NATURE AND AESTHETIC IMAGINATION IN

CAPITALIST SOCIETY

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This book was written between 1973 and 1976. Much of it is therefore clearly out of date, and some of it downright embarrassing. However I feel certain that the core ideas in it stand the test of time, and that it is therefore worth preserving. Except for the occasional word, I have not tried to change the book: it would be impossible to rewrite something written forty years ago. (2014)

CONTENTS

PREFACE

This book explores the notion of imaginative praxis as a means to comprehend the historically changing relations of society to nature. In Part I, an attempt is made to develop a theoretical framework adequate to understanding cultural systems in general. Culture, as dynamic symbolic process, is seen as both embedded in and reproducing dominant social forms, but also as a partially conscious dimension of creative transformation.

This analytical framework is employed in the elucidation of symbolic representations of nature taken from certain cultural movements in the history of Western Capitalist Civilization. In Part II a structure of sensibilities and beliefs in 15th C Flemish landscape painting is explored in its interrelationships with emerging urban capitalist society; in Part III certain similar structures in British Romantic poetry are analyzed within the context of the Industrial Revolution.

Part IV looks at Surrealism in relation to advanced capitalism, in which, under the influence of Marxism, earlier conceptions of the imaginative perception of nature become self-conscious and historically situated. Part V looks at the aesthetic experience of nature in a different civilization, thereby allowing the development of an understanding of society's praxis within and upon nature both on a pan-historical level and in relation to specific social formations situated in space and time.

Part VI examines praxis within industrial societies, expanding thereby the terms evolved within earlier sections. Finally, Part VII attempts to synthesize from the aesthetic interpretations of nature in various societies at different stages of development, a dynamic structure of ideas and sensibilities which are appropriate on their particular level of consciousness to the transformation of Western Capitalist societies. The aesthetic experience of nature is held to offer one area from which the human process of living can be assimilated into the contemporary consciousness of a collective human history.

PART I

Culture, symbols, history and society

This first section is an attempt to formulate a general theoretical framework adequate to understanding "cultural performances" in societies. Examples of particular cultural performances are discussed here mainly to elucidate the general argument. The analytical framework developed is employed in subsequent sections, mainly in the elucidation of symbolic representations of nature within certain cultural movements from the history of Western Capitalist Civilization. Structures of sensibilities and beliefs in these cultural performances are explored in their interrelationships with dominant social forms. Later sections will also take up other themes touched upon here.

I use the term “symbol system” to mean any “semiological system” as conceived by the originators of the “science” known as semiology, namely de Saussure and Charles Saunders Peirce. The word symbol has unfortunately been used in numerous different ways, but it seems the best one in this discussion because it allows the theoretical integration of the concepts “culture”, “role”, “self” and “consciousness”. The level of my analysis does not necessitate the sub-division of “semiotic signs” into “icon”, “index” or “symbol” as in Peirce, since the exact nature of the relationships between signifier and signified is important only for depth discussions of particular systems; the concern of the following is to depict general characteristics of all cultural systems. Further, I follow Jackobson and Wollen in seeing an overlap of all three kinds of relationship in any actual semiological system; even in verbal language not only arbitrary relationships exist, for language frequently uses "iconic" signs (Peirce's term) also, where syntactic order resembles the meaning structure. It follows that for me de Saussure's stress on the arbitrary nature of signs is, in the final analysis, mistaken. Lastly, my argument runs counter to de Saussure's (and following him, Roland Barthes`) distinction between natural and cultural signs - the one uncoded, the other coded. My view is to understand all consciousness as human and symbolic; nature is perceived and responded to through social symbolism. Since therefore my theoretical framework is not based on any one "semiologist", it seems best not to force all concepts into the terms of any one of them.

By trying to talk about symbol systems in general, I encounter the problem of seeming to assume that everything, from ordinary speech or a Greek drama to a modern poster or a TV advertisement, is ultimately the same kind of thing. In fact 1 am trying to show that all symbol systems are potentially (and in practice, usually) creative, praxical communications. Thus it is that I use Chomsky's term "performance" to cover anything from a simple utterance to a literary text. But I do not wish to obscure the subtle differences between different symbol systems in different contexts, nor suggest that detailed study of any particular system does not entail the use of specific concepts and terms. For example, the situation of a medieval religious sonnet is vastly different from that of a TV programme in modern "mass communications". Yet on the highest, most general level both are cultural performances - ordered symbolism created by individuals within specific socio-historical circumstances. The fact that modern "mass media" precisely do not "communicate", but control and mystify consciousness is a statement of a different order - the word "communicate" in particular being used in a different sense.

For human beings in society, all knowledge and sensibilities are held in socio-historically relative forms - that is, they exist within specific "languages"(2). Objects are only perceived by subjects; ultimately the distinction between subject and object in perception is analytical(3). "Reality" is only known or felt through particular symbolic systems. Knowledge and feeling, and the particular mode through which they are expressed or communicated are inseparable, in concrete instances, though not entirely untranscribable from one symbol system to another.

Human beings live in and are formed by humanly created symbolic environments of objects and symbols - cultures. Even physically untouched nature is perceived through humanly created symbols, that is, nature is humanized by man in society. A culture is an historically specific mediation of society with nature. The forms of relationship of man to man and man to nature are reflected in, expressed by, and in turn conditioned by, the various interrelated "languages" through which existence is experienced.

The complex totality of "culture" consists therefore of numerous inter-penetrating "languages" or symbol systems, sometimes embodied in objects(4), which make up the totality of individual and social "experience". Linguistic communication, for example, bears a complementary relationship to non-linguistic experience; they are mutually inter-dependent. Hence a poem can express and evoke sensibilities "too deep for the brief fathomline of thought or sense"(5), and mystical writings can convey something of a desired silent experience, beyond words or feelings. Hence too, any particular symbolic system - painting, literature, or insignia and emblems, must be seen as existing within a matrix of the totality of culture.

Culture is a dynamic, symbolic, intersubjective complex of communication systems embedded in and inseparable from the form of a particular society's mediation with nature - that is, its mode of production. Material production is a human practise separable only analytically from "practice" in symbols and ideas. Simultaneously,

culture is embedded in the relationships within and between classes, i.e. the social relationships of production. It reflects and projects "reality", a part of which it is. It reinforces dominant experience and delineates and directs men's mode of action on nature and with one another; it expresses and interprets experience. It elucidates and clarifies aspects of "reality" through imitation, metaphor, satire or fantasy, etc. etc. Cultural performances are social processes, practises in which the perceivers (readers, audiences, etc.) relate to the performance in such a way as to redefine, re-feel their "reality". On this level, art and ritual are the same. The performance is a potentially infinite mirror for creative, reflexive, human existence - a collective praxis.

Many performances are contradictory(6). On the one hand they serve to perpetuate "reality" through basing themselves implicitly on collective conceptualizations and sensibilities which maintain the living out of existing social organizations and practises. As such, performances express “legitimating ideologies” of the status-fuo - though these ideologies do not necessarily "come from" the ruling class. (Methodism in 19th C England for example was a powerfully conservative system of beliefs constraining the socially transformative potential of the working-class. Yet the religious forms that emerged arose to a considerable extent from the working class itself - though naturally they were encouraged and approved of by the ruling class.)

On the other hand performances expose aspects of "reality" to critical perusal, drawing the perceivers into a reflexive dialectical relationship with the performance. The use of the labels "naturalism" and "realism" in discussions of art often represents a misunderstanding of this dual facet of most art and culture. Thus all art is some form of "realism" in that it draws on elements of experience/reality and synthesizes a “whole” from them - elucidating thereby some feature or other of "reality". (This would seem to be equally true of Gorky or Kafka). There is no such thing as "naturalism" if this is supposed to mean a perfect mirror image of nature or society - free of value-orientated bias and manipulation in the abstraction from "reality", "reality" which is itself humanly created in the case of society.

Sometimes however, the degree of creative, reflexive re-synthesis and re-structur£ng of "reality" involved in the "audience" participation in a performance is minimal, as in what Duvignaud calls “the aesthetic of total communion”(7) or primitive ritual (and as in most ordinary conversation), in which traditional conceptions and feelings arc re-affirmed as a strictly unmodified "conscience collective". And a cultural form strongly orientated toward the maintenance of existing social relations and their associated symbol systems, such as the Hollywood film, presents tha myths of mid-20th C American capitalist society in ways militating against critical exploration of tha conveyed experience. The Hollywood film is in fact one example from commercial oulture in contemporary western society, in which the efficacy of legitimating myths is connected with tha treatment of "entertainment" as a commodity.(8)

Even in the most stable societies then, culture will contain contradictory "performances" - differing in their implicit assumptions and the aspect of "reality" explored, and therefore in their evaluation of existing reality and in their implied aspirations for social development. Most art concretizes some aspects of experience, simultaneously to implying resolutions to contradictions in experience, or opening new modes of experiencing "reality". The variety of "orientations" which could be elucidated in most performances is potentially infinite. The tendency of thought represented in Lucien Goldmann however, is to reaolve artistic performances into two components:

"The exceptional individual. whose work is identified with the transindividual subject (e.g. class) have aspirations and needs corresponding either to the total restructuring of all human relations and relations between man and nature, or to the total preservation of existing structures and values."
My foregoing argument should indicate that this resolution into "progressive" tendencies or tendencies orientated toward maintaining the status quo greatly simplifies the complexity of the relationship between performances and social experience. But I shall return to Goldmann later.

Some recent approaches to understanding "languages" in society view symbolic systems of communication aa being structurally conditioned by the historically specific economic and cultural organisation of the society in question. Thus Bernstein, for example writes:

"...language is a set of rules to which all speech codes must comply, but which speech codes are realised is a function of the culture acting through social relationships in specific contexts. Different speech forms or codes symbolise the form of the social relationship, regulate the nature of the speech encounters, and create for the speakers different orders of relevance and relation." (10)

Bernstein does go on to say that speech forms can in turn modify the social structure which initially evolved them, but how this can happen given what appears to be a structural linguistic determinism is an unresolved problem. The problem is part of a much greater issue, an understanding of which is, I believe, implicit in the writings of Marx though many later "Marxists" have not interpreted them thus. It is, simply, that society is both an objectively given socio-economic formation on the one hand, and a continually reproduced and transformed result of subjective human practise on the other:

"History is in the first place that of the 'developing productive forces taken over by each generation and hence the history of the development of the forces of the individuals themselves', or, more specifically, at every stage of history there is a 'material outcome, a sum of productive forces, a historically created relationship to nature and of individuals towards each other´, a sum-total of productive forces 'that is transmitted to each generation by its predecessors´ and 'on one hand is modified by the new

generation but on the other itself prescribes its own living conditions and imposes on it a definite development, a special character of its own - so that, in other words, circumstances make men just as men make circumstances."(11)

Societies in all phases of development thus rest on definite productive forces and relations which shape their lives, but which harbour "contradictions" that compel the emergence of new productive forces and new means of symbolic expression and communication. The emergence of these however, is through creative, human experimentation. A poem, for example, is both an objectification of a specific socio-historlcal formation, and an embodiment of the creative exploration within a language by one man or woman, in which meaning and medium are inseparable. Put another way, cultural conventions and performances are structured like language(12), and the art-forms of a particular soclo-historical epoch can be seen to represent socially locatable "mental structures"(13) or ideological forms pertaining to specific social classes (though as I argue later, the relating of performances to a particular class alone is inadequate), but at the same time speech or art products are symbolisms "using experience creatively in communication" - considering any expression or text that is interpretable by others as a communication. Thus there is nothing exclusive between the concepts "practise" and "structure", between the "creativity involved in a language use and the implicit restrictions of conforming to a structure."(15) A symbol is both a socially agreed label for a portion of “reality” (and performances in particular symbol systems are constrained by the social "rules" for the system in question), and something given meaning by the actual use of "experience in reality" for communicating.

Structural changes in socio-economic formation bring human beings to new experiences relative to their positions in the changing social structure (class, group, role). The artist or any other “performer” encounters new experience, and the relationship of art to experience as a whole undergoes shifts, associated with which are the mobilizations of different elements of individual and group consciousness in particular symbolic systems (e.g. poetry or drama).(16) The artist, like individuals “performing” in all other symbolic systems, is drawn to deal with the new experience in new ways, applying old schema and techniques to embrace new experience. This leads to the correction and adjustment of the schema - innovation. Gombrich shows how the century-long "naturalistic revolution” in 5thC BC Greece entailed the artist's application of techniques similar to the Egyptians´, which were gradually modified as first foreshortening, then space, and then light were "conquered". In sculpture, the stiff figures moved first one foot forward, then bent their arms, and then softened from mask-like smiles.

In Egypt art was conceptual, a pictograph of a victorious king in battle being an embodiment of the king's warlikeness, not a realistic depiction of a battle. Tomb paintings are not narrative “scene from daily life” but conceptual sequences to be

"read"; e.g. "harvesting entails ploughing, sowing, reaping; care of cattle entails fording of streams and milking." Gombrich suggests that representations of the year's cycle on tomb walls were meant to impart eternity to the inmates.

The function of the artist as creator of standardised plctographs symbolising certain truths, is related to the location of Egyptian art in a specific structure of society and religion. But in Homeric narration not only the "what" but the "how" of mythical events la portrayed. The mental set has developed which allows a particular story-teller or painter to give a specific account - his particular evocation of a legend. This acceptance, Gombrich notes, is closely tied to the development of reason in Greek Philosophy; the latter is of course related to the economic and social development of Greece - the growth of maritime trading, independent democratic city-states, etc. Once the artist was considered as someone with a right to evocate a particular interpretation of a myth, his activity had changed, and with it the relationship of the activity to his society. He no longer made symbols of eternal truths, but was attributed with powers of creative imagination and the ability to seek "beauty". He explored his new experience in a new way, and in doing so his artistic techniques were changed. He sought new means to capture the illusion of reality. Art works became secular objects, and were considered "beautiful".

The analysis of changes in a particular social activity is constantly brought to a consideration of the socio-economic formation as a totality, every aspect of which is ultimately interwoven with every other. This, I believe, is one of the major insights of Marx, who was not a determinist of any sort, but attempted to elucidate the complex totality of man. His analytical abstractions - "means of production" or "productive forces", "social relations of production" and "consciousness" or "ideological superstructures", are merely the most convenient to discuss and conceptualize the infinite web of social reality(18), essentially to illustrate that a society is a mode of production - of goods, individuals, institutions, ideas and feelings. Societies reproduce themselves continuously, both perpetuating forms of economic production, kinds of individuals through socialization processes etc. and also modifying these at the same time. The circumstances men find themselves in, necessitate their creative transformation of their dealings with nature and with themselves - transformations in technology and symbol systems within historically specific constraints and spheres of "possibility".

Change in any particular social practise ia implicated In change of the social formation aa a whole. It is not a question of assigning relative importance to "economics" or "ideas". Althusser´s formulation of the problem is only partially helpful, conceiving society as a "...complex internally structured totality of various layers and levels (of practice) related to each othar in all sorts of relations of determination and interdependence."(19)

The inter-relatedness of different practices is not something formulateable in terms of deterrminist laws - it is a conceptual basis for understanding what a society is. The ways in which practises affect one anothsr in a specific historical instance is a question for the elucidation of the partioular historical instance (as in the interpretation of the causal relations between the emergence of certain religious beliefs, technological innovations, and new class formations in the rise of western capitalism. Marx and Weber do not disagree in principle over this issue. Both appear to have the same conception of the complex, dialectlcally interactional process between "productive forces", "social relations of production" and "consciousness". The differences in their analyses of the historical problem lie in their choices of which aspsets of the complex process to investigate most thoroughly - and thereby give greatest emphasis to. (However, in Part VI the residual positivism in Weber is discussed.) It follows from this that the notion of "independence" or "autonomy" of social practices arises from mistaking the inter-relatedness of parts within a totality for laws of determination.

The development of means to express new experience confronting the artist is a question of "socialising" what is at first private experience - private because a "language" to communicate it does not yet exist. But his exploration in a symbolic medium to express and communicate, his working in a medium innovatively, is not simply a process of "translating" private experience into a "form". All performances are "formed-content", the separation of form from content being analytical. For example, in poetry meaning and sound are explored inseparably, discovering through their reverberations new sensibilities. These are not the "mirror image" of new experience, though they derive from it. The use of a symbol in speech or an artwork is not simply the placing of a label for a specific pre-existing item, whose "slot" is determined by structural rules. Rather the symbols are continually "brought into life" through their use in comunication - retaining elements of past meanlng whilst also continually being transformed in meaning by usage in new contexts. Talking about language Black notes:

"... one important function of verbal expression is to reveal to the author what he thinks. He thinks in speaking or writing - as Wittgenstein liked to say, one can think with a pen as well as in one's head..."(20)

An individual in society is a symbolic self, socialized through "languages". The self is then steered into experience by symbols(21) to cope with situations. Feeling, sensation and impulse are socially converted into emotion, perception and purpose(22). "Roles" are socio-historical "vocabularies of motives" suited to a performance part, making inter-personal action possible. As already mentloned, circumstances of social change may leave vital areas of experience without appropriate "public" symbol systems for communication and for guidance of individuals in coping with experience. Such incommunicable, unsocialized

experience will be located in "private languages". The creative performances of certain individuals and groups develop from this public language, through practice, working in media, "dealing with problems" - both in art and speech(23). This process, it is argued, is not simply a duplication or projection of "experience" that existed privately before. In the same way that the quotation from Black above points to thinking in speech, Reid(24) objects to what he calls "two-term theories of art" such as those of Santayana and Susanna Langer, in which the art-object is conceived as presenting something else - "what-is-felt" by the artist. Rather, Reid argues, the artist imaginatively constructs a new object in terms of a medium, derived from life experience but not photographing it. A painter does not "represent" nature either as a mirror or just selectively or evaluatively. He thinks, sees, feels in terms of the medium, and his achievement of embodiment "transforms reflexively" everything he does."(25) Thus Barbara Hepworth writes of drawing:

"A new line has a particular 'bite ' - one is lost in a thousand possibilities because the next line in association with the first will have a compulsion, carrying you forward into unknown territory. Suddenly there is a new form before one's eyes."(26)

The meanings of creative performances are therefore not exact replicas of pre-symbolic experience - they are rather a coming-to-terms-with not very well understood experience which is the basis on which the creative practice draws, and which in a sense compels the exploration(27). Meanings and the media in which they are communicated are related in the way a melody is to its embodiment in actual sounds, and in the way thought is immanent in its symbolic expression(28). Ths full significance of a performance nay not be consciously realised even by the originator. He is dealing with symbols whose complex re-synthesis involves elements of past meanings and anticipation of future ones. Thus Coleridge wrote:

"... language is the armoury of the human mind; and at once contains the trophies of its past, and the weapons of its future conquests."(29)

A discussion of Shakespeare's use of words by George Steiner is worth quoting in full:

"In poetry, and in much literary prose, polysemy, with all its devices of word-play, double-entendre, ambiguity and echo, is constant. A great poet is one around whose use of any individual word is gathered a live cluster of resonance, of overtones and undertones. When the Ghost tells Hamlet that the secrets of Purgatory would make his hair stand on end ´Like quills upon the fretful porpentine, the phrase strongly suggests an heraldic crest. This suggestion has been prepared for, mutedly, by Horatio´s previous description of the Ghost as 'Armed at point exactly, cap-a-pe.' Now the intimation and associated family of images is developed; the Ghost admonishes Hamlet that the dread truths of Purgatory must not be blazoned forth.

Originally, blazon signified a painted shield; by derivation it comes to signify the act of disclosure, or identification, which is the object of heraldry. But the mere sound of the word, here the echo being simpler and deeper than that of a pun, makes us apprehend the blaze, the cleansing fires in which the Ghost is doomed, for a time, to dwell. Shakespeare did not ´know´ that modern philology ascribed a remote, common origin to the two words. That knowledge was active and implicit in his total use of all valuations and tonalities of language." (30)

Artistic creation is a social process, an activity occurring within a symbol system," and it is thus that Goldmann can consider an artistic structure as representing a "trans-individual subject" dynamically involved in "solvlng historical problems." Just as Goldmann explains Pascal's "tragic vision" in terms of Jansenism and the predicament of the "noblesse de robe" in the France of the mid 17thC,(31) Levi-Strause interprets Caduveo art forms as imaginative resolutions to contradictions in Caduveo social institutions.(32) He notes first that Caduveo art is marked by dualism: the men sculpt, the women paint; there are two styles of painting - one is angular and geometrical, the other free and curvilinear. Most compositions are based on an orderly mingling of the two. Levi-Strauss then turns to an analysis of Caduveo society. This is divided into three castes, rigidly barred from intermarriage, so that each caste tends to turn in upon itself, thus threatening the cohesion of the society as a whole. But this danger is averted by a vertical division of the society, cutting across the classes. Members of one class cannot marry members of another but in each class the members of one moiety are compelled to marry members of the other. Thus, thinks Levi-Strauss, the asymmetry of class is balanced by symmetry of moiety, such that Caduveo social structure consists of a contradictory principle as does the style of its art. In the first, social mechanisms based on reciprocity are opposed to social mechanisms based on hierarchy. In the second, asymmetrical design is opposed to symmetrical design. Levl-Strauss argues that the contradiction on the social level could have been resolved through social institutions, such as a belief that the moiety-system had existed prior to classes. But this had not occurred, ao the confusion and disquiet within the members of the society are transposed and expressed harmlessly in their art:

"The mysterious charm and (as it seems at first) the gratuitous complication of Caduveo art any well be a phantasm created by a society whose object waa to give symbolical form to the institutions which it might have had in reality, had interest and superstition not stood in the way. Great indeed is the fascination of this culture¸ whose dream-life is pictured on the faces and bodies of its queens, aa if, in making themselves up, they figured a Golden Age that they would never know in reality."(33)

The point of this discussion of Levi-Strauss' analysis is to illustrate that even in a "primitive" society artistic activity occurs within a socio-contextual symbolic system, in such a way as both to represent features of the past and present of a class, group or the society as a whole, and to depict actual or desired future developments of it.

Thus poetry "insinuates into reality new possibilities of order and relation."(34) And Duvignaud writes:

“Every artistic experience..... is a 'new deal´ which while undoubtedly making use of essential elements from the human landscape inhabited by the artist...., suggests a new arrangement and a redistribution of the established system. Art is very rarely the representation of an order. Rather it continuously and anxiously opposes and questions it.”(35)

It is this notion that is central to Lukács´ literary criticism. His criteria of "great" literature, his judgements and his prescriptions for how novelists should write in the 20thC are not important here. But his "sociology of bourgeois literary symbolism", as it might be called, is relevant. For Lukacs:

“True art…aspires to maximum profundity and comprehensiveness, at grasping life in all-embracing totality. .....it examines in as much depth as possible the reality behind appearance and.... represents... the dynamic dialectical process in which reality is transformed into appearance and is manifested as a phenomenon...art thus represents life in Its totality, in motion, development! and evolution....”(36)

Because it draws into a coherent, symbolic totality the most significant elements of social reality, art attains an understanding of actual historical tendencies and of a desired harmonious society of the future (which for Lukács converge since the emotional and ethical hope for socialism in capitalist society is also an historical inevitability):

"through the representation of a type, the concrete, universal and essential qualities, what is enduring in man and what is historically determined and what is individual and what is socially universal, combine in typical art. Through the creation of the type and the discovery of typical characters and situations, the most significant directions of social development obtain adequate artistic expression.”(37)

Following Marx, Balzac is for Lukács the supreme social realist, having achieved penetrating exposés of the fundamental human relationships of his society although espousing consciously a "reactionary" ideology, and supposedly having prophetically created characters still embryonic in his time, who were to emerge fully only after his death.

This idea of the artist as one who, working syncretistically in a symbolic medium, achieves an intuitive representation of the reality of his time, and also portrays aspirations for the resolution of ita contradictions and a "vision" of a higher human condition, la clearly expressed in Shelley's "Defence of Poetry". Talking of Milton´s "Paradise Lost", he says:

"He mingles as it were the elements of human nature as colours upon a single palette, and arranged them in the composition of his great picture according to laws of epic truth.....

“It is a difficult question to determine how far (he was) conscious of the distinction which must have subsisted in (his) mind between (his) own creeds and that of the people (of his time)..... Milton's poem contains within itself a philosophical refutation of that system, of which.... it has been a chief popular support..... Milton's Devil as a moral being is..... far superior to his God, as one who perseveres in some purpose which ha has conceived to be excellentt, in spite of adversity and torture."[(38)]

Milton´s poetry goes beyond his consciously accepted beliefs, espousing a ravolutionary morality. Similarly, John Berger(39) argues that Cubism, while responding to a situation in which conventional images no longer had meaning, and erecting a style of painting in certain senses "bourgeois" (i.e. exhibiting an introspective concern with form and capable of reaching only the intelligencia) - at the same time laid the basis for a transformative realism with revolutionary possibilities.

A performer in any symbol system is constrained by his social role, conceived as the product of symbolic socialization. The "language” he uses is related to his life-experience - the socio-historical reality in which he has lived, and which has structured his "self", and is in particular constrained by his present location in that structure. Speech (in general, but not in all conditions of use) and artistic activity, is the creative implementation of words in one case, and the creative arrangement of elements in a medium in the other. These elements come from the performer's experience and their structured whole bears relation to his specific location in society.

But the art work is not simply a reflection of a "class", nor necessarily does it represent a coherent "world-view" in Goldmann's sense. For "class" is not a "thing" but an historical "happening"(40); an abstract, not empirical concept, through which the dynamics of a social system are understood. (For example, in the various forms of capitalist society of the past and present, all individuals do not fall into one "class" - as a specific empirical raferant - or another. But the consciousness and behaviour of all individuals are related to the dominant contradiction of labour and capital, and more specifically are related in complex ways to their location in it.) An art work will draw on disparate elements of social experience which are concentrated into a form with multifold implications, not necessarily depicting a definable view which is exactly locatable in major historical movements. It will offer explorations of tendencies in social change and implicit aspirations for the future, but not either clear cut "progressive" or "reactionary" interpretations (indeed,

there do not seen to be two such definable orientations even in social science.) The theories of Lukács and Goldmann rely on a certain interpretation of history (with the general characteristics of which I do not quarrel) but then deal only with literary work which can be fitted into it, considering the rest "invalid" but not explaining them. This is not to say their analyses hold no important value. Particular "world-views" - structures of thought and feeling do arise in connection with particular socio-historical circumstances. But any specific world-view, though it may appear the most important meaning in an art-work or art movement, is nevertheless a distillation, an extraction from the complexity of the text or texts. It is related to the analyst´s concerrns, and its ontological status cannot be different from Weber´s "ideal types". Thus, where the concern is primarily the context of the art-work in class history, its structure can be elucidated in terms of definitive drives to come to grips with certain class-specific life-problems. But this is not the only level on which artistic exploration of experience can be understood.

Nor can only a certain type of social realism be granted a "world-view". Fantasy, science-fiction, satire, works with a one-sided emphasis or dealing only with a narrow field of experience, all draw on the performer´s experience and explore it in some way. Where corresponding world-views form a "movement" (e.g. a "tragic vision" in two or more writers from a particular class and period), this should be seen as a coalescence of numerous creative efforts drawing on related experience in similar ways - efforts which greatly differ from them cannot be considered simply "invalid". They are different syntheses arrived at by different individuals. For Lukács and Goldmann the explanation of art-works in socio-historical terms is inseparable from doctrines of aesthetic judgement on the one hand and ideas about what kind of literature is most validly engaged in the movement for social progress on the other. These latter are valid investigations, and are necessarily related to the researcher´s mode of historical explanation; they should not to my mind however, actually intrude into socio-historical explanation in the form of notions regarding the "validity" of past literature.

Particular socio-historical formations exhibit specific cultural symbolisms. These represent particular modes of relationship between human beings, and relationships between human beings and nature. Symbols are used to offer explanations for and to maintain social orders, patterning behaviour and experience. Their use also anticipates future developments, which they can to a limited extent actually influence and help bring about. Symbolisms, like tools (technology), develop in the process of shaping reality and working in it to continue existence. They are integral to the prevailing social structure. To repeat what has been said before, "means of production", "social relations of production" and "culture" are all abstractions from the dynamic totality of reality. No one abstraction is the first or ultimate cause of the whole, nor of change in the whole.

Consciousness of and sensibilities towards nature in any society are part of that society's selection from and categorisation of reality, related to its mode of production, its work on nature - with tools, ideas and feelings. All perception of and feeling for nature is through human symbolisms - which include art, science and language. This study is to a large extent an attempt to analyse artistic practices in symbolisms of nature in the history of capitalist society. The three "movements" I want to discuss are the rise of Flemish landscape painting (1420-1520), English Romantic poetry (c. 1790-1825) and Surrealism in France (c. 1920-1930).

The discussion of Flemish landscape painting in Part II represents an attempt to analyse the "vision of nature" in 15thC Flemish urban society - in which capitalist relations of production were developing. In Part III, British Romanticim is related to the first phase of the Industrial Revolution. The turning towards nature by its poets seems clearly linked to the greatly increased disruption of traditional relationships in society - with a new, aggressive individualism, the growth of cities and manufacturing industry, and is also connected with the isolation and disenchantment from the times of the poets. This last was partly related to the fact that original poets lacked a reading public - traditional patronage having become greatly reduced in importance while a new consumer public had not developed a taste for original poetry. More important, it was likely that the sensibility of a poet like Shelley would lead him to violent rejection of his class - a commercial, landowning ruling class, whose wealth was frequently gained in commerce then used to buy an estate with attendant gentry prestige. The attitude to the land was commercial; a poet could hardly find this an aristocracy whose wealth and power were in some sense "justified" by its closeness to the soil, or by its benevolence to the poor, as in former times.

In circumstances of rapid development of manufacturing industries, property relations and money economies, the experience of individuals becomes "alienated". This term has many levels of meaning. For the sake of the brief account here, I will note the following: experience of circumstances subject to powerful but poorly understood social forces (i.e. more so than in previous forms of society); loss of even a limited control over the world; separation from other people in a competitive society characterised by the breakdown of community and increase in division of labour; urban existence, removed from nature and direct relationships with the materials worked on in production. Under such circumstances a conscious attention to "nature" seems often to increase - as in Flanders with the early developments in capitalism, in the late Tang and Sung dynasties in China,[43] and in Romanticism, especially in the England of the early Industrial Revolution.(44) Nature is no longer taken for granted; it is no longer sheltered from deep emotional concern in a social matrix of assumed perceptions. Nature impinges on a reflexive consciousness, holds complex meanings, provokes strong feelings. The experience of human relationships becomes increasingly symbolically

intermingled with nature; fears, hopes - a whole spectrum of subtle and varied emotions are projected into nature. Natural symbolisms then enter experience and affect the consciousness and experience of society; society is viewed in terms of symbols found in nature; judgements of society are based on the vision of Nature as are ideas of how it should be changed.

PART I: NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Peter Wollen: "Signs and Meaning in the Cinema" (1969).

2. When I use "language" to mean languages in general, I will put it in quotation marks. When not, I mean it to refer to its everyday sense, i.e. a linguistic system. "Language" is therefore synonymous with "symbol systems".

3. L. Goldmann expresses this Hegelian insight by saying there ie a "partial identity of subject and object." ("The Human Sciences and Philosophy" 1969.)

4. Or animals and even humans in certain contexts. Cf. Levi-Strauss´ analysis of women in inter-group marriages representing symbolic communication.

5. Shelley, from "Epipsychydion".

6. SOME have only one or the other of the followihg contradictory characteristics. Many important artistic performances of a culture have both, and so has "serious conversation" (dialogue).

7. J. Duvignaud: "The Sociology of Art" (1972).

8. D. Chaney: "Communication, Entertainment and Audiences", unpublished seminar paper, University of Durham.

9. L. Goldmann: T.L.S. article, (1967).

10. B. Bernstein: "Language and Socialisation" in Minnis ed.: "Linguistics at Large, (1971).

11. H. Fleischer: "Marxism and History", (1973). Quotations from Marx.

13. E. Leach: "Language and Anthropology" in Minnis, op. cit.

13. Goldmann's term.

14. D. Chaney: "Language: Code and Action", unpublished seminar paper, University of Edinburgh.

15. Ibid.

16. Cf. Hymes: "Towards Ethnographies of Communication" in Giglioli (ed) 1972. In a discussion of the "Saplr-Whorf hypothesis", Hymes notes that language (the linguistic system) does not hold the same position in any totality of communication systems. And in "Two Types of Linguistic Relativity" (W. Bright ed. 1966), he writes "...people who enact different cultures do to some extent experience distinct communicative systems, not merely the same communicative condition with different customs affixed."

17. T.H. Gombrlch: "Art and Illusion". Gombrich's approach is apparently an application of Karl Popper´s "Evolutionism and Theory of World 3" ("Popper", Bryan Magee, (1973)) but this line of thought is hardly an innovation of Popper's. It is in fact implicit in Marx's writings.

18. Particular "means of production" are only such within a specific set of "social relations of production" and only to human beings whose motivations and states of knowledge lead them to use them as such. One term entails the other.

19. "Levi-Strauss, Althusser and Structuralism", seminar paper by Dr. Miriam Glucksmann, University of Leicester, (1972).

20. Max Black: "The Labyrinth of Language", (1968).

21. C. Wright Mills: "Character and Social Structure" (1953). Confining himself to linguistic language, Mills uses the term "word-motive" to convey the significance of symbols to human experience and behaviour.

22. Following Backer's terms in explicating Mill's theory, in E. Becker: "Mill´s Social Psychology and the Great Historical Convergence on the Problem of Alienation", in "The New Sociology", Horowitz ed. (1964).

23. This is analogous to technological innovation through progressive improvisation-attempts to solve immediate problems.

24. Louis Arnaud Reid: "Meaning In the Arts".

25. Reid, ibid.

26. Barbara Hepworth: "Carvings and Drawings."

27. In the same way, "contradictions" in a society at a particular stage of development compel men to explore new techniques of production (if they are to survive). Cf. Gordon Childe's explanation in "What Happened in History" (1942) of the way the neolithic economy brought about population increase and the disadvantage of isolation of the neolithic community which its means of production could not sustain. The solutions to the problem did not spring full-grown in the imaginations of men. Any social revolution occurs through this process (see Part IV).

Similarly, Karl Popper¨s view of the development of science is one in which existing bodies of theory become inadequate in explaining new discoveries. The solving of problems or contradictions which are internally compelling of further scientific exploration sometimes results in a transformation of the whole conceptual scheme within which the exploration began. Also for Popper, the scientist and artist are both engaged in extending the understanding of experience by the uee of creative imagination subjected to critical control.

28. Max Black: op.cit.

29. Coleridge: "Biographia Literaria".

30. George Steineri "Linguistics and Literature" in Minnis ed. (1971).

31. L. Goldmann: "The Hidden God", (1964).

32. Claude Levi-Strauss: "Tristes Tropiques", (1961).

33. Ibid.

34. G. Steiner: op.cit.

35 Duvlgnaud: op.cit.

36. Georg Lukács: “Preface to the aesthetic writings of Marx and Engels.” In G. Lukács: "Writer and Critic", (1970).

37. Ibid.

38. Shelley: "A Defense of Poetry".

39. John Berger: "Problems of Socialist Art” in Baxendall ed.: "Radical Perspectives In the Arts", (1972).

40. Cf. E.P. Thompson: "Peculiarities of the English", Socialist Register, 1965.

41. Cf. Karl Mannheim: "Ideology and Utopia", (1936).

42. Raymond Williams: "Culture and Society, 178O - 1950", (1958).

43. It would be absurd to assert that whenever certain conditions obtain, an artistic sensitivity to nature results. The "certain conditions" would be very difficult to define absolutely clearly, and it can always be argued that some concern for nature is found In most forms of art. However, the development of landscape painting into the most highly regarded form of art in Sung China was concomitant with an unprecedented development of commerce, manufacture, money relationships entering into agricultural production (i.e the growth of a commercial land-owning class, looking to the land as a source of income but with no close ties to the soil nor to the peasants, and not concerning itself with even running the estates (cf. the early 19thC English landowning class)), and a growth or urban life. Property relations developed very far, though we know from Marx's and Weber´s analyses that Capitalism oould never grow fully In ancient China. Many of the groat landscapists were recluses in nature, highly critical of what they regarded as disharmony and "unnatural" morality in society.

This relationship seems more than coincidence, even though the circumstances of a totally different civilisation cannot allow simple comparisons with the West.

44. For the Romantics it was not just values felt in nature which were contrasted with "unnatural" society - such as harmony or simpicity of existence. It was also the belief that a particular kind of perception of the forms of nature - aesthetic or mystical - was related to a state of being which reached "Truth". This truth waa not only a system of rational ideas, but a truthful way of being. From it seemed to stem the answer to human existence. The sensibilities aroused by direct communion with nature were seen as the the deepest instruction to human understanding and feeling for life in every dimension.

This hyper-sensitised perception of nature, an ecstatic revelation of "Being" within phenomena (which is I feel also the eeeenee of Taoiat-influenced Sung landscape and the 15thC Flemish 1andscapes of Dirk Bouts and Geertgen tot sint Jans), was seen by Coleridge and Shelley as a facet of the Imagination. For Shelley, the Imagination is also the human faculty which transforms society in creative praxis (cf. Parts III and IV). Thus human emancipation is intimately related to the deep intuitive vision of nature. This connection is of significance for my intention to inter-relate Surreallism with 15thC landscape and 19thC Romanticism - as three syabolisms in the experience of nature in widely differing conditions of what can be generally terued "capitalist society."

