contrast to the positivism of Newtonian science, inseparable. Quantum physics in particular has forced an overcoming of Cartesian dichotomies between mind and matter, observer and observed, showing that knowledge is a part of praxis, the total activity of humans in and upon the world, which continuously changes both. Ideas are not passive, static representations of reality arrived at by isolated, unhistorical thinking minds, but the symbolic component of action upon reality. Quantum theory ensures recognition that "data" are not given to disinterested observation, but are consequences of the observer's activity. It is an aspect of probability theory which Einstein could not accept, that in a sense an event is as much a subjective projection of an observer as a fact occurring in an objective time-order.⁽¹⁰⁾ Whether indeterminacy is to be ascribed to the basic processes in the universe, or to the incompleteness of our understanding, physics recognises in practice now that all models are partial abstractions, temporary crystallisations of thought in the praxis of the experimenter, and behind him or her, the social world which does things to nature.

The dialectical epistemology generated thus sees mind and reality as poles of an ultimate unity in interaction and interpenetration. Though the action of the observer constructs reality, and all perception is active synthesis, this is no idealism. Rather reality, of which consciousness is a part, is continuously appropriated in a process of - by and large - developing comprehensiveness. Knowledge is a process of abstracting from facts that are always constituted through theories from an infinitely complex totality; it is active and historical.

Bohr's conception of wave/particle complementarity meant that solid matter was replaced by wave-like patterns of probabilities. As for the theory of relativity, time is inherent to a unitary, space-time matrix. Instead of isolated objects with properties independent of their context filling empty space, matter can be seen as a curdling in a unitary manifold which is active and expanding. Going beyond the dualism of passive matter and acting forces, we find inorganic processes as vital and creative, though not of course in the ways we use these terms in relation to

biological life or human history. With dichotomies of energy/matter, spirit/mechanism overcome, we can grasp better the reality where photons seem to process information and act upon it as if "conscious".(11)

The-post-Einsteinian universe is a dynamic becoming in space-time in which, Cassirer(12) argues, we no longer need to ask whether time is an objective order or totally observer-dependent. The mechanistic determinism of isolatable entities is replaced by a tissue of interconnectedness, where instantaneous non-local connections between particles, and Machian action at a distance, are part of a cosmic burgeoning web of space-time.(13) This dialectical, unitary, organic universe is developmental. The cosmos has a concrete history which is of its inherent nature, as activity. This history is not in an external, linear, alienated time-logic, it is qualitative growth, out from and of reality itself. This is true within inorganic history, and in the emergence of more complex forms of dialectical process - life and consciousness.

It is not only in modern physics that static dualism is challenged. The new cosmology emerges in more or less coherent form in other spheres of twentieth-century western consciousness and culture. Modernist art-forms shattered three-dimensional space and linear time, reconstructing reality in myriad forms in Cubism, Vorticism, Constructivism, and sometimes as in Surrealism consciously attempting a new organic space-time seen as the imaginative counterpart to post-Einsteinian science. Literature rejected linear-rational narrative in favour of condensation and active image-mosaics, whilst "atonal" music broke up the structures of western classical tonality, forging from its elements a decentred, ungrounded tonal dream-logic. These cultural expressions are components of the overall movement in anti-capitalist sensibilities in the twentieth century. They imply the urge for a form of existence in which both the individual and society as a whole is felt as in dialectical development and qualitative burgeoning growth. As Henri Bergson opposed intuitive flux and duration to the spatialised, dissected, reified time of the western intellect, labour rebels against the non-creative, repetitive, segmented organization of work under Taylorist "scientific management". In all spheres of reified social relations and culture, the anti-capitalist sensibility urges for a subjectively determined, authentic activity, in which rhythmic flexibility and qualitative variation are characteristic. For both social processes and individual activity to be under conscious, flexible control, all forms of alienated division of labour must have been overcome - both the rigid division of mental from manual labour and the external fragmentation of tasks. Such a society would be undivided and conscious of itself undertaking an harmonious metabolism with the rest of the cosmos. A society no longer governed by reification no longer dominates and manipulates nature in an uncontrolled, ecologically unsound mode of production. This entails an emancipatory, psychic praxis also, bringing into being a balanced, integrated individual. A psychic individuation in which the faculties of cognition, intuition, feeling, and sensation are dynamically interactive but harmonious is unrepressed and unalienated, and is the underpinning of a society of individuals co-operatively running their affairs. Where the reification and fragmentation in production, in thought, and in culture are overcome, social processes can be universally understood and participated in through voluntary

co-operation. Self-fulfilment is seen as complementary to, rather than in inherent antagonism with, society's dialectical self-development. A society whose production is geared to authentic need and use considers both ecological soundness and the desire for creativity in labour; it would create both goods and an environment that were aesthetically harmonious. The urban environment in particular, as a manifestation of humanity's mediation with nature would no longer be the ugly, chaotic consequence of alienated forces, but a consciously created aesthetic form.