Further References:

Ernst Fischer: "The Necessity of Art", (1963).
T. and E. Burns (eds): "The Sociology of Art and Literature", (1973).
Diana Laurenson and Alan Swingewood: "The Sociology of Literature" (1972).
John Berger: "Ways of Seeing" (1972).
L.S. Vygotsky: "Thought and Language" 1962.

PART II

The development of capitalism and the rise of Landscape painting in fifteen century flanders

The transition from European Feudalism to Capitalism was a complex historical process. Under the feudal economic organisation agricultural workers (serfs) were legally and traditionally bound to the estates of lords. In return for the expropriated surplus of their labour (obligatory labour-services), the serfs had rights to work on the land to provide for their own subsistence; they owned their limited instruments of production, and were guaranteed some degree of military protection by the lord. The political organization of feudal Europe was heterogeneous. There was conflict of political power between the landowning nobility and the centralised authority of prlnces and bishops. To a large extent these were colonial classes ruling over previously subjugated peoples, giving the former a strong element of internationality.

Under fully-fledged Capitalism, the economic organisation typically entails an industrial property-owning class expropriating the surplus from the labour of a working-class. The latter is divorced from the complex means of production, and brings to the market its labour-power which is exchanged in a formally free way for wage-money. The accompanying political organization is typically that of the bourgeois-democratic nation-state.

The transition cannot be discussed in detail here, but I will delineate the features of it crucial to this analysis. There was a growth of commerce in Europe after 1100 AD accompanied by development of the towns. For Pirenne(1) the first was the cause of the second, whilst Mumford(2) argues that urban developments led to the re-opening of continental routes and regional and international trade centres; but a mutual interaction can surely be assumed. Such development was also contingent upon agricultural improvements after the llthC, which allowed for an increase in population and food supply - necessary factors for urban development, and created a need for means to market and distribute the surplus. The discovery of new continents and trade-routes, and inventions such as the mariner's compass (in this particular case the invention was introduced from China), were also factors in the process.

Conditions evolved in the towns which allowed for primary accumulation of capital, dependent on the emergence of a "civil society" in Marx's(3) term, i.e. an autonomous sphere of economic activity unimpeded by the political and religious restrictions

characteristic of the community-orientated feudal system. The communal movement of urban emancipation, to be discussed shortly in connection with the Flemish cities, separated the political sphere from the economic and gave rise to legal and institutional arrangements which made the accumulation of capital possible and socially acceptable. A. crucial role was played by Christianity in allowing the emergence of a "confessional association" in the medieval town, in which kinship ties were obliterated making possible the idea and reality of political equality. Tor both Marx and Weber this was a necessary condition for "mercantile capitalism" to develop.

The emerging city had profound transformative effects on the countryside. These were extremely complex, however, and generalizations about commercialisation of the land must be made cautiously. The process of "commuting" labour-services for money-payments or land-hire did not always occur in those places where commerce and then capitalist industry grew earliest; in fact the growth of a money economy was frequently associated with an intensification of serfdom. Circumstances led sometimes to one, sometimes to another action on the part of the lords - this being governed by which was economically most favourable for the lord and the presence or absence of strong pressure from the peasantry for conmutation.(5) The connection between the growth of the market and the transition to leases or hired labour on the land may sometimes have operated via the effect of trade on the process of class differentiations among the peasantry (trade having made possible the emergence of a wealthy peasant class) rather than via a direct influence on the economic policy of the lord. A wealthy peasant class might in one circumstance be stronger in demanding commutation, in another its existence might be accompanied by a still poor and powerless peasant class that could be easily enserfed.

The course taken in the countryside of Flanders whilst the commercial development of the Flemish cities was underway is crucial to the understanding of that urban reflection on the land, to which I shall turn shortly. Here a variety of tendencies were exhibited. To a considerable extent commutation occurred, generating both a class of small peasant proprietors who marketed their produce in the growing towns, and also a propertyless rural proletariat. The latter filled the towns in large numbers and this tendency was exacerbated following the Black Death in the 14thC, when there was a mass exodus of peasants leaving exhausted and ruined agricultural land, as elsewhere in Europe. This was yet another factor which helped the disintegration of feudal organi zation, providing an added strain on a system already subject to a matrix of circumstances threatening it.

There was also a forceful movement by the new urban bourgeoisie and urban artisans onto the land, sometimes by reclamation of unused land, sometimes by the purchase of estates from the nobility which was retrogressive and neglectful. This of course contrasts strongly with the course taken in England, where the nobility was highly progressive, commercializing the land with the help of Enclosures backed by the monarchy. In Flanders the commercialization was undertaken through an alliance between the above mentioned "bourgeoisie" and the Duke of Burgundy, who early in

the 15thC brought most of the Low Countries under his power. The latter undermined the holdings of the Church and the nobility, and built up large estates of his own. He and the towns together supported and protected the peasantry against the nobility who sometimes attempted re-enserfment. The echevins (the urban democratic government to be described shortly) of Ypres, for example, declared proudly that "never was there heard tell of folk of servile condition nor of mortemain" in Flanders.(7) Characteristically, the Duke of Burgundy, while favouring the emancipation of serfs, helped landed proprietors against the flight and the demands of agricultural wage-earners by various measures including coercion.

With the towns the Duke supported agricultural colonization, works of embankment and drainage, and protected natural wealth such as waters and forests. Against the desire of the towns he favoured the spread of rural industries. Meanwhile the towns triad to subject the neighbouring countryside to their dictates. Thus although the towns opened the way for the encroachment of princely power, the contradiction between them was soon evident - a point which will recur later.

The efficiency of agriculture in Flanders was increased during the 14th and 15thC. Here the fattening of cattle on turnips and leguminous plants waa invented. Intensive farming developed and Flemish florists earned an international reputation. Forests were turned to profitable account.

I shall now turn to an account of the Flemish cities themselves. During the middle-ages these towns lay within the territories of small prelates, some ruled by secular princes, some by bishops. These prelates had shifting alliances with larger monarchies or the Vatican, often existing in a subordination to them that waa more theoretical than actual. Pirenne explains the rise of Bruges, Ghent and Ypres as resulting from travelling merchants clustering around feudal "castra" in the 10th and llthC, both for protection and because they were situated favourably for trade. At first they would trade in wool, hides, fish and small manufactured articles; during the Crusades spices and precious goods from beyond Europe were added to the typical merchandise. Generally the feudal lord encouraged the settlement of merchants around the castle; they would build a wall around their dwellings which would join the castle walls. The typical medieval town that sprang up thus was a community of burghers of mixed origins. It would include the original traders, serfs who had left the land for a variety of different reasons, plus older aristocratic families who would own land in the town and the neighbouring countryside.

The political organisation of these communities was remarkably democratic at this stage. The community strove to secure privileges, rights, etc. from the feudal authority, sometimes through violence. In the case of towns situated in the territory of secular lords, the struggle seems to have been mostly peaceful since the lord was prepared to grant advantages to encourage the town's growth. Generally he relinquished feudal obligations held on citizens, who became without exception "free". He was prepared to abandon trade restrictions which were feudal legacies, provided the burghers satisfied him with some form of payment. Most important, the burghers acquired autonomous

municipal government. The echevinage, which started as a feudal governing body, came to consist of burghers elected by burghers. The lord appointed one representative only for himself: the president.

The pattern in ecclesiastical territories was different. The bishops were less prone to relinquish obligations over and grant freedom to the new urban community. This is reflected in the political organisation of medieval towns in bishoprics (e.g. Liege). Because the echevinage remained strictly feudal, the burghers created their own council or political representation called jurati, which acted on behalf of the burghers in opposition to the bishop's echevinage.

Ths typical medieval town grew to be more than a community of merchants. The predominant activity came to be manufacture for a local market (consisting of the prince or bishop and his "court", the nobility and peasantry of the countryside and the urban population itself) and a limited export market. Manufacture was organized within craft guilds. Each craft had its own guild which the appropriate craftsmen had to join in order to carry out their skills. Guild organization was "socialistic": due to a situation in which the market demand was constant (since the market was predominantly local and the population also constant). It protected the producers and prevented any individual dominating the others through capital accumulation, controlled production and retail price and limited to two or three the number of assistants any craft-master could hire. Working hours and the advertisement of products were strictly regulated, as also were the kinds of tools and raw materials used and the quality of products. The guilds had no fixed capital but executed regulations in the interest of all their members; they also procured raw materials which were evenly distributed among the craftsmen. The guilds and town government enforced regulations over the food market, supplied by peasants from the countryside (the latter were provided by the towns with an opportunity to raise their standards by producing above subsistence necessities and marketing the surplus), in such a way that the citizen-consumers were sure of a favourable position.

The mode of production in the urban handicrafts was simple commodity production, of a non-class, peasant type, where the craftsmen owned their own tools. This differed from the crafts undertaken on a feudal estate only to the extent that the craftsmen were making their wares for sale on a market and not as an obligatory service for a lord. Division of labour was based on the final product (so that a commodity stayed in the same workshop for every stage of its manufacture) and not on technical specialization of operations (e.g. spinning, weaving, dyeing, etc.) which, it was feared, might place the worker nearest the market in a position to dominate the others and depress them to the level of wage-workers.

This typical medieval urban organisation co-existed in the bigger towns of Flanders with a more capitalistic system from as early as the 12thC. In such towns as Bruges and Ghent there flourished a weaving industry. Since the raw material (wool) came from afar (England) and the large quantities of finished product required export-marketing, the industry succumbed early to a tendency to minority control. "Putting out" merchants

of "drapers" bought wool in England, supplied it to the weavers, and marketed the finished cloth. This cloth was of high quality, and because of the essential nature of clothing, was able to find a large market in various European countries. The workshops were independent; the looms ware owned by master-weavers who received wool from the draper and wages for themselves and for their two or three assistants. Nevertheless these workers formed a proletariat in contradistinction to the guild craftsmen; they were all wage-earners, and all but the master-weavers did not owe their means of production and none owned the raw material used by the industry.

The quasi-capitalistic organisation of certain industries (particularly weaving and metal-working) helped the towns in which they existed to develop early in a way that was to be followed by the society at large as feudalism crumbled.

In the towns of Ypres, Bruges and Ghent the increasing predomlnanoe of quasi-capitalist industry was accompanied by the replacement of the communal town government by a "patriciate". This was an aristocracy of merchant capitalists and landowners, a new class which differentiated itself from the rest of the burghers. This class managed to secure the previously democratic echevlnage as the instrument of its domination. In a variety of ways measures to prevent the echevins from becoming hereditary offices were circumvented. Merchant guilds, restricted through high entrance fees to an elite, replaced the power of guilds organised according to craft. A trading oligarchy appeared within the major guilds and the town government.

By 1300 there was serious conflict between this patriciate and the impoverished wage-earning proletariat in Bruges, Ghent and Ypres. The latter were supported by those wealthy burghers who were excluded from power by the sclerotized patriciate. The feudal powers aligned themselves too in this conflict that was symptomatic of the emerging capitalist system. The local princes supported the weavers; the King of France in an attempt to extend his sovereignty over Flanders supported the merchant patriciate. Previously to this the patriciate had allied itself with the French king against the Count of Flanders.

The conflict was brought to a head by the increasing misery of the proletariat and the fact that the patriciate class gradually lost hold of the actual trade of wool and cloth, although still in control of cloth manufacture. This last factor was the outcome of the English Wool Staple - a law which prevented foreign merchants from buying English wool, restricted the export of wool and encouraged the manufacture of cloth in England. Also the development of sea trade had placed the export of Flemish wool into the hands of Venetian sea-traders in the place of Flemish overland traders.

A long sequence of uprisings by the artisans and weavers culminated in a successful revolt in 1302, after which revolutionary governments were enstated in the towns and the forces of the patriciate and the king of France were beaten at the battle of Courtrai.

The new government attempted to organise a democratic commune, but very soon the merchand capitalist class regained power over the cloth industry. The weaver proletariat before long found the interests of all other factions pitted against it, and was pushed back to its former position but for minor political rights which it retained. The economic mode of cloth production could not be changed (a deep understanding of which was of course lacking) and all through the 14th and l5thC unsuccessful revolts occurred. These were nevertheless surprisingly well organised and clear in intention, exhibiting considerable class consciousness.They were very violent and instilled great fear in the bourgeoisie and nobility whom the weavers constantly attempted to massacre.

The overthrow of the patriciate did however result in a different form of government which Plrenne calls "democratic". Though the large-scale capitalistic weaving industry was largely unaffected by it, the municipal administration ceased to be in the exclusive hands of an oligarchy, and was now determined by a number of corporations representing the dlfferent crafts. The towns were therefore governed by a balance between interests of particular crafts, and pursued policies of protection and privilege for the town as a whole. The burgher communities once again posed obstacles to the further development of a capitalist and unrestricted market. In principle they had reverted to the direct government which had prevailed in the early period of urban communes, with the difference that now no one waa qualified to a voloa In tha administration by reason of hia poaltlon aa a simple burgher: he must enter an officially recognized corporation or "member". The old patriciate now constituted a single "member" alongside the others, as did the weavers.

The "democratic" government in Flanders which followed the 1302 uprising had fought the French king with tha help of the Count of Flanders, who consequently maintained his supremacy. Thus the Flemish cities did not gain the autonomy of those in Italy and Germany, but nor did they come early under the power of monarchy as in France or England. The municipal exclusiveness of the Flemish cities was not favourable to a united opposition against the count. Nevertheless, because the latter needed money for his growing administration which the revenues of his lands no longer sufficed to pay, he turned mostly to the towns for support. In return for such payments Ghent, Bruges and Ypres became the dominating political power in Flanders. But to bring us to the point mentioned before, a growing centralised power was incompatible with municipal self-government, and this conflict came to a head when Flanders was drawn into the Burgundian State under Philip the Good in the early 15thC. The latter event was favourable to, and a necessary part of, the further development of rationalized capitalistic tendencies within the towns. Philip the Good enforced a centralized legal and political authority on the towns, and as with the agricultural policies discussed earlier, promoted "progressive" tendencies in urban economy. Large-scale commerce and foreign trade demanded the abolition of restrictive policies and privileged markets, and a single law for the whole state. There grew up universities, law courts and new institutions with numerous officials. The nobility transformed itself by degrees into a nobility of courtiers, whilst the urban upper class provided the Duke with recruits for his administration. The capitalists favoured his growing intervention.

But the majority of burghers did not. Burgher communes in Ghent and Bruges took up arms separately against the Duke and faced inevitable defeat many times in the 15thC. The echevin and the "members" or corporations lost much of their power to the Duke's stewards, except in the most local aspects of government. Yet the Duke was not able to obtain absolute sovereignty, and tried to satisfy certain local demands. His policy was often therefore a hesitating attempt to reconcile incompatible tendencies, leading to inconsistencies.

Philip the Good was succeeded in 1467 by Charles the Bold, whose despotic rule extended the centralized authority yet more. The urban communes consisting of the lesser burghers and crafts revolted again, once more unsuccessfully. By this time the decline of the cloth industry in Bruges and Ghent had minimised the importance of the weavers in these conflicts.

The decline of Bruge, Ghent and Ypres during the latter half of the 15thC was due partly to the strangulating effect of the English Wool Staple and partly to the social unrest in these cities. The inferior wool from Spain was supporting a new weaving industry in Antwerp. The shift to Antwerp was also associated with the fact that "enterprising" capitalists could set up industries here without having to deal with the medieval guild restrictions on trade, wages, techniques, etc. that still lingered at Bruges, Ghent and Ypres, even though in the weaving industry these had for the most part disappeared. At Antwerp there were no limits to output, no craft guilds uniting artisans or prescribing wages, apprenticeship conditions and work-hours. Besides cloth manufacture and export, Antwerp became the world's commercial and financial centre and there grew up a large variety of other industries organized on capitalistic lines. It should be emphasized that new manufacturers were not the "descendants" of the mercantilist or "putting out" capitalists of the previous era, but a new, aggressive, entrepreneurial class which led on as it were, from where the previous class had arrived. The growing manufacturing proletariat was excluded from all legal and political rights. Not even the theoretical edifice of a weavers' corporation existed as at Bruges and Ghent (although this had not significantly ameliorated the structurally dictated condition of employment insecurity and poverty of the proletariat in Bruges and Ghent), and in Antwerp ineffective riots and revolts occurred.

From being under the Burgundlan court the Low Countries went, through royal marriages, to the Hapsburg and then to the Spanish crown. The 16thC is concerned with the growth of nationalist consciousness among the urban middle-classes of the Low Countries - overcoming the hitherto parochial mentality. The close relation between the growth of capitalism in Europe and that of royal power has been noted. The increase in government and military expenses forced kings and princes to turn to merchant bankers for loans, and employed them to handle increasingly complex problems of state finance. Fortunes were made from the opportunities provided by offices in royal governments and large-scale contracts with them. Central governments broke down urban monopolies, guild controls over production and wage, etc., and opened up a freer inter-

urban trade to expand capitalist enterprise. Governments also fostered commerce by negotiating trade treaties. Thus economic nationalism was in its infancy in the 15thC Low Countries. However. middle-class capitalism soon came into conflict with the monarchical state which had favoured its development in the 15thC, and in the 16thC the first bourgeois nation-state emerged in the Netherlands, heralding the political form appropriate to the growing predominance of capital.

The capitalistic ruling class appropriated the Calvinist ideology in a struggle for national independence in the Low Countries from the Roman Catholic, aristocratic Spanish crown. This struggle was successful in the north (the modern Netherlands) under the leadership of William the Silent. It was unsuccessful In Flanders and Brabant (present-day Belgium). Related to this is the decline of Antwerp in favour of Amsterdam as the commercial and financial centre of Northern Europe after the wars against Spain.

Economic and political change in Europe had been creating strains within the Roman Catholic Church since the late Middle Ages. The Reformation was the culmination of a process that vaa responding to the development of a money-economy and commerce. To maintain its power the Church began to take loans from capitalists (in spite of Christian strictures against usury), and to obtain money in more or less corrupt ways (heavy taxes, indulgences etc.) The difficulties in providing theological justifications for these acts was matched by the general decay of the Church's ethical credibility. The Reformation was accompanied by a disintegration and resynthesis of political alliances in Europe - religious contention providing both theoretical rationalizations and predisposing orientations of belief for political and economic actions. Protestantism provided an ideological basis both for the nationalist struggle of a colonized society and for capitalistic economic practices in a self-conscious commercial class. There is a distinction between the two, even if they cannot be disentangled in the historical reality.

The inter-relation between religious belief and socio-economic change is very complex; the Weberian thesis that Calvinism provided a "spirit" efficacious for developing capitalist activity focuses on a single, rather late step in a complex dialectical process. The tendency toward criticism of the Church was already strong in the 15thC, associated with the Humanist movement in thought. In the 16thC the Protestant ideologies were accompanied by similar changes within the Catholic camp - since all were faced with the same, more or less developed economic and political circumstances. Undoubtedly Protestant!am played the role Weber analysed, but then all forms of Christianity came to justify and predispose men toward economic practises previously unacceptable to the Christianity of e.g. St. Thomas Aquinas, to a greater or lesser extent. In addition, Protestantism and certain Catholic sects also provided a fitting set of beliefs for an experience of increasing insecurity and alienation before the forces of a market beyond immediate comprehension and manipulation.

It is fairly certain that capital which was first used in the establishment of capitalist production, was "generated" initially in trade. It was through trade in a situation of an

undeveloped market (feudal production being parochial) that fortunes could be quickly made. These could be supplemented by loans to decadent feudal barons or crowns and by buying urban land. Then - due to the separation of the raw material from the craftsmen and the craftsmen from the (distant) consumer at this period; and the fact that the resources in the hands of the producers were so meagre - then capital could revolutionize the production of industries like wool-weaving. THUS Marx's view is justifiable, that a crucial factor encouraging the accumulation of capital in late medieval society was the emergence of "civil society", this resting upon certain technological and agricultural innovations. The origins of capitalism cannot be reduced to a discussion of technological change nor ideology alone, but involve the elucidation of complex configurations of factors. Historical change for Marx occurs as a complex, dialectically interactional process between "productive forces", "social relations of production" and "consciousness". Productive forces are not mere natural data, but involve the historical conditions (i.e. the predominant social relations and associated states of knowledge) under which natural phenomena are utilized in material production. Man's position with regard to the inter-dependency of changes in social consciousness and economic practices is not fundamentally different here from Weber's.

I shall now attempt to analyse the emergence of landscape painting as a self-conscious artistic practice in the Flemish cities of the 15thC. The location of a particular practice¨s coming-into-being is always to some extent arbitrary, so I shall justify the delineation I am making. I follow the art historian Friedlander(8) in seeing the first sign of a new concern for nature in the paintings of Jan van Eyck around 1420, and take the development up till Joachim Patenir (died 1520) who is usually recognised as the first painter to depict “pure” landscape, that is to recognize nature in itself as valid subject-matter for art. This 100 year period corresponds with important changes in the movement from medieval to capitalist social and economic practices.

Now the tendency to give increased importance to landscape in painting was not unique to Flanders in this period. It is found in Italy and Southern Germany also. In Italy it is associated with the Renaissance and the development of urban communities with features similar to those of Flanders, including the growth of a capitalistic weaving industry, whilst the German painters produced their landscapes largely for Italian art patrons from the Renaissance towns. Conceivably then, one could study the rise of landscape in connection with the Italian towns, but there are reasons for finding Flanders more valuable. Firstly, contemporaries considered landscape to be the invention and province of Flemish painters and later observers have continued to do so. The Italian Renaissance had a primarily humanist ethos in which landscape was considered inferior, even if frequently painted, to the human form. More important however, is the fact that 15thC Flemish landscape led directly into 16thC and 17thC Dutch landscape. This indicates the greater historical significance of landscape in Flanders if one is concerned with the relation between it and the development of Capit alism; Holland is where the capitalistic tendencies of 15thC Flanders took root and

developed after its emancipation from Spain, whilst Flanders itself (which failed to break from Spain) and the Italian cities declined, and the importance of landscape went with them. Landscape painting within the prototypical forms of capitalist society in 15th C Flanders offers an early and poignant insight into an "artistic vision of nature" in the new kind of society; the same fundamental characteristics of it can be found in modified forms and with new significances in the efflorescences of landscape painting in l7th C Holland and 18th C and 19th C France and England.

It is relevant to see how the social context of art production changed over the 100 years under consideration. Jan van Eyck painted on commission for princes and bishops. He was employed first with the bishop of Liege, then with Philip the Good of Burgundy(9) (who moved his court to Flanders in 1420 - an act which provides a symbolic beginning to the period). Withth the latter Eyck was on close terms, and this fact, coupled with the knowledge that he was the first Flemish painter to sign his works. suggests that he represents the 15th C painter's ascent from the craft anonymity of medieval artists.(10) Later Eyck lived at Bruges, where he worked for merchants and the richer burghers, executed public commissions such as altarpieces, and painted the statues on the facade of the Town Hall. By 1520, Patenir in commercially thriving Antwerp was producing landscapes for an anonymous, largely middle-class art market. The art-work is now a commodity handled by the art-dealer. The artist and purchaser never meet, but the first has a "name" and produces works of a saleable kind ("genre") for which he is known. The entrepreneurial class in Antwerp of the 1520s is not the same as the burgher-merchant class of the earlier period in Flanders, still less the same as the nobility for whom the early Eyck painted. Thus the "vision of nature" we are studying is not something that emerged within a single class - the bourgeoisie - as a mechanical thing, it is the development of a "vision" that accompanies a shift in the economic structure. This process does also entail the rise of a middle-class, though "not as a thing but a happening."(11)

This "vision of nature" (the content of which I shall come to) I conceive as an aesthetic sensibility pertaining to certain social groups in 15th C Flemish urban society. It is a part of the "ideological practise" of the society, in the sense that Althusser for example uses the term, and rests (with reservations - discussed in Part I) upon the conception of society as a "complex internally structured totality of various layers and levels (of practise) related to each other in all sorts of relations of determination and interdependence."(12) Within the totality of "ideological practise" there is great variation: there are linguistic, visual and musical sign-systems according to one possible mode of classification: there are religious, political, and scientific "ideas" according to another. Within a designated set of attitudes and sensibilities called an "aesthetic vision of nature" there will be incorporated a multiplicity of sign systems from seemingly incompatible systems of ideology and practise. In the elucidation of the 15th C Flemish vision of nature we shall have to deal with elements from theological and political beliefs for example. But although contradictory elements co-exist within it, this does not exclude the validity of seeing landscape painting as a single phenomenon, a practise and aesthetic sensibility developing over time in which past meanings are never totally

overthrown, yet in their persistence alter their connotations and denotations, and come to exist within a different total context - to the other elements of which they come to bear new relationships. And as with linguistic systems, artistic representations of nature use communally held, intersubjectlve symbols which structure individuals' experience of "reality" - indeed are that reality. A trivial but nonetheless real example of this point is offered by an 18th C guidebook to the Lake District: "from the delicate touches of Claude verified at Coniston Lake, to the noble scenes of Poussin, exhibited at Windermere Water, and from there to the stupendous romantic ideas of Salvator Rosa, realized in the lake of Derwent."(14)

The attempt to discern the structural meanings of a complex practise like landscape painting can draw on the insights of anthropological studies, for example that of Turner.(15) In his analysis of a tribal ritual, Turner found it necessary to go beyond the interpretations given by participants (i.e. explicit meanings) and also found that members of different groups within the larger group viewed the ritual from different "structural perspectives". He also found that rituals (like landscape paintings) held disparate and contradictory elements. Like the landscape paintings of a particular socio-hiatorical context, the ritual is a symbol exhibiting condensation of meaning. This is analogous to Freud's term "overdetermination" which denotes how a single dream image may express several unconscious desires. Similar points are raised in Geertz's discussion of political ideologies, valid equally for artistic productions. Landscape paintings, like ideologies grasp, formulate and communicate social realities (including nature) which elude the tempered language of science or philosophy. As in metaphor, there is an interplay between discordant meanings symbolically coerced into unitary conceptual frameworks, giving rise to significance on a new level.

Over the 100 years under consideration here, landscape paintings can be seen to have become progressively the expression of a "vision of nature" in a capitalist society. Now structures of thought and artistic practises arise, as Mannheim(17) showed, from definitive drives to come to grips with certain life-problems associated with specific social classes or groups. The vision constitutes a "mental structure" in Goldmann's terms, and two quotes from him should lead us to the elucidation of this vision:

"Human facts (e.g. art works) are responses, constituting attempts to modify the situation in a sense favourable to the aspirations of the subject. Or, all human behaviour tends to modify a situation felt as disequilibrium, to create equilibrium."(18"

"The exceptional individuals whose work is identified with the trams-individual subject (e.g. class) have aspirations and needs corresponding either to the total restructuring of all human relations and relations between man and nature, or to the total preservation of existing structures and values."(19)

Thus landscape painting, an historical "project" born of the l5th C within emerging capitalist society, has tendencies "urging" for both the advancement of this society, and for its replacement by a society in which the "ailments" of capitalist society are

resolved. The first expresses the positive world-views of an ascending middle-class and a new social mode of production. Like Levi-Strauss' myths in primitive societies, collective conceptualizations and sensibilities allow of and develop further the living out of existing social organizations and practises. The second tendency is described by Duvignaud as that "attitude" of art which searches its appropriate social structures, i.e. it attempts to "create" a society:

"Every artistic experience.... is a 'new deal´ which while undoubtedly making use of essential elements from the human landscape inhabited by the artist.... suggests a new arrangement and a redistribution of the established system. Art is very rarely the representation of an order. Rather it continuously and anxiously opposes and questions it."(20)

Before applying these arguments to the landscape paintings themselves, I must undertake a digression into the relationship between man and nature in capitalist society. A fundamental premise of dialectical materialism is that man's continued existence relies upon a "metabolic interaction" between society and material reality. According to Kolakowski:

"The assimilation of the external world, which is at first biological, subsequently social and therefore human, occurs as an organization of the raw material of nature in an effort to satisfy needs; cognition, which is a factor in the assimilation, cannot evade this universal determinian .....

"Nature appears as the opposition encountered by human drives, and all possible cognition is man's realization of the contact between conscious man and the external resistance he experiences.....

"It is impossible for man to conceive of himself in his independence from his own practical contact with it or its opposition to his efforts, for it is this contact which gives birth to and defines his ability to comprehend...

"Nor are the qualities of things forms or attributes of reality 'in itself´. They are socially subjective as long as they bear the imprint of the organizational power of man, who sees the world in such terms and from such points of view as are necessary for him to adapt to it and transform it usefully."(21)

Although the tenor of this verges on utilitarian determinism (and all thought cannot be helpfully reduced to the satisfaction of needs), Kolakowski has described the process by which man humanizes nature, his apprehension of nature being always socio-historically locateable and relateable to specific conditions of both means and social relations of production. "Technology discloses Man's mode of dealing with nature, the process of production by which he sustains his life, and thereby also lays

bare the mode of formation of his social relations, and of the mental conceptions(22) that flow from them."

At the same time as, and associated with, society's "humanization of nature" (in which men change the forms of the materials of nature and change their cognitive apprehension of nature), society is itself transformed - though not through any causal determinism. The dialectical process by which nature is mediated socially is described by Lenin:

"Cognition is the eternal, endless approximation of thought to the object. The reflection of nature in man's thought must be understood... in the eternal process of movement, the arising of contradictions and their solution." (23)

I am assuming in this study that the "vision of nature" contained in 15th C Flemish landscape painting can be considered as an element of the total social consciousness relating to the state of both means and relations of production in 15th C Flanders (not to be conceived as a static condition, but in continual flux). The importance of the social apprehension of nature to the dialectical relationship between "means of production" and "consciousness" is shown in the following:

"… according to Marx 'productive forces´ are not objective facts external to human consciousness. They represent the organization of human consciousness and human activity: Niagara Falls does or does not constitute a 'productive force´ not because of its natural, 'objective´ attributes per se, but because surrounding society does or does not view it as a productive force and does or does not harness it to purposive human action." (24)

According to Marx, nature that is unworked is economically valueless, having purely potential value which awaits its realization:

"The material of nature alone, in so far as no human labour is embodied in it, in so far as it is mere material and existing independently of human labour, has no value, since value is only embodied labour...."(25)

And:

"Those areas of nature not yet drawn into the sphere of hunan production - a primitive forest or atoll in the Pacific - can only be viewed and comprehended through the categories of the already appropriated part of nature. Just as in Hegel'a aesthetic the perception of natural beauty presupposes the perception of artistic beauty, In opposition to the common view, Marx saw the as yet umediated part of nature as only relevant from the point of view of its possible future modification." (26)

Thus, perceptions and knowledge of nature (including "aesthetic" ones) arise within specific social relations of production and their associated utilisation of nature; this perception and knowledge of nature in turn serves to predispose men toward certain modes of activity on nature. We are now in a position to understand part of the meaning of 15th C landscape painting in its context - specifically the tendency within it, mentioned before, to express the positive world view of the ascending middle-class and its utilization of nature. Landscape painting depicts the countryside which the urban bourgeoisie is trying to bring under its ownership - that which is already farmed and also untouched land which this class, with the help of the Duke of Burgundy, is rapidly bringing within human control and production. Fields, working peasants, dykes, bridges; hills, waterfalls and forests (potential means of production) are all depicted in detail and with enthusiasm. Nature is no longer the environment to be taken for granted - it is a new challenge and the new stylistic techniques of naturalism such as three-dimensional perspective can convey the substantiality and tangibility of objects and their exact positions in space, allowing the definitive depiction of property - potential and actual.

The capitalistic development of Flanders was closely associated with the consolidation of the Burgundlan realm in the 15th C. Its continuation in 16th and 17th C Holland was associated with the emergence of a nation-state after the rebellion against Spain. Throughout the period, landscape painting responded to and helped to create the political idea of the "nation". Under foreign occupation Flemish landscape helped to engender a specific love for the countryside of the Dutch-speaking peoples. After "liberation" it continued to do so in the new bourgeois Dutch state.

Before attempting to elucidate further meaning in 15th C landscape painting, another digression is necessary into the capitalistic form of production.

The commodity reflects the relation between nature and society at the stage of development of the forces of production associated with capitalism. According to Marx, as a determinant of the exchange-value of a commodity under capitalism, labour is abstract, general and undifferentiated. The exchange-value of a commodity is a non-natural characteristic typical of the bourgeois form of production:

"Since exchange-value is a definite social manner of expressing the amount of labour bestowed upon an object, nature has no more to do with it, than it has in fixing the rate of exchange."(27)

The transformation of products of labour under capitalism into commodities "has absolutely no connection with their physical properties and with the material relations arising therefrom. There it is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things."

As Schmidt puts it:

"...commodities…no longer incorporate the living interaction between men and nature, but emerge as a dead and thing-like reality, as an objective necessity by which human life is ruled, as by a blind fate." (28)

As a determinant of use-value, however, labour is concrete, particular and composed of many distinct modes of labour. In its use-value a product of labour confronts men in its "plain, homely, natural form."(29) In Schmidt's description: "Use-values are specific natural materials, mediated through specific purposive actions which serve to satisfy specific human needs."

The world of use-values is compounded of labour and natural material, i.e. humanised nature. The use-value of things produced by man is realized without exchange "by means of a direct relation between the object and man."(30) The essence of pre-bourgeole forms of production consists in personal, transparent relations of dependence between men. The products of labour do not become commodities. In Feudalism and Antiquity, a "natural form of labour" prevailed even though these were class societies, for serfs and slaves were unseparated from the means of production with which they worked; they were not separated from and set over against the means of production and all property.

For Marx, the supersedence of Capitalism is Socialism, in which prevails the highest form of real mediation between man and nature:

"In the Paris Manuscripts, while under the influence of Feuerbach and Romanticism, Marx portrayed labour as a process of progressive humanizatlon of nature, a process which coincided with the naturalization of man.

"He therefore saw in history, stamped as it is with the imprint of human labour, a clearer and clearer equivalence between naturalism and humanism. The later, and more critical Marx of the economic analysis took the view that the struggle of man with nature could be transformed but not abolished.....

"Nature and society are not rigidly opposed. The socially active man 'confronts the material of nature as one of her own forces. He sets in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate the material of nature in a form suitable for his own needs. By thus acting through this motion on the nature which is outside him and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature.'

"The content of this metabolic interaction is that nature is humanized while men are naturalized. Its form is in each case, historically determined. Labour-power, that 'material of nature transferred to a human organism) acts on the materials of nature which are outside man; it is through nature that nature is transformed. Men incorporate their own essential forces into natural objects which have undergone human labour. Through the same process, natural things gain a new social quality as use-values, increasing in richness in the course of history."(31)

In bourgeois society, according to Marx, the unity of man and the stuff of nature in the form of use-values is overladen by the "division between (the) inorganic conditions of human existence and (the) active existence itself, a division first posited in its completeness in the relation between wage-labour and capital."(32)

The unharmonious metabolism between man and nature characteristic of bourgeois society is manifested in the stultification of personality of both worker (as mere object of labour) and capitalist (as mere predicate of capital); also in the antagonistic relationship between them. Marx also criticized the abrupt division between town and country which disturbed "the metabolism between man' and the earth, i.e. the return to the soil of its elements consumed by man in the form of food and clothing, and therefore violated the eternal natural condition for the lasting fertility of the soil."(33) In the society of the future there would be a "higher synthesis... of agriculture and industry" In which the metabolism between man and nature would come about "systematically, as a regulating law of social production, and in a form appropriate to the full development of the human race." Here Marx showed a coherent "ecological" consciousness.

Of the future society Marx wrote:

"Communism as a fully developed naturalism is humanism and as a fully developed humanism is naturalism. It is the definitive resolution of the antagonism between man and nature, and between man and man. It is the true solution of the conflict between existence and essence, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species."(34)

Later Marx wrote:

"Freedom.... can only consist in socialized men, the associated producers rationally regulating their interchange with nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the

true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis."(35)

In all labour which is no longer alienated, man succeeds in returning to himself out of the estrangement of his own essential powers, and in making himself at home in the external world transformed by these powers.

We come now to the tendency In 15th C Flemish landscape painting which is critical of and antithetical to capitalist society (cf. the quotes of Goldmann and Duvignaud earlier), and which pertains not only to the bourgeois class but to the emerging social formation as a whole. This is the depiction of the "harmony of nature". It is found in van Eyck, Dirk Bouts, van der Goes and even in Hieronymous Bosch. It is a projection of a state of affairs in which nature is humanized and man is naturalized. The idyllic state of nature in Bouts' paintings reflects and is reflected by the serenity of the saints depicted within it. This contrasts strongly with earlier paintings of saints in which the surroundings, if there are any, are unimportant. The yearning for an undistorted interaction between man and nature (where production creates "use-values" in a classless society, free from domination of man or nature), in contradistinction to that prevailing under capitalism and commodity production, is only in embryo form in the 15th C. But it is essentially the same "vision" that is articulated under 19th C industrial capitalism by the Romantic poets and painters. (That this was sometimes consciously expressed as a conservative yearning for a mythical "organic" society of the past, does not, I think, affect the overall view I am proposing). Ruisdael In 17th C Holland, Wordsworth and Constable In 18th and 19th C England, each turn to the "morality of nature" in contrast to the immorality of society. They yearn for a world in which man understands his true situation - as existing within a cosmic plan, as part of Nature. It was an intuitive understanding of Marx's Socialism in which nature is humanized that led Constable to declare that "the life of men is reflected in the chiaroscuro of nature."

The concept of alienation is fundamental to the Marxian analysis of history. According to the latter, human history is the development and differentiation of so many forms of society characterised by so many forms of human mediation with nature. These different forms, or modes of production, are the ways in which the human collective appropriates the raw stuff of nature within which it exists, trans-forming it into human values (which latter are themselves conditioned by the particular forms of society.) Specific modes of production entail particular patterns of social organisation. Institutions, forms of consciousness etc. are complementary to the essential forms of labour process through which nature is transformed into human values, some of which, in the form of means of production, are set in action by further labour to further transform nature.