If these are some of the implications of a unitary, organic, dialectical and developmental cosmology, we would be particularly interested in considering other historical contexts in which similar world-views have obtained. We have already noted that the undivided primitive co-operative tends to engender a simple dialectical materialism, though its limited appropriation of nature limits it to a cyclic process, not a developmental growth. George Thomson(14) has tried to show how the particular social position of Herakleitos in fifth century BC Greece generated a highly sophisticated form of dialectical, monist organicism; as a representative of an aristocracy opposed to commodity production, he maintained the essential flux from tribal cosmology, enriching it through the critique of Pythagorean undialectical dualism. Herakleitos is still bound to cyclicity, however, in spite of his achievement of a world-view that seems more pertinent now than the philosophies of Classical Greece which were to supersede him. It has already been noted that in the early development of western capitalism an organic/ dialectical pantheism was expressed in various contexts, and it can be argued that this represented a unique historical moment in which feudal stasis could be rejected without capitalist civilisation having yet imposed its atomistic, determinist dualism.(15) A vision of unitary process could appear, which in a sense looked beyond the epoch of capitalist society that would follow it. The popular movements involved in the demise of feudalism could allow it to appear as if the new society would be egalitarian and that labour would be free and self-determined; the reality of capitalism as a new class system ensured that the Newtonian world-view came in fact to predominate. The huge thrust given to the logic of capitalist production by the Industrial Revolution gave rise to a revolt against mechanism in the Romantic movement: in England and Germany in particular the call was for a society in harmony with nature, one in which all-rounded individuals would engage in unfragmented labour upon nature experienced as whole, vital, and as a source of aesthetic and intuitive knowledge.

These tendencies in western bourgeois societies come through into the twentieth century, as we have already seen. They represent manifestations of an urge for a social transformation that has not prevailed, but which becomes more pressingly urgent as the nuclear age unfurls, and as societies claiming to be communist reproduce the same fundamental forms of alienation as the West. Now of all the forms of non-dualist, organic, dialectical cosmology that have emerged in pre-capitalist societies, the most fascinating and sophisticated is that which evolved in traditional China. Its great importance lies in its closeness to the emancipatory cosmology we have been

considering, and in the richness of a different tradition which it can bring to a world-view with now global significance.(16)

To understand the context in which arose what Needham calls "organic naturalism", we must outline some of the significant features of traditional or Imperial China. The unification under the Chi'in dynasty in the third century BC saw the emergence of a distinct form of society, in which prevailed what has been termed the Asiatic mode of production. This was an economic system characterised by a landowning gentry, on whose land worked a small-holding peasantry who paid rent in grain. A state bureaucracy under the supreme control of the Emperor both sustained the gentry in their position, and was dependent upon its surplus product from which it siphoned a large amount in taxes. A hierarchy of officials collected taxes from every level of peasant and landowner, each passing a proportion upwards, ultimately reaching the Emperor. There was thus an interdependency between the gentry and the imperial bureaucracy. Unlike in western feudalism where local barons had their own armies and the king's power rested uneasily on their support, in China the state monopolised military power, and circulated a non-hereditary officialdom to control different regions. It has been suggested by numerous writers that this centralised control over a huge territory owed a great deal to the requirement for large irrigation schemes and canal systems in the agricultural conditions of China, which an autarkic form of feudalism could not sustain. After the earlier "feudal" and then "warring states" periods, the gentry was inclined to recognise the importance of such a state.