The forms of mediation between society and nature, or labour processes, can be characterised in terms of differential relations of power and control over society's production (with respect to age, sex, or social class). Inseparable from these social relations of production are the forms of appropriation of nature, conceived in terms of the degree of integration or separation of the physical tasks of production; the degree of separation or integration of physical and mental labour; of specific physical tasks from control over production as a whole; of specific physical tasks from the knowledge implicitly utilised in the specific physical tasks and in their co-ordination in the total labour process.

In "primitive societies" (i.e. communities not yet manifesting social division of labour beyond those of sex), there is a high degree of integration of the capacities, activities, and knowledge entailed in production. Given the level to which society as a whole has evolved, there is a maximal integration of human faculties concretised in each individual; all individuals participate in the appropriation of nature equally in terms of labour-time submitted by each, and in terms of each individual's consciousness of the real nature of production - i.e. each individual is as conscious in the productive process as is the society as a whole, and is therefore fully conscious in relation to the historical circumstances of his society. It is not until the development of class societies that the masses of people become ignorant and mystified about the real processes of the appropriatlon of nature which they enact, becoming herd-like, cut off rom the administration of society and the knowledge upon which their exstence rests.(36)

Thus, whatever faculties, productive capacities, sensibilities nd knowledge exist within society are in primitive society embodied in each and every individual, i.e. society socializes its members into "all-round" personalities within the terms and limits of its historical context and possibilities. It is this state of unalienation which Socialism wishes to re-create on the level of its historical context (which, of course, constantly change such that Socialism is not a stasis but a continual self-transformation and re-definition of itself). From our perspective within Capitalism, it will seek to abolish the reification of activities in occupational roles, in which the "self" is defined in relation to one or more isolated tasks or modes of thought and feeling. It will seek to organise the reproduction of life as a collective enterprise, with all activities maximally generalized, associated not with separated economic units in competition or conflict, but with a self-conscious community. Thus, for example, "architecture" would become, as in primitive society, something which human beings practise in the building of their houses; even if some people still spent more time in “architecture" than others (due to personal inclinations) they would not be mere practitioners of packaged information or skills - conceived as private possessions inseparable from the individual self and role - which are exchanged for the means of individual subsistence.

Socialism would seek to abolish inequalities based on an individual's fixed location within production, which latter would become more fluid. It would abolish inequalities of social status attributed to different tasks, which would nevertheless become equally distributed. It would abolish the notion of individual material success: production would be by all, for all. The development of individual personality, talents etc. would be within material equality and equality of social responsibility. It being recognized that all phenomena of personality, behaviour etc. are aspects of social processes, undesired deviance, indolence, irresponsibility, apathy etc. would be removed by the self-conscious transformation of social processes (such as housing, education, etc.). Where necessary, positive discrimination would ensure equality. Differences between individuals arising within the same class context could be focussed into different forms of involvement in community concerns, not into selfish advance in wealth, prestige, power over and distance from others. Self-fulfilment would be identifiable with serving society, not as in antipathy to it (as in Capitalism). Ever more uniquely evolving individuals would co-operate, where warmth and understanding in human relationships, the creation of beauty in an harmonious, exciting society were the values prized in society.(37)

Primitive societies (whether of hunter-gathering or simple agricultural economies) provide the archetype of society which is in its totality (and within its own historical terms) unalienated. (Primitive cosmologies – whether animist or pantheist - are non-dualistic; as for dialectical materialism "matter" and "spirit", creator and created, are seen as a unity.) This is no doubt the deeper meaning behind the artistic tendencies of the 20th C which have turned to primitive art for inspiration, with a more or less consciously radical import (viz. Picasso, Matisse, Surrealism). It is primitive society which "Rouseau holds up as "natural", and which Marx's notion of "primitive communism" raises to scientific rather than mere moralistic significance. The lack of anthropological knowledge of the very diverse kinds of primitive society available to Marx allowed him to simplify this largest portion of human history, yet contemporary knowledge - while revealing tremendous variations in primitive social forms, and also displaying their less idyllic modes of social control - still bears out the historical reality of unalienated social production.

"The absence of such a division of labour as would lead to the formation of specialized crafts prevents the working out of techniques requiring a long apprenticeship and special knowledge, though it makes possible a more harmonious development of the body and of human activity. Those peoples who do not know as yet the division of labour, but who have been able to overcome famine and the worst epidemics, thanks to favourable natural conditions (Polynesians, some North American Indians before the white conquest, etc.) have developed a human type admired by modern civilised man."(38)

It is not only the hamonious being integrated into an harmonious society that Socialism must "learn" from and re-create on a new plane. According to Marshall Sahlins(39) paleolithic society was not a society whose normal condition was racked with the fear of famine (which Mandel, like most writers - "bourgeois" or Marxist - tends to think). This notion of primitive poverty derives on the one hand from the observation of peoples starved to death by capitalist imperialism, or on the other by the imposition of bourgeois economic categories upon paleolithic economies. Thus, Sahlins writes:

"Modern capitalist societies, however richly endowed, dedicate themselves to the proposition of scarcity. Inadequacy of economic means is the first principle..... (of a) system (which) institutes scarcity in a manner completely unparalleled and to a degree nowhere else approximated. There production and distribution are arranged through the behaviour of prices, and all livelihoods depend on getting and spending, insufficiency of material means becomes the explicit, calculable starting point of all economic activity. The entrepreneur is confronted with alternative investments of a finite capital, the worker (hopefully) with alternative choices of remunerative employ, and the consumer.... Consumption is a double tragedy: what begins in inadequacy will end in deprivation. Bringing together an international division of labour, the market makes available a dazzling array of products: all these Good Things within a man's reach - but never all within his grasp. Worse, in this game of consumer free choice, every acquisition is simultaneously a deprivation, for every purchase of something is a foregoing of something else, in generally only marginally less desirable, and in some particulars more desirable, that could have been had instead."(40)

Thus, a "life of hard labour" is the condition of existence under Capitalism (and of course, other class societies). But for hunter-gatherers like the !Kung of the Kalahari:

"....in their own life and with their own artifacts they were comparatively free from material pressures.... they all had what they needed or could make what they needed, for every man can and does make the things that men make and every woman the things that womeen make.... They lived in a kind of material plenty because they adapted the tools of their own living to materials which lay in abundance around them and which were free for anyone to take....enough (ostrich egg shells) are found for every woman to have a dozen or more shells for water containers - all she can carry - and a goodly number of bead ornaments. In their nomadic hunting-gathering life, travelling from one source of food to another through the seasons....(and) with plenty of most materials at hand to replace artifacts as required, the !Kung have not developed means of permanent storage and have not needed or wanted to encumber themselves with surpluses or duplicates... They borrow what they do not own. With this ease they have not hoarded, and the accumulation of objects has not become associated with status."(41)

The absence of an obsession for the accumulation of things, the relative ease with which social needs can be satisfied allowing much "free" time and a non-compulsive shading off of work into leisure(42), and an attitude towards things focussing upon their real use - such that as much concern, creativity and feeling can be directed upon one small pot as upon a hundred large pots - are all orientations of existence which Socialism would want to re-create. They rest upon a condition of affluence relative to the institutionalized needs of society; socialist organization of production and distribution accompanied by socialist consciousness would attain such an equilibrium between the development of needs, desires, etc. and the level and variation of goods produced.

Some of the above-mentioned attitudes were expressed in the "hippie movement" of the 1960s. Hippie culture and values at first – though taking on distorted forms and fundamentally lacking in rational-political perspectives, represented in certain respects a microcosmic anticipation of some socialist perspectives and life-orientations within advanced capitalist society. Born within post-Second World Capitalism in expansion, the hippie movement was able to live from the crumbs picked with relative ease from the "affluent society"; hippie groups were able to live from the wages of one or two working at a time, or from working for only several months in the year. This supported a material level of life which was considered adequate given a subjective orientation of rebellion against middle-class "materialism" and acquisitiveness. It was accompanied by an attitude of looking for intrinsic interest in all things - in an old piece of furniture as much as in a new, or expensive antique one, and was part of a naturally emerging pattern of sharing things and the rejection of hoarding as pointless. The quality achieved in human relationships(43) and in the experience of things - natural and humanly produced - replaced status and wealth as sought-after values. Even though framed within an individualistic and often escapist mode of self-explanation, even though the "appreciation of all things" degenerated into an undiscriminating naivety, and even though it was necessarily a minority movement based on a capitalist affluence and therefore was not as such a form that could prefigure western socialism - nevertheless the meaning of the hippie movement should be recognized as hlstorically important:

"We are inclined to think of hunters and gatherers as poor because they don't have anything; perhaps better to think of them for that reason as free. Their extremely limited material possessions relieve them of all cares with regard to daily necessities and permit them to enjoy life." (Gusinde, 1961. p.1)(44)

For neolithic society also, the surplus provided by simple agriculture and cattle raising does not yet enable the craftsman to become completely free from the task of producing his own food:

"Just as at more primitive stages of economic development society remains based on the cooperative organization of labour. The community needs the labour of every one of its members. It does not yet produce a surplus sufficiently large for this to become private property, without jeopardizing the survival of the whole community. The customs and code of honour of the tribe are opposed to any individual accumulation in excess of the average. Differences in individual productive skill are not reflected in distribution. Skill as such does not confer a right to the product of individual work, and the same applies to more diligent work.....

"The co-operative organization of labour in its pure form means that no adult holds back from participating in labour. It thus implies the absence of a "ruling class". The work is planned in accordance with custom and with ancient rights based on a deep knowledge of the natural environment (climate, composition of the soil, habits of game, etc.). Tho chief, if there is one, is rarely the embodiment of these rites and customs, the correct fulfilment of which he ensures."(45)

It is with the emergence of a large, permanent surplus of foodstuffs, of specialization of crafts, and of the rise of towns and generalized exchange, that Civilization - i.e. class society - is born. Notwithstanding the tremendous advances in productivity, in knowledge, in sophistication of sensibilities etc. made possible by many of these developments (though, of course, the latter are only enjoyed by a minority) the new class society is alienated. The division of labour and fragmentation of knowledge and experience is accompanied by exploitation of class by class, and by repressions exerted by one class over another (whereas in primitive society repressions necessitated by existence in nature are generalised throughout the human collective leaving aside differentiated authority associated with age and in some cases, sex). Social control becomes an institutionalized function of reified organizations under the control of ruling classes, bureaucracies, armies, etc. Various aspects of the mental and emotional life of man are separated out from the integral totality of the primitive collective: in particular religion, art, and science.

The growth in average productivity of labour created the necessary material conditions for the evolution of Civilization and class society (a general process differing in specific features in the different parts of the world in which it occurred). In the late 20th and 21st Cs AD a further growth in average productivity of labour may create the material conditions for an evolution into a new level of civilization - uniting humanity's achievements under class society with its memory of and yearning for the unalienated experience of the primitive collective. A growth in productivity of labour, i.e. an advancement in the productive forces, creates the possibility for, but does not necessitate, any specific social evolution. In our context the difference between possibility and necessity is crucial, for without humanity's

collective, conscious choice, the reemergence of unalienated society will not occur.(46)

In primitive societies, production is for social need; use-values are co-operatively produced by individuals who submit an equal amount of labour-time. The equality of individuals' responsibilities with respect to labour-time given to production is consciously regulated through customs and religious rites. Gradually - and in various ways and to differing extents in different parts of the world - the emergence of craftsmen carrying out specialized forms of production resulted in the production of commodities, that is, goods which must be exchanged in order to provide for the producer's needs. Up till the development of modern capitalism, such production of exchange-values co-exists with production of use-values; indeed in many societies engaged in commodity production for trade, no individual spends all his time producing exchange-values. In Western Feudal society, a relatively small number of independent urban craftsmen produced (petty) commodities for the market, whilst the major part of (agricultural) production was for use-values. Here, as elsewhere, production of use-values for social need was maintained in a class society. That is, no exchange was practised between serf and lord; the lord merely appropriated the surplus of the use-values produced by the serf; production was for social need, though the lord's needs were allowed to be greater than the serf˝'s(!). Agricultural labour was still co-operative and calculated in terms of labour-time; onto the egalitarian village, clan, tribe or family was superimposed an appropriating class. The serfs´ service to the lord (institutionalised through the latter's military power and the value-system of feudal Christianity) was reckoned in terms of the labour-time required to produce goods for the lord, or in terms of labour-time submitted by the serf on the lord's land.

Meanwhile in the growing towns of medieval Europe independent craftsman produced exchange-values. The values of goods exchanged repeatedly on the market establish themselves according to a yardstick, based on the average labour-time necessary for the production of particular goods. That is, the number of hours of labour necessary to make a good in the average conditions of productivity of a given society, come to fix the exchange-value of the good; thus, for example, so much cloth is “worth" so many chairs. Petty urban commodity production - which developed the farthest in Flanders and Italy In the 13th-15th C and began to dissolve the feudal production of use-values in the countryside around - is governed by the law of value through which the abstract, simple, socially-necessary labour contained in commodities determines their exchange. The workings of the market are still well understood by the producers however:

'"These rules.... remain quite obvious at the beginning of the period of commodity production. The proof is to be seen in the fact that in the corporations of Antiquity and in those of China, of Byzantium, of the European and Arab Middle Ages, etc.,

fixed rules, known to all, laid down alike the labour-time to be devoted to the making of each object, the length of the apprenticeship, its cost, and the equivalent normally to be asked for each commodity.

"This obviousness merely gives expression to the fact that with petty commodity production we have reached only a transitional stage between a society consciously governed by labour co-operation, and a society in which the complete dissolution of community ties leaves no room for anything but "objective" laws, that is, laws which are blind, "natural", independent of man's will, as the regulators of economic activity." (47)

Petty commodity production, such as that carried on by late medieval urban craftsmen organized into guilds, represents a partial human alienation. As a producer of exchange-values for the market, the craftsman is no longer producing for immediate social need, but is separated from the consumer of his products by an impersonal market. The direct relationship between production and consumption has superimposed upon it the alienated mediation of money. The social division of labour, between urban craft produotion and rural food production, generates the alienated relationship between town and oountry; the unity of productive experience is broken. The urban citizan eats food whose extraction as food from nature he is no longer involved with; the rural food-producer comes to exchange a portion of the food he produces for manufactured goods whose produotion processes he may little understand. The technical division of labour, i.e. the specialization of urban commodity production into craft guilds, also entails the partial alienation of productive experience into separated processes, ie. a chair-maker is not a shoe-maker who is not a wheelwright, etc.

However, the producer of petty commodities still owns his means of production. He controls the processes of production possibly more than the producer of agricultural use-values before him (whose activities are largely determined by "nature" given his limited technology) and certainly more than any producer of manufactured goods "since". He makes a whole product, e.g. a chair, from beginning to end, from raw materials to finished product which latter is a totally satisfying externalisation of his human subjectivity. No two chairs are exactly the same, nor produced in exactly the same way (i.e. the ordering of the various component tasks, the relative distribution of time accorded to them, and the overall control of the labour-process are stamped with the individual's control, as subject, over its object). There is no institutionalised specialisation of tasks within the production of any specific commodity (the possible allocation of specific tasks to different journeymen being subject to change and personal negotiation). The market is small, and local; thus the impersonality of the latter is restricted, and the quality of goods still associable with individual producers and subject to a human appreciation on the part of the consumer - who is more than a mere consumption unit. Through the guild and the urban commune, production is

still co-operative and related to social need and responsibility; producer relates to producer as fellow human with equal right to subsistence and fulfilment in labour, and equal obligation to the craft (maintaining standards of production etc.), to the consumer, and to the commune. It is for these reasons that the late medieval craftsman has been seen as an archetype of the unalienated producer, as the image of dignified labour-process in which the utilitarian and the aesthetic are unified in productive activity. For William Morris in the 19th C, the medieval craftsman was the antithesis of the alienated labourer of industrial Capitalism, the archetype which should be reconstituted under industrial Socialism within the terms of machine production.

In this section we have already seen how, under the conditions of late medieval Europe, cloth manufacture could come under the control of the capitalist mode of production. Cloth could become the first good produced on a large scale for a wide market, in the same way that textiles could be the first mass-produced articles in the Industrial Revolution. To the extent that any commodity can be marketable to classes other than the aristocracy, clothing is the first one, provided a money economy has already partially developed and has turned producers of use-values into "part-time" producers of exchange-values. The distance between the source of raw materials (e.g. English wool) and the place of cloth manufacture (the Flemish cities here being considered) made the latter highly susceptible to domination by the wool and cloth merchants - the commercial bourgeoisie generated under the first phase of European Capitalism. Capitalist manufacture can be seen as having first emerged as a major, and inevitably successful, form of production in the cloth producing towns of northern Italy and Flanders between the 13th and 16th Cs. In l5th C Flemish cloth production can be seen all the general features of capitalist alienation of production(48), which later swept through all other areas of production, both urban and rural. The direct producers no longer own their means of production; as productive units individual producers are forced to carry out fragmented tasks - isolated components of the total productive process over which they have no control. Fully alienated, depersonalised labour becomes a mere factor of production for the capitalist who controls it; labour as human content is poured into reified structures and thereby mutilated; all human activity, thought and experience is more and more channeled into predefined channels which are functions of the capitalist process of production - no longer a transparent social organisation (like Feudalism), which, no matter how harsh or unjust, is enacted by human beings more or less unalienated from what they do. Activity that cannot be cut to the needs of capitalist production becomes fragmented into "hobbies", "leisure", etc. A new rigidity of time sets in, a standardised control of human existence whereby the very physiology of the producer is adjusted to the alienated process of production in shift-work, the calculated integration of tasks within a single plant, etc. This (to the producer) externally-determined timetable of existence cornes to appear as "natural" or necessarily related to the needs of reified human powers no longer recognised as the

result of human activity - machinery, the market, etc. In primitive society, nature determines the rhythm of labour given the existing level of human knowledge and technology; this is a partial alienation inasmuch as the forces governing life are attributed to Nature as such rather than the inability of man to control production within nature beyond the limitations of primitive society. However, within this alienation (which Socialism could abolish, understanding Nature dialectically, i.e. as having control over human life only to the extent that the latter is not consciously controlled), primitive man organises the cooperative struggle with nature through forms that are transparent to him. Similarly in feudal society the appropriation of the peasants´ surplus is transparent, and is immediately rejected (viz. the repeated peasant uprisings in Feudal Europe and dynastic China if the legitimizing ideologies are no longer accepted.(49) Again, within the constraints imposed by nature (given the existing level of technology), and within the exploitative class relationships, the organisation of production under Feudalism is still relatively conscious. There is not, as under Capitalism, the split between intention and act, the externalisatlon of all subjectivity such that action emerges not from a subject who perceives the world and thinks, feels, and acts, but is regulated in a way that is meaningless to the producer - meaning being looked up in ideas which are rarified, "pure" concepts.

Alienation under Capitalism reaches the highest form hitherto in human history. Phenomena related to the very nature of the anarchic system of production - wars between national Capitals; pollution and the destruction of nature; regional depressions, uneven development, waste, unemployment, slum housing, Third World famines - all are perceived through alienated forms of knowledge as being caused by anything other than the social-economic system of which they are parts.
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In other forms of society analogous phenomena are more or less transparently perceived but in none are they mystified as under Capitalism. The real (social-historical) reasons for feudal wars may not be understood by its participants, but who is fighting whom is fairly clear (by contrast with the U.S. war against Vietnam, for example, in which American soldiers thought they were the allies of South Vietnam against the North). Under Feudalism, if famine is caused by natural disaster or by pillage, it is relatively clearly seen as such. The reasons why crop failures or pillaging occur may be obscure, but the issues are less mystified than for famine under modern Capitalism, which is attributed to Nature, overpopulation, laziness, genetic inadequacies, cultural backwardness - not as the inevitable consequence of the market in the era of Monopoly Capitalism.

Under Capitalism the "war of all against all" appears the natural state of society. Benevolence, kindness, and related feelings are isolated within the inner personality whilst the outer man must be more or less callous. As Weber showed in his Protestant Ethic study, the misery of others becomes accepted as inevitable, natural etc. - not something regarded as the consequence of man's collective inadequacies.

A lack of concern for others is actually given first religious, then secularly moral veneration. Perhaps for the flrst time in history poverty becomes socially institutionalized. A proportion of society lives in poverty (i.e. denied subsistence existence as defined by the level of social development attained) whether Capitalism is in boom or slump. In previous forms of society this was not the case; unless upset by war, crop failure, plague, etc. the working economy succeeds in providing subsistence existence to all its members - again, as defined by the particular society's level of productivity (and excluding e.g.criminals who are judged as having rejected the norms of the society.)

Under Capitalism the alienation of the individual is a peculiar kind of isolation; the further the individual evolves as a conscious, feeling being the more his isolation grows. Commonality of feelings becomes more and more difficult the more human beings become individuated. Knowledge and Experience are felt as bitter fruits leading to personal agony; the archetype of this is Faust for whom more knowledge and deeper feeling send him into an endless, self-perpetuating spiral of ever-intensified sence of separation, hopelessness, pain and guilt. The individual's deepest feelings become specific and interiorized, unable to be communicated or fully manifested, locked in a privatized pain in which only a personal transcendence is possible - if any. The "eternal" aspects of the "human condition" - i.e. realities common to any social experience - the movement of time, mutability, death - are felt through the dominant traditions under Capitalism with an almost pathological melancholy and nostalgia. The unattainability of pure forms - the flower that crumples to dust before the human touch - becomes a central poetic image in capitalist civilisation. Such sensibilities expressed in the art forms of other civilisations are appreciated with intense understanding: the pursuit of Daphne who turns into a tree as the horror-struck Apollo touches her, in Ovid's Metamorphoses, is perhaps an underlying experience of all modern Western poetry.

We have seen how the production of use-values under Western Feudalism (in its ideal form) gives birth to a limited degree of urban production of petty commodities, which from the 13th C onwards is gradually replaced by capitalist production. The first is an economy based fully on a conscious regulation in terms of labour-time; the second is based on labour-time translated into prices (exchange-values) through a market which is understood and therefore controlled (by the guilds), (50) the third is a form of economy in which labour is no longer understood as creating value. Under capitalist production (whether in its early manufacturing period, in its industrial entrepreneurial period, or - with superficial modifications induced through State intervention - in its monopoly period), the exchange-value of goods on the market is seen as being controlled by the "natural" laws of supply and demand, whilst the wages of the producer are seen as being controlled by natural market laws, which ensure simultaneously the payment of the "real" value of his labour. Capital (which is stored labour) is seen through an alienated vision as creating value.

Exchange-values (whose averages are, as in petty commodity production, conditioned by average labour-times) are indeed in the immediate determined by the market(51) - i.e. relations of supply and demand regulate specific prices of particular goods. But alienated consciousness under Capitalism does not see that overall exchange-values are in actuality compounded of paid labour (wages, the price of labour-power) plus unpaid labour (surplus value). Surely for the first time in human history goods are seen as being produced not by work, but by magic.(52)

In l5th C Flanders there existed side by side all three modes of production; in it can be seen the simultaneous processes of the dissolution of Feudalism, the development of urban commodity production, and the beginnings of the capitalist supercedence of both former modes of production. The nature of artistic creation can be seen through this analytical framework: the artist throughout the Middle Ages in its "ideal", pure form, was a producer of use-values, a craftsman usually living on a nobleman´s estate who was called upon to practise his craft for his lord. Like the blacksmith or a cobbler, he produced goods required by the lord and was guaranteed a material existence (food, shelter etc.) providad by the lord out of the surplus owned by the lord after its appropriation from the peasantry. He was effectively a serf released (partially or totally) from agricultural labour, sustained by use-values produced by tha former, producing non-agricultural use-values for the lord (or the Church - which was in no economic way different from a secular landowner). He owned his own tools (brushes etc.), was provided with raw materials (paint etc.), and "went along with" the estate; he did not produce exchange values. Such would have been the anonymous book illustrators of the early middle ages, or the monk copyists working in monasteries.

By the 14th and 15th C, most artists were producers of petty commodities. Those living in towns were mainly independent craftsmen like any others, and artistic creation reflected the characteristics of petty commodity production discussed above. The notion of an "artist" as such did not yet exist; sculptors for example were specialized kinds of stone-workers, usually members of the guild of masons. "Melchior Broederlam of Ypres, the skilled and reputable painter of the Duke of Burgundy, was expected to paint standards and decorations as well as altarpieces. In 1386-87 he painted the Duchess´s hearse and also a drapery and pavilions of the Duke's boat…..

"Trades and crafts in medieval towns tended to congregate in communities.....Most of those people in Paris concerned in book production, including the majority of the manuscript illuminators, lived on the South Bank, in the vicinity of the University. On the other hand most of the painters and image-makers lived on ths North Bank....."(53)

Some “artists” held official positions in the courts of kings or noblemen (e.g. the Limbourg brothers in the court of the Duc de Berry). Here, a remnant of the earlier type of medieval craftsman, working directly in the service of a lord, is maintained; by the 14th and 15th C however such official artists would be in receipt of monied salaries.(15) However, whether holders of official appointments or independent craftsmen, 15th C painters were producers of exchange-values.

"Many regulations survive of which the purpose was specifically to prevent the painter from applying his art with intent to defraud....A Florentine provision of 1335 sought to protect the quality of horse-armour....The Venetian statutes of 1271 contained the general regulation that any vendor had to declare, on sale, whether his objects were new or old - that is, brand-new or refurbished.... in altarpieces.....the danger was not that the article would collapse, perhaps in the middle of a battle, but that the patron would be delivered something, the intrinsic value of which was less, than had been paid for. The artist might have employed gold-leaf of unusual thinness, carelessly applied, or an inferior blue in the place of lapis lazuli....patrons themselves sometimes tried to guard their own interests by specifying in the course of a written contract the materials which were to be used."(*55)*

These considerations reflect exactly the guild-nature of late medieval crafts, concerns which would not apply where a craftsman was in the direct service of a lord producing use-values.Yet although the nature of the art-work as an exchange-value is clear, it is also obvious that the relationship between producer and purchaser (patron) is still personal.(56) By the time we come to art-production in the Antwerp of the 1520's, we find the works of an artist such as Patanir being sold on an entirely impersonal, anonymous market. The artwork is an almost fully capitalistic commodity, sold frequently in shops specifically concerned with retailing paintings. As mentioned eariler, paintings are designed to meat a general market "taste" and are frequently executed through a technical division of labour; they are however still produced by craftsmen who own their own workshops and tools.

The changing nature of the art-work as a use-value, a petty commodity and then a capitalistic commodity reflects the changing social modes of production in general. It is also interwoven with the changing relationship between art and the totality of social life. The cave paintings of Lascaux are inextricable parts of the social, economic, cosmological-religious life of the primitive community; these different aspects of existence are not separated out into specific modes of activity or circumscribed areas of experience. Art created in the “ideal type” of early Medieval production of uae-values is partially alienated to the extent that artistic creation is centred on certain individuals who spend most or all of their labour-time in artistic pursuits whilst others spend little or none. It is alienated to the extent that its forms and content are primarily determined by the values, experience etc. of the nobility and Church, and are bound up with the exploitative relations between classes and the

distorted visions of the world which accompany them (folk art produced by and for the peasantry will be less alienated in this respect, though it will naturally contain certain elements of the dominating structure of values within which the peasantry must live). However, early medieval art, as use-value, is relatively unfragmanted from the totality of social experience within which it arises. In particular, medieval art Is largely concerned with eliciting religious awe and devotion - and as such is a vital part of the belief system which directs and perpetuates the feudal organisation of production. It sanctions the exploitative relations between lord (or Church) and serf, identifying duty to God with the dutiful carrying out of one's role in feudal society; it simultaneously provides a mode of cosmic interpretation and experience which maintains a sense of meaning for the individual, and secures the bonds between people in the medieval collective.

The art of the independent urban craftsman is in some respects more, and in some respects less alienated than that of the early medieval artist. As we have seen, the production of art works as exchange-values deflects concern from art-as-experience to art product as thing-of-value; to the extent that patrons are "private" citizens art works can be sbut up in collections which are never seen by more than a few privileged burghers or noblemen.(57) Yet as a producer the artist has gained some respect and dignity, and is therefore more able to stamp his own unique experience upon his work, whilst still being understood by others. Aesthetic creation and manual work are not separated in reality or consciousness. The shift from religious iconography to an increased secular content in art-works is paradoxical; on the one hand the inseparability of art and religion ensures that art is part of the over-riding mode of interpretation which penetrates every aspect of medieval existence, on the other the possibility of representing secular contents - especially labour activities - draws more of the life of the collective into the sphere of art. And where the artist is called upon to execute public works for the town hall or cathedral, his activity is one in which the entire urban community participates - finding in it its self-identity, its collective pride etc.

As art becomes commodity in the capitalist market, the alienative tendencies seen in petty commodity production are further and further evolved. As the distance between creation and appreciation of art grows through the ever-developing impersonality of the market, so aesthetic experience becomes ever more an isolated fragment of the totality of social experience. The "emancipation" of the artist from the status of craftsman to that of the genius, eccentric, seer, or useless parasite, is accompanied by the increasing restriction of autonomy, imagination, and self-directed labour in all other areas of social activity. The artist comes to be seen and even sees himself, as "free" in spirit though he may live in the proverbial garret; he is "free" because and in spite of (and this contradiction is the very essence of capitalist alienation) the impossibility of his communicating to his fellows. "Successful" art is more and more "hack" art - carried out according to the

inauthentic, pre-determined wishes of those who benefit from the alienated mode of production. The bourgeois obsession for the artist's "individual vision" appears as a respect for creativity, honesty, authenticity etc. but it is in reality no more than an escape-valve for society's repression of authentic experience. The real historical urge for all human beings to be "free", "special", "creative" etc. is disposed of in the mythology of Art.

For in bourgeois society - in all its phases - art necessarily explores ideas and sensibilities which are incompatible with the acceptance of bourgeois society. The real experience of art is therefore thrust into a mystique of Art, which is made inexplicable. An artist is not viewed as a total human being whose experience, constructed through the processes of living, feeling and striving to express him/herself, is partially objectified in certain artifacts we call "art". Rather, fragments of his being (which is a flux of total experience), are sensationalised, fetishized and turned into commodities - as are also the objectifications of his life. The real value of his life and art cannot be known, therefore the mystique of his personality, even his suffering, is turned into the (marketable) value; its meaning is smothered, its opposition to alienation is assimilated. The artist´s "talent" (which is no more than part of the way the particular human being has lived and attempted to express his existence) is on the one hand a saleable "special" faculty, on the other the "inspiration" of a "genius". The external, observable aspects of a person who grapples with reality, strives to find an authentic mode of living, are rejected as signs of madness in non artists; in the Artist they are revered, but their meaning is ignored.(59)

The potentially unique creativity and experience of every individual is fetishized and deposited upon the Artist. Because, in bourgeois society, "personal" experience is irreconcilable with reified "public" existence(60) (and spiritual life is kept inward whilst sensual life is kept outward), "subjective" personal art comes to be seen as in opposition to "social realism". No longer can there be one, integrated human experience which is explored on an infinite number of levels.

The exploration of "aesthetic experience" under Capitalism, as this comes to be defined within bourgeois society, draws the individual ever more into a consciousness of the isolation and conflict of personal feelings: dread. The recognition of being under the grip of powers beyond his control heightens his experience of "angst" and intensifies his attempts - both in art and life - to break out from them. This attempt however - especially during the last century - has most frequently been expressed within a philosophy of anarchic individualistic rebellion. Aspects of bourgeois existence are singled out for particular attack, without their being located in an historical understanding of the entire nature of bourgeois society. Instead of situating their experience, thought, and struggle within a rational analysis of Man - a philosophical anthropology - aesthetic rebellions have repeatedly erected

mythologies of sexuality, death, the irrational nature of the soul, etc. This has been the case for Kirkegaard, Nietszche, Wagner, and the pre-Raphaelites (with the notable exception of William Morris). No distinction is made between the characteristics of human existence in general and those pertaining to specific epochs of history. With no realistic vision of a resolution to existing realities, the present is opposed by a nihilistic orientation toward the future, frequently glorifying pain and self-destruction. Working within the alienated fragment of bourgeois society called art, artists have not been able to recover a relationship between "the aesthetic" and the totality of social reality(61) - which alone could usher in meaning simultaneously in living, in authentic art, and in rational thought.(62)

The mystification of art in bourgeois society has obscured the real struggle for a free individual living in an unalienated society, which is the potential significance of the aesthetic struggle of artists under Capitalism. The outcome has been that Socialism has been defined in terms that appear to deny the artistic imagination; partly because artistic movements have often aligned themselves - in the name of artistic integrity - with the forces of reaction, and partly because the first attempt to build socialism gave rise to Stalinism, which certainly was the enemy of the imagination. Because artistic expression is not identical to rational analysis, it has frequently been deprecated by proponents of Reason as ambiguous, indefinite, etc. (This seems to underly the views of Plato in his "Republic", 16th C criticisms of poetry, and Stalinist apologetics). On the other side, the kind of "sludge" Romanticism referred to in the last footnote, and the tendencies in Dada and Surrealism which can culminate in fascist political views (see Part IV), are among the many examples of art worshipping the "anarchy of the imagination". This latter tendency, in many forms, eondsmns any conscious integration of art and polities as intellectual dogmatism.

A resolution is easily found if art is understood historically, if the vision of Socialism is clearly felt. For intellectually derived ideas can - and usually have - guided the bases of artistic enterprises. Once the fundamental purposes, the broadest terms of an artistic project are thought out, then the imagination is let to go free in the exploration of the experience in question. The Imagination is neither slavishly constricted by fixed ideas nor does it wander randomly. It is the dialectical balance, the infinite movement from analysis to imagination and back again that draws out the fullest potentials in both.(63) Within a framework developed by the intellect, the imagination explores infinite resonations between sound, image, meaning, colour, etc., which stretch beyond that which conscious thought can delineate; the imagination bursts through the structures developed by the intellect to embrace higher totalities of experience.

There is, therefore, no need for dichotomies between "personal" and "social" art. Confusion over this has existed both in bourgeois and Marxist conceptions.

"Socialist realism" or revolutionary art does not necessarily have to be accompanied by a conscious revolutionary commitment on the part of the artist, nor a clear analytical understanding of the struggle for Socialism. This is usually recognised by Marxist analysis, e.g. in Lukacs´ work on Goethe, Balzac and Thomas Mann. Where Marxism has been most in error has been in its attempt to provide prognoses of what the socialist artist should do: all that can be said here is that the ideal would be for the artist to unite an analytical perspective and socialist intention optimally with his imaginative, syncretistic exploration of subjective experience, which is then transposed into an artistic synthesis. Neither form nor content can be prescribed by anyone other than the artist him or herself;| such prescription gives rise to official "hack" art such as the vilest portraits of Napoleon or Stalin. Or, it can result in propaganda - which is certainly needed for revolutionary socialism, but which is not art as we must understand it for our historical context.(64)

I have argued that the disintegration of the feudal social order and life-experience and the concomitant rise of a quasi-capitalist order and its associated world-views is the all-pervading characteristic of the 15th C Flemish cities. Changes in all levels of social life (economic, political, etc) are interrelated with changes in all levels of consciousness and experience. It is a question of total contextual change, not one of tracing determinist effects of specific "objective" economic "factors". I am not asserting that under given socio-economic conditions certain cultural phenomena inevitably arose - rather I am investigating the infinite dialectical relationships between events, institutions and kinds of experience that in fact arose together in Flanders - trying to locate these phenomena in an historical conceptualisation which makes general understandings possible. If I were cautiously to concern myself only with the concrete historical instance of 15th C Flanders, then the significance of this time and place within the centuries-long transition from European Feudalism to Capitalism could not be shown. If I were to deal with it simply as an example of a huge world-historical process, the distinctive elements of Flanders would lose significance - why study the landscape painting in Flanders rather than in Italy where capitalistic wool manufacture was also developing, and why the 15th rather than the 16th or 17thC? How could I locate deep meaning in a particular relationship to nature when this is clearly not a universal concomitant of developing Capitalism?

My thesis is, therefore, that the specific circumstances of Flanders allowed of a form of cultural expression and exploration of a kind of profound experience which is a particularly important revelation of the existential situation of human beings moving into a prototype of modern society. Landscape painting in the Italian Renaissance (in particular Bellini and Leonardo) might conceivably be explored in an analogous way. But, as mentioned before, landscape did not emerge as the dominant art-form in Italy, partly because Brunelleschian geometrical perspective is not a good basis for naturalistic landscape. Paintings by Pollaiolo (c. 1475) for example, make the landscape essential, but there is an unresolved break between foreground and

background, since the panoramic perspective demands a high point of view for receding landscape. Piero della Francesca realised this and avoided the problem through placing his figures on a high ledge, thus eliminating the transitional middle distance. Now Van Eyck had dealt with transition in space instinctively and through empirical observation, geometrical perspective being unknown in Flanders in the early 15th C. Thus partly because of this incompatibility between mathematical perspective and nature-realism, and partly due to the dominance of Michelangelo's classical and neo-Platonic ideal in art in which the human form was considered a loftier subject for painting, Italian landscape as a major genre in itself did not emerge. The Florentines came to rely on the round hills and bushy trees of Roger van der Weyden to furnish fashionable backgrounds. And in the 16th C Mannerism was to make Michelangelan notions into a cult.