The absence of primogeniture in the inheritance of land meant that a gentry family could not sustain its position unless at least one member in each generation became an official who was able to accumulate wealth and new land. This was achieved through the system of imperial examinations, success in which required lengthy study in the classics of many branches of knowledge. Through this system the gentry was bound into the ruling bureaucracy, the latter continuously recruiting from it and to some degree from peasants who succeeded in obtaining the necessary education. As the bureaucracy was non-hereditary, it was continuously re-created out of other strata, giving rise to a system that perpetuated itself in spite of periodic breakdowns and dynastic changes, through to the epoch when western intervention initiated a different development. It was so capable of reproducing itself that even when towns developed with a merchant class and an artisanate, and market relations and use of money were extended, these pockets of nascent capitalism never led to an overall transformation of the system, as occurred with the towns of medieval western Europe. Among many other factors this was due to the maintenance of links between town-dwellers and their ancestral land which prevented a new urban commune emerging. The consequence was that even when capitalist production developed on a considerable scale, the state could keep it in check, and the "bourgeoisie" would use their wealth to obtain education for sons to secure entrance into the bureaucracy.

Within this social system there developed a dynamic complex of cosmologies, world-views or religions. The major strands were constantly merging, mutually influencing and inter-ramifying, in such a way that Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism are inaccurately thought of as rigidly

separate entities. A plethora of conceptions of reality co-existed at any time, even within ruling-class orthodoxy. Thus Buddhism when it came to China was prevailingly dualistic, Confucianism was non-dualistic, organic and dialectical but saw the world as a hierarchy in equilibrium, whilst a conception of linear, advancing time in nature and history evolved quite early. These are mostly features common to class societies, but exceptionally in China there was also an important place for a dialectical, organic, unitary cosmology which held sometimes to a cyclical and sometimes to a developmental, qualitative growth conception. This was the essence of Taoism, but the crossing-over and mutual influence between world-views already mentioned insists that the term be used loosely.

There are a number of distinctive features of imperial Chinese society which help to explain how a cosmology orientated to a classless, self-developmental social form could become so significant. A long line of historians and social theorists have considered that the Chinese state expressed a closer functional continuity from primitive communal authority than that of any other pre-modern state form. Paradoxically, in spite of this state's complexity and its being a means for class rule and exploitation, Chinese political philosophy always thought it should benevolently maintain the interests of all the people and social harmony, rather than be a tyrant manager or a means for the few to dominate the many. It is also the case that the other side to esoteric Taoist cosmology was a popular egalitarianism. Further, many Taoist thinkers from Lao-Tzu on were voluntary or involuntary exiles from the court elite, disaffected with public status, power, and external trappings of worldly success. Thus there is an implicit and sometimes explicit connection between Taoism and popular aspirations, which sometimes give rise to a quietist withdrawal from political affairs and personal communion with nature, and sometimes to a revolutionary millenarianism.

It is significant that artists and poets often turned their attention to nature most acutely in periods of turmoil, such as during the collapse of the Han dynasty and the Tang. This "romantic" urge for individual and social harmony with nature was also intensified in periods marked by a strong development of commerce and urban capitalism. The most striking instance of this was in the Sung dynasty (AD 960-1279), during which there was an extraordinary cultural efflorescence, manifested most particularly in landscape painting and scientific observation of nature. During the Sung occurred the greatest development of trade, manufacture, towns, and a money market in the whole history of pre-modern China. The period has been compared with the western Renaissance, which is in part apt, so long as the crucial difference is recognised that capitalist development could not break out of its containment within the dominant system in China, unlike in the west where the Renaissance marked the beginning of a long-term transformation from feudalism to capitalism. Nevertheless, in the Sung period there were huge developments in iron and steel production, unsurpassed even in the West before the eighteenth century; several cities had populations of over a million.

The outlook that predominated among Sung artists was Ch'an Buddhism, a synthesis from Buddhism and Taoism. Metaphysical speculation about the Buddhist Absolute gave way to a

concern with revelatory experience, a total enlightenment of the whole self to the cosmos, the latter being seen as the unified, organic, dialectical and burgeoning Tao. The landscape painting that represented this par excellence was often the work of recluses, far from the cities or the court, sometimes living in monasteries. There is much to suggest a typically "romantic" antipathy to growing manufacture, commerce and the importance of money in their orientation – in part conservative, part escapist, part visionary and radical, projecting an experience of harmony and integration against the alienation of capitalism. At once a continuation of high cultural tradition, they also represented a traditional tension between Taoism and Confucian orthodoxy, reflecting the conflict of interests between the people and their rulers. But the organic, dialectical experience of Taoism developed a new intensity and sophistication, in response to the partial development of capitalism. As often in western capitalism, a pattern, of sensibilities appears which sees beyond capitalism to a condition where spontaneous, authentic being and action could be in harmony with an egalitarian society and nature. But as the development of capitalism is blocked, the conscious political understanding and action that could attain a transformation to such a social form is unobtainable. The vision is contained in an individual, passive aestheticism, imbued with melancholic yearning.