In Flanders on the other hand, landscape came to be seen (both by the Flemish and by the Italians) as its distinctive form of expression. It remained important throughout the "insincerity" of 16th C Mannerism and continued into the great era of 17th C Dutch landscape. Its close relationship with developing Capitalism and the bourgeois nation-state is therefore clearer. It might also be reasonable to speculate that manufacturing capitalism in Renaissance Italy was not to remain dynamic for deep social reasons, so that its cultural expressions might not bear such intrinsic significance for the changing western psyche in the long term. Certainly the humanist individualism of the Italian Renaissance is connected with the new society, but Italy was not to be a major ground for the further development of Western Capitalism as were the Low Countries.

Fundamentally, however, tale study attempts to arrive at generalisations from the concrete specificity of Flanders, because of the kind of generalisation it affords. The different cultural movement of the Italian Renaissance could be similarly investigated for other aspects of human sensibilities related to the emergence of Western Capitalism (indeed many of the ideas discussed here arose first or simultaneously in Italy).

The development of urban capitalist manufacture, commerce, and political forms gradually taking on characteristics of a rationalized, bourgeois parliament - is accompanied by shifts in beliefs about society and the universe. Relationships to other humans in a market economy become more impersonal and functional as traditional authority relationships are replaced by contract and exchange of money - both in employment and in marketing. The number of human beings coming into any one man's horizon of concerns becomes much greater, and individual connections become more indirect. Activities become defined more by a modern notion of time - something like a tape-measure, each segment having equal value. This replaces time as something cyclical, in which units are defined more by what always happens in them(65) rather than by their abstract, potentially functional value.

Objects come to be perceived in terms of their occupation of measurable space, which is again equalising and rationalistic. Society is seen to be determined by supra-individual market-laws, which, though transcending human will, are not those of God. The Universe no longer functions directly according to a personal God's will - it has laws that are uniform, determinate and discoverable, even if in the last analysis they are laid down by God. These latter changes in experience are reflected in the breakdown of Feudal Christian beliefs - in Flanders the 15th C affords clear anticipations of the Reformation and the bourgeois "scientific spirit".

On a deeper level than changing economic and political activities and organisations, or even the changing ideas and feelings about society and God, is a change in deeper-than-verbal experience, the very base-line of "being". The experience on this level that emerged in Flanders I call a "visionary perception" which arises with a new attention to nature - the non-human, visible world. It is different from the inner religious visions common in Feudal Christianity, for it is associated with empirical experience, not the inner spirit in vacuo in which religious symbols (Christ, cross, dove etc.) embody visionary meaning. The new experience is obviously not found in every member of the society, nor equally in each class or group. But for those that undergo it and express it, it represents a "psychic dislocation" of immense significance to the society as a whole. Nor is it simply a purely esoteric reflection of larger social change - this kind of experience enters the cultural milieu, the wider social reality, affecting ideas and feelings in diverse complex ways. I discuss elsewhere the "how" of this interest in nature - through the growth of respectable secularism, a pantheistic tendency in religion, the attention paid to nature by city-dwellers no longer surrounded by a taken-for-granted countryside, and the economic impulse behind an urban bourgeoisie eager to commercialize agricultural production and oust a land-owning nobility from economic and political power the "what" of this experience is ultimately interrelated with these considerations, but must be considered in its own right, as a window into the deepest levels of the historical psyche.

What is the experience suffused in van Eyck's(66) Turin miniatures and his Adoration of the Lamb landscape; in the landscapes of Bouts and Geertgen tot Sint Jans St. John the Baptists, in van der Goes' Fall of Man, and Gerard David's Baptism of Christ? It is the experience of cosmic love - something very difficult to define in terms other than painting or poetry, a "sudden feeling that the moment Is blessed and eternal."(67) It is an experience of "isness" - nature is, it is both matter and divinity, from and to which flow human pain, joy, hope and death, all suddenly drawn into a higher harmony of total being. Nature is paradise, but not just pretty. It is exactly seen and portrayed, yet is more-than-real in this heightened perception. It is the third of Ruskin's three classes of perception:

“The man who perceives rightly, because he does not feel, and to whom the primrose is very accurately the primrose, because he does not love it. Then, secondly, the man who perceives wrongly, because he feels, and to whom the primrose is anything else than a primrose: a star, or a sun, or a fairy's shield, or a forsaken maiden. And then, lastly, there is the man who perceives rightly in spite of his feelings, and to whom the primrose is for ever nothing else than itself - a little flower apprehended on the very plain and leafy fact of it, whatever and how many soever the associations and passions may be that crowd around it."(68)

It is poetry of light always, that reveals more than phenomenal appearances in ripples of water, flowers, leaves, sky - or reveals them in such emotional and spiritual intensity that the bare phenomena open out more than themselves; they seem to crack open, revealing sone divine essence which is however not beyond human existence but pervaded with the utterness and completeness of the spectrum of human experience.

Such an experience conveyed in a dominant art-form of the time means more than some peripherally significant fashion. The base-line of experience is no longer an Idea or the person of God. It is Nature - the beginning and end of everything - in which man carves his little niche, of which indeed man is just one, though rather an odd one, part. The experience of man is less egocentric than in the medieval view of himself as the special creation, for which nature is at once a fearful obstacle to his existence and mere God-given matter, necessary to his survival. Now man's drama is a struggle in which he is a part of and yet alienated from this totality. He is still unique - he alone reflects upon this Nature, experiences it as something other than himself. Yet through this experience he becomes one with it again, in a communion possible only because of his separation fom it. This is both his tragedy and his special ecstasy, which take the place of the Fall and God's special mission for man as guiding allegories - though consciously the latter remain for a long time the prevailing belief-systems. (The conscious articulation of the new experience has to await the next major crisis of Western Civilization - the Industrial Revolution, in Romanticiam).

This experience is located in human and natural alienation. It is an impulse which leads to (and is simultaneously the result of) scientific study of and progressive work on nature; a kind of cosmology in which the spiritual and the material merge.(69) Work and all of life is a spiritual quest. The goal - not philosophically formulated until the 19th C in Romanticism and Marxism - is the overcoming of Man's alienation, the creation by man of a society working in harmony with nature in both concrete and spiritual terns. The experience is the focus of man's present misery, and the light of hope and meaning for his quest in life - his ideal future.

There is in this experience the treading on a precipice of self-disintegration - this is

the price of communion for man alienated in society. Its danger and painfulness are quite clear in Romanticism. Yet there is a strong suggestion of the solemnity of the crisis leading to harmony in 15th C Flanders - demonstrated in the actual personalities of van der Goes and van der Weyden. But in the paintings themselves it is also deep: in the exquisitely sad tinges of pink on the horizon in Geertgen's St. John, which are reflected in John's expression. It is also the experience of the individual self, aware of itself as unique though in a predicament common to all human beings.

In primitive societies nature is a source of fear; inexplicable natural forces govern every aspect of human life in ways that are experienced directly (though of course they are in fact mediated through specific socio-historical structures). Man is a piece of cork on an ocean, and natural forces must be appeased. There is no need for a dichotomy between the natural and supernatural - what is experienced, simply is. Representation of nature, embedded in a ritual attitude of appeasement, or celebration, or the strengthening of appropriate emotions for collective actions(70), abstracts in its denotation or personification of natural powers. Exact depictions of nature are perhaps avoided as being sources of fear;(71) beyond this however is the fact that men´s concern is to affect these forces, thus symbols are required in the attempt to manipulate the cosmos. Sometimes a primitive "realism" emerges, such as in the "X-ray drawings"(72) of Australia, Melanesia and N.W. America (in which the skeletons and internal organs of animals are included), but this is a sort of pictorial account or diagram of what animals consist of. The form of nature as an interwoven, unboundarled, continuous fabric, is transparent to the eye of primitive artistic reflection.(73)

The urban civilizations of Antiquity painted landscape, though the Greek sense of values held it subordinate to the human form. Yet the existence of poetic effects of light and naturalistic forms, especially in Roman murals, suggest that urban society and commerce made nature partially opaque to the artistic imagination. In Classical literature rapt descriptions of nature are also frequent, but usually as backgrounds to narrative, or as metaphors for human situations.

Medieval society once again looked through nature; again existence absolutely within nature - hostile and fearful - led to its being only a source of religious symbols.

"Even as late as the ninth century the Utrecht Psalter is full of landscape motives taken from Hellenistic painting, and its impressionistic scribbles still imply a sense of light and space. There is no simpler way to show the triumph of symbol over sensation in the Middle Ages than to compare its pages with those of the ´copy´ made by the Monk Eadwine for the monastic house of Canterbury in the middle of the 12th C.

"All art is to some degree symbol, and the readiness with which we accept symbols as real depends, to a certain extent, on familiarity. But we must admit that the symbols by which early medieval art acknowledged the existence of natural objects bore unusually little relation to their actual appearance." (75)

When Petrarch - bridging the medieval and the Renaissance worlds - climbed a mountain in order to enjoy the view, he was struck with remorse when at the top he opened a copy of St. Augustine´s "Confessions", and read: "And men go about to wonder at the heights of the mountains, and the mighty waves of the sea, and the wide sweep of rivers, and the circuit of the ocean, and the revolution of the stars, but themselves they consider not." The appreciation of nature was felt to be in conflict with godliness and self-knowledge.

Yet even within the limitations set by medieval symbolism, nature was occasionally painted for its sensuous beauty in the "Hortus Conclusus" (Closed Garden) - an enclave of paradise, of which the source was probably Persian. Delicate flowers and fruit delight the senses, but they still have an immaterial quality suggesting heavenly joy. Outside the Garden the wild chaos of nature(76) is sometimes represented in fantastic, foreboding rock formations.(77) Medieval theology was utterly dualistic, separating phenomenon and essence, sensation and symbol, nature and divinity; Truth was to be found in interiorized contemplation of God and the soul - nature and the senses were evil temptations.

But a medieval art form existed from which landscape proper was at last able to emerge: this was the secular illustrated manuscript.(78) The medieval "interpretation" of nature was full of paradox and conflict. Nature was the harsh reality to which man had been relegated, justly for his sins. It necessitated toil, caused fear and suffering, and yet from occasional delights in it an inkling of God's permanence could be felt; from the cycle of seasons and climate might be known the divine transmutations worked by God. Visionary or allegorical solutions to the problems of existence, within the dominant value-system, could deny nature anything but its temptation towards sensuous delight, or could see it solely as a metaphor for the soul´s inner struggle of good against evil. But the continual wresting of physical existence out of nature, in the toil of the vast majority of the people, could not but find some emotional expression even in art forms that belonged to the classes that were freed from it.(79)

"The resetting of classical motifs for the picturing of seasons and months into a specifically Christian scheme provided one such formula."(80) From the portrayal of seasonal growth, landscape could be borne as it could not from the vision of eternal spring. For, although months night be personified in classical symbols - such as the barque of Venus for April - the illustration of the twelve months of the year and their

labours in the fields led to the exploration of nature in aspects that might otherwise be ignored. The secular illustrations in "Books of Hours" painted for the nobility, provided the context within which “a new idea of space and a new perception of light" could allow a "new nexus of unity, enclosed space…. This new way of thinking about the world may be called scientific, for it involved the sense of relation and comparison as was the measurement on which science is based. But it antedates the real rise of science by almost two hundred years, and we find it in the work of artists who do not SSSB to hav« been troubled by ths mathematics of perspective.... Already in 1410 Pol de Limbourg, in his eagerness to record the truth of country life, has achieved a new unity of tone. And fifteen years later van Eyck has painted in the Adoration of the Lamb the first great modern landscape. From one point of view this marvellous work may be considered as the culmination of the landscape of symbols. It is still conceived in terms of a paradise garden, in the centre of which stands the fountain of life. Leaves and flowers are all rendered with a Gothic sense for their individual entity and decorative possibilities. Round the garden there are still the remains of the Gothic forest, dense thickets of trees, with their trunks very close together. But the garden is not shut in with trees, nor even with a hedge of roses. As in a landscape by Claude, our eye floats over
the flowery lawns into a distance of golden light. We have escaped from the Middle Ages.”(81)

Eyck (1390-1441) began the process of intruding landscape into the devotional picture, moving beyond the strictures of the Church which throughout the Middle Ages had tended to allow only the depiction of religious figures. Eyck's innovation therefore was to bring the technique of the miniature (with which he worked early in his career) into the devotional painting, that is he adapted old schema to incorporate new experience.

The Ghent alterpiece consists of a number of panels depicting God, Mary, John the Baptist, Adam and Eve, and the "donor" of the picture and his wife. The donor was a wealthy burgher who later became Mayor of Ghent, and he payed Eyck to execute the work for the town's cathedral. (This would enhance both his own and the town´s esteem). The lower part of the closed panel depicts the Adoration of the Lamb - a scene referring to verses in the Book of Revelation. The discussion will centre on this part of the altarpiece because it is here that the landscape is important.

The lamb is the focal point of this lower part, to which all the figures turn and worship. "Mankind, thirsting for salvation, is represented here on the paradisiac greensward by its noblest exponents - the Prophets, the Apostles, the Saints and the Martyrs appear in clove-knit groups on either side.”(82)

In the "Adoration of the Lamb" panel the holiness of the scene is portrayed as much in the brilliant flowers and lush vegetation as in the lamb, the altar and the holy

figures. Eyck (and his patrons) could find it far from heresy to venerate the Creator through the depiction of all His works. The "Fountain of Life" in the lower centre seems literally to water the flowers and the grass as much as it symbolically "feeds" the believers among humanity. Considering this bottom part of the altarpiece In relation to the top part in which the forms of God, Mary, etc. are shown, Panofsky says:

"....we are faced not with a contrast between Heaven and earth but with a duality of Heavens, one on top of another.(83)

This pantheism, or secularisation of Christianity, forshadows bourgeois humanist thought later in the century - in particular that of Erasmus - and anticipates the Reformation of the 16th C.

In the landscape, as much if not more than in the rest of tha painting's content, Eyck displays vary acute powers of empirical observation. In fact he gives distant objects too much detail to be realistic. This may be related to the embyonic emergence of the "scientific spirit" in the Low Countries, associated with the rising middle-class and later with Protestantism. Linked with this, but constituting a factor in its own right is the tendency starting with Eyck to depict the "familiar". Elements of the vegetation could have been recognised by the people of Ghent as like their own:

"…. typical of Dutch art is the peculiar naturalism by which it is differentiated not only from the general European baroque, with its heroic attitudes, its austere and often rigid solemnity, and its impetuous, exuberant sensualism, but also from all earlier styles based on fidelity to nature. For it is not merely the simple, pious, reverent objectivity of the representation, not merely the endeavour to depict life in its immediacy in the familiar forms, which everyone can confirm for himself, but the personal experience implicit in its outlook, which gives this painting its special quality of truth. The new middle-class naturalism is a style which attempts not only to make spiritual things visible, but all visible things a spiritual experience. The intimate...painting is an...expression of the bourgeois spirit with its untiring psychological inquisititiveness….(84)

It is illustrative of the kind of artist Eyck was that he was also a goldsmith and architect.

The empiricist leaning of Eyck goes alongside a different tendency which could be termed a new sort of realism. Certain parts of the vegetation consist of exotic and tropical forms, such **as** the palm-tree, which are intended to convey the Biblical setting of the scene, and these match the oriental clothes of the prophets in the lower left group. Likewise, in the panel to the side of the lamb the "soldiers of Christ" and the pilgrims go through a barren, rocky pass from where the lush meadow is hidden

from sight - as if to indicate the "rocky path" taken by man on his way to salvation. This imaginative realism rests however upon observation, for van Eyck had the opportunity to observe Mediterranean vegetation during visits to Spain and Portugal. The bourgeois affection for the "familiar" is accompanied by a taste for the strange and exotic.

Whilst bourgeois inclinations are on the ascent in the work of van Eyck, aspects of it still represent the art of the nobility. Panofsky typifies the "international style" of the 14th C as a self-conscious extravagance of a nobility fearful of intrusion from the new bourgeoisie. Eyck, he argues, attempted to recapture in a different medium some of the splendour and meticulous workmanship of the treasures of his early patrons. His painting is jewel-like to capture the glow of pearls and precious stones which still symbolize "celestial virtues". Eyck combined the medieval idea of treating the frame like chased metal which encloses a precious stone - the picture - with the modern idea of the frame simply isolating an imaginary space. By subduing the frame or making it life-like (e.g. simulating marble on a wall) he showed the modern inclination, but by making the panel a tangible piece of luminous matter - an "object d'art" - he adhered to the old tendency.

Finally, in the Ghent altarpiece we find that naturalistic depiction of man and nature in harmony which I discussed earlier. Techniques of parspective etc. allowed Eyck to convey a harmonious blending of the landscape with the humans and with the church spires (in contrast to older paintings in which such forma seem to be "stuck" onto the background). One derives its poignancy from the other: hills take on the elegance of the churches, the churches become imposing like the hills. In the right side panel two women – Mary Magdalene and Mary of Egypt - emerge from the foliage. They seem to be in a transitional position between nature and the human scene. The groups of Saints and Virgins hold rich palm fronds in their hands: part of the landscape is actually taken up by humans.

The 15th C aesthetic vision of nature (here considered in Flanders but, as already mentioned, found in similar forms elsewhere) lies within the concurrent and interacting developments in technique and sensibility:

"The medieval picture, be it framed tablet, stained glass window, sheet of parchment or mural, acted as a plane surface. The more the figures on them were invested with reality, the more violent grew the thirst for space, until finally the surface was broken through, the eye went deeper as through a window, and the third dimension was conquered. With this shift in their mode of vision landscape artists opened the door which had already been shaken vigorously by their love of nature. Thirst for space is the primary thing; the rediscovery of the laws of perspective only comes second. People were painting more or lass correctly in parspeotive vail before tha mathematical rules were known."(85)

Similarly, the Galilean scientific world-view represented a synthesis of what Needham calls the "practice of the higher artisanate" (represented by the miner Agricola (1490 - 1555), the instrument-maker Robert Norman (f1.1590), artist-engineers and architects such as Brunelleschi (1377 - 1446), and Leonardo da Vinci (1452 -1919) and the speculative scolastlcism of, for example, the Universities of Oxford and Padua. Mathematical formulation was the "magic touch" brought to concrete natural phenomena, within a new cosmology that sought to understand logically the uniformity of Nature. Needham finds the roots of the pre-Galilean speculation at Padua in the general turning towards nature of the later Middle Ages:

"Historians have long recognised that the middle of the 12th C was a turning-point in the history of European thought. Whether or not because of the because of new contacts with the Islamic world (especially Averroism), the 12th and 13th Cs saw a vast movement away from anthropocentric symbolism towards genuine interest in objective Nature. This can be traced in every department of thought and art, from the growing naturalism of Gothic stone-carving to the rise of new realiasm in theology, liturgy and drama. It is not possible to overlook this naturalistic movement in tracing the roots of modern science."

In his discussion on the emergence of the Renaissance cosmology - the basis of bourgeois natural science - Collingwood convincingly demonstrates that there were two main phases. The first was a pantheistic cosmology, for which the material and the divine were one in nature; this gave way to mechanistic dualism. The pantheistic phase embraces the 15th and 16th Cs, as a counterpart to the aesthetic visionary perception of nature. An empiricism at once secular and religious, a tendency towards nature mysticism and a pantheistic cosmology, are inter-related with one another as a structurally developing moment of consciousness in a particular, early period in the history of capitalist society (which is simultaneously the demise of feudal society). Collingwood is worth quoting at length on the pantheistic phase in the development of Renaissance cosmology:

"In opposition to these teleological methods (in Aristotelian medieval doctrine), the new theory of nature insisted on explanations through efficient causes, which meant explaining all change and process by the action of material things already existing at the commencement of the change. The assumption that change must be explained in this way is already a conscious principle in the philosophers of the 16th C. Thus Berbardino Telesio, in the middle of the century, regards nature not as drawn onwards by something outside itself to imitate forms having an eternal and immaterial existence, but as possessed of an intrinsic activity of its own, namely heat, in virtue of which it generates motion in itself and thus produces all the various types of structure found in the natural world. The naturalistic philosophy of the Renaissance regarded nature as something divine and self-creative; the active and

passive sides of this one self-creative being they distinguished by distinguishing natura naturata, or the complex of natural changes and processes, from natura naturans, or the immanent force which animates and directs them. This conception was much closer to Plato than to Aristotle, for the tendency of Plato's Pythagorean cosmology was to explain the behaviour of natural things as an effect of their mathematical structure, a tendency quite in harmony with the work of the new physical science; whereas Aristotle´s cosmology tended to explain it through an elaborate chain of imitations of imitations of the divine nature. Hence the Renaissance philosophers enrolled themselves under the banner of Plato against the Aristotelians, until Galileo, the true father of modern science, restated the Pythagorean-platonic standpoint in his own words by proclaiming that the book of nature is a book written by God In the language of mathematics. For the Aristotelian doctrine that change is an expression of tendency, the 16th C substituted the Platonic doctrine - strictly the Pythagorean doctrine, for in essence it is pre-Socratic - that change is a function of structure.....

"The theory of nature, in the 16th and l7th C, passes through two main stages. These are alike in their hostility to Aristotle and their rejection of teleology and insistence on the immanence in nature of formal and efficient causes; they are alike in a kind of neo-Platonism or neo-Pythagoreanism, I mean in their insistence on mathematical structure as the basis of qualitative differences. The difference between the two stages lies in their view of the relation between body and mind. In the early phase, the world of nature, which is now called natura naturata, is still conceived as a living organism, whose immanent energies and forces are vital and psychical in character. The naturalistic philosophies of the 15th and 16th C attributed to nature reason and sense, love and hate, pleasure and pain, and found in these faculties and passions the causes of natural processes. So far their cosmology resembled that of Plato and Aristotle; and even more that of the pre-Socratics. But this animism or hylozoism was a recessive factor even in the early Renaissance cosmologies, whereas it had been a dominant one in Greek thought; as time went on it was submerged by the mathematical tendency which from the first had accompanied it; and as this tendency got the upper hand the idea of nature as an organism was replaced by the idea of nature as a machine. The change from the earlier or organic to the later or mechanical view was, as I shall explain, chiefly the work of Copernicus. But even the earlier view differed sharply from the Greek theory of the world as an organism, owing to the insistence on the conception of immanence. Formal and efficient causes were regarded as being in the world of nature instead of being (as they were for Aristotle) outside nature. This immanence lent a new dignity to the natural world itself. From an early date in the history of the movement it led people to think of nature as self-creative and in that sense divine, and therefore induced them to look at natural phenomena with a respectful, attentive, and observant eye; that is to say, it led to a habit of detailed and accurate observation, based on the postulate that everything in nature, however minute and apparently

accidental, is permeated by rationality and therefore significant and valuable. The Aristotelian tradition, regarding nature as a material imitation of a transcendent immaterial model, implied that some things in nature were accidental. Aristotle himself had said that matter, i.e. the element of unintelligibility, was the source of the accidental element in nature; and it was not until the Aristotelian cosmology was swept clean away that scientists could begin to take nature seriously and, so to speak, treat her slightest word as deserving of attention and respect. This new attitude was firmly established by the time of Leonardo da Vinci at the end of the 15th C.

"But at this early date nature was still regarded as a living organism, and the relation between nature and man was conceived in terms of astrology and magic; for man´s mastery over nature was conceived not as the mastery of mind over mechanism but as the mastery of one soul over another soul, which implied magic…..

"(Later Giordano Bruno (b. 1548) contributed to the theory of nature in his philosophical interpretation of Copernicanism). He realized that the new astronomy…. implied a denial of any qualitative difference between terrestrial and celestial substance..... The material world is conceived as an infinite space, not empty but full of yielding and plastic matter which recalls to our minds the ether of more modern physics..... This all-embracing and unchanging substance, the matrix of all change, is at once matter, in its capacity as extended and moving, and form or spirit or God, in its capacity as self-existent and the source of movement.... God is both principle and cause, principle as immanent in each individual part of nature, cause as transcending each individual part.

"This pantheistic cosmology…. is like Anaximander in conceiving our world as one of an infinite number of vortices in an infinite homogeneous primary matter extending throughout infinite space, and in conceiving this matter as identical with God. And..... just as the pantheism of Anaximander gave way, as Greek thought developed, to a doctrine according to which the world is not God but God´s creature, so Bruno´s pantheism gave way to a doctrine according to which the world is not divine but mechanical, implying therefore a transcendent God who designed and constructed it. The idea of nature as a machine is fatal to monism. A machine implies something outside itself. The identification of nature with God breaks down exactly when the organic view of nature disappears." (87)

This pantheistic cosmology is expressed intellectually in the 15th and 16th C philosophies of nature(88), and is experienced aesthetically in landscape painting. As a structure of interwoven belief and feeling, it accompanies the early development of urban Capitalism and modern science, maintaining nevertheless aspects of previous modes of interpretation and sensibility. Simultaneously however, it points in a partial way toward a new cosmology beyond the mechanistic dualism which will in fact follow it for four centuries; it anticipates the cosmology which in

Part VI it is argued is now emerging as the appropriate form of interpretation accompanying the transition from the capitalist, to the socialist, mode of production. For this too embraces a unity of matter and mind: dialectical materialism supercedes both mechanistic materialism and idealism. This too will conceive the relationship between man and nature not as mind controlling machine, but as metabolism between the "soul" of man and the "soul" of nature. Whereas under Capitalism nature has been and is conceived as mere raw material, a thing to be chopped up and manipulated in the capitalistic "utilisation" of resources according to a capitalist economic rationality - under Socialism there is emerging, and will evolve further, an emancipatory metabolism, a self-becoming of man within nature. Nature will be conceived of and experienced as an organic unity of dialectical interaction and process; society will transform itself, and nature, in conscious awareness of itself and nature.

The experience of nature which informed the 15th C Flemish landscapists is close to Erasmus´ Platonic notion that elements in the visible world symbolize the invisible world; earthly beauty reflects the beauty of the soul; man stands between the two worlds, belonging in part to each.(89) Such is the essential nature of 15th C Flemish painting, according to Puyvelde:

"They set themselves the task of rendering with veracity the warm luminosity of a summer´s day, the cold bright light of winter, the clear morning light, or the delicate shadows of twilight, and of obtaining a faithful delineation of the atmosphere, that crystalline fluid which envelopes and links all things together in nature, paling the tones as they recede into the distance and leaving us with the suggestion of unlimited space. For the first time in painting, the van Eycks show us man in the universe.....

"It was their sincere search for objectivity which impelled these painters to represent the hereafter, a story from the Bible or from the life of a saint, in the setting of their own everyday life….

"..... theirs was the profound piety of those to whom all that touches the divine, far from being an abstraction, is a living reality, in direct contact with the life of every day and every hour..... in transposing their vision into visible forms they kept very close to the living world before their eyes….

"…. as they looked at the forms before them, they were penetrated by a sense of the mystery of nature and of human life, of the dreams of the soul and the perceptions of the sense..... A human face took on a quality of universality and became the face of a person who, though certainly an individual, was at the same time an image of humanity. A landscape was a corner of nature, but also a concentrated image of the universe....

"Inanimate nature was enveloped in the mystery of the emotion experienced by the artist as he contemplated, analysed and re-composed it in his vision, clothing it in the dream woven by his innermost soul." (90)

Panofsky(91) likewise characterizes the Flemish aesthetic experience as a "quality of reality (which) belonged exclusively to the particular things directly perceived by the senses and to the particular psychic states directly known through inner experience" whereas for Italian neo-Platonism the truth of a created thing consisted in its correspondence to its Idea. He argues that van Eyck used empirically arrived-at perspective to realize the infinitesimally small and the infinitely large, interiors and cosmic panoramas! to emphasise the relative completeness of what is actually presented and the absolute transcendence of what is merely implied (through making the painting a cut out of reality which includes the viewer in the scene). This is similar to Chinese, especially Chan-influenced (see Part VII), nature painting which also finds the Totality in the microcosm of a blade of grass or a tree, and the vastness of the Power in landscapes that can never convey enough, for example, of mountains. This is the kind of mystical experience for which concrete nature, in all its facticity, impinges with intense energy on the senses as miracle, merging with an "inner" vision which makes contact with the dream-power within phenomena and takes the perceived real into an interiorized spiritual fantasy-vision.

Both Panofsky and Friedlander see Dieric Bouts (1413-75) as the next great explorer into landscape after van Eyck. Panofsky describes medieval painting as a language suited to a Christian spiritualism which demands an independence of soul from body. Martyrdom or religious ecstasy is portrayed through an extinction of individuality in the presence of supernatural powers; figures are thus frozen into immobility or contortions incompatible with "realism". Bouts maintained this devitalization of the human figure, but in order to vitalize space; space is brought to life and "thereby announced the possibility of landscape painting as a species sui generis."(92) Religiosity is poured into nature; the localities of his saints are fairylands rendered from the contemplation of both a mystic and a naturalist. In his St. Christopher, wavelets "evoke the impression of uninterrupted regression in space....Bouts…. was the first.... to make use of....the illusion of continuity in space...."(93) In this, and in his St. John the Baptist, landscape frames the "subject", and creates, as in other works, the mood of the whole. It is especially in his close-up details of a bird, a snail, flowers, turf and trickling water, that the exquisite gleam of primaeval freshness and wonder is felt; even his commissioned paintings of gruesome executions give him the excuse to paint a few near-to flowers as if they were crystals of eternity. Bouts conveys human solitude, through the remove and reserve of facial expressions (even in a tortured martyr) and the perfect, infinite silence of nature in a glowing, but mournful, harmony of colour. Bouts is a very early poet of isolation and alienation, which is explored within the strange and beautiful melancholy of nature

and the movement of light and shade. There is a tension, in his St. Christopher and St. John, between a harmony of the human being in nature, and a discordance - expressed in the stiffness with which the figures are stuck against the middle distance.

Hugo van der Goes (1140-62) is often looked at by art historians as an early van Gogh - anguished to the point of insanity, wresting a vibrance which is both frighteningly dynamic and fervent. Grief, disorder, portending tragedy fill his human figures; the break-up of the feudal system, manifested in wars, chaos, the sacking of towns, is contiguous to the horror and insecurity experienced by van der Goes. He conveys experience mostly through human psychology, but where he paints nature it is with the discord between figures and terrain overcome. Landscape is used to create spatial depth, subordinating detail to total effect. In his The Fall of Adam and Eve in paradise, nature is green, rich and luxuriant, the sky a heavenly blue. But the beauty is tinged with sadness, as if it must pass or as if it cannot be really grasped but only dreamed of. Harmony is both there and already lost, and then again yearned for;| nature is both real and a visionary symbol. Adam and Eve are awkward, even ugly in the perfectly executed Eternal Garden; in the other side of the diptych, The Lamentation of Christ, the reconciliation with Christ after the Fall is through ghastly suffering, intensified in a swirling, dark sky.(94)

Of Geertgen tot sint Jans' St. John the Baptist, Genaille(95) writes: "….the Saint, his hand pressed to his cheek, seems less to meditate on divinity than he seems absorbed in the charms of his retreat." I would have said rather that he is sunk away, not in divine meditation nor charmed by nature, but as an outsider from nature. Harmony and sparkling beauty are all around him; as a troubled human he is only partially within it. Friedlander writes:

"Here the sward is not an artificially constructed stage, rather, as a vehicle for the content of the picture, it is of equal value to the figure of the Baptist and contrasts with it significantly. One is tempted to declaim: all's well with the world, and only man is vile! Formally and colouristicallally the following elements face and complement one another: the saint sunk in thought and sorrow, humped into a triangle, in a cool brown and grey-blue robe, not enthroned but simply seated to one side, and, to the other, a warm, soft, radiantly sparkling slope of meadowland. The old enmity between man and his surroundings has been pregnantly and dramatically exploited, as nowhere else in the 15th C."(96)

In Geertgen, landscape seems to be urging to burst out from the constraints of the devotional picture; it is in nature that sensuous interest and emotional experience can be explored and expressed .

Hieronymous Bosch (1450-1531) develops landscape through the expression of anxiety and paranoia. The disintegration of the medieval world and the emergence of urban capitalism is comprehended through religion: "The same subjective religious spirit which brought about the mystical movements of the Brothers of the Common Life and the Congregation of Windesheim fiills the work of the Dutch painters, whether they go in a realistic direction, like Geertgen tot sint Jans, or in a fantastic and visionary one, like Bosch. Both are equally expressive, and frquently blend. (97)

Bosch lived and worked in one of the largest towns of Brabant, called 's-Hertogenbosch. This was a thriving middle-class commercial centre with a vigorous cultural life. Religious life was particularly flourishing, and the proportion of the population that belonged to one of the several religious orders was greater than in any other town in the Low Countries(98). Bosch himself was member of the "Brotherhood of Our Lady", an orthodox order dedicated to a return to a fundamentalist Christianity. Like many religious movements of the 15th C (culminating in the Reformation) this order was critical of the developing commercial tendencies in both society and the Church.

The paintings of Bosch have been characterised as conscious moralistic denouncements of human vices, in particular Avarice and Lust. Whether this is justified or not, he seems obsessed with human frailty and wrong-doing; human impotence before retribution is conveyed with disgust and unsympathetic resign. Most of Bosch's paintings were collected later by the Catholic fanatic Philip II of Spain, the architect of the Inquisition. Their depiction of hell and torment and of people as inhuman spindly forms also express a profound "ontological insecurity" (to use R. D. Laing's term) and lack of understanding and community with fellow human beings. Bosch therefore anticipates the punitive and guilt-ridden aspects of the Reformation. Man is not the devout child of God, but the plaything of demoniac powers reigning on earth. This can reasonably be related to the growing experience of alienation in the developing capitalist society, described by Hauser:

".....in the narrower sense of the term in which we are interested in the present context, it originated in the age when the organic unity of the spiritual world began gradually to disintegrate into a multiplicity of aspects, interests and ties. This is of course a very ancient process…. In the broadly uninterrupted process of development… there have been some pauses offering rest and relief, as in the Middle Ages, for instance, as well as a number of sudden, revolutionary leaps, of which the most striking was that which took place in the 16th C. Western man experienced another such leap in the 19th C with the development of modern high capitalism.

".....(people) may have been at the mercy of tyrannical lords before, but now they found themselves at the mercy of forces from which they were estranged....

"In the classical meaning of the term (in Hegel, Marx and Kierkegaard)..... alienation means divestiture of self, the loss of subjectivity; a turning inside out of the personality, exteriorizing and driving out what ought to remain within, with the result that what is ejected in this way assumes a nature completely different from the self, becomes alien and hostile to it, and threatens to diminish and destroy it.

"....(the artist) expresses his concern, dismay and despair at a world in which the spirit of alienation, de-personalization, and soullessness prevail." (99)

The painting by Hieronymus Bosch of The Penitence of St. Jerome is spiky and irritating to look on. The tree to the upper left consists merely of sprigs growing out of a distorted stump. The solitary bird sitting on it makes it eerie and unwholesome. The background scenery alone has beauty in it, but on closer observation this is a sickly green and yellow. The portion of landscape on a receding plane contrasts with the vertical section in which the saint is; the first is both a contrast to and a reflection of the miserable human state. Around the man atrange objects take on the form of a monster: two holes become eyes, spiky branches become hair. Potentially pleasant colours and forms turn into ambiguous and disturbing connotations. The link from nature to man runs through the symbolism of the owl and lizard (which signified human evil in Bosch´s time) and also through the rocks suggesting the head of a monster, in the mouth of which Jerome appears to be. The position of Jerome is unbalancing to the eye, as if mocking him and his hopeless efforts at penitence. The cross with a real miniature Christ on it is vulgar, and is awkwardly held in Jerome's hands. The "monster" also looks like a rubbish heap and a line of bushes extending into the landscape appears as its tail.

Jerome is made a fool of by the landscape - he cannot get his legs comfortably onto the rock. He does not belong in nature. The potential effect of his soft, dignified red cloak is nullified, made ridiculous by the spiky log on which it rests, and the owl next to it. Jerome is trying to be dignified and sincere, but his face has an inane expression. His lustful thoughts are symbolised by the large decomposing fruits around him (common in Bosch's symbolism). The products of man and civilization - a book, a hat, a gravestone, an object like a table tipping over - look scattered, impotent and broken up, and Jerome himself seems the same.

Only the simple farmhouse and church in the landscape portion of the upper right are harmonious in their surroundings, growing out of the flat and stable earth. Thus the landscape portion contains contradictory implications: it is an idealized state of existence and at the same time reflects the blemished condition of man (viz. the "pimply" impression given by the distant trees). The tree with the bird on it in

the upper left stands between man and nature physically and shows both these aspects of nature -serenity and deformation. The foreground around Jerome has holes issuing nasty fluids, but there are none in the harmonious landscape portion. On the other hand, the small lake in the upper right landscape portion looks like an eye in the earth - the shadow of a tree suggesting the pupil. This is perhaps a hint of a motif used in many of Bosch's other paintings - the "eye of God" watching man's evil.

Bosch represents an aspect of that cluster of attitudes, described so brilliantly by Huizinga(100), which pervaded the 14th and 15th Cs: pessimism, sense of impending calamity, obsession with the sin of cupidity, insecurity before violence, morbidity and gloom in the personally internalized sufferings of Christ. This cannot be gone into in detail here, but it is obvious that such orientations are related to the decline of feudal civilization, the search for religious forms that adequately answered to real experience, and to the Black Death (which was, significantly, a function of expanding trade). The despair in feudal breakdown, stemming from the aristocracy but obviously permeating further, is interwoven with fear of the future and the disorientation of all classes in the face of the emergence of bourgeois social forms. Bosch anticipates the docta ignoranta of Breughel's tlme: the feeling that man did not know who he was or what he was living for. Breughel conveyed aspects of life's enigma as automatic and mechanical, in games, masquerades - absurd and senseless.(101) The perception of people as swarms engaged in chaotic puppet play is present also in Bosch.

At the beginning of the 16th C Gerard David painted his Baptism of Christ at Bruges. In a sense it lies at the end of the Eyckian development of visionary landscape, for as Bruges and Ghent declined in economic power and Antwerp grew, artistic culture shifted in Antwerp toward Italian imitation, which is evidenced in the landscapes that ensued and the temporary turning away from natural observation.

It is an astonishing advance in composition, and in the smooth interlacing of human figures into nature. “The landscape is no longer read or spelt out: it rings as a whole."(102) Genaille writes:

"The feeling for nature is in its amplitude and diversity, an entirely new quality. Of course ws also find here, as in van Eyck and Bouts, vegetation meticulously painted leaf by leaf with a botanist's concern for precisely characterizing each species, distinguishing between the beach and the chestnut-tree, for carving out every flower, iris, poppy (the despair of all painters), Solomon's seal, strawberry. But under the gentle light of nightfall, in an exquisite art of aerial perspective, here, for the first time, a huge forest appears, masses of foliage, the underwood cut through by a glade that draws the eye beyond, toward a lovely horizon of hills, of a city, and of crags dominated by a castle. The green and ochre tones are delicately shaded. A delightful

impression of freshness emanates from the whole. It is no longer a vision of the earth as a paradise we are offered, in which the magic of light gives the simplest detail the aspect of a miracle. We are presented with the poetry of a plausible and naturally organized landscape as expressed by a painter moved by that countryside." (103)

Patenir, as mentioned before, was the first artist to be considered and to consider himself a "landscape painter". He worked in Antwerp, which carried on a large export trade in art-works. According to Hanns Floerke(104) there were in Antwerp about three-hundred "masters" at work in 1560, compared to 169 bakers and 78 butchers. According to Hauser:

"....it happens for the first tiras in the history of Western art that we are able to establish the existence of a surplus of artists and of a proletariat in the art world. The dissolution of the guilds and the fact that artistic production ceases to be regulated by a court or by the state allow the boom on the art market to degenerate Into a state of fierce competition....." (105)

The painting had become a commodity with an "exchange-value." Like all labour, artistic production involves the mediation of nature - human labour transforming the "natural substratum" (nature-in-itself) into a painting, a product (nature-for-us). As with the worker in the capitalist industries of Antwerp, so with painters the mechanization of production for a market was accompanied by specialization. Patenir frequently collaborated with Quentin Massys for example, a reknowned specialist in figure-painting.

The dominant mode of art-production through specializations in specific "genres" was related to the contemporary socio-economic structure. Gombrich(106) shows how this rested also upon a particular aesthetic orientation common to artist and art-collector, which originated in the Italian Renaissance. It entailed a concern for artistic quality as such, regardless of the function or the subject-matter of the painting. Aesthetic qualities are values in themselves. The painter is not merely an illustrator, but a creator, a poet - thus arises the possibility of a "pastoral" painter. Such ideas took root easily in Flanders and Brabant (Antwerp lies in the latter county), especially as many of the buyers were Italians.

A Patenir landscape, such as the Flight into Egypt was essentially something pleasurable, to be enjoyed in the home. The remoteness and strangeness of the landscape was liked because: "The interest in geography, stimulated by the great discoveries of the age, added to the delight in this convenient opportunity of getting to know foreign parts."(107)

A landscape by Patenir is not an immediate recording of a segment of nature without organization, as it was to become later. The observation of nature gave building material from which a stable, balanced whole was constructed. His aim was to represent a "condensation" of nature as a whole, to display a "miniature globe".(108) This was done by many artists through tricks of composition such as the positioning of masses of vegetation on both sides and the harmonious positioning of the skyline. Real landscape was seen to be fortuitous and "imperfect" in contrast to subjects like the Three Kings worshipping Christ or three goddesses with Paris, which had an inherent balance. This meant that the impression of completeness had to be wrested purely from "form". Thus, there was a clash between the need to represent the segment realistically as part of a larger whole, i.e. to evoke the impression of the countryside extending laterally beyond the frame, and the desire to offer something complete in itself. The conflict in composition reflects a conflict in sensibilities of the bourgeoisie (viz. realism versus tamed idealisation). "Patenir usually dealt with it not by creating a lateral framework to his composition, but by concentrating the vision of the viewer through the accentuation of the centre - a particular bit of nature from which the remaining country sinks away. Tie could then allow horizontal lines to point the way beyond at the sides.

In the Flight into Egypt the sense of realism is more active in details than in the larger construction - as for example the unlikely shape of the rocky crag illustrates. Furthermore, two perspectives are used in the construction of the whole. Horizontal surfaces are seen from above, verticals from the side.

In this painting the human forms are happily placed in nature (though in other religious paintings Patenlr had man overwhelmed by or appearing desolate in nature). They are small but significant (rather as in Chinese landscapes). Joseph must bend to ascend the mountain, but he is not overcome by it. The form of the whole is congenial; this effect is engendered largely by the doubling of features: two people, two swans, two crags, two clouds. The harmony of man in nature is imperceptibly enhanced by the welcoming wide open doors of the houses.

After Patenir'a death, landscape as a category is not considered to have maintained a high standard, being produced for a generalised "taste" of the market. Great landscape re-emerges, of course, with Breughel and then with the 17th C Dutch landscapists.

PART II - NOTES AND REFERENCES

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3. K. Marx: "Capital", Vol. I.

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9. Panofsky: "Early Netherlandish Painting".

10. A. Martindale: "The Rise of The Artist in the Middle Ages and Early Renaissance."

11. E.P. Thompson: "Peculiarities of the English". Socialist register, 1965.

12. "Levi-Strauss, Althusser and Structuralism". Seminar paper by M. Glucksmann. Durham University.

13. Cf. "Structuralism and Ideology". Seminar paper by N. Pearson, page 8. Durham University.

14. Quoted in E.H.Gombrich: "The Renaissance Theory of Art and the Rise of Landscape" in "Norm and Form".

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22. K. Marx: "Capital", Vol. I.

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26. A. Schmidt: "The Concept of Nature in Marx".

27. K. Marx: "Capital", Vol. I.

28. A. Schmidt: op.cit.

29- K. Marx "Capital", Vol. I.

30. Ibid.

31. A. Schmidt: op.cit.

32. K. Marx: "Grundrisse."

33. K. Marx: "Capital".

34. K. Marx: "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts".

35. K. Marx: "Capital", Vol. III.

36. The ruling classes also see the productive processes they control through distorting ideologies (religion in feudal society, bourgeois economic theory in capitalist society, etc.). The real perception of the productive process is only made possible through the re-integration of the knowledge "owned" by the ruling class, and the experience known by the masses - which re-integration transforms both, realising the potential within both. This re-integration appears to have been possible only since the emergence of Capitalism, though it is thereafter possible in all existing forms of society.

37. This discussion anticipates, and provides a link into, the subject matter of Parts VI and VII. This is one of the many instances demanding that the reader approach

this book from all directions - from front to back, back to front, from centre outwards. It is in this respect that the following note about Education is not considered a "digression".

Under Capitalism, the "educational system" serves to reflect and perpetuate class relations (though simultaneously transforming them according to the changing requirements of Capitalism). In providing for the necessary productive roles in the system, it serves to create a majority of "failures" - human beings whose self-definitions as persons lacking intellectual »nd creative capacities suit them for their functions as manual workers and house-wives. Those who "achieve success" are those who, through developing the technique for hoarding parcels of knowledge to be displayed on demand with a minimum of reflection, take on the non-manual functions of control and regulation of society's life and production.

Empiricist sociology recognizes that "educational achievement" in contemporary capitalist society is directly correlated with social class origin, and that "income", "opportunity" etc. are in turn correlated with "educational achievement". But the framework of empiricist analysis precludes an understanding of what this means. By conceiving the issue merely in terms of "inequality" and of "wastage of potential" it fails to see that the educational system in fact succeeds in its essential function of transmitting the dominant ideologies and patterns of behaviour appropriate to the needs of Capitalism. What it (i.e. empiricism) implicitly urges for is a system of equal opportunity brought about by reforms within Capitalism. Its vision is of a laissez-faire Utopia, in which equality of access to those social resources which underly educational success (parental encouragement and commitment to educational values, housing space, good teacher/ pupil ratios in schools, etc.) can be attained within the very system that necessarily maintains the inequality of these resources, such that the opportunity to hold power, effect social control, obtain larger portions of the social surplus etc. is equally open to all.

This extraordinary, contradictory vision coincides with the phenomenalist notion of "social structure" as a pyramidal stratification of occupations. Rather than using a dynamic conception of an historically developed social organization of production, mere socio-economic strata are categorized according to empirical criteria. Working class children are "deprived" of middle class "advantages"; it is not perceived that both are socialized into their historically structured class positions - both being shaped for their fragmented tasks within the capitalist mode of production.

The very notion of equal opportunity to attain differential rewards within a hierarchically ordered society is of course a complete absurdity. Even if "social context" were made "equal" overnight, if individual differences were able to grant differential social power and wealth, classes would immediately re-emerge, from which would result new institutionalized inequalities in education. The notions of

"equal opportunity", selection on a "fair" basis, "perfect" social mobility etc. are fantasy projections of legitimating capitalist ideologies. They completely ignore tbe fact that any social selection is according to an institutionalized structure of values, related to those aptitudes upon which the particular form of society rests; and which in a hierarchical society are conceived as deserving differential status and financial reward. Equality in education can only mean the elimination of class-based differences between people, accompanied by the re-definition of labour, of "success" and "failure"; by the abolition of specialization of activities and the dichotomies of mental and manual, administrative and directly productive, work. Educational equality can only mean the maximisation of every individual's unique capacities without according differences in wealth, power and prestige to individuals of different personality, leaning, etc. Education would still be transmitting dominant values, but these will entail the cooperative appropriation of knowledge through mutual exploration, the development of universal self-confidence and creativity. Ideas and skills will be inseparably linked to human interaction and mutual assistance in developing ways to live collectively within nature. Children will still respond differently to the same education (since socialization is the continuous, infinitely complex dialectical interaction between an individual's unique genetic make-up and his social context/experience), but the manifestations of these differences will not be measured. The personality will be seen as an infinite web or kaleidoscope of abilities, tendencies, aptitudes, etc., not a unilinear measurable ladder. No single, fragmented ability will be wrenched out of the dynamic complex of the human self and made into a measurable "thing" according to which role selection is practised by the controlling class in society. The uniqueness and ultimate incomparabllity of the individual will be respected, and cultivated to the maximum decgree that society can muster.

It is clear that manifest human differences in mental "aptitude" etc. related to class, sex snd race are the result of social and historical processes. There has not been sufficient time, in evolutionary biological terms, for classes to segregate into distinct gene-pools, nor in all probability for ethnic groups inasmuch as mental functions are concerned. Nor is there any reason to assume that sexual differences in mental and emotional processes, present now or in any past time, are functions of genetic factors as such, i.e. that different social-cultural mediations could not bring about any number of variations in observable sexual differences or similarities. When we recognise that no human being yet utilises more than a tiny proportion of his biologically given brain capacity, all attempts to relate aptitudes to genetic factors are shown to be meaningless. When all the biological capacities have been maximally evolved into cultural attributes, and when all social conditions are absolutely equal with respect to intellectual and imaginative stimulation and the development of self-confidence, then perhaps we will be able to see if there are any genetic factors making for differences between the sexes and ethnic groups. But such a situation is light-years away, and even if there were such genetically

grounded differences, there would be no reason for them to be accorded differential social value. Similarly for differences between individuals in a classless society - a capacity for arithmetic computation need not be considered superior (in a rational society of "plenty" and socialized production) to poetic imagination; initiative need not be defined in relation to callousness and competitiveness.

However, it is obvious that there would always be regional and cultural differences (fortunately!) in the classless society, which would be manifested in different personality-structures. It is not "equal opportunity" - which would always be in the terms defined by a particular system and the classes whose interests it served - which is desired, but the equality of a humanized collective, co-operatively developing all human powers.

Under Capitalism the working-class socialization of children reproduces the repression of creative and intellectual capacities (even though socialization is contradictory, i.e. it structures ideas and behaviour such that congruity between them and experience is never complete, leading to innovatory and creative re-perceptions of reality). After the crucial shift of political power to the working-class, there must be an immediate rechannellng of social wealth into working-class wages, housing, etc. accompanied by massive measures of positive discrimination in education (which would at first be only an ad hoc socialist education). This would feed into the long-term process of resocialization, reconstruction of all institutions etc. - always as a dynamic process constantly re-analysed and re-criticized through permanently stimulated pressures from below to transform and socialize society. In this process an emancipatory education would be born.

38. E. Mandel: "Marxist Economic Theory", (1962).

39. M. Sahlins: "Stone Age Economics", (1972)

40. Ibid.

41. L. Marshall: "Sharing, Talking and Giving: Relief of Social Tensions among !Kung Bushmen", Africa 31, (1961).

42. M. Sahlins: (op.cit.) notes that the Yir-Yiront of Australia, "make no linguistic differentiation between work and play", and that hunter-gatherers on the whole do not have to exhaust themselves to attain a nutritious and diversified diet.

43. Hippie communes also represented experiments in the post-bourgeois family. A less authoritarian attitude towards the upbringing of children is mads possible by the diffusion of parental responsibilities through a number of adults (as is the case in primitive societies and to some extent in traditional peasant or working class

communities). Greater concern for children's appraisal of reality is matched by less socialization into and less strict recognition of social roles and the importance of possessions.

44. M.Sahlins: op. cit.

45. E. Mandel: op.cit.

46. As discussed in connection with sexual repression in Part VI, society will never attain "absolute freedom", that is, with no authority, no necessary restraint of individual desires in the interests of the community, etc. It could attain the minimum of authority (which would be generalised and collectively imposed), through an optimally developed self-discipline, to the degree to which the existing level of knowledge (scientific, social, ethical) and the productivity of labour, would allow. Disalienation is an endless, perhaps oscillating, becoming. It has already been seen that in "primitive society" productivity is not high enough to allow the crystallisation of a non-producing ruling class. The development of early civilizations in which large populations formed integrated social units rested upon an increase in the productivity of labour sufficient to allow a minority to be freed from productive labour, and which in fact necessitated classes if civilization was not to regress to primitive forms - since productivity is not yet high enough to make possible the generalisation of the "higher" aptitudes cultivated by the ruling elites. This consideration is relevant to the later discussion of state socialist societies which have developed from backward economic conditions, and in which the existence of political elites would appear inevitable. The high productivity of modern capitalism, and in time, the state socialist societies, will enable the overcoming of separation between production and social administration - i.e. the collective ownership and control of the means of production, the means for human thought, of administration, and of aesthetic appreciation. A collectively conscious, fully classless society depends upon a low average labour-time being required of each individual, so that all the capacities necessary to regulating existence can be appropriated by all.

47. E. Mandel: op.cit.

48. Just as (see Part III) the English textile industry between 1780 - 1830 reveals all the major features of industrial capitalist alienation.

49. This is not the case under Capitalism, in which the rejection of certain aspects of Capitalism rarely leads the working-class to directly oppose the ruling-class.

50. ".....the totality of the physical qualities of commodities which give them their use-value, is determined by the specific labour which has produced them; the labour of a weaver determines the dimensions, fineness and weight of the cloth; the labour

of a potter determines the durability, shape and colour of the pot. But if these commodities are each the products of a specific kind of labour, they are also the products of social human labour, that is, of a part of the total labour time available to a particular society, and on the economy of which society is based ..... This is the fact that makes commodities commensurable; it is this general human labour - called abstract labour because abstraction is made from its specific nature...that is the basis of exchange value.....

"Since the dawn of petty commodity production, about 3,000 BC, all labour has been considered equivalent, regardless of its special character. On the tablets..... found at Susa, the wages in the household of a prince are fixed uniformly at 60 qua of barley for the cook, the barber, the engraver of stones, the carpenter (etc.)…. At this early phase of the production of exchange-values, however, men were not able to arrive at the notion of "abstract labour"; the equivalence of different skilled trades was conceived as such. The idea of "abstract labour" could not arise until the appearance of the mobility of labour-power in the capitalist era. This implies not merely that one hour of the labour of a textile worker produces as much as one hour of the labour of a brickmaker, but also that these jobs have been interchangeable in large-scale industry." (E. Mandel. op.cit.)

51. "Market conditions" are never pure however, i.e. specific prices are controlled by capitalist syndicates, cartels, etc. even before the era of monopoly capital, whilst the wages of particular groups of workers are affected by the locally differing, historically developed organizations of labour.

52. "No principle or treasure that we hold, from the spiritual knowledge of our free schools and churches to the creative magic of free labour and capital, nothing lies safely beyond the reach of this struggle (against Communism)....." (President Eisenhower's inaugural address).

53. A. Martindale: "The Rise of the Artist", (1972).

54. In the towns too, official Town Architects or Town Painters were appointed by the communes. "The peintre de la ville was perhaps appointed in imitation of the peintre du roi or peintres de Monseigneur le duc...." (A. Martindale: op.cit.

55. A. Martindale: op.cit.

56. See W. Stechow {"Northern Renaissance Art 1400-1600. Sources and Documents") for examples of contracts between Church authorities and painters, in which subject matter, effort and tine limits and price are strictly stipulated.

57. Compare a fresco in a Church - seen by the people at every Mass - with the paintings of Breughel who was virtually unknown until the 19th C, because all his paintings were in private collections.

56. John Berger (“Ways of Seeing") has very astutely stressed the polarity between "hack" and "genuine" art under Capitalism - the one financially remunerative, the other necessarily antithetical toward those who pay. Paintings like "Les Oreades" by Bourguereau (1825-1905) were pleasing to "men of state, of business, (who) discussed under paintings like this" while William Blake could scarcely earn a living from his art. Nowadays, the painter of a breakfast cereal advertisement will live well whilst genuine artists will rarely sell a picture. The extreme nature of this split increases as Capitalism develops further; it is certainly new to Capitalism.

59. The tendency toward an escalating hyper-sensitivity, referred to before, becomes increasingly the hallmark of the Artist, especially from the Industrial Revolution onwards. Misery, insanity, and "anti-social behaviour" (in bourgeois terms) are common to such varied artists as Shelley, Leopardi, Beethoven, Van Gogh, Gauguin, Munch, Dylan Thomas, Pavesi, Pasolini, etc. etc.

60. One of the most prominent themes in drama and opera in bourgeois civilization has been the irreconcilability of loyalty to a social cause or duty towards the State, and the love for a single individual; examples are "Anthony and Cleopatra", "Aida", and "Eritrea". This theme is not unique to bourgeois experience, being important in Greek tragedy also (especially "The Orestes” trilogy of Aeschilus) - for similar underlying reasons, though less fully evolved.

61. This is a major level of meaning in Thomas Mann's superb short novel (and in Visconti´s film based on it) "Death in Venice". Aschenbach is the Aesthete; he plumbs the very depths of artistic meaning, and knows that only very few people ever can. His "outer" life (for example his marriage) has been not greatly satisfactory, but rather lonely and uneventful. It has been compensated by hia art, and by the totally superficial public recognition that has given him self-esteem.

At the peak of his "career" ard bourgeois approval, the meaning given him by art begins to pall. He attempts to find a wider "answer" for his soul, to extend his aesthetic experience into something broader. He goes to Venice, the city of beauty. He stays in a hotel where the European "haute bourgeoisie" take their pleasure: amid the poverty of 19th C Venice they eat fine food, make polite conversation, fuss about the service at dinner and bathe in the sea with all the Victorian trappings that keep people from feeling nature, themselves, and others. Yet Aschenbach does not confront the split between the hypocritical, callous, emotionally and intellectually superficial bourgeoisie, and Art. Rather he respects and emulates these leisured philistines and elegant parasites; the contradiction is merely felt in loneliness and

irritability towards common people. When he does feel something strongly - the adolescent Tadzio - it is a purely ephemeral kind of beauty. The human being underneath it is superficial and even callous; in any case Aschenbach does not know him. Tadzio's beauty - which Aschenbach cannot have, and which is anyway unpossesable - obsesses his mind, heart and soul. It eats into him and poisons his capacity even to enjoy what he could before as an independent person. Aschenbach's repressed, unsatiated emotions ooze out, leading to total disintegration of the precarious stability he knew previously. He cannot control them nor place them in any meaningful context, any more than he could see aesthetic feelings in relation to the world he lived in. The "refined" control in his art is shown to be an illusory cage around a fragment of his being; when the former breaks down, so does his being, and his existence ends - swallowed up by his own misery and the plague and poverty of Venice.

62. It is pointed out in Part III that the early 19th C Romantics were struggling for such a synthesis, but that Romanticism since has given up this struggle, tending to glorify mere symptoms of the early movement - isolation, individual integrity, bohemianism, etc. This has obscured the positive meaning of early Romanticism, which has thus been viewed (negatively) through the accretions of the late 19th C Romantic legend. The twentieth century reaction against Romanticism has failed to distinguish between the attempted synthesis in, for example, Shelley - of analytical reason, political commitment, and the exploration of the individual soul, on the one hand, and the self-indulgence and agnostic pessimism of e.g. Matthew Arnold on the other. The subsequent anti-Romantic movement has been equally unsuccessful in achieving a synthesis, priding itself on the mere denunciation of personal feelings in a sterile "classical" revival.

63. See A. Ehrenzweig: "The Hidden Order of Art".

64. Thus, there is no reason why artists should not serve revolutions by providing propaganda posters etc. At the same time, art which expresses "reactionary" ideas and perspectives can remain uncensored and be usefully analysed; revolutionary leaders may certainly choose not to publicise it as widely as "revolutionary" art - but they need not attempt to suppress it. Indeed they should not, since it will express contradictions still present in society which are better understood than ignored.

Ultimately, of course, the aim of socialist society will be to eliminate the specialised functionary - the artist - and allow aesthetic creation to be an integral strand within all experience and activity (though this does not preclude the possibility that some people will spend more time writing poems than others). Through the generalized appropriation of art - of the meaning of Shelley's or Van Gogh´s life and art - the sense of uniqueness and human separation will remain but within a communality of understanding which will sustain it, allowing the knowledge that comes from deep

experience and pain to be held in a new, higher kind of collective in which the individual is sustained by communal warmth and sympathy.

65. What E.E. Evans-Pritchard says of the Nuer in "The Nuer", (1940) would apply by and large to the notions of time in the peasant society of Feudal Europe: "........Nuer do not to any great extent use the names of the months to indicate the time of an event, but generally refer instead to some outstanding activity in process at the time of its occurrence.....since time is to them a relation between activities. During the rains the stages in the growth of millet and the steps taken in its culture are often used as points of reference. Pastoral activities, being largely undifferentiated throughout the months and seasons, do not provide suitable points....

.....the Nuer have no expression equivalent to 'time' in our language, and they cannot therefore, as we can, speak of time as though it were something actual, which passes, can be wasted, can be saved, and so forth....(they do not) feel they have to co-ordinate activities with an abstract passage of time, because their points of reference are mainly the activities themselves..... Events follow a logical order, but they are not controlled by an abstract system, there being no autonomous points of reference to which activities have to conform with precision."

Marc Bloch, talking of the medieval attitude to time, writes in "Feudal Society", Vol. I (I961):

"These men, subjected both externally and internally to so many ungovernable forces, lived in a world in which the passage of time escaped their grasp all the more because they were so ill-equipped to measure it. Water-clocks, which were costly and cumbersome, were very rare. Hour-glasses were little used. The inadequacy of sundials, especially under skies quickly clouded over, was notorious. This resulted in the use of curious devices. In his concern to regulate the course of a notably nomadic life, King Alfred had conceived the idea of carrying with him everywhere a supply of candles of equal length, which he had lit in turn, to mark the passing of the hours, but such concern for uniformity in the division of the day was exceptional in that age. Reckoning ordinarily - after the example of Antiquity - twelve hours of day and twelve of night, whatever the season, people of the highest education became used to seeing each of these fractions, taken one by one, grow and diminish incessantly, according to the annual revolution of the sun. This was to continue till the moment when - towards the beginning of the 14th C counterpoise clocks brought with them at last, not only the mechanization of the instrument, but, so to speak, of time itself."

The historical transformation from the feudal to the capitalist mode of production, entailed (as in all social changes), the infinitely complex interactions between changing technology, the emergence of new social relations, and new conceptions

of "reality". Technical changes allowing new urban institutions to arise, were accompanied by appropriate transformations in consciousness; the latter brought about further innovations in technologies in forms orientated to the furtherance of this consciousness, etc. etc.

The new conception of time was related to urban capitalist society just as Evans-Pritchard (op.clt.) says of the Nuer that: "Beyond the annual cycle, time-reckoning is a conceptualization of the social structure, and the points of reference are a projection into the past of actual relations between groups of persons."

66. For simplicity I am avoiding the issue of whether it was Hubert or Jan or both, that painted the various works: I truncate all into "van Eyck". Since all the historians of art consulted consider that both brothers painted miniatures and panels, nothing can be lost - given the lack of any specialized discussion of style here - by so doing.

67. K. Clark: "Landscape into Art", (1949).

68. J. Ruskin: "Modern Painters".

69. Here again is an anticipation of Puritan "wordly asceticism". The early bourgeois philosophy of labour and science is contradictory; it sees labour as both mechanical control of despiritualized nature and as the basis of harmonious relations between man and nature (conceived as a unity of matter and spirit). This paradox is not however drawn out in "Weber's study. It is to be found also in Francis Bacon, who reflects both bourgeois scientism and anticipates the notion of a human science, developed imaginatively for the emancipation of human relations (it is the latter aspect of Bacon's thought that excited Shelley - see Part III).

The fact that the decline of Feudalism and the early ascendancy of the bourgeoisie were accompanied by partially formulated ideas which are in retrospect compatible with ideas orientated toward Socialism under advanced Capitalism, raises a complex issue. The breakdown of Feudalism saw massive peasant revolts; but it was not the masses which steered the new form of society. Likewise in the French revolution, the bourgeoisie in its progressive struggle for power identified itself with the "people" and therefore held conceptions of liberty and equality; these are disbanded or distorted once the bourgeoisie has gained power.

Thus it has been very reasonably suggested that the cave paintings of animals at Laseaux were the objects of mock hunts, serving as preludes to real hunting expeditions. In this case, the representations are extraordinarily "naturalistic", yet the animals are abstracted from nature as a whole - there is no "landscape".

In an essay called "The Eskimo and Man´s Place in the Universe", Riesman considers a myth about an abandoned orphan as the central cultural orientation of the Eskimos. The Universe tells them they have no responsibility, that they belong nowhere. Thought is believed to exist outside of man (the word for "thought" and "outside" are the same). It requires a creative human act for thought, or the universe, to acquire a form of existence. To affirm meaning within a Universe of chaos, the Eskimo finds joy - not a mystical joy - in daily problems of living; through concern with which he becomes aware of the forces of the Universe which no longer deny his existence when his feeling of smallness is turned into a creative statement of his place in it.

"The Great sea
Has sent me adrift,
It moves me as the weed in a great river,
Earth and the great weather
Move me,
Have carried me away
And move my inward parts with joy."

71. Z. Barbu (in an essay called "Sociological perspectives in art and literature" in "The Social Context of Art", (Ed. J. Greedy, 1970) describes the art historian Worringer's view of primitive art thus:

"What form(s).... the main characteristics of the primitive man.... is an attitude of fear and mistrust toward nature..... Because of this, his basic reaction is one of diffidence, and of withdrawal from nature. Worringer calls this type of relation to nature abstraction, meaning both the primitive's inability to experience, and his (unconscious) avoidance of experiencing nature directly and concretely through his sense organs. Moreover, the primitive seems to be possessed by a compulsive need to schematize and abstract his physical environment. He achieves this by religious and artistic activities, that is, by putting between himself and nature a web of spiritual images and abstract forms. His religion and art are therefore two basic ways in which he escapes from the natural and sensorial into the magic and abstract."

72. See L. Adam: "Primitive Art", (1940).

73. This is not to say that primitive art saw the "reality" of nature more or less than any other period of art; all art sees particular aspects of "reality" through particular perspectives. It would be quite wrong to ascribe the labels "unrealistic" or "non-objective" to any art by virtue of its difference from Western realism, for the latter is merely one mode of perceiving and experiencing reality. The very words available tend to lead one to do this, but what is being attempted here is a delineation of the mode of primitive art's reflection upon nature.

74. M. Bloch (op.cit.) writes:

"The men of the two feudal ages were close to nature - much closer than we are; and nature as they knew it was much less tamed and softened than we see it today. The rural landscape, of which the waste formed so large a part, bore fewer traces of human influence. The wild animals that now only haunt our nursery tales - bears and, above all, wolves - prowled in every wilderness, and even amongst the cultivated fields..... behind all social life there was a background of the primitive, of submission to uncontrollable forces, of unrelieved physical contrasts."

75. K. Clark: op.cit. The illustrations of medieval Psalters, for example, show how controlled by the frame are the scenes represented. Only in the borders is there found experiment in realism, with less stylized, naturalistic birds and flowers being represented.

76. Pearsall and Salter in "Landscapes and Seasons of the Medieval World", (1973) write in their Introduction:

"The natural world presented to medieval man aspects of paradise, and of perdition: it was simultaneously the garden of God, and the "terra Babylonis", the land of confusion and sterility into which he had been sent after the Fall. His attitudes to it were various, and, at times, ambiguous: his desire was to enjoy it, to delight in it as a stimulus to the senses, but he was equally anxious to control and limit it.... Consequently, in life as in art, we see him moving always from the "real" to the Ideal, in an effort to preserve and conceptualize what was, by definition, transient and sensuous. Creating a garden out of the wilderness reassured him of this God-given power over the mindless luxuriance of nature. Tilling and reaping, in the steady cycle of the year's weather, reassured him of a divine order, a rhythmic and meaningful pattern of planets, and seasons, to be interpreted and utilized by man ..... wealth of reference and source material outweigh freshness of observation..... The artefact is an approximation to the eternal."

77. The tooth-like crags in Patenir landscapes are survivals from this medieval symbolic landscape.

78. Pearsall and Salter (op.cit.) trace a related development in poetry - from the decorative, heraldically ordered landscape of Gothic poetry to the Scottish poet Gavin Douglas who was "the only poet comparable with the great Flemish landscape painters in his detailed, coherent, and emotionally aroused descriptions of the seasonal labours and landscapes.

E.R.Curtius in "European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages", (1953) shows how medieval secular poetry used nature through an epic stylization or "versified

lexicography" drawn from the rhetorical schools of Antiquity. Curtius also traces the development of the "locus amoenus" which from Theocritus, Homer and Virgil consisted of a flowery meadow, a spring and sometimes trees and breeze, and which held a special charmed beauty or spell. It was subjected to new conceptual schematizations in the middle ages, and poets such as Milton and Keats can be seen as having recreated it. The history of landscape painting is obviously close to this parallel development in literature.

79. Just as the contradictions of feudal class relations were expressed in complex antagonisms between religious orthodoxy and heresies, so the conflicts within medieval orientations toward nature reflect class antagonisms. The orientations of the clergy and nobility pervade peasant mentality, as the physical experience of the peasantry enters into the art of the nobility.

Never in history are distinct cosmologies associable with distinct social classes; the dominant belief system pervades the entire society, whilst oppositional tendencies - more or lees complete resolutions to existing ideological contradictions - appear in pockets of all classes, even though "stemming" primarily from the subjugated classes.

80. Pearsall and Salter: op.cit.

81. K. Clark: op. cit.

82. M.J. Friedlander: Netherlandish Painting", Vol. I.

83. E. Panofsky: "Early Netherlandish Painting".

84. A. Hauser: "The Social History of Art". Though actually referring to a later period, this quotation applies equally well to the period being discussed here.

85. M.J. Friedlander: "Essay on Landscape".

86. J. Needham: "Mathematics and Science in China and the West" (1959).

87. R.G. Colllngwood: "The Idea of Nature" (1945).

88. Another example is the 16th C English writer John Aymer who wrote: "Nature is nothlnge els but God him selfe, or a diuine order spred thoughout the whole world, and ingrafte in euerye part of it."

89. The ideas of Erasmus display further the structural interrelations of sensuous experience, religious ideas, etc. for the period in question. It has already been suggested that elements of the 15th C "vision of nature" anticipate the Reformation

in its secular, empirical, familiarization of religion, in its association of landscape with a specific nation, etc. Likewise many of the ideas of Erasmus are precursors of Lutheran and Calvinist attitudes towards religion and society: in his insistence on rational understanding as a valid prelude to the spiritual understanding of the scriptures, in his rejection of ceremony and the significance attached to relics etc. as hypocritical show, in his view of ethical behaviour being the practical outcome of belief, and in his acceptance of certain aspects of capitalistic economic practice.

90. L. van Puyvelde: "The Flemish Primitives", (1948).

91. S. Panofsky: op.cit.

92. Ibid.

93. M. Friedlander: "Landscape".

94. The question as to whether the inference of "feelings" in a painting in this way is justified, is discussed more fully in Part III. Basically it is argued that all interpretation is in accordance with structures existing in the mind of the investigator, but that analysis allows the inferences to be situated both historically, and in the terms of the experience and theoretical predispositions of the investigator. To deny this seems to erect a false dichotomy between "facts" that can be proved about a work, and feelings towards which an attitude of solipsism is adopted. Here it is accepted that any theoretical construction implies a specific value-orientation to history, and that "facts" only exist in relation to theories, which actually engender them; all analysis abstracts according to the historically located slant of the investigator; all dimensions of reality - including "feelings" are fit subjects for analysis.

95. R. Genaille: "From van Eyck to Breughel", (1954).

96. M. Friedlander: "Landscape".

97. O. Benesch: "The Art of the Renaissance in Northern Europe", (1947).

98. W.S. Gibson: "Hieronymous Bosch".

99. A. Hauser: "Mannerism".

100. J. Huizinga: "The Waning of the Middle Ages", (1924).

101. A. Hauser ("Mannerism") writes: "One of the most conspicuous features of Breughel's mannerism is his submergence of the individual in the mass or in nature.

The individual's plight, his pleasures and pains, are subjected to the tragedy or tragi-comedy of life as a whole, and are reduced to insignificance in comparison. The origins of landscape painting are connected with this relegation of the individual and of humanity itself from the centre of the universal stage. Only when this world below had ceased to be a mere stage on the road to redemption, that is, a mere temporary dwelling place for mankind, and man himself, with his aspirations to salvation, had ceased to be the purpose of creation could landscape painting develop into an independent branch of art. The connection between this process and 'the breach in the unity of the Renaissance´ was recognized by Dvorak, only he believed that this breach was brought about by the reception of the Renaissance by Northern Europe. In fact, however, landscape painting originated In the Netherlands and Germany independently of any such process, for the simple reason that the Renaissance with its individualism and anthropocentrism, never established itself in Northern Europe, and in so far is it took root there, did so after landscape painting had already begun. In the Germanic countries landscape painting was able to develop freely because it never encountered the obstacle of the individualism and anthropocentrism of the Italian Renaissance and consequently never had to shake it off; the loosening of the hold of Christian dogma and men's release from the bonds of a philosophy of life orientated to a world beyond were sufficient to make it possible."

102. M. Friedlander: "Landscape".

103. R. Genaille: op.cit.

104. H. Floerke: "Studien zur niederlaendischen Kunst - und Kulturgeschicte".

105. A. Hauser: "The Social History of Art".

106. E. Gombrlch: "The Renaissance Theory of Art and the Rise of Landscape", in "Norm and Form".

107. M.J. Friedlander: "Van Eyck to Breughel", Vol. 11.

108. M. J. Friedlander: "Landscape".

0. Benesch (op.cit.) writes. Patenir was not the originator of the panoramic world landscape, because Hieronymous Bosch preceded him in this field, but he was the artist who raised this type of ideal landscape painting to an end in itself. The world is spread out like a map. The planes recede in the sequence of brown, green, and blue, a formula of landscape which was valid until the l7th C. It is a landscape appropriate to the era of a new cosmography which is not limited to a small area of

known territory, but encompasses the whole globe. The physical world, unlimited according to the new experiences, was presented in its exotic aspects."

Further References:

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PART III

English (british?) Romanticism and the industrial revolution

An Industrial Revolution refers to that historical process in which scientific and technological knowledge is systematically harnessed to production, it is a process which increases the productivity of the society within which it occurs to degrees unprecedented in its history and once adopted is extended infinitely, ushering in an age in which continuous revolutionization of productive techniques is the norm. The first Industrial Revolution occurred in Britain in the 1780s, and as for all historical phenomena an interpretation of its genesis must elucidate a unique constellation of factors in an historical context, which for the first time in human history made such a phenomenon possible.(1) The precondition for the Industrial Revolution was a well-developed capitalist economic system - that is, by 1770 a pre-industrial capitalistic economy was far enough evolved to make it possible to talk of Britain as a capitalist socio-economic formation. As such, a manufacturing class of entrepreneurs was free to deploy capital, set up factories and use technological innovations in whatever ways might maximise profits from production. At the same time, a state apparatus existed which represented the interests, and was motivated by the economic principles of, the manufacturing and commercial class. This state, with a strong navy, was committed to foreign policies orientated towards securing raw materials and potential markets. At the same time, the increase in population in 18th C Britain, and a slight rise in average standard of living, supplied a minimal domestic market for the first mass-produced goods. Other necessary conditions for this first Industrial Revolution may include the small size of Britain: in an age when tha transportation of a ton of goods 20 miles overland could double its cost, there could be little chance of a first Industrial Revolution in a land-looked area.