The cosmology and experiential orientation of Taoism and its development into Ch'an Buddhism during the Sung dynasty is expressed in art and science. Reality is movement and becoming, in an organic, inter-connected pattern of "point-instants". The *I Ching* conceives of a total interrelatability of all events, chance is never contingent; therefore every instant leads into all, the "eternal now". Nature is simultaneously divinity; there is no dichotomy between form and content, between that which causes change and that which changes. A readiness to conceive of a unified mind/body allowed such scientific developments as acupuncture whilst various self-disciplinary practices were simultaneously physical and mental. A unitary, dynamic space-time is rendered especially in Sung landscape painting, for which the viewer is in motion, there being no single fixed position from which a static three-dimensional space opens out, as with western perspective, nor a single simultaneous moment in which all depicted occurs. The viewer moves over mountains and through mists; the plane of vision constantly alters. Painting was thought of as an act of creative Tao, a human manifestation of the Tao in everything: to paint nature was to let it man through one. Viewing landscape painting was to be immersed in, be an active part of, the seamless, intricate, four-dimensional web of nature.

The organic and dynamic characteristic of Taoism allowed the susceptibility of Chinese science to comprehension of magnetism, the concept of field, and action at a distance such as that of the tides. Technological developments reflected social need of course, so that application of scientific knowledge was primarily in fields like hydraulics, canal building, military requirements or navigation. The underlying cosmology however, proves to be more apposite to science now than that of post-Renaissance western thought. Nature is flux and infinite movement between opposites; time is the Tao itself, there is no beginning or ending of time, only of things in time.(18) Nature and history are both streams to be attuned to. Once understood, action and

experience can be aligned spontaneously to them. Through discovering one's own nature, the individual can be in harmonious self-control, and society in control of itself. Rather as for marxism, understanding the flow of history allows self-conscious control over it, through moving with it according to its laws. For human beings to discover their nature, to become themselves as a mountain is a mountain or a tree is a tree, means for them to be in conscious harmony with nature as the self-conscious apex of Tao, overcoming the alienation produced by consciousness without understanding. Taoist science is an harmonious interacting with the totality, not a domination of nature: the unforced character of Chinese science, its unrushed pace of development and the morality applied to its use are, like the emphasis on natural healing in medicine, testimonies to this orientation. Humanity in balanced control expresses its real nature; the enlightened individual and society, is an integrated whole. This matches the psychoanalytical conception of healthy psychic individuation as the absence of repressed and distorted impulses in aggression and compulsions. Sexuality for example is a natural energy both psychic and physical, a life-force that is suppressed at the peril of disharmony. Existence should be attuned to the "now" in the infinite process, without fear towards the future nor compulsion from the past. An active harmony in nature is simultaneously intuitive, rational, affective, and sensual.

All phenomena are temporary structural constellations of the organic web in flux. This anti-atomistic view does not see the individual as isolated or fragmented into ego and body urges, thought and reality. As for western romanticism, imagination is the key to integrated perception and activity, the contrast to fragmentation and exploitation in humans' relations with nature and with themselves.

The idea of dialectical growth and simultaneous self-control implies subjectively determined processes in labour and social institutions. The conception of socialist development in Maoist thought had a tremendous potential legacy in Taoism, to rework in practical political and social terms. The crucial element for Maoism, in its rejection of state- bureaucratic socialism, is the emphasis on people being in control of their own development on every level. . This means an overcoming of divisions between mental and manual labour, town and countryside, managers and managed. Technologies should be developed and applied as and when people choose, ensuring that advances in production are simultaneously socially emancipating. With no alienated logic of "technical progress" dominating and fragmenting human beings, they enter into a free and collectively conscious metabolism with nature.

We see in the twentieth century a world-view emerging which demonstrates a complex convergence. If China needed external intervention before it could break from the self-perpetuation of its traditional class system and unleash its potential for human growth, the west needs to be sinologised in the sense suggested in this essay. The new world-view was led towards by the findings of science itself, through philosophical critique, of mechanism, empiricism, positivism* dualism, atomism and reified time, and by the contradictions in societies straining to develop into free, harmonious metabolism with nature. This world-view is the cosmological correlate to the global tendency towards self-transformation, reunification of knowledge with

action and integration of self and society in a higher form. Its development is inseparable from this urge to change society. Rational, ethical, intuitive and physical imperatives converge in it.

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