But the overriding point is that the mode of production in Britain was capitalist: the Industrial Revolution occurred as a logical process - given certain scientific inventions - in a kind of economy in which the maximisation of individual entrepreneurs' profit was unfettered. For the first time in history, a manufacturing class had the power to implement technological innovations in production, and was able to obtain higher profits by so doing. This is not to say that a "bourgeoisie" held political power directly in 1770. In fact, the centuries-long transition from a feudal to a capitalist mode of production in Britain was not accompanied by the simple ascendance of one class and the decline of another. From the Tudor period onwards, the land-owning nobility showed a strong tendency to commercialise agriculture; the

backing of a monarchy in need of money allowed land-owners to enclose their own land and the traditional "commons" of the peasantry and turn them over to commercial production - mainly of wool - for an export market. From the middle of the 18th C this process was carried out through Parliamentary Enclosure Acts. Much of the nobility became effectively capitalist, creating at the same time, through the expulsion of the peasantry from the land, an urban proletariat.(2)

The commercialization of the nobility went side by side with the emergence of a manufacturing bourgeoisie; they interpenetrated one another in every sense - through marriage, through manufacturers buying country estates and simulating aristocratic life-styles, or through the nobility becoming entrepreneurs when, for example, coal was discovered on their land.

Thus, a "bourgeois" state in Britain was not run directly by the manufacturing class even in the 19th C - the majority of statesmen were of aristocratic origin even in the 1880s. Rather, manufacturing interests directed the movement of the state without a cataclysmic deposition of the aristocracy as in France, tending instead to favour the stability and traditional authority vested in a nobility - provided it was progressive enough in economic policy. In Britain it was, and hence the conflict between aristocracy and bourgeoisie was protracted and muted; when open conflict did occur, over the issue of protection of English corn prices as against Free Trade in the 1830s and 40s for instance – "bourgeois" interests eventually triumphed.

English Romanticism - a cultural effluorescence comprising literature and to a lesser degree painting - was to a considerable extent conscious of itself as a movement produced by, related to, reflecting upon, and criticizing: the earliest phase of the Industrial Revolution.(3) Although the Industrial Revolution between 1780 and 1825 was for the most part contained within the textile industry, the Romantics were conscious of its impact upon society as a whole, were conscious of the relation it bore to the kind of society that had already emerged, and probed with extraordinary sensitivity and insight into the human implications of a world-shattering turn of history. This chapter is concerned with the Romantic "vision of nature" as a structure of sensibilities found in certain poets between 1780-1825; it is an abstraction from tha complex, contradictory and dynamic experience and literary expression of certain individuals. The elucidation of this structure of sensibilities must now be discussed.

Actual works of art, or poems, exist within an infinitely complex totality - a particular socio-historical context. The "meaning" of an art work is an analytical abstraction from reality, holding validity to the degree to which it makes the reality intelligible. An infinite number of "structures of sensibility" could be extracted from a particular cultural movement, depending on the slant of the investigator. Such concepts hold an ontological status equivalent to Weber´s "ideal types". The

construction of a sensibility structure must consider the art work itself, the personality structure of the artist, and the socio-historical context. Ultimately, each of these terms can only be understood in relation to the others. If the art work is considered alone, an "aesthetic meaning" is attributed to it which can hardly do other than reflect the values of the investigator. Since these are unquestioned, particular historically relative values and modes of perception are expressed in ahistorical, absolute terms. If the art work is seen only in relation to the artist's personality, the interpretation may, as in Freud's discussion of Leonardo da Vinci, make universal assumptions about psychic dynamics and the creative process. (Of course the universal application of a psychic model derived from observation of men in a specific soolo-historieal location, is an inevitable development of an individualistic psychology like Freud's).

Such an approach cannot grasp the dialectical inter-relation between this socio-historical context and the individual's biography, nor the degree of social constraint upon technique, medium, or form in the art work. But if the art work is considered only in relation to socio-historical context, a tendency to determinism is likely to result;(4) the point is missed that social knowledge expressed in an art work is mediated through a particular personality with a unique experience.(5) If a constantly moving interpretation works between the totality of the art work, the totality of the artist´s psyche, and the totality of the society in question, then aspects of the artist's personality can help to construct a sensibility structure. Instead of allotting random, psychologistic relationships between aspects of the artist's personality and isolated features in his work, meaningful features of the artist and his life may come to clarify the art work as a whole, and may delineate the exact way in which the social totality has engendered a particular work of art - conceived not mechanically, but dialectically. Thus, the sorts of experience lived through by 19th C artists especially, may be crucial for understanding the meaning of their art; loneliness or anxiety may not be incidental, but structurally related to the reality of the society - so that an understanding of Shelley's or Van Gogh´s life would be essential to analysing their work; or the meaning of such a work as the Pastoral Symphony night be better appreciated after an acquaintance with Beethoven's letters in which he describes his walks in the country. Even psychoanalytical insights could take their place within a widely contextual analysis without making assumptions about an artist´s psyche from an art work, or vice-versa, directly.(6)

Artistic performances tap the "infinity" of the individual's experience: "infinity" because it is dynamic (always changing) and not structured, patterned, categorised until articulated into an expressive communication. Aspects of experience are then nailed into symbols, strokes, sounds - into the form of a sonnet, the characters of a play, the harmonies in music. Meaning, feelings, ideas are inter-pervaded in a balanced, organic wholeness in what is called a work of art.(7) The work of art therefore taps all "levels" of the artist's psyche simultaneously - conscious meanings

contained in precise, public symbolisms, personal idiosyncratic feelings, and also deeper-than-conscious strands of sensibility which are profoundly related to the socio-historical context but which elude exact linguistic description.(8) All such "levels" must be considered in the Romantic vision of nature.

The sociology of art is faced with a dilemma over what it is ultimately studying in terms of socio-historical context: the experience from which a performance derives, the structural integrity of the performance itself, or the process of reception and assimilation of the performance by other individuals. This last is variable, i.e. the way a performance is understood and experienced depends upon the "audience" according to its social group and historical location. The nature of such variation in the reception of art-works is in itself a subject for investigation. However, the sensibility structure I elucidate here is not based on any specific audience - other than I myself in my soolo-historical location. Art works are always communications, understood in ways varying in relation to the "audience" in question. Thus, a sensibility structure is objective inasmuch as it is rationally located in the context being considered, but like Weber's "ideal type" it is relative to the investigator's concerns and historical position. It exists as an abstraction in the investigator's mind - an abstraction, as always, from an infinitely complex, dynamic reality.

The experience from which a performance derives, and the structure of the performance itself can only he seen in relation one to another. The "experience" itself is partially understood through "texts" or performances though also from other convergent kinds of evidence. On the other hand the way in which a performance structures experience is itself an aspect of that experience, i.e. kinds of experience make for the choice of particular subject matter and media, whether this is effected through patterns of patronage, or through the internalization of certain "tastes", or through a very personal response to experience. Thus it may appear that the analytical separation of the experience from the performance is tautological. In fact, however, "contextual" analysis cannot avoid the elucidation of different phenomena in terms of each other, as Lovell(9) points out. Far from being undesirable, this is essential if justice is to be done to the complexity of cultural phenomena - if explanations are to go beyond positivist notions of necessary or sufficient conditions. Because "experience" is hard to get to directly, the category has been largely ignored. Thus, art works are discussed in their own terms alone - meaning and development are conceived of as "immanent to art itself"; or, they are seen as artifacts of specific socio-historical structures, which again bypasses consciousness and experience.

"Experience" is the totality of an individual or a group's being-in-the-world, every aspect of which is related in some way to every other aspect.(10) The totality of an individual´s experience is a structure of beliefs and feelings complementing a given socio-economic formation, and, more particularly, the class in which the individual has arisen. What has not been developed by the sociology of culture from Mannheim

to Goldmann is a conceptual framework allowing one to relate the experiences of individuals or groups to the nature of the society´s mode of existence as a whole. Such a conception does not involve falling into a "group mlnd" interpretation. It is merely an attempt to show the partial inter-relatedness of subjective experience across classes. Thus, Romanticism existed within the contradictory totality of early 19th C English society. It is not to be seen as an experience related essentially to a specific class, even though most Romantic poets came from the educated classes. Generally, cultures should be seen as expressing dynamic relatlonships, as structured through tha tensions and contradictions between classes. Aspects of working olaaa experience and perspective force themselves into the aesthetic totality of a bourgeois art fom, which may simultaneously wrestle with and incorporate dimensions of a receding aristocratic world-view. The romantic orientation is therefore bound up with the experience and actions of the working-class,(11) as I will try to show, even if working-class individuals themselves rarely evolved a "romantic attitude" to nature. The problem of conceiving "experience" in relation to social structure entails not only surpassing positivist "cause and effect" explanations, but encompassing a dynamic, continuous dialectic between parts within the totality of individual and group (or class) experience, between the parts and this totality itself, and between both parts and the totality of individual and group experience with concrete socio-economic historical formations.

The dynamic totality of an individual or group's experience consists of feelings, thoughts and perceptions in "multiple realities."(12) "Deep" or esoteric levels of experience are interrelated with concrete or "mundane" levels, and, changes in any one "level" give rise to subtle modifications of the whole. On an individual level, Krueger describes experience thus:

"Everything distinguishable in experience is inter-connected, embedded within a total-whole that penetrates and envelops it....

"Feelings and emotions are influenced by every change in the experience content and its conditions (quality, intensity, duration, etc.). Here the smallest causes may have the greatest effects.

“….change in total complexes is more exactly perceived than any change in their parts."(13)

The emergence of a particular structure of sensibilities within particular individuals, conceived as a subtle tonal pattern of emotion and thought, must be related to more than class alone. Changes in the society as a whole - technological and urban developments in particular in the present case - must be seen as directly and indirectly affecting new structures of sensibility. Different classes evolve different sensibilities reflecting their different relations to the whole, but they may hold a

mutual inter-relatedness on the deepest level. Thus, there were Romantic poets among farm labourers, the professional middle-class, and among aristocrats.

The totality of consciousness, experience, is made up of what Alfred Schutz calls "provinces of meaning" or "realms of experience". "Reality means simply relation to our emotional and active llfe; whatever excites and stimulates our interest is real.

"….it is the meaning of our experiences, and not the ontological structure of the objects, which constitutes reality. Each province of meaning - the paramount world of real objects and events into which we can gear by our actions, the world of imaginings and phantasms, such as the play world of the child, the world of the insane, but also the world of art, the world of dreams, the world of scientific contemplation - has its particular cognitive style. It is this particular style of a set of our experiences which constitutes them as a finite province of meaning. All experiences within each of these worlds are, with respect to this cognitive style, consistent in themselves and compatible with one another.....each of these finite provinces of meaning is, among other things, characterised by a specific tension of consciousness, by a specific time-perspective, by a specific form of experiencing oneself, and, finally, by a specific form of sociality."(14)

The paramount reality for Schutz is that of everyday life which commonsence thinking takes for granted. It includes "physical objects, facts, and events within our actual and potential reach", i.e. direct experience in work, family, community. Other provinces of meaning, with their specific "cognitive styles", are "transcendences" of everyday life experience. The transcendent realities of Nature and Society are common to all mankind, though experienced within different perspectives and adumbrations:

"…...we find in our socio-cultural environment itself socially approved systems offering answers for our quest for the unknowable transcendences. Devices are developed to apprehend the disquieting phenomena transcending the world of everyday life in a way analogous to the famliar phenomena within it."(15)

Although each province of meaning is characterized by a mode of experience incompatible with the others, all provinces are interrelated in the totality of human consciousness. The nature of everyday life experience impresses itself upon transcendent realms of experience; changes in the ordering of it must affect transcendent realms. At the same time, transcendent reals come to operate within everyday life experience: phantasy and theoretical contemplation enter into the concrete world of work.
Now the Romantic vision cuts across all provinces of meaning in Schutz´ sense; it involves an "attitude" and perception of everyday life experience, it is a mode of understanding society, both intellectual (i.e. ideas about politics, economics etc.),

and intuitive and emotional. It is a relation to the Cosmos, a bearing open of the soul to the universe in a particular way – again, both emotional and involving elements of a scientific cosmology. All the levels of experience are inter-related in complex ways which I shall try to elucidate. The most esoteric, transcendent modes of feeling are related to the experience of everyday life, and therefore to the totality of the society at the particular historical moment. The understanding of such esoteric experience is therefore a door into the inside reality of the society - even if the experience was articulated only by very few actual individuals.

I have already suggested in Part II that there is, throughout the history of Western Civilization, a deep strand of sensibility associated with the imaginative vision of nature. It is essentially the opening up of the second type of imaginary awareness according to Sartre's(16) distinction: the first is the purely imaginative creation of non-existent objects, inner fantasy. The second is an apprehension of the real in which perceptual experience is given meaning "beyond itself" - the object is clothed in meanings drawn from all levels of experience. This kind of imaginative perception, directed onto nature, is accompanied by a throwing of overcoming emotion upon nature, particulars of which become both image and symbol of intense subjective and ultimate cosmic feeling; it is the imaginative vision of the eternal within the particular, cosmic vitality in growth, essence in movement. In it is the melancholy of Time, the pain in the experienced tension between change and Being, the consciousness of humanity's rupture from nature. Suddenly it is "humanly untouched nature" - the very thought being significant. This sensibility goes deeper than the varied forms in which it has been expressed. In 15th C Flanders it is still within a stylised arrangement of nature, but the experience is nevertheless a visionary perception. In an ideal vision of nature painted by Bouts, truth gleams sadly through the forms of leaves, flowers, water, hills. In l7th C Holland Ruisdael moves in the vital, writhing growth of trees, swirls of clouds and water, in a new romantic vision. Then, in late 18th C England, Constable sketches directly from nature, capturing transient particularities to demonstrate the work of the Creator.

This sensibility follows the major shocks of a new disruptive order in human society; 15th C urban Flemish capitalism, 17th C Dutch, 18th-19th C industrial capitalism in England.(17) The eternal condition of man, alienated through his unique possession of consciousness, reflection, awareness of isolation, time and death, is heightened by the new intensified forms alienation takes on within capitalist society. For the Romantic poets, a psychic dislocation gives rise to a visionary perception of nature: "normal" appearance - matter - cracks, disintegrates, allowing communion with its essence. Shelley's poem "Epipsyohidion" is many things: a declaration of love to a woman, an expression of his Platonic vision of Truth within and beyond all reality; and although the island he and his lady will go to is a fantasy, it is infused with this experience of the Divine gleaming through Nature, which came from his personal trance-like observation:

"And from the sea there rise, and from the sky
There fall, clear exhalations, soft and bright,
Veil after veil, each hiding some delight,
Which Sun or Moon or Zephyr draw aside
Till the isle´s beauty, like a naked bride
Glowing at once with love and loveliness,
Blushes and trembles at its own excess:
Yet, like a buried lamp, a Soul no less
Burns in the heart of this delicious isle,
An atom of th'Eternal, whose own smile
Unfolds itself, and may be felt, not seen
O'er the gray rocks, blue waves, and forests green,
Filling their bare and void interstices."

In Shelley, like Wordsworth, the various forms of nature are listed in a strange, dreamlike, sonorous meandering; the whole expresses a "visionary gleam". As Raymond Williams says:

"It is often a prolonged, rapt, exceptional description; an intricate working of particularity, as opposed to the more characteristic attribution of single identifying qualities in most earlier writing…...

"…..the human separation of Wordsworth and Clare.... is mediated by a projection of personal feeling into a subjectively particularised and objectively generalised Nature."(18)

The union with nature is melancholy and lonely; all the Romantics were ostracised from their society - all of them were intensely concerned with society. Whether it is John Clare, aware of Enclosures and the commercialization of agriculture destroying the "natural" countryside, or the feeling of Wordsworth or Shelley that the developing society is adrift from Nature in all its ways, there is the conviction that the return to Nature, as individuals and as humanity, is the all-embracing quest for mankind.(19) Nature is the teacher, as Wordsworth explicitly says:

....of all the mighty world
Of eye and ear, both what they half create
And what perceive; well please to recognize
In nature and the language of the sense,
The anchor of my purest thoughts, the nurse,
The guide, the guardian of my heart, and soul
Of all my moral being."(20)

Truthful existence is in Nature, in all the senses I hope to bring out. On Shelley's ideal island in Epipsychidion:

> "Our simple life wants little, and true taste
> Hires not the pale drudge Luxury, to waste
> The scene it would adorn, and therefore still,
> Nature with all her children haunts the hill.
> The ring-dove, in the embowering ivy, yet
> Keeps up her love-lament, and the owls flit
> Round the evening tower, and the young stars glance
> Between the quick bats in their twilight dance."

Communion with Nature means also that relations between people are characterized by love, generosity, and mutual understanding. The idea of such love between humans embedded in nature, is one level of meaning in Epipsychidion, simultaneous to the expression of personal love for a particular woman, the mirror of Shelley's soul:

> "Our breath shall intermix, our bosoms bound,
> And our veins beat together; our lips
> With other eloquence than words, eclipse
> The soul that burns between them.....
> As mountain-springs under the morning sun
> We shall become the same, we shall be one..."

To live in spiritual closeness with Nature did not mean literally a return to hermit-like simplicity. From Shelley's writings, a very profound idea emerges of an urban society which would attain a new harmony with nature. In a letter to his friend Peacock in 1819, Shelley wrote:

"I now understand why the Greeks were such great poets: above all, I can account, it seems to me, for the harmony, the unity, the perfection, the uniform excellence, of all their works of art. They lived in a perpetual commerce with external nature, and ourished themselves upon the spirit of its forms.Their theatres were all open to the mountains and the sky. Their columns, the ideal types of a sacred forest, with its roof of interwoven tracery, admitted the light and wind; the odour and the freshness of the country penetrated the cities."

The Romantic poets experienced their lives as isolated from society. As poets, many of than underwent the hell of being inored, partly because, as Raymond Williams shows, patterns of traditional patronage were declining - leaving art like everything else to the selection of an anonymous market. This market was not able to recognise

great poetry, requiring rather whichever fashionable, inauthentlc style was in vogue. Their sensitivity to the realities of their society led many of then to open rebellion against the social order and the ruling-classes, even when, as in the ease of Shelley, they came from these classes.(22) The paradox arose in which Wordsworth could speak of the respect and reverence that a poet should feel toward the People, whilst the Public, "ever governed by factitious influence", should not be prostituted to. And Shelley, whilst bestowing upon poets the highest duty to their society as the "legislators of the world", also adds the word "unacknowledged". Trelawny records that Shelley said to Byron:

"Write nothing but what your conviction of its truth inspires you to write; you should give counsel to the wise and not take it from the foolish. Time will reverse the judgement of the vulgar.
The Romantics - more totally perhaps than any group of artists before or since - were locked into a situation in which the quest for "truth", and the acceptance of responsibility to humanity, meant censorship, rejection, and the hatred of their contemporaries from the educated classes.(24) Not surprisingly they wrote for posterity, putting their hopes on the future to understand and make use of them. That the future in fact made a legend of glorious isolation, twisting the Romantics' undesired pain into a glorification of "art for art's sake" and the lonely garret - is a function of the continued development of industrial capitalist society. That Romantic Myth is the very opposite of Shelley, Keats, Blake.

The actual isolation of their lives heightened their communion with nature(25) and with humanity in the abstract. The expression of human alienation was given its burning intensity from personal experience. The exploration of beauty or truth always enters realms of melancholy, unreal, shadowy dream. Though ecstatic, their penetration leads to loneliness and the feeling that they recede just as they are found. Love is unattainable, elusive, yet worshipped as being as powerful as the god of any human religion. The unearthly beauty of passages in "Epipsychidion" is such as to utterly depart from normal perception; it is both a cosmic and an inner voyage. The sound penetrates and shimmers beneath the veil of sanity, to enter a timeless, unbearable love, a communion wearily and desperately yearned for; the words seem to be a spell, like nothing

else in literature, transporting the self to a state of ultimate being in which all emotion is felt, and united: pain and sustained ecstasy reach Eternity:

> ''The Blue Aegean girds this chosen home,
> With ever-changing sound and light and foam,
> Kissing the sifted sands, and caverns hoar;
> And all the winds wandering along the shore
> Undulate with the undulating tide:
> There are thick woods where sylvan forms abide:
> And many a fountain, rivulet, and pond,
> As clear as elemental diamond,
> Or serene morning, air; and far beyond,
> The mossy tracks made by the goats and deer
> (Which the rough shepherd treads but once a year)
> Pierce into glades, caverns, and bowers, and halls
> Built round with ivy, which the waterfalls
> Illumining, with sound that never fails
> Accompany the noonday nightingales;
> And all the place is peopled with sweet airs;
> The light clear element which the isle wears
> Is heavy with the scent of lemon-flowers,
> Which floats like mist laden with unseen showers,
> And falls upon the eyelids like faint sleep;
> And from the moss violets and jonquils peep,
> And dart their arrowy odour through the brain
> Till you might faint with that delicious pain.
> And every motion, odour, beam and tone,
> With that deep music is in unison:
> Which is a soul within a soul - they seem
> Like echoes of an antenatal dream."

The visionary perception of nature is often thought of as dream; the imagination runs like fluid into it, making it glow with the freshness and purity of Adam's Garden in the dawn of time.(26) The veil over normal perception falls, and reality glistens in its "isness", revealing Truth - the inspiration of poetry. For John Keats it is the trees themselves that dream:

> "As when, upon a trancéd summer night,
> Those green-robed senators of mighty woods,
> Tall oaks branch-charmed by the earnest stars,
> Dream, and so dream all night without a stir."(28)

Whether the vision is a dreamlike perception of reality, or an imagined reality in a

dream, is inconsequential.

> "... a bowery nook
> Will be elysium - an eternal book
> Whence I may copy many a lovely saying
> About the leaves, and flowers - about the playing
> Of nymphs in woods, and fountains; and the shade
> Keeping a silence round a sleeping maid;
> And many a verse from so strange influence
> That we must ever wonder how and whence
> It came. Also imaginings will hover
> Round my fireside, and haply there discover
> Vistas of solemn beauty, where I'd wander
> In happy silence, like the clear meander
> Through its lone vales; and where I found a spot
> Of awfuller shade, or an enchanted grot,
> Or a green hill o'erspread with chequered dress
> Of flowers, and fearful from its loveliness,
> Write on my tablets all that was permitted,
> All that was for our human senses fitted."(29)

Or, in Shelley:

> "..the Earth and Ocean seem
> To sleep in one another's arms, and dream
> Of waves, flowers, clouds, woods, rocks and all that we
> Read in their smiles, and call reality."(30)

Often the "essential" vision of nature - as both material and divine - is felt to be closest in childhood, before intuition is eroded by conception. This is a part of the sadness of time and change for Wordsworth:

> "There was a time when meadow, grove and stream,
> The earth, and every common sight,
> To me did seem
> Appareled in celestial light,
> The glory and the freshness of a dream.
> It is not now as it hath been of yore –
> Turn whereso'er I may,
> By night or day,
> The things which I have seen I now can see no more."(31)

Shelley also felt it:

“"There was a Being whom my spirit oft
Met on its visioned wanderings, far aloft,
In the clear golden prime of my youth's dawn,
Upon the fairy isles of sunny lawn,
Amid the enchanted mountains, and the caves
Of divine sleep, and on the air-like waves
Of wonder-level dream…..”(32)

So far is normal life estranged from the one sure knowledge of Truth, that life itself comes eventually to be seen as an extinction of that communion (as in some forms of Buddhism) - a temporary eclipse:

"Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting…...”(33)

And:

"That Benediction which the eclipsing Curse
Of birth can quench not….”(34)

The penetration to the "essence" or vital energy in Nature, in which the "veil" of normal, surface perception falls - is an experience in which the categories of the normal self dissolve.The experience is therefore:

"To mingle with the Universe and feel
What I can ne’er express, yet can not all conceal".(35)

Human emotions take on a cosmic significance - the grief, ecstasy, and totality of human feelings with which Nature is saturated take on an absolute intensity:

"To me the meanest flower that blows can give
Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears."(36)

Or:

" ..... as from a hyacinth full
Of honey-dew, a liquid murmur drops,
Killing the sense with passion;"(37)

The death of the self is not Death; and since Nature and man are ultimately one reality, there being no theological dualism of Matter and Divinity, death is simply a re-joining in the endless process:

"He is made one with Nature: there is heard
His voice in all her music, from the moan

Of thunder, to the song of night's sweet bird;
He is a presence to be felt and known
In darkness and in light, from herb to stone,
Spreading itself where'er that Power may move
Which has withdrawn his being to its own."(39)

In Part I it was suggested that the sudden development of property relations and urban society is frequently accompanied by the turning of artists to nature; human experience becomes intermingled with nature, where new symbolisms are found which then enter experience. Both personal and wider social experience are viewed in terms of natural symbols.(40) The new heights of alienation brought about by industrial urban capitalism are expressed in Romantic poetry through an interpenetration of human and natural symbolism. The meanings of alienation were discussed in Part II. The late l8th and early 19th Cs represented an intensification of their manifestations; in particular the creation of fully artificial urban environments, apparently outside of nature. Wordsworth writes:

"For a multitude of causes, unknown to former times, are now acting with a combined force to blunt the discriminating powers of the mind, and, unfitting it for all voluntary exertion, to reduce it to a state of almost savage torpor. The most effective of these causes are the great national events which are daily taking place, and the increasing accumulation of men in cities, where the uniformity of their occupations produces a craving for extraordinary incident, which the rapid communication of intelligence hourly gratifies."(41)

And:

"Little we see in Nature that is ours;
We have given our hearts away, a sordid boon!(42)

Experience in nature is contrasted with experience in the city (London by 1815 had a population of over 1 million people). In the latter the mind and senses are constantly stimulated by sounds, sights, movements, beyond the individual's powers of selection; the state engendered is one of continuous superficial sensory arousal, making all things of equal significance. In nature, mind and feelings are able to settle into a deeper, more melodious mode of perception and contact with the self; sounds and sights can be selected, discriminated in a state of being which allows greater refinement of sensibility. This more intuitive, integrated mode of existence only comes to be considered such when cities exist to provide the contrast; reflection then allows a clearer understanding of harmonious being; nature becomes a teacher. This integrated state of self is similar to those cultivated by yoga, meditation, and mysticisms of "self-awareness". In all of them the prevailing belief is that a higher calmness allows the experience of the deepest passions. It is not thought that human

beings can be taught to become "good" or that aggression and selfishness can be simply suppressed by self-control - which is the basis of religious evangelicism. Rather, the tendencies toward fear, pride and hatred are accepted as existing in human beings, as being in fact vital parts of the whole spectrum of experience. But, in a state of harmonious relation between self and nature, the "instincts" can be channelled and balanced - steered away from disintegrative and destructive paths. This is the feeling in Byron, who loves "not Man the less, but Nature more":

> "To fly from, need not be to hate, mankind:
> All are not fit with them to stir and toil,
> Nor is it discontent to keep the mind
> Deep in its fountain, lest it overboil
> In the hot throng, where we become the spoil
> Of our infection, till too late and long
> We may deplore and struggle with the coil,
> In wretched interchange of wrong and wrong
> Midst a contentious world, striving where none are strong...
> Are not the mountains, waves, and skies a part
> Of me and of my soul, as I of them?
> Is not the love of these deep in my heart
> With a pure passion?"(43)

Or, as Keats writes;

> "Oh ye! who have your eye-balls vexed and tired,
> Feast them upon the wideness of the Sea;
> Oh ye! whose ears are dinned with uproar rude,
> Or fed too much with cloying melody,-(44)

Different aspects of alienation are touched upon by the different Romantic poets, yet the various expressions coalesce into a vision of alienation from nature. John Clare, a farm-1abourer, observed Enclosures and growing capitalist agriculture destroying the countryside he loved, and driving the rural lower classes off their land or into desperate poverty. In spite of the ideology of laissez-faire(45) which legitimized the new relationship between the ruling class and the people, the 1815 Corn Law (representing the land-owners' interests) restricted the import of corn, keeping the price of bread above the farm-labourers' means. In 1830 starving field labourers rioted for a wage of half-a-crown a day; three were hanged, 420 deported to Australia. The labourers' experience is found in Clare:

> "Accursed Wealth! o'er-bounding human laws,
> Of every evil thou remainst the cause:
> Victims of want, those wretches such as me,

Too truly lay their wretchedness to thee:
Thou art the bar that keeps from being fed,
And thine our loss of labour and of bread.”(46)

And in explicit discussion of Enclosures

"There once were lanes in nature’s freedom dropt,
There once were paths that every valley wound –
Inclosure came, and every path was stopt;
Each tyrant fix’d his sign where paths were found."(47)

Clare also laments the separation from nature of those in urban environments:

"Must scenes like these expand,
Scenes so magnificently grand,
And millions breathe, and pass away
Unblessed, throughout their little day,
With one short glimpse?"

It may have been partially this feeling that led the Commons Preservation Society in the 1860’s to attempt to resist the exclusion of urban populations from the nearby countryside.(48) During the Romantic era, the continuing division of England into large, private estates simultaneously with the growth of towns was seen by the Romantics as an unprecedented trampling on "the old laws of England". Injustice and tyranny are felt to be related to this cutting off of people from nature.

In Shelley the idea is expressed that both worker and capitalist are alienated in a society dominated by market relationships. For although the "market" is in fact the means by which invisible exploitation is enacted, it nevertheless has its own dynamic; it is a blind force compelling the capitalist to behave in certain ways if he is not to collapse. If the worker, forced to sell his labour on the "free" market, is driven by invisible forces beyond his controll the capitalist, as Marx described him, is a "mere predicate of capital". He is not the subject of his actions but follows rather the dictates of a reified system, in the same way that the worker’s labour is determined by the production process. But he believes he is authentic, an "individualist". He believes his selfishness is virtuous and in the interests of mankind; authentic feelings are so far eroded that he is unaware of the alienated callous relations between himself and others, between himself and nature:

"Commerce has set the mark of selfishness,
The signet of its all-enslaving power
Upon a shining ore, and called it gold;
Before whose image bow the vulgar great,

The vainly rich, the miserable proud,
The mob of peasants, nobles, priests, and kings,
And with blind feelings reverence the power
That grinds them to the dust of misery.”(49)

The market, competitiveness, and greed are not "natural" as the economists would have it:

"Hath Nature's soul,
That formed this world so beautiful…..
...on Man alone,
Heaped ruin, vice and slavery.....?
Nature! - no!"(50)

It is in a specific historical epoch that man is becoming rent from nature in this way.

It is in Shelley that the implications of the imaginative perception of nature are most thoroughly pursued into social and political thought, though elements of his vision are to be found in other Romantics. The direct, deeper-than-analytical knowledge that Nature teaches, is that all human beings have the same rights to live, love, and explore their potential to the utmost.

"I know
That Love makes all things equal: I have heard
By mine own heart this joyous truth averred."(51)

Human oppression is quite simply "the insolent violation of the most sacred ties of Nature and society."(52) Human oppressors are:

".... .Woodmen who expel
Love’s gentle Dryads from the haunts of life
And vex the nightingales in every dell."(53)

The understanding of this knowledge is "too deep for the brief fathom-line of thought or sense", it is the awareness in Nature of the inestimable beauty, of the uniqueness and sacredness of every leaf, flower or cloud - which, in natural spontaneity blend together to form a higher order, a harmony, as should exist in human society.

From the basis of an experience of oneness with all, in which all human powers are integrated; from the identification of the ever-changing soul with the mysterious movement of clouds and water, emerges the will to see all human beings free. From the ever-changing patterns of light on the moving forms of nature, a sense of human

existence being part of the natural process is derived. Through the transient, never-repeated patterns can be glimpsed an eternal truth.

Inseparably linked with this intuitive experience are rational conceptions of human history. It cannot be said that Shelley developed a coherent philosophy of history, but numerous lines of poetry and statements in prose suggest the germ of a remarkably profound comprehension of history as an active process, occurring within and transforming nature, of society as an ever-developing complex totality in which institutions and patterns of ideas and culture interact dialectically. As examples:

"....habits which subsist only in relation to a peculiar state of social institution may be expected to cease as soon as that relation is dissolved."(54)

"Poets, not otherwide than philosophers, painters, sculptors, and musicians, are, in one sense, the creators, and, in another, the creations, of their age."(55)

Or, as in the following, a very penetrating "sociology of religion":

"....religion in Italy is not, as in Protestant countries, a cloak to be worn on particular days; or a passport which those who do not wish to be railed at carry with them to exhibit; or a gloomy passion for penetrating the impenetrable mysteries of our being, which terrifies its possessor at the darkness of the abyss to the brink of which it has conducted him. Religion coexists, as it were, in the mind of an Italian Catholic, with a faith in that of which all men have the most certain knowledge. It is interwoven with the whole fabric of life. It is adoration, faith, submission, penitence, blind admiration; not a rule for moral conduct. It has no necessary connection with any one virtue. The most atrocious villain may be rigidly devout, and without any shock to established faith, confess himself to be so. Religion pervades intensely the whole frame of society, and is according to the temper of the mind which it inhabits, a passion, a persuasion, an excuse, a refuge; never a check."(56)

Shelley did not achieve a philosophical synthesis from his ahistorical Platonic idealism and his rational, empirical, materialism. Yet sometimes his understanding of social reality forces one to believe that, had he lived to the modest age of 65, he would have found a synthesis in Marxism. He was aware that the evils he observed in England were not the results of industry as such, but of industrialization and agricultural commercialization through a capitalist economic system. Money, he knew, was the embodiment of a particular social relationship - a phantom that appears to be a natural "thing", rather than stored labour: the capitalist's wealth is the ownership of others' work:

"'Tis to let the Ghost of Gold

Take from Toil a thousandfold
More that e'er its substance could
In the Tyrannies of old.

Paper coin - that forgery
Of the title-deeds, which ye
Hold to something of the worth
Of the inheritance of Earth.

'Tis to be a slave in soul
And to hold no strong control
Over your own wills, but be
All that others make of ye.

And at length when ye complain
With a murmur weak and vain
'Tis to see the Tyrant's crew
Ride over your wives and you -
Blood is on the grass like dew."(58)

In a situation where one class owns the means of production and can harness a dispossessed class to work for it in order to maximize profits, the organization of labour in industry is alienated. Within capitalist terms, the most "efficient" method of organizing labour is to harness each worker to one cog in the production process. Technology - which could be the basis for a higher human existence - fragments, enslaves, mutilates and impoverishes the worker:

"....we have more scientific and economical knowledge than can be accommodated to the just distribution of the produce which it multiplies....

"The cultivation of those sciences which have enlarged the limits of the empire of man over the external world, has proportionally circumscribed those of the internal world; and man, having enslaved the elements, remains himself a slave.

".....the abuse of all invention for abridging and combining labour, (is) to the exasperation of the inequality of mankind....the discoveries which should have lightened, have added a weight to the curse imposed on Adam."(60)

The resolution to the miseries of poverty and alienation in capitalist society is through social revolution, conducted by an organized, conscious working-class:(61)

"Science, Poetry, and Thought
Are thy lamps....

Let a great Assembly be
Of the fearless and the free...

Rise like Lions after slumber
In unvanauishable number -
Shake your chains to earth like dew
Which in sleep had fallen on you –
Ye are many - they are few.”(62)

The following has the resonance of "The Communist Manifesto":

"This is the age of the war of the oppressed against the oppressors, and every one of those ringleaders of the privileged gangs of murderers and swindlers, called Sovereigns, look to each other for aid against the common enemy, and suspend their mutual jealousies in the presence of a mightier fear. Of this holy alliance all the despots of the earth are virtual members. But a new race has arisen throughout Europe, nursed in the abhorrence of the opinions which are its chains, and she will continue to produce fresh generations to accomplish that destiny which tyrants foresee and dread."(63)

Though not explicitly stated as such by Shelley, different forms of society are characterized by different relations of man to nature - in economics, and in ideas and feelings. Capitalist society is the highest form of alienation from nature; it destroys both nature and man. The capitalist mode of production is associated with a consciousness dominated by the "calculating faculty" at the expense of the imaginative, creative faculty. In the same way, Marcuse identifies "technical reason" as that ideology of thought and sensibility which banishes imaginative thought about how technology could be used to the benefit and fulfilment of society; banishes the possibility that "progress" could be other than capitalist progress.(64)

Shelley's "Defense of Poetry" has often been taken as suggesting that the answer lies simply in the cultivation of poetry; but in fact his ideas are far more sophisticated than this. He identifies the revolutionary orientation with the imagination; the imagination overcomes the fragmentation of knowledge, allowing its possibilities to be realized: "The poetry in these systems of thought is concealed by the accumulation of facts and calculating processes."(65)

The imagination welds ideas to actions, in praxis:

"There is no want of knowledge respecting what is wisest and best in morals, government, and political economy... We want the creative faculty to imagine that which we know: we want the generous impulse to act that which we imagine; we want the poetry of life……."(66)

Clearly, Shelley was getting at the idea of a revolutionary consciousness: the idea of a new man, in whom intellect and feeling would be harmoniously balanced. This new consciousness is related to a real dialogue with nature, for it is the imagination that is excited by communion with nature. The society of the future would use technology in harmonious metabolism with nature, and within close relationships of feeling between men:

> "Thou hast a voice, great Mountain, to repeal
> Large codes of fraud and woe; not understood
> By all, but which the wise, and great and good
> Interpret, or make felt, or deeply feel."(67)

The society in harmony with nature and itself would not be ruled by a science of domination over nature and man; knowledge would be guided by the imagination, and harnessed to the fulfilment of human ideals. M.H. Abrams writes in a footnote to "Mont Blanc", the poem just quoted:

"…..This work…. emphasizes the interchange between mind and nature in perception and goes on to pose the question of the significance of nature to man.....

"The poem raises the central problem about the nature and human significance of "Power", the ultimate principle behind all natural and mental process. The symbol of this Power is the river Arve, which has its "secret throne" at the summit of Mont Blanc. ....

"It is the enlightened human will alone which can convert this purposeless destroyer and preserver to moral purposefulness, by harnessing process as means to its own human ends, even to the revolutionary end of total reform by the repeal of "Large codes of fraud and woe"."(68)

The emergence of revolutionary consciousness is conceived by Shelley historically. He understood that industrial capitalist society was the first occasion in which the age-old conflict between ruled and ruling classes could be resolved into classless society - with collective production for equal distribution, and equal access to civilization and the cultivation of creative faculties - both because of the potential elimination of material scarcity, and because of the knowledge that this society engenders. The French Revolution could not fulfil the ambition of equality contained in its rhetoric because of: "a defect of correspondence between the knowledge existing in society and the improvement or gradual abolition of political institutions."(69) But in capitalist society, the ideas and sensibilities in the interests of the working class have a larger historical significance - they are identifiable with the ultimate ideal of human emancipation - not only in rhetoric but in coherent

scientific and ethical theory. The development of the emancipatory orientation requires time and hard-learned experience:

"Could they listen to the plea of reason who had groaned under the calamities of a social state according to the provisions of which one man riots in luxury whilst another famishes for want of bread? Can he who the day before was a trampled slave suddenly become liberal-minded, forbearing, and independent? This is the consequence of the habits of a state of society to be produced by resolute perseverance and indefatigable hope, and long-suffering and long-believing courage, and the systematic efforts of generations of men of intellect and virtue."(70)

Shelley seemed conscious of the Marxist realization that knowledge is never disinterested - it is always "class-related". The most objective knowledge within Capitalism will correlate with the aims of the masses, will be identifiable with human emancipation. It will be less fettered than ruling-class knowledge, which is 'presented in such a way as to appear neutral:

"….I have, what a Scotch philosopher characteristically terms, a ´passion for reforming the world': what passion incited him to write and publish his book, he omits to explain. For my part, I had rather be damned with Plato and Lord Bacon than go to Heaven with Paley and Malthus."(71)

The emancipatory orientation requires imagination. When Shelley writes: "A man, to be greatly good, must imagine intensely and comprehensively; he must put himself in the place of another and of many others; the pains and pleasures of his species must become his own",(72) he is not simply referring to "altruism" and the wish for sincere, sympathetic relations of feeling between people. He is also pointing towards the idea of historical awareness, the understanding of the self (one's own and others) as part of the stream of history. This is a transcendence of the self as constructed out of immediate experiences in life; it is the understanding that phenomena such as money and classes are not "natural" but historically created and historically relative. It is therefore the overcoming of class, national, and sexual prejudices in beliefs and values.(73) When Marx and Engels wrote: "Workers of the world, unite!" they meant, above all: understand yourselves historically, only then can millions of people act together authentically to build a world under the guidance of the highest achievements of the conscious mind. The transcendent consciousness can envisage itself as a unique point in the intersections of an ever-moving process: "the nature of man is no abstraction inherent in each individual, but the ensemble of human relations."(74)

The imagination understands the self in the process of history and nature. It envisages higher orders of being, and strives to attain them, reconceiving the dream as reality changes and is changed in endless, flexible movement. Once aroused in

the masses of people, it will lead to conscious, collective existence in nature; social and economic practises will at last be organized to serve human ends. This idea is deeply rooted in Maoism – in some ways the highest form of political thought to emerge in the 20th C. Social development is conceived as society working on itself in nature; policies are adopted as people themselves choose them. No logic of technology is allowed to determine the organization of society; man is subject of man's affairs. Technology is adopted where and when it is desired, in ways that enhance unalienated social existence in harmony with nature. Production is organized by free human beings; efficiency is not a technical issue, but a human one. The balance of intellectual analysis and imaginative feeling in Mao-tse-Tung is very much the sort of consciousness that began to germinate in Shelley and the Romantic poets, and will be dealt with in later sections.

For the Romantics the source of poetry was in the direct communion with nature. The Romantic perception felt the divine in nature in a melancholy reverberation with deeper-than-seen forms of beauty, in which is experienced solitary pain in the yearning for intimated perfection and consummated emotion: the soul moves mysteriously through the surf on waves, the writhing of tree trunks, the twisting of leaves in the wind and sprinkling sunlight. Onto the lonely ripples of moonlit water is projected the love which is unattainable with concrete beings. Simultaneously, the experience of the one, moving Power in nature, manifested in infinitely varied forms, is the oracle of man's destiny: the teacher of how and what he should feel and do.

For Shelley and Wordsworth it is Nature itself that speaks through the "poet, as for Taoist poets and painters: "The breath whose might I have invoked in song"(75) Once aroused in the poet, the imaginative understanding of truth is expressed in ways that will cause others to be excited into the same state:

> "Be thou, Spirit fierce,
> My spirit! Be thou me, impetuous one!
>
> Drive my dead thoughts over the universe
> Like withered leaves to quicken a new birth!
> And, by the incantation of this verse,
> Scatter, as from an unextinguished hearth
> Ashes and sparks, my words among mankind!"(76)

This is a pleading invocation to the wind, symbol of the one Power in nature and man. It is like the Taoist who wishes the Tao to run its course through man: "Destroyer and preserver; hear, oh, hear!"(77) It is an urgent plea because the times are suppressed of imagination. This theme is common to William Blake, Coleridge and Keats:

"…ye were dead
To things ye knew not of, - were closely wed
To musty laws lined out with wretched rule
And compass vile.....”(78)

Poetry in the narrow sense would be one means of awakening the deadened faculties in utilitarian, capitalist industrial society:

The most unfailing herald, companion, and follower of the awakening of a great people to work a beneficial change in opinion or institution, is poetry. At such periods there is an accumulation of the power of communicating and receiving intense and impassioned conception respecting man and nature."(79)

Poetical imagination cracks systems of knowledge to extract their kernels of human emancipatory meaning; it creates a susceptibility to the "poetry" concealed in theories of economics and all other disciplines and experiences. For Shelley the "poetry of economics" would be the exploration of possibilities for liberation it would see knowledge as not only a state of being but of doing. Knowledge should not be held down as mere systems of laws etc., but should be a part of human praxis - the flux of thought into action, action into thought.

If Marxism developed the idea of the dialectical emergence of "consciousness" - the coming of people into intellectual awareness of self, class, and history in the process of humanly willed social transformation, the Romantics dreamed of the evolution of imaginative awareness through those human sensibilities orientated towards integrated existence, communication, and harmonious balance of reason and emotion. The complex relationship between Marxism and Romanticism in capitalist industrial society is a reflection of the historical struggle of intuition and intellect, and the human effort to forge their unity. Socialist revolution in the West might be said to have failed hitherto to the extent that these two faculties of human comprehension and grappling with the world, have remained rent from one another. "In the failure of the two traditions to come to a point of junction, something was lost. How much we cannot be sure, for we are among the losers."(80)

PART III - NOTES AND REFERENCES

1.See E.J. Hobsbawm: "Industry and Empire", (1568).

2.See Barrington Moore Jr.; "The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy'', (l966*)* and also E.P. Thompson: "The Making of the English Working Class", (1963). Not all the migration from country to town was directly caused by Enclosures; much of it was the result of increasing commercialization of the land making existence impossible for small-holding farmers.

3. The particularly repressive Governments in Britain during and after the revolutionary wars with France helped also to shape the socio-political perspectives of the Romantics. See the introduction by W. Marshall to "The Major English Romantic Poets", (1963).

4. With this, the over-simplified idea of art "reflecting" society arises. In this is implied a one-to-one relationship of "experience" to art and a psychologistic notion of artistic expression; from it can also arise determinist dogma about how art should relate to its social context.

5. The further we move into the modern era the more important do artists' personalities become. This is due to the increased degree of individualization (which is not necessarily also individuation) resulting from increasing social differentiation - that is, "world-views" become relatively more specific to individuals and less "organic" or collective. But it does not mean that knowledge of artists' personalities could not be important to the understanding of other historical epochs - for primitive or Ancient Egyptian art for example.

6. Nor need the erroneous assumption be made that universal ahistorical instincts are sublimated into complicated symbol-condensations in the art of all times and places.

7. Human activity of every kind is the creative synthesis of experience to give it form: making a table, riding a horse, or writing a poem. In each case the means of expressing, projecting or carrying out the activity is inseparable from the activity itself and the experience within which it occurs. An artist does not choose a form and then fill it with what he wants to say; he or she struggles with the world (words, sounds, lumps of rock) to wrest out of it something of himself. Human beings collectively create their "environment", their 'world of objects, feelings, beliefs,

activities; this is the form in which man, society, mediates with nature - in the production of goods, living in houses, and in the creation of art-forms. As a particular artifact arising from man's mediation with nature (i.e. existence), art is one of the ways in which the form of any society's (and more specifically, within this, any social class or group is expressed (and which at the same time poses often an imaginative projection of a higher relationship of man to nature). Art is not a "special" activity on this level - it should be seen as linked to all other human pursuits through which man's world is created and transformed.

8.Different "levels" of the psyche should not be viewed as lying on a continuum with the "social self" sliding into an individual self. All the "self" - from levels of publicly defined knowledge and feeling to more elusive, personal experience - is equally "social", that is, formed through the individual's interaction with "reality" - though uniquely to each individual. The "deepest" levels should not be conceived as the unchangeable essence of an individual, present from birth.

9.T. Lovell: "Sociology of Aesthetic Structures and Contextualism" in "Sociology of Mass Communications", Ed. D. McQuail, (1972).

10. Cf. R.D. Laing's notion of understanding the "patient" as a person: "....no matter how circumscribed or diffuse the initial complaint may be, one knows that the patient is bringing into the treatment situation, whether intentionally or unintentionally, his existence, his whole being-in-his world. One knows also that every aspect of his being is related in some way to every other aspect, although the manner in which these aspects are articulated may be by no means clear. It is the task of existential phenomenology to articulate what the other's "world" is and his way of being in it." R.D. Laing: "The Divided Self", (I960).

11.Shelley was self-consciously committed to the creation of a cultural counterpart to the proletarian radicalism of the early 19th C, and saw Romantic poetry as part of the English Revolution ("Defense of Poetry"). In general, Romanticism wrested form out of the experience of capitalist industrialization, as the active radical culture of the artisans, weavers and spinners "made" them into a class simultaneously to being "made" a proletariat by the process of economic change.

12.A. Schutz' term.

13.F. Krueger: "The Essence of Feeling" in "The Nature of Emotion", Ed. M.B. Arnold, (I968).

14.Alfred Schutz: "On Phenomenology and Social Relations", (1970).

15. Ibid.

6. Jean Paul Sartre: "The Psychology of Imagination", (1948).

l7. Herbert Read, in "The Meaning of Art", (1931) also found in 15th C Flemish landscape painting a sensibility in common with 19th C English Romanticism:

"If a point has to be fixed for the beginning of modern landscape painting, it might as well be Patenir (1485-1524);.... What that quality is....has nothing to do with the quasi-scientific interest in the morphology of rocks and plants which inspired the only possible predecessor of Patenir in this branch of art - Leonardo da Vinci...

"To give a more definite name to the quality that distinguishes landscape painting, I think it would have to be called "poetry"… a particular state of sensibility...it is essentially a romantic art, an art invented by a lowland people who had no landscape of their own. Later in the 17th C it became... a deliberate creation of "atmosphere" for its own sake, rather than a revelation of a precise experience. In Claude and Poussin the ´poetry´ is definitely allied to literary modes.... Constable came, like Wordsworth... to restore the poetic worth of realism and naturalism. "....a key to this attitude can be found in.... English poetry. The secret is in Wordsworth's counsel: 'Let nature be your teacher' ...It is an attitude of trust in nature, an attitude far removed from the aggressive Sachlichkeit of German art and the sardonic realisme of French art...(in Constable) nature is in some sense a refuge from life. ...courage and… vision...blaze out in Blake and Turner."

It seems reasonable to find a meaningful similarity in the "structure of sensibilities" in the vision of nature from two periods which, though greatly different, had certain essential characteristics in common. The great differences in means of expression of feelings for nature (and in the feelings themselves) in these periods is not to be obscured. It is simply that structurally similar circumstances are associated with analogous patterns of feelings - similar "meaningful wholes" that may be traced independently in a 15th C Flemish landscapist, a Shelley, and a Kuo Hsi.

18. Raymond Williams: "The Country and the City", (1973).

19 Sometimes, for example in Coleridge's maturity, the harmonious relationships desired were conceived conservatively - as a yearning for the mythical "organic" society of the past. In fact the conservative and the radical reaction to laissez-faire Capitalism had many characteristics in common; Coleridge was outraged at the conditions of the working-class, but for him the "solution" was not an egalitarian society, but one in which a responsible, benevolent and cultured ruling class ensured that the working people had work, bread and "proper" education.

20.Wordsworth´s ''Lines Written a Few Miles above Tintern Abbey."

21. R. Williams: "Culture and Society 1780-1950", (1958).

22. Apart from his antagonism toward class society on principle, it was likely that the sensibility of a poet like Shelley would lead him to violent rejection of his own class, whose wealth (as in his own family) had been gained in commerce then used to buy an estate with attendant gentry prestige. Its attitude to the land was commercial; the poet could hardly find this an aristocracy whose wealth and power were in some sense "justified" by its closeness to the soil, or by its benevolence to the lower classes, as was possible in former times.

23.E.J. Trelawny: "Records of Shelley, Byron and the Author", (1878).

24.Furthermore, the Romantics constituted a group of people experimenting with mores and life-styles which were beyond their time and their class origins. The tragic, isolated existence lived by many of them can be sympathetically understood without either idolization or condemnation (one or other of which alternatives is often found in biographies of Shelley in particular) .

25.”…in solitude, or in that deserted state when we are surrounded by human beings, and yet they sympathize not with us, we love the flowers, the grass, and the waters, and the sky. In the emotion of the very leaves of spring, in the blue air, there is then found a secret correspondence with our heart. There is eloquence in the tongueless wind, and a melody in the flowing brooks and the rustling of the reeds beside them, which by their, inconceivable relation to something within the soul,
, awaken the spirits to a dance of breathless rapture, and bring tears of mysterious tenderness to the eyes..." Shelley: "On Love".

26.The fact that Keats and Shelley, in particular, turned to the pastoral genre in poetry, is partially responsible for the conception of the Romantics as escapist and backward-looking. In fact, however, Shelley strove explicitly for "something wholly new and relative to the age, and yet surpassingly beautiful" (letter to Mrs. Shelley, Aug. 1821). Being one of the oldest strands of western culture, the pastoral genre was one which allowed particular emotions to be transcended, embracing "eternal" levels of human experience - especially mutability and death. In such a "supra-individual" form and symbolism the poet's feelings are able to set off associations into many historical epochs - from Theocritus to Milton. A symbolism that had not taken so long coming into being could not carry the intensity of emotion and the infinite implications of meaning which are found in "Epipsychidion" or "Adonais". But it is essentially the feelings of the 19th C that are poured into the names of flowers, muses, etc. - whilst sparking off resonations that seems to stretch to infinity. For Shelley, pastoral poetry allowed that harmony of sound and feeling, that kind of imagery which he believed aroused the imaginative faculty and the human sympathies - hence it was a form urgently related to the age. It is not strange but

rather an indication of understandable contradiction in Romanticism, that a fundamentally "aristocratic" genre should take on a radical relation to the age. At the same time, pastoral poetry has always been a product of urban societies (see Part II).

27. The forms of nature are perceived as if they were drawn into an inner reception, intense and ethereal; they are "felt" with the entire, bared-open, hyper-sensitized soul. This experience shades without qualitative distinctions into Truth as known through art, in human freedom, in love.

28. Keats: "Hyperion".

29. Keats: "Sleep and Poetry".

30. Shelley: "Epipsychidion".

31. Wordsworth: "Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood".

32.Shelley: "Epipsychidion".

33.Wordsworth: op. cit.

34. Shelley: "Adonais".

35. Byron: "Childe Harold's Pilgrimage", Canto IV.

36. Wordsworth: op.cit.

37.Shelley: "Epipsychidion".

38.The unity of Matter and Spirit is also central to William Blake. In a commentary to the first of Blake's "Illustrations of the Book of Job", S. Foster Damon ("Blake's Job", (1966)) writes:

"Job is basically a good man, although he has never recognized the true God. Therefore on his right is his spiritual wealth, a Gothic Church, and on his left his material wealth, the flocks and barns. But the sun is setting."

39. Shelley: "Adonais".

40. The intermingling of the natural and the human occurs on all levels, for example, the conversation between Byron and Shelley in the latter´s poem "Julian and Maddalo" is interspersed with poignant natural descriptions:

"...with a remembered friend I love
To ride as then I rode; - for the winds drove
The living spray along the sunny air
Into our faces; the blue heavens were bare,
Stripped to their depths by the awakening north;
And, from the waves, sound like delight broke forth
Harmonising with solitude, and sent .
Into our hearts aereal merriment.
So, as we rode, we talked; and the swift thought,
Winging itself with laughter, lingered not,
But flew from brain to brain…"

In Shelley's "To a Skylark" and in Keats's Odes, personal feelings flow subtly into the observations of nature, which then come back into experience.

41Wordsworth: Preface to "Lyrical Ballads".

42.Wordsworth: Sonnet "The World is Too Much With Us".

43.Byron´s "Childe Harold".

44. Keats: Sonnet "On the Sea".

45. The founders of the Anti-Corn Law League in 1839 resolved that "the agricultural proprietor, capitalist, and labourer are benefited equally with the trader, by the creation and circulation of the wealth of the country...."

46. John Clare: "Helpstone".

47. John Clare: "The Village Minstrel".

48. D. Thomson: "England in the 19th C", (1950).

49.Shelley: "Queen Mab".

50.Ibid.

51.Shelley:"Epipsychidion". <>

52.Shelley: Letter to the Editor of the "Examiner", June, 1821.

53.Shelley: "The Woodman and the Nightingale".

54. Shelley: Preface to "Hellas".

55. Shelley: Preface to "Prometheus Unbound".

56. Shelley: "Preface to "The Cenci".

57. Thus, as previously discussed, his tendency to forge a unity of ideal and material sometimes gives way to a theological dualism. And sometimes he remains hinged to the static Natural Laws of the Enlightenment - though the deeper experience of his poetry is that of Truth as a becoming, an ever-changing relation between self and nature through Promethean struggle and the realization of human potential.

Coleridge retains a theological dualism, yet also grasps dialectical, organic form and movement. In this he takes over the contradictions of German Idealism, through contact with which his mind was shaped. Coleridge's "France: An Ode" feels Liberty as a spirit in Nature, rather than a force of nature and humanity.

58. Shelley: "The Mask of Anarchy".

59.I have not thought it necessary to go into the well-documented conditions of the British/English industrial working class in the early 19th C. A working day of 12 or more hours in utterly inhuman working and living conditions, the use of child labour etc, are not universal characteristics of capitalist industrial society. Alienation and inequality in general are however; and it is the Romantic exploration of these phenomena which holds the greatest historical significance.

60.Shelley: "The Defense of Poetry".

61.See E.P. Thompson (op.cit.) for an account of the very considerably developed class consciousness and radical culture of the period; it was as a part of this structure that Shelley saw such poems as "The Mask of Anarchy".

62.Shelley: "The Mask of Anarchy".

63.Shelley: Preface to "Hellas"; this paragraph was suppressed by the publishers in 1822, and was first restored in 1892.

64. For example, in modem capitalist society the only alternative to slums is high-rise flats; the only way in which the internal combustion engine can be used is one creating traffic jams and pollution: the only kinds of television stations are commercial or state owned.

65.Shelley: "Defense of Poetry". For Blake too, the "Resurrection to Unity", the return to the "Universal Man" from the "fall into Division" of the human faculties, is equated with the coming to life of the imagination.

66. Ibid.

67. Shelley: "Mont Blanc".

68. M.H. Abrams in "The Norton Anthology of English Literature", Vol.2 (1968). The unity of mind and nature, the "Power", is akin to the Oriental Tao. Human existence is in Truth if the mind is aligned to this, for both Shelley and Taoism.

69. Shelley: Preface to "The Revolt of Islam".

70. Ibid.

71. Shelley: Preface to "Prometheus Unbound". Note Jurgens Habermas´ clarification of the issue of knowledge and ethical predisposition in "Knowledge and Human Interest".

72. Shelley: "Defense of Poetry".

73. The Imagination puts a person in the place of others. Thus tolerance (though not without moral judgement) and understanding of why people are what they are is possible. The historical imagination identifies with others' predicaments, with historically conditioned suffering of all kinds, through uniting the intellect with love.

74.Marx: "Theses on Feuerbach".

75.Shelley: "Adonais".

76.Shelley: "Ode to the West Wind".

77.Ibid

78. Keats: "Sleep and Poetry". Much of Blake's poetry and painting is a celebration of Imagination as a power of Light in the dark ages of calculating reason; and

Coleridge, in a letter to Wordsworth, wrote: "…the philosophy of mechanism...cheats itself by mistaking clear images for distinct conceptions, and... idly demands conceptions where intuitions alone are possible or adequate to the majesty of Truth. In short, facts elevated into theory - theory into laws - and laws into living and intelligent powers."

79. Shelley: "Defense of Poetry".

80. E.P. Thompson; "The Making of the English Working Class",(1963). I admit licence in the use of the quotation in this context, for Thompson was not specifically referring to Marxism; however, I do not feel I distort his meaning by quoting him here.

PART IV

Surrealism and twentieth century capitalism

This section does not pretend to be a systematic account of the Surrealist movement. There are many books covering the historical developent of Surrealism; books on Surrealist paintings, Surrealist writing, and on the complex relationships between the movement and revolutionary politics. Here I am only attempting to pin-point certain characteristics of Surrealism which hold deep significance for the larger aim of this study as a whole. My object is to draw out those aspects of Surrealism which are vital to understanding the contradictory nature of culture in 20th C Western Capitalism, and to trace the development of those anti-capitalistic tendencies which are central to this work's attempted synthesis.

Between 1919 and 1924 a group of people in Paris joined efforts to form a self-conscious movement which they called Surrealism, with André Breton as their effective ´leader'. It was very much a ´total´ movement, relating itself to every dimension of reality. The First World War had destroyed liberal 19th C Western Capitalist Civilization. Out of the wreck of machines and corpses a new kind of void was emerging: the modern technocratic megalopolis.(1) Of course this historical shift was not a sudden one, but it was the fundamental aspect of the new psycho-social realities of modern capitalist society to which the Surrealists were so poignantly sensitive.

Whereas the Da-da movement had been essentially an anarchic burst of desperation and anger against the mass insanity of total war between capitalist nation-states, the Surrealists sought to integrate their spontaneity and violence within a clearly conceived movement which could lead to the transformation of society. The

consciously worked to explore a symbolism which would grasp the "pseudo-Gemeinschaft"(2) of the age, expose it, communicate it, and open up a new human potential. How this was attempted, the degree of "success" it attained, and the present relevance of its ´orientation´ are the issues to be discussed here.

The Surrealists perceived very clearly the psychic and ideological process through which "technical reason"(3) suppresses those faculties in individuals (both working-class and bourgeois) which are not compatible with functioning as cogs in the Capitalist System. Their attack on reason was expressed in numerous forms. On the whole the enemy was identified with the European Enlightenment and all that followed from it. For example the 'Surrealist map of the world´ (in 'Varieties', Brussels, June 1929), which gave to areas of the world sizes proportional to their closeness to the 'Surrealist ideal', makes Britain, France (except for Paris) and Italy minute whilst Germany and Austria retain larger significance. Such places as Easter Island are bigger than Australia. Anglo-Saxon countries in particular-are reduced in size. This represents a failure of the Surrealists to distinguish between the calculating reason of technocratic capitalism and the critical, imaginative reason of the Enlightenment, and is perhaps the gravest contradiction in the movement. For on the one hand, the role of intellectual ideas in their total ´orientation´ was always ambiguous, especially as they professed to be Marxists. On the other hand their obsessive preoccupation with the "irrational" as an untamed, amoral power could give rise to tendencies that were frankly Fascist. (This helps to explain the apparent paradox in the similarity of means of expression and to a certain degree of content between the Surrealists and the Futurists - many of whom were outspoken Fascists.) Salvador Dali came actually to be a fascist sympathizer, while various writings by Surrealists glorify the demonic and macabre urges set free through psychic liberation. It is not so surprising that the arousal of the "masses" can be described like this by Antonin Artaud:

"Infused with the idea that the masses think with their senses first and foremost and that it is ridiculous to appeal primarily to our understanding as we do in everyday psychological theatre, the Theatre of Cruelty proposes to resort to mass theatre, thereby rediscovering a little of the poetry in the ferment of great, agitated crowds hurled against one another, sensations only too rare nowadays, when masses of holiday crowds throng the streets.

If theatre wants to find itself needed once more, it must present everything in love, crime, war and madness....

This is why we will try to centre our show around famous personalities, horrible crimes and superhuman self-sacrifice, demonstrating, that it can draw out the powers struggling- within them, without resorting to the dead imagery of ancient Myths."(4)

Elsewhere, however, are very acute exposures of that logic which allows only one definition of progress, in the name of which the alienation and fragmentation of human beings is perpetrated and justified:

"We are still living under the reign of logic, but the logical processes of our time apply only to the solution of problems of secondary interest. The absolute rationalism which remains in fashion allows for the considerations of only those facts narrowly relevant to our experience. Logicalconclusions, on the other hand, escape us. Needless to say, boundaries have been assigned even to experience. It revolves in a cage from which release is becoming increasingly difficult. It too depends upon immediate utility and is guarded by common sense. In the guise of civilisation, under the pretest of progress, we have succeeded in dismissing from our minds anything that, rightly or wrongly, could he regarded as superstition or myth; and we have proscribed every way of seeking the truth which does not conform to convention."(5)

The following image describing the limits to analytical thought divorced from a wider appraisal of the ends of life is similar to one in Shelley's "Defense of Poetry":

"In the narrow tank which you call 'Thought' the rays of the spirit rot like old straw.

Enough play on words, syntactic dodges, formula-juggling; now there is the great Law of the Heart to find, the Law which is not a Law (a prison) but a guide for the Spirit lost in its own labyrinth. Further away than science will ever reach, there where the arrows of reason break against the clouds, this labyrinth exists, a central point where all the forces of being and the ultimate nerves of Spirit converge."(6)

Much of the 'ethos' of Surrealism is clearly concerned not with "irrationality" for its own sake, but with a full experience in which all human faculties and sensibilities are integrated; a society of humans whose actions were guided by such a balanced psyche would be one that was ordered according to a "higher rationality". In capitalist society, on the other hand, isolated phenomena are rationally calculated whilst the whole is anarchic, chaotic and purposeless. The partial awakening of repressed modes of perception and experience would be the pre-condition of a transition to socialism in a 20th western capitalist society. The surrealists were therefore justified in considering their orientation as essentially answerable to Marxism. The split between thought and feeling, intellect and creativity, analysis and imagination has been disastrous for both art and revolution - a condition brought about by capitalist industrialization itself - ever since it became dominant in Western society in the early 19th C. That the Soviet Communists did not see the matter in this way is understandable. Although Lenin was certainly no philistine towards art in general, he is supposed to have remarked that he dared not listen to Beethoven as it 'affected his judgement'. This seems significant. The Bolshevik Revolution was

from the beginning necessarily a coldly calculated enterprise - Trotsky, a man of both artistic and intellectual acumen, took a long while to accept Lenin's views on the revolution.(7) That he did so eventually was because he saw that in an autocratic, 'backward" country like Tzarist Russia, only an efficient, absolutely disciplined party could ever take power. And only a condition of virtual mass starvation could justify the kind of authoritarian revolutionary government which the Bolshevik State became. Under the conditions of Russia therefore, it was possible for a consideration of how to develop an '"emancipated psyche" to appear a deflection from primary, issues. But in a 20th C Western capitalist society, where the powers of oppression are no longer mainly in the form of armies and police - it could not.

Lenin considered that in Tsarist Russia the proletariat should seize power even though a majority of the population had not yet understood that socialism was the only means through which they might emancipate themselves. Only after the old state was smashed, would a majority be won over to socialism.After the defeat of the German revolution of 1921, he was convinced that in western bourgeois countries the nature of the state necessitated that a majority of the working class be won over before state power could be taken, and that the social-cultural conditions of these nations made such a development possible - whereas the cultural conditions of the Russian masses had made this impossible in Russia. The gradual shift in Western Communist Parties from the strategy of frontal attack to Gramsci's "war of position", i.e. the struggle to build a broad, popular movement can be seen as anticipated by the Surrealists on the cultural level. For clearly, the emergence of a broad political front entails also the growth of widespread imaginative awareness and the exploration of experience on all dimensions.

Also for reasons stemming from the particular circumstances of the Russian Revolution, there emerged a great lack of imagination and human feeling in the Soviet leadership after Lenin's death. Related to Stalin's condemnation of anything experimental, vital, or imaginative, as 'bourgeois', is his view of socialism itself. In his view state ownership of the means of production is in itself the laying dowm of a 'socialist base', even if the kind of central control over production which evolves maintains most forms of alienation characteristic of capitalist society, and where political terror represses creative involvement and thought on the part of the masses. Such a view, in which the criterion of a socialist society is a matter of words and labels rather than the imaginative understanding of the actual experience and reality of the working people, was one which could fiercely resist not only intellectual debate but most forms of creative expression and exploration.'(9) The circumstances of a first socialist revolution in conditions of only partially developed capitalism, resulting in a modernization programme controlled by a political elite, was the context within which "Stalinism" reduced Marxism to the perceived priorities of the Soviet Party. A form of collectivism which denied significance to the individual's imaginative experience - inevitable perhaps in the Soviet Union in this period - is

inappropriate to advanced capitalism, in which socialist practise entails the extension of bourgeois democracy into a higher, integrated individuality.

To describe ´Stalinism' as unimaginative and repressive of intellectual enquiry is not to deny that factional differences in the leadership presented a great problem in a contest in which the very survival of the socialist state was in question. Nor can it be denied that the various forms of Russian modernist art, for example Constructivism, which had developed with the revolution, were inappropriate to an aesthetic mobilisation of the Russian masses - even if intellectually they were answerable to revolutionary theory. Deeply related to the crisis in western bourgeois art, abstraction explored experience in a form that was perhaps too early for the Soviet Union in the 1920s.

Thus the tensions between the Surrealists and the Communist Party which led to the expulsion of Breton and some other Surrealists in 1933 are complex.(10) There were some elements in the surrealist 'experience' which are inconsistent with the ideas and practise of socialism. The different conditions in Russia and western Europe explain to a certain extent the emergence of a contradiction between a Soviet-orientated Communist party and the perspectives of Parisian revolutionary intellectuals, over the human preparation for revolution. Most important is the fact that the Bolshevik regime became essentially a ruling elite, re-organizing a society according to the visions of this elite in power (even though the conditions in which they found themselves may have left them little alternatives i.e. to talk of the Bolshevik leaders as an elite is not to imply that they represented the emergence of a new ruling class, guided by new interests of domination as opposed to the needs of the masses), as opposed to providing a guidance and co-ordination to real mass involvement and social transformation.(11) It was to the latter conception of revolution that the surrealists were committed.

The core of Surrealism´s "ethics" may be extracted from a piece of writing by Louis Aragon called "Ethical Sciences: Free to You!"(12) Expressed in a characteristically obtuse, abstract and polemical manner, the essential ideas are that the only free being is the moral being, who wants and strives for the freedom of all:

"He is the moral being... who wants only what should be, and who, free in his existence, necessarily becomes the development of this free existence.Thus freedom appears as the true foundation of morality, and its definition implies the very necessity of freedom. There can be no freedom in any act which turns against the idea of freedom. One is not free to act against it - that is, to act immorally."

This is quite compatible with the Marxist synthesis of rational understanding and ethical imperative, for which, in the historical context of Capitalism, an objective analysis of the world must necessarily align human beings towards action which will

lead to a classless, universally free, society. It also maintains an essential existential tenet - the idea that a person who fully understands himself and the world is bound to act morally, to further all human freedom:

"Such a being, who has no will but his becoming, who is subject to the development of the idea, and can only imagine, can only identify himself with the idea, surpasses his own self.(13) The apparent dualism, or conflict between determinism and free will is therefore overcome as in Marxist thought (and, as discussed later, in Taoist philosophy where the truly spontaneous self is inevitably aligned to the cosmic Tao):(14)

"Will a new affirmation of freedom not emerge from determinist dogma? Freedom transfigured by its opposites beside these troubled waters I wait for its divine features to become transparent under the spreading ripples of the inevitable, under the loosened chains concealing its face.

Wide-eyed freedom, may it return like a street girl. This will no longer be the freedom of old now that it has known Saint-Lazare.... The word, though dishonoured on your public pediments, remained in your mouth when you were foolishly saying that it was banished from your heart. And thus denied, freedom finally exists. It emerges from the darkness, into which ceaseless causality flung it, adorned and enveloped by the concept of determination. Then who resolves the contradictions of freedom: Who is perfectly free and, at the same time, determined,:necessary? Who draws from his necessity the principle of freedom?"(15)

Freedom of heart and spirit is inseparable from the urge for social revolution. It is bourgeois thought, bound to the maintenance of a particular historical social order, which erects philosophies of causal determination on the one hand and ethical systems of individual freedom on the other.(16) For Aragon, the Revolution is part of the Cosmic Plan (in Marxist terms: historical desirability); within it there is absolute freedom for the individual self that is in contact with the pulse of the universe:

"Then, oh moderates, you will no longer be able to find refuge in the streets, in houses, in places of worship, in brothels, in children's innocence or in women's blue tears; then, owls and orators, tyrannical freedom will suddenly nail you to your doors, then it will cast its name to the universe with a great burst of laughter, and the universe will go on, saying that freedom is now called the Perpetual Revolution."(17)

The Surrealists´ interest and involvement in non-rational experience is expressed in their infatuation with dreams and the state of being known in psychiatric terminology as psychosis. Their enthusiasm for Freud came about essentially

because they too considered the "unconscious" to have its own structure - its own logic - which could and should be investigated. They also believed that the unconscious was of paramount importance to every aspect of life.

The idea of "automatic writing" in which the poet suspends the ego's critical control whilst the unconscious pours out its own imagery, verbal associations and poetic patterns, is not really a discovery of Breton's. Many 19th C poets were aware of the process, and used drugs such as opium to "dissolve" the ego and arouse the unconscious. But this indicates merely a deliberate focus on deeper-than-conscious structuring of symbols (or the visionary "inner eye" for painting). In fact, all artistic creation (and many other activities) rests upon this. Ehrenzweig(18) describes the creative process as the constant alternation between differentiated, conscious modes and undifferentiated, unconscious modes of psychic functioning. The conscious "gestalt" principle enforces the selection of a definite gestalt as a figure (for painting; relations of words in poetry) whilst the multi-dimensional attention of the unconscious embraces both figure and ground (or in poetry, the totality of infinite relations). In music, conscious vertical attention has to select a single melody, whilst horizontal, undifferentiated perception can comprise polyphony. In making the next stroke in a painting, the artist does not usually make a conscious decision. Rather, he may step back and view the emerging object with an "empty" stare, each addition completely changing the dynamic interaction between dots of colour, elements of tonal structure etc. The low-level "syncretistic" functioning' of perception and creation embraces the totality instantly and prompts the next movement or addition. The detail of paintings often reveals highly idiosyncratic brushwork or "hand-writing", which is the outcome of unconsciously controlled activity.(19)

Thus, there is nothing unique in the Surrealists' mode of creating. The published poetry of Breton for example is clearly not purely "automatic'', i.e. without any "post-inspirational" re-structuring from the intellect.(20) The characteristics peculiar to surrealist painting and poetry are rather the kinds of unconscious associations which are drawn upon. The kind of imagery cultivated by the surrealists was "the bringing together of two realities which are more or less remote. The more distant and just the relationship of these conjoined realities, the stronger the image - the more emotive power and poetic reality it will have."(21) The ideal surrealist image came from the 19th C poet Lautreamont: "He is as handsome... as the fortuitous encounter on a dissecting table of a sewing machine and an umbrella."

What was original in Breton was his connecting the unconscious (in Freud's sense) with the imagination, and this with the dimensions of experience repressed in Western Industrial Capitalism. He was concerned with more than mere sexual repression upon which "civilization" is founded for Freud:

"Surreialism's whole ambition is to furnish that method with possibilities of

application not at all concurrent in the most immediate realms of consciousness. With all due respect to certain narrow-minded revolutionaries, I really do not see why we should abstain from raising problems of love, dream, madness, art and religion provided that we consider them in the same light in which they, and we too, consider Revolution."(22)

In this, Breton anticipated much neo-Marxist and neo-Freudian thought - that of Marcuse, Wilhelm Reich, and R.D. Laing, for example. From the first the surrealists were concerned to live out in art the truth they found in Hegel; the dialectical inter-pervasion of self and "reality", the unity of consciousness and its object. ‘They explored the power of consciousness to create the reality it "sees":

"...one rainy day in an inn by the seacoast, I was struck by the obsession exerted upon my excited gaze by the floor - its grain accented by a thousand scrubbings. I then decided to explore the symbolism of this obsession and, to assist my contemplative and hallucinatory faculties I took a series of drawings from the floorboards by covering them at random with sheets of paper which I rubbed with a soft pencil. When gazing attentively at these drawings, I was surprised at the sudden intensification of my visionary faculties and at the hallucinatory succession of contradictory images being superimposed on each other with the persistence and rapidity of amorous memories. As my curiosity was now awakened and amazed, I began to explore indiscriminately, by the same methods, all kinds of material - whatever happened to be within my visual range - leaves and their veins, the unravelled edges of a piece of sackcloth, the brushstrokes of a "modern" painting, thread unrolled from the spool, etc., etc. Then my eyes perceived human heads, various animals, a battle ending in a kiss....." 23

The recognition and exploration of dream, drawing it into waking life to flood the controlled, "rational” conscious mind, was seen as an overcoming of schizoid alienation, rather as R.D. Laing was later to view the ‘‘journey’' of a psychotic breakdown:

"It seems that the psychotic crisis may enable one to overcome a deep rift in the human personality, characteristic of "normal" man in our type of society. Modern civilisation has created a fissure between the "inner" and the "outer" layers of existence, between "me-here" and "you-there", between "mind" and "body". These divisions of personality are not inevitable or natural, but the outcome of “an historically conditioned split"; we can conceive of a point in huraan existence before this lapse occurred, an "original Alpha and Omega of experience and reality" to whose oneness the mystic and the schizophrenic both manage to return. It is not the psychotic who is "alienated” or has the "split personality", in Laing’s terms, but the so-called "normal" person: alienation and splitting are indeed the basic conditions for our repressive normality and its apparatus of anti-human institutions."(25)

The unity of self and "reality" is recovered through a total relationship of being to the outer world. This mode of being and perceiving, typified in surrealistic creation is also, therefore, a unification and integration of all human faculties and sensibilities:

"It is the only structure that responds to the nondistinction - better and better established - between sentient and formal qualities, and to the nondistinction - also better and better established - between sentient and intellectual functions, which is why it alone can equally satisfy the mind."(26)

It is the abnormal condition of western civilization that has led to the repression of the most authentic dimensions of experience, associated for R.D. Laing with the true self, whilst the recognized perceptions, experience and behaviour are false impositions of roles compatible with the functioning of the "normal" society. Thus Ehrenzweig suggests that the "syncretistic" mode of perception, characteristically repressed in western society, has become associated with repressed emotions. When unconscious elements do erupt, they appear chaotic. The ordered, calculating "normal" ego fears this reality.(27) As Laing puts it:

"....our "normal" "adjusted" state is too often the abdication of ecstasy, the betrayal of our-true potentialities. .....many of us are only too successful in acquiring a false self to adapt to false realities."(28)

Here, however, a qualification of surrealism is required if the kernel of truth is to be extracted from the experience of the movement. R.R. Laing does not glorify psychosis as such: a psychotic lives through hell even if a higher state of being is attained ultimately (and often it is not). For him, psychosis is a social phenomenon - instanced in particular individuals who very often become psychotic precisely because they are unduly sensitive and honest to their "true" selves; they will not or cannot live out the false roles foisted upon them, or live in conditions in which their authentic existence is undermined. Psychosis is a response to the abnormal world - a complete break from it to live within the "inner" self; it is not in itself a desired state of normality. Rather, what we call psychotic experience is the uncontrolled eruption of the deepest psychic elements which have been repressed and distorted through socialization into an alienated normality. Sometimes ths surrealists thought of it this way; psychic liberation was necessary, but its immediate forms could be dangerous:

"…I have done everything to make my soul monstrous. Blind swimmer, I have made myself a seer. I have seen. And I caught myself falling in love with what I saw and wanting to identify myself with it."(30)

At other times, however, some of the surrealists did not appear to be seeking a

synthesis ox reason and psychic intuition.(31) Instead appears a blind worship of whatever forms the "irrational" happens to take. Salvador Dali's "Paranoia-Criticism" allows critical intervention to make paranoic images active, to organise and synthesise them. But no reason cr judgement is called upon in the nurturing of psychotic symbolism. It is to the credit of Breton that he tried to draw a distinction between Dali's surrealism and his own, although not perhaps identifying the issue very clearly:

"The other route offered to surrealism, the.... fixation on dream images, has been confirmed by experience to be far less safe, and even very susceptible to risks of being led astray...

In spite of an undeniable ingenuity in his staging, Dali's venture, ill served by an ultra-retrogade technique...and discredited by a cynical indifference regarding ways of imposing himself on the public, has shown signs of panic for a long time now and has only been salvaged momentarily by the organization of its own vulgarities. Today it flounders in academicism..."(32)

For it was quite clear to Breton and to others since who have been inclined to distrust surrealism because of it, that Dali's form of irrationalism is more than compatible with Fascism.(33) For the latter was also hostile to bourgeois culture, bureaucratic "reason" and the repression of sexual and demonic urges. But the solution it advocated was very different from that advocated by socialists and by Breton's surrealism. The "dangerous" tendency is also to be found in Artaud's frequent indulgence in sadism. At other times we find a tone in surrealist writing similar to that in Dostoyevsky's "Underground Man" or "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man". In an article by Jacques Rigaut(34) there is a delight in self-humiliation, a "clever" cynicism taking- him through vicious circles of self and life debasement:

"Whenever I could betray a friend's confidence, I don't think I missed the chance...the surest way of having some comic relief is to deprive creatures of their little lives - -without any motive, just for laughs... What a peal of laughter at my mistress's terrified face when, as she waited to receive a caress, I slugged her with my American right hook and her body fell several feet away....

As long as I do not overcome the taste for pleasure, I well know that I shall be susceptible to the intoxication of suicide….

The important thing was that I had made the decision to die, not whether I actually died...

But there, all the same, is the most absurd act, fantasy at its explosion, and unconstraint beyond sleep and purest compromise."

Here the exploration of ennui, the unhealthy malaise of bourgeois existence, is not turned toward a resolution through struggle for psychic emancipation, but to destruction. Spontaneity becomes negative affirmation. Another example of surrealism "led astray" is in the following by Dali:

"Last May, on the train between Cambronne and Glaciere, a man of about thirty, sitting opposite a very pretty girl, skilfully separated a magazine he was pretending to read, in such a way that the girl was presented with the sight of his penis, erect, complete and magnificent. Some fool's discovery of this exhibitionist act, an act which had plunged the girl into a tremendous and delicious confusion, but without the slightest protest, was enough to cause the exhibitionist to be apprehended and expelled by the other passengers. We can only express our vehement indignation and our contempt for such abominable behaviour against one of the purest and most disinterested acts a man is capable of performing in our age of corruption and moral degradation."(35)

Here the contempt for bourgeois hypocrisy and puritan morality is turned into a delight in shocking for its own sake - not as a prelude to a free sexuality. The girl's confusion is "delicious" - when in fact it exists for no other reason than that she has been brought up to be an inhibited, sheltered "pretty girl". The conflicts of an unhealthy society are enjoyed in their own right, not explored in order to transcend them.

The French psycho-analyst Lacan has described the unconscious as "structured like a language." It was the nature of this language that surrealist poetry and painting explored. Now a language is a symbol system; it is understood by linguistic science as a system in which a "signifier" represents a "signified". Lacan has been at pains to show that the signifier is not an empty symbol functioning merely to denote an object - that is, with a fixed, but arbitrary meaning. Rather, the signifier constantly "passes over to the level of the signified;"(36) the relation between signified and signifier is dialectical. He gives as an example two identical doors over one of which is printed LADIES, and over the other, GENTLEMEN. Here the "signifier intrudes into ths signified, (for) the mere juxtaposition of two terms whose complementary meanings ought apparently to reinforce each other....(produces) an unexpected precipitation of meaning: the image of twin doors symbolizing... the solitary confinement offered Western Man for the satisfaction of his natural away from home...."(37)

A symbol such as "tree" is not something static: "For ths signifier, by its very nature, always anticipates on meaning by unfolding its dimension before it.... (The symbol "tree") can still call up with the robur and the plane tree the meanings it takes on, in the context of our flora, of strength and majesty. Drawing on all the symbolic

contexts suggested in the Hebrew of the Bible it erects on a barren hill the shadow of the cross."(38)

Far from a one-to-one relationship between signifier and signified, !"one has only to listen to poetry... to hear a true polyphony emerge... along the several staves of a score." Languages are structured in a series of orders, from the phonetic to the grammatic, like "the rings of a necklace that is a ring in another necklace made of rings. Language can say something quite other than what it says."

The surrealists wanted to break the patterns of relationship between symbols and objects and between symbols, erected by their age. Thus Breton says of Max Ernst:

"The external object had broken with its customary surroundings, its component parts were somehow emancipated from the object in such a way as to set up entirely new relationships with other elements, escaping from the principle of reality while still drawing upon the real plane (and overthrowing the idea of correspondence)."(39)

The surrealist experience attempted to break the static correspondences related to a particular reality and its maintenance.(40) They wanted to initiate the ever-transforming, dialectical movement of symbol, and object:

"...to bring together two images permits them to go beyond the usually limiting consideration of the object's known life. In their (poets and artists) eyes the object, no matter how complete, returns to an uninterrupted succession of latencies which are not peculiar to it and which invoke its transformation."(41)

This constant transformation of relationship, exploration of new latencies, is authentic human life:

"When I know where the terrible struggle within me between living and likely to live will end, when 1 have lost all hope of enlarging the scope of reality.... When my imagination retires within itself and coincides only with my memory, I shall gladly grant myself, like the others, a few relative satisfactions. I shall go over to the "embellishers". I shall forgive them. But not before!"(42)

Breton was quite clear in associating the static, surface perception of the object, the fixity of object and symbol correspondence, with the turning of all objects into commodities of utility in capitalist society:

"The objects which assume their places (in)... the surrealist exhibition of May 1936 are above all likely to lift the prohibition resulting from the overpowering repetition of those objects which meet our glance daily and persuade us to reject as illusion

everything that night exist beyond them. It is important to strengthen at all costs the defences which can resist the invasion of the feeling world by things used by men. more out of habit than necessity. Here as elsewhere the mad beast of custom must be hunted down."(43)

Marcel Duchamp's "ready-mades" are examples of what Breton refers to here, as is the painting by Magritte called "The Key of Dreams" in which are depicted a horse's head, a clock, a jug, and a suitcase - and under which are written respectively the words: the door, the wind, the bird, the valise.

Related to the "static" perception of the object as surface, is the identification of transitory realities with eternal truths, ths confusing of history with nature, which pervades the consciousness of man in capitalist society. Trapped in the experience and conception of things as commodities, "becoming" is reduced to fixedness. Breton writes in the work just quoted:

"´What´, writes M. Bachelard, 'is belief in reality, what is the idea of reality, which is the primordial metaphysical function of the real? It is essentially the conviction that an entity exceeds its immediate known quantity, or, to put it more clearly, it is the conviction that there is more to be found in the hidden real than in the immediate known quantity.´ Such an affirmation is sufficient to justify strikingly the surrealist course leading to the instigation of a total revolution of the object."

The surrealists launched an assault on the "bourgeois" perception of the object, both natural and human, and the experience of time and space. A three-dimensional space, in which objects occupy specified positions, was the world-view established by the Renaissance. Newtonian physics is the scientific corollary to it: time is a separate dimension defined in relation to velocity of specific objects. In place of this science of mechanical causality Einstein's Relativity established the world-view of a ´four-dimensional space-time continuum,' a specified point in which there is an ´object-event.' Time is relative; the experience of it as segmented and linear is a function of the limits imposed by man's terrestrial situation and his powers of comprehension. More specifically, the perception of reality in terms of three dimensions of space and one separate dimension of time is the scientific world-view historically associated with western, urban, capitalist society.(44)

In tune with the attempt of the surrealists to surpass "bourgeois" categories of perception was their enthusiasm for Einstein:

"…the Greeks...materialised their psychology and their Euclidean sentiments in the nostalgic and divine muscular clarity of their sculptors, (while) Salvador Dali, in 1935, with regard to this agonising question which is that of "Einsteinian space-time...creates...watches.... (that) are nothing but paranoia-critical camembert, tender,

extravagent, solitary in time and space."(45)

The “post-bourgeois” experience of surrealism is rendered in putting space and time on a continuum. This is expressed in the 'mystical’ time-suspended quality of much surrealist art. The object as a commodity, something outside and alien to the individual consciousness, is explored in a new way. The relativity of time is felt as a deliberate break from the linear, measurable flow of time for the western consciousness. The experience of the object is "absolute" - not bounded in time and space - and is a mode of perception similar to that of Eastern mysticism. It is a creative relation of self to object, described by Erich Fromm in another context:

"If we are fully aware of a tree at which we look - not of the fact that this is correctly called a tree, but of this tree, in its full reality, in its suchness - and if we respond to the suchness of this tree with our whole person, then we have the kind of experience which is the premise for painting the tree.... In full awareness there is no abstraction; the tree retains its full concreteness, and that means also its uniqueness. There is only this one tree in the world, and to this tree I relate myself, I see it, I respond to it. The tree becomes my own creation."(46)

The idea of an "absolute' knowledge of reality was similarly portrayed by Henri Bergson.(47) In his view, the western intellect conceives in static categories, through which time is experienced by analogy to space. Intuition goes deeper, experiencing time as duration - a burgeoning, unsegmented movement. Through intuition reality is directly known as change, creative energy.

Surrealism attempted to unite scientific knowledge with intuitive experience, to construct a world-view appropriate to a new ordering of society. If this was only vaguely spelt out, in ways full of the whimsy of the surrealists’ collective personality, it does not prevent us from extracting the core of validity in their enterprise. Later in this study I shall return to the idea of a convergence in Einstein’s physics, dialectical materialism, and certain strands of Eastern mysticism.

The closeness of surrealism to the mysticism of the "Upanishads", Taoism and Sen Euddhsim, is quite apparent. That this need not be a deflection from rational understanding of the world and political commitment is argued again later. Provided it is not taken over as dogma, but transformed suitably, Taoism seems in fact as appropriate as any existing cosmology to what may be called a ´socialist society’.

Da-da had rested upon the idea of One reality or Self, to which was connected each human being’s creative imagination. Some da-daists (especially Hans Arp and Tristan Tzara) had been content to let Nature give the forms to collages or "poems" - that is, to leave them entirely to chance rather than let the human mind mediate the One’s creativity:

"The law of chance, which embraces all other laws and is as unfathomable to us as the depths from which all life arises, can only be comprehended by complete surrender to the Unconscious. I maintain that whoever submits to this law attains perfect life."(48)

Surrealism took over the core of this view. Automatic creation was seen as tapping the universal unconscious(49) (though differently in different individuals - but allowing a basic form of human communication.) Cultural tradition was seen to be minimised in the elimination of the ego in creation. As for Taoism and Romanticism there is only one energy - the same for Nature as for Man.(50) Artistic creation is Nature working through the mind and feelings. The surrealist vision of reality was thought to he an 'absolute', ultimate perception, comparable with Eastern thought:

"When one sees Eternity in things that pass away and Infinity in finite things, then one has pure knowledge."(51)

The passages in the "Upanishads" about dreaming are also similar to the surrealist attitude:

"When a man is asleep his soul takes the consciousness of the several senses and goes to rest with them on the Supreme Spirit who is in the human heart. When all the senses are quiet the man is said to be asleep. Then the soul holds the powers of life - breath, voice, eye, ear, and mind - and they rest in quietness....

The Spirit of man has two dwellings: this world and the world beyond. There is also a third dwelling-place: the land of sleep and dreams. Resting in this borderland the Spirit of man can behold his dwelling in this world and in the other world afar, and wandering in this borderland he beholds behind him the sorrows of this world and in front of him he sees the joys of the beyond....

When the Spirit of man retires to rest, he takes with him materials from this all-containing world, and he creates and destroys in his own glory and radiance. Then the spirit of man shines in his own light.

In that land there are no chariots, no teams of horses, no roads; but he creates his own chariots, his teams of horses, and roads. There are no joys in that region, and no pleasures nor delights; but he creates his own joys, his own pleasures and delights. In that land there are no lakes, no lotus-ponds, nor streams; but he creates his own lakes, his lotus-ponds, and streams. For the Spirit of man is Creator."(52)

The piece called; "Death: the Oaken Rampart" by Robert Desnos expresses the idea that the mind can leave its finite restrictions in space and time and reach eternity. The idea of a God, as in Christian (or any other) dualism is a feeble excuse for

material immortality and a petty security for the ego. Rather as for Zen Buddhism, which does not speculate about the 'after-life´, eternity for Desnos can be an instant - it is 'here and now´ if properly attended to:

"…immortality is impure; only eternity is worth considering. It is shocking that the majority of men link the problem of death to that of God.... He who does not doubt the non-existence of God renders concrete his inadmissable ignorance, as understanding of the spiritual elements is spontaneous. He who believes in God is almost always a coward and a materialist limited to his own physical appearance. Death is a material phenomenon. To have God intervene is to materialize him. Death of the mind is an absurdity. I live in eternity in spite of the ridiculousness of such a declaration. I believe I live, therefore I am eternal. Past and future serve matter. Spiritual life, like eternity, is conjugated in the present tense."(53)

Rational systems of belief always entail some cosmology, some notions about the wider universe within which human history occurs. For the surrealists there seemed no reason why the experience (rather than the rational, analytical interpretation) of the whole fabric of reality should not be expressed in non-rational, that is, poetical or mystical ways.(54) Essentially their cosmology was that of Unity in the Universe, though Artaud sometimes seems to have appropriated the strand of dualism in Eastern thought; compare the following extracts:

"You who are not imprisoned in the flesh, who know at what point in its carnal trajectory, its senseless comings ann goings, the soul finds the absolute verb, the new word, the inner land; you know how one turns back into one's thoughts, how the spirit can be saved from itself; you who are inside yourselves, whose spirit is no longer on the corporeal level, here are some hands for which taking is not everything; minds which see further than a forest of roofs, a flowering of facades, a nation of wheels, an activity of fire and marbles."(55)

And:

"When the wise man knows that the material senses come not from the Spirit, and that their waking and sleeping belong to their own nature, then he grieves no more.

Beyond the senses is the mind, and beyond mind is reason, its essence. Beyond reason is the Spirit in man, and beyond this is the Spirit of the universe, the evolver of all."(56)

The surrealists had an eclectic interest in varied art forms and systems of thought from western civilization and other civilizations of the world. Anything related to dream symbolism or the sort of morality, cosmology, and vision developed by surrealism, could find its place within it. As in other 20th C art movements, a variety

of “primitive” cultures were taken as sources of inspiration. But it was for more than their artistic achievements alone that such cultures were found interesting; it was always the totality of human experience that the surrealists were concerned with - from the psychic to the overtly political level.

Surrealist art claimed to be committed or ´engaged´ on many levels. Much of it aimed to expose the reality of capitalist society and to instigate ’socialist praxis’;(57) the actual mode of creation was considered as typifying non-alienated existence; it attempted to "explore and communicate the kind of knowledge and experience appropriate to a society of free human beings. The criticism of European modern art in general made by Lukacs, is that the artist repeats the alienation of the wage-labourer: he is a "specialised ´virtuoso´, the vendor of his objectified and reified faculties…. he lapses into a contemplative attitude vis-a-vis the workings of his own objectified and reified faculties.”(58) Hence the obsessive concern with technique and abstract form in modern art, which is merely a prostitution of experience and ability. But, if this applies to much modern art, it is not a valid critique of surrealism. Not only was consideration of technique for the surrealists always related to the content being expressed and the reasons for its expression, but they were consciously against individuality for its own sake, favouring collective efforts wherever possible. Their whole enterprise was a reaction against reified consciousness, seeking to relate their creativity to the transformation of society. Their prose manifestos, for example, took their form from the attempt to subvert existing cornmunications media; thus they used headline statements which were shocking and injunctive:

“OPEN THE PRISONS DISBAND THE ARMY

Social coercion has had its day…."(59)

Or poetry such as this by Prevert:

> "Be forewarned you old guys
> be forewarned you heads of families
> the time when you gave your sons to the country
> as one gives bread to pidgeons that time won't come again.....
> close the eyelids
> the scavenger´s coming to carry you away
> it’s over the three musketeers
> now’s the sewerman’s time"(60)

Surrealism was on the whole considerably less obscure to popular understanding than were other major 20th C art and literary movements - though for reasons beyond its control it did not reach far beyond an intellectual elite. They did not

experiment in the breaking down of words or grammatical structure, a tendency which can sometimes justify the criticisms of ´technique for its own sake´ which comes from orthodox ´socialist realists'. The fundamental message of surrealism is perhaps expressed in ´The Dunce' by Prevert:

> "He says no with his head
> but he says yes with his heart
> he says yes to w
> he says no to the teacher
> he stands
> he is questioned
> and all the problems are posed
> sudden laughter seizes him
> and he erases all the words and figures
> names and dates
> sentences and snares
> and despite the teacher's threats
> to the jeers of infant prodigies
> with chalk of every colour
> on the blackboard of misfortune
> he draws the face of happiness."(61)

Since the events of May 1968 in Paris there has been an increase in the attention given to Sursealism. It has not passed unnoticed that the ´New Left´ or ´Counter Culture´ represented a rebirth of the essentials of the surrealist 'spirit´(62). Many of the insights of the Surrealists have become more widely explored, whilst the contradictions in Surrealism have increased proportionately. The recognition that modern technocratic capitalism is something requiring a mode of analysis and action beyond that which the Communist Party had offered, has been reflected in the important developments in the 'dialectics of the psyche´ - in Marcuse, R.D. Laing, Jacques Lacan and many others. The rediscovery of spontaneity, improvisation and imagination in politics, and the growing awareness of the interrelatedness of sexuality and politics are testimonies to this reemergence. On the other hand modern revolutionary movements have suffered from insufficient organization and intellectual analysis - Marxism is frequently rejected in favour of a naive utopian anarchism(63) - and have failed to develop effective, forms for widespread communication. The degeneration of the 'hippie´ movement displayed, above all, the fragmentation of human faculties and experience which the surrealists attempted to integrate: the tendency has been for 'spiritual' or 'psychic' exploration to become individualist, escapist, agnostic and indifferent towards society and history.(64)
But these themes will be taken up again in later sections.

As discussed in Part I of this study, sccio-historical change offers new "possibility"

in experience. The ease of working a medium to express new experience depends on the degree to which the medium constrains, is recalcitrant to, change. Limitations in the possibility of expression prevent the experience being communicated, embraced collectively, and thereby being understood and used to enrich the living out and transformation of social relations. It was such restrictions in western society that the surrealists were acutely aware of; this awareness allowed no distinction in their minds between artistic expression and social-political revolution.

Now meaning in cultural symbolism is the living out of social relations - not something that reflects,, flows from, is conditioned by, an "infrastructure" or economic "base". Thus in contemporary western capitalist societies the "status quo" - a system in which both production and consciousness are controlled in a subtlely disguised manner in the interests of modern corporate capital - is lived out through a complex of myths and distorted corsmunication:

"If, for reasons related to the structure of communication it is not possible for groups and individuals to locate themselves in society and to articulate their interests, repressive communication occurs. If predefinitions are inherited from traditional ideologies and explanations are engendered by specific interest constellations, repressive elements enter communication since the generalisations and synthesis attained through these elements become inadequate or obsolete. Nevertheless these explanations may be meaningful for the individual and essential for his inner reality maintenance and identity reinforcement; although, objectively seen, they obfuscate social reality and its analysis since perception and analysis is structured according to concepts which are no longer relevant."(65)

Thus the majority of individuals are socialized into symbol systems associating the current social system with "democracy" which is therefore "good"; anything urging change in it is "anti-democratic" and therefore "dangerous". "Violence" is a symbol applied only to actions counter to the system; no actions within the system are so labelled. The actualities of individuals' experience - impotence, insecurity, etc. have no public symbol system for their articulation, for their communication, which could lead to transformation of the social relations engendering them:

"... a class which is linguistically deprived would hardly be able to generate, from its own bases, symbols and ideas contrary to the dominant ones. Concomitant with rigid modes of socialisation, a restricted, communication performance would limit reflection and selfreflection proper because of the impoverished linguistic base.

"...(public language) is an expression of official symbols and predefinitions, (private language is) the expression of individualized needs and privatised meanings. If public and private language coincide, a state of symbolic integration is reached in society. In societies characterized by distorted communication, ranges of symbols

and interpretational rules that are politically contrary to the official symbols and definitions cannot be used in public...(and) are repressed from public language and relegated to the private one where, for technical reasons, domination or manipulation cannot be exercised by those in power.." (66)

Habermas analyses the situation similarly:

"Rationalization at the level of the institutional framework (i.e. emancipatory transformation) can occur only in the medium of symbolic interaction itself, that is, through removing restrictions on communication…

Rationalization (in this sense) does not lead, as does the rationalization of purposive-rational subsystems, to an increase in technical control over objectified processes of nature and society but would furnish the members of society with the opportunity for further emancipation and progressive individualization.

...advanced capitalist society has to imunize itself, by depoliticizing the masses of the population, against the questioning of its technocratic background ideology: in the public sphere administered through the mass media… Publicly administered definitions extend, to what we want for our lives, but not to how we would like to live if we could find out, with regard to attainable potentials, how we could live."(67)

It was a profound if not an essentially analytical understanding of modern capitalist society on the part of many of the surrealists which led them to consider 19th forms of revolutionary propaganda - pamphlets on economic theory, party meetings etc. - insufficient for the mobilization of alienated, automated, western human beings. Theirs was a courageous, insightful (if over-optimistic) attempt to develop symbolisms to tap the subtleties of unrecognised experience so as to combat the restrictions imposed on the "creative being" of individuals socialized into a particular world of manipulative and distorted symbols.(68) They tried to present "role vocabularies" (to use C. Wright Mill's term again) adequate to critically understanding and transforming society, symbols which would draw on creative experience and steer people toward a revolutionary orientation to the world:

"A system of conventions can be modified to meet needs which we can scarcely imagine existing before ths system existed. And its modification and enrichment may in turn create the possibility of thoughts such as we cannot understand what it would be for one to have, without supposing such modification and enrichment to have taken place. In this way we can picture a kind of alternating development. Primitive communications-intentions and successes give rise to the emergence of a limited conventional meaning-system, which makes possible its own enrichment and development which in turn makes possible the enlargment of thought and of

communication-needs to a point at which… there is once more pressure on the existing resources of language..." 69

Such "praxical" communication is normally impossible for the vast majority of people in western society. For example:

"A message encoded into 'students demand autonomy' will be decoded differently by members of different classes. Those sharing the restricted speech code will be limited to interpretations which probably exclude any connection between the demand and their own life situation. Without a semantic possibility to translate ''autonomy" into something meaningful in their language, they will retain from the message the surface only (students cause unrest, etc.) Moreover the demand of autonomy itself belongs to a range of needs which have not been part of the traditional working-class repertoire. The rudiments of the working-class ideology do not suffice to generate the interpretational rules necessary for the translation of autonomy into the consciousness."(70) .

By contrast to this retardation of praxis and potential development of symbolism for communicating and transforming society, Alfred Willaner(71) depicts a process of "imaginaction" - an idea which he finds vary much alive in the surrealist experiments. This term conveys the idea of progressive re-synthesis of world-view, the breaking down of old images of society to form newer ones which entail the practise of imaginative possibilities leading to socioeconomic emancipation. This relies on the communication of newly formed images of the social situation from one group to another group that is able to apply this to its own experience, then extend it.'(72)

Hence the surrealists' tendency towards collective artistic creation, the improvised nature of their exhibitions and manifestos, and their lack of exact political doctrines. They wanted to initiate a process of "imaginaction", not lead a "movement" or formulate political theories. In many of their paintings nature is a projection of human fantasy; man is a dreaming agent endowed with infinite creative possibilities. Events have causes in the unconscious of individuals.

The surrealists sought to develop symbolisms to unify experience, to integrate unconscious and conscious, to make "private languages" public, collective and exrerimental. Hence their involvement with Freud, their concern for the liberation of repressed exrerience and desire, their efforts to evoke in people active any vital orientations to the world. In "automatic" writing and fantastic paintings they hoped to trigger the unique, spontaneous experience of other persons.(73) In an overcoming of the inner-outer dualiam in the western self, the surrealists thought they saw the possibility of regenerated, creative human-beings, capable of emancipatory interaction between one another and with nature.

PART IV NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. I quote from David Thomson; "Europe since Napoleon",(1957) for a summary of post-war 1 economic development in France:

"....during the war she had experienced an industrial revolution more intensive than hitherto, and this continued after the war. The loss of her richest industrial and mining areas had forced her to develop all other rather resources to the utmost, and the insatiable demand for munitions boosted the metallurgical and chemical industries. Hydro-electric power was developed to make up for the shortage of coal, and new areas of the country became industrialised. Encouraged by wartime controls and necessities, industrial units became larger. During the post-war years the re-equipment and modernisation of her northern industries and the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine carried this revolution very much further. The new plant was more efficient and productive than the old, and by 1927 all the devastated areas had been restored. This combination of innovation and renovation brought an impressive expansion in her whole productive capacity between 1923 and I929. The emergence of France as a much more industrial state was the most striking feature of western European economy in the postwar years. It meant, too, that she became an exporting nation on a scale larger than before. By 1925 the indexes of her industrial production and railroad transportation were more than double those of 1919. Her balance of trade and payments, remained favourable after 1924. The basis of French prosperity seemed firmer and more durable than that of Germany. But even this comforting development called for adjustments and led to fresh problems, both internal and external, which France proved unable or unwilling to face.

Internally, industrialisation caused a labour shortage that had to be met by foreign immigrants; it caused new tensions between industrial and agricultural interests, because the deeply rooted traditions of a highly protective agricultural policy kept the price of food and cost of living high, and so made for high wages. Externally, therefore, France entered the export trade handicapped by being unable to cut costs and prices below a certain level, at a time when selling on world markets was becoming increasingly competitive. Home consumption was restricted because the purchasing power of the workers left little surplus for other than necessities. Moreover, international trade itself was about to enter into a phase of rapid contraction after 1929...."

2. A term which conveys the falsity and artificiality of a society in which all personal feelings and ties are distorted in the pursuit of instrumental, ´rationalistic´ aims. Cf. Marvin B. Scott: "The Social Sources of Alienation" in "The New Sociology," Ed. I.L. Horowitz (1964). A quotation in this essay from Lowenthal

describes pseudo-Gemeinschaft in an extreme form - a Nazi concentration camp:

"Terror accomplishes its work of dehumanization, through the total integration of the population into collectives, then depriving them of the psychological means of direct community in spite of - or rather because of - the tremendous communications apparatus to which they are exposed. The individual under terrorist conditions is never alone and always alone. He becomes numb and rigid not only in relation to his neighbour but also in relation to himself; fear robs him of the power of spontaneous emotional or mental reaction. Thinking becomes a stupid crime; it endangers his life."

3. Marcuse's term in "One-Dimensional Man." See Part V.

4 A. Artaud: "The Theatre and its Double."

5. Andre Breton: First Surrealist Manifesto,(1924).

6. Antonin Artaud: Letter to the Chancellors of the European Universities. Cf. Shelley's image of "light and fire from those eternal regions where the owl-winged faculty of calculation dare not ever soar." The significance of pointing out such similarities between Romanticism and Surrealism lies in the fact that both were consciously orientated toward the integration of intellect and imagination, within capitalist society which splinters them: art is put in a special "box" where imagination is respected whilst life (work etc.) is suppressed of imagination.

7.Thus Trotsky in 1904 ("Our Political Tasks") wrote in respect of Lenin's wish for a tightly-knit vanguard party with a strong centralized authority: "the party is replaced by the organization of the party, the organization by the central committee, and finally the central committee by the dictator." Later Trotsky considered that Lenin's views reflected not an anti-democratic tendency, but a clear understanding of the concrete conditions of Russia: "only the highest concentration on the goal of revolution free from everything pettily personal can justify this kind of personal ruthlessness.... His behaviour seemed to me inadmissable, terrible, shocking. Yet at the same time it was politically correct and therefore indispensable from the point of view of organization."

When Stalin is compared with Mao, we find the latter endowed with an imaginative sensitivity commensurate with someone who is simiItaneously revolutionary leader, Marxist theorist, and poet. During socialist construction Mao always stresses the need for the people concerned to be drawn into formulating, criticising and enacting policies, so that ´subjective' interests conflict as little as possible with ´objective' assessments. If they do, the classes that act according to their subjective views are often considered "correct" whilst the Party is at fault (for example, when high

taxation resulted in peasants hoarding grain, it was the Party that had to change). The idea of Mao's "On handling contradictions among the people" is that the state should help the people to handle their own contradictions. Similarly, persuasion and material encouragement should be used to sway right-wing dissenters to "mass-line" perspectives; only as a last resort should they be regarded as "enemies."

I hope it is clear that the discussion of the personalities of revolutionary leaders, in terms of their imaginative sensitivities etc. is only considered significant inasmuch as the personalities bear structural relationships to the revolutionary processes of which they are major figures. A person like Lenin was "needed" for the Russian revolution; or his character was formed through his recognition of where he stood in history. The circumstances of the Chinese revolution made possible a poet-revolutionary leader, whilst the construction of socialism in the Soviet Union - isolated, backward, the first experiment in socialism - made a leader like Stalin (ruthless, doynatic, with an absolute certainty about his own correctness) possible or even partially inevitable, though of course Stalin's despotism went far beyond what was required to prevent the collapse of the socialist state and indeed inhibited the development of actual potential.

8.An anecdote quoted in "Not by Politics Alone", (ed. Tamara Deutscher) illustrates Lenin's attitude to one aspect of the ´surrealist ethos'. Visiting the students at the Higher Art-Technical Institute in 1921 he saw a line from Mayakovsky on the wall: 'We shall toss ferro-concrete into the sky´. Lenin remarked; Why into the sky? We need it on the earth. For a down-to-earth Bolshevik such an idea was merely light-headed zaniness; for Mayakovsky it was presumably a metaphorical expression of revolutionary exuberance, also perhaps hinting that material development under Socialism would be qualitatively different from that under Capitalism. Imaginative liberation from the controlled functioning as a unit in a rigidly organized society, was not a conscious part of the Bolshevik vision.

9.Both the form and the kind of subject matter of the official 'socialist realism´ were considered matters for the State to determine. Such an official art cannot allow for a syncretistic exploration, for which ambiguity and unconscious organic complexity are of the essence. Rather, it leads to propaganda art, which, like western advertising, merely portrays unimaginative distorted, official myths. (Similarly, modern Soviet media distribute information as parcels of knowledge, rather than opening up collective experience and enquiry to allow unalienated production of social ideas.) And ironically, the Soviet ´realism' was nothing but a weak redefinition of 19th C European bourgeois naturalism. Even folk art, which could (as in China) have been turned toward the dialectical transformation of experience, was branded as inferior to the official realism. (SœJohn Berger: Art and Revolution".)

"Revolutionary art" cannot he prescribed in terms of form, style or media. What is

required is an understanding of what is authentic art - something that draws upon the deepest, real experience; in the synthesis and expression of which form, style etc. are wrested from it. No edict can enforce a particular experience, though revolutionaries can attempt to open people up to the human struggle of which they are a part, or persuade them to seek life rather than death. Revolutionary aesthetics can outline fundamental conceptions of history and nature, and the character of artistic creation; but the expression of a unique person's confrontation with experience must be left to his own, syncretistic imagination.

The revolutionary orientation to art must also reinterpret all art of the past. It must go beyond the notion that Mozart or Beethoven were experimenting in forms or looking for affects. It must show how all such art is grappling with experience - that such artists were not so much concerned to impress their contemporaries with "great art" (which is now made into an unapproachable altar of asstheticism) as to awaken the human spirit to love, beauty, and freedom. Such "great artists" have been not so much the manifestations of a great civilisation but Prometheans struggling with a reality that has oppressed them.

To the extent that all authentic art will be contradictory, i.e. displaying "non-progressive" characteristics as well as yearning for light - the exploration of it should always be socially instructive. The censuring of all "heretical" feelings is not demanded by a conscious human self-transformation, which must use art as a window into human reality and cultivate the critical faculties to "see through reactionary tendencies".

10.In the Second Surrealist Manifesto (1929), Breton describes how the Party "asked me to give a report on the Italian situation in the ´Gas´ cell, specifying that I was to rely upon statistical facts alone (steel production, etc.) and especially no ideology. I could not."

11.The contrast between Soviet history and Maoist conceptions of socialism will be discussed in later sections.

12. From "La Revolution Surrealist",No.2, Jan. 1925.

13. Louis Aragon: op.cit.

14.Whilst the Marxist conception of man considers the continuous human struggles throughout history - which ultimately strive for the highest state of existence possible - as natural, i.e. in the nature of man, so Taoism finds natural human spontaneity to be orientated to just civil life in the same way that trees grow according to their nature. Just as for Marxism the end of human effort is the creation of a society consciously controlled by society for its optimum freedom and

fulfilment - society in harmony with nature, so for Taoism the 'true´ existence yearned for by man is through a consciousness that knows itself part of nature - aligned with the Tao. For both, consciousness has led man to a split from nature; his refinding himself in nature is on a new human level, in which consciousness is at last understood as being natural, in which nature and mind, matter and spirit - are one. The natural state of existence for the form of Romanticism discussed in this study, and for Taoism, Surrealism and Marxism, is not an asocial spontaneity supposedly reflecting the wildness of nature. It is the development of the natural potential of self and society. Put differently, it is not nature which is embraced whilst culture is rejected; nature is understood as always experienced through culture, whilst the desired culture is one in which man's nature is unfolded.

15. Ibid.

16. For example: positivist or scientistic social science, and laissez-faire ideology with respect to individual freedom. In the bourgeois system of values, initiative and urge for fulfilment are seen as inseparable from the will to control other people, not as depending upon a human order which maximizes the potential for initiative and fulfilment in all.

I7. Ibid.

18. Anton Ehrenzweig: "The Hidden Order of Art", (1970).

19.In "Le Surrealism et la Peinture",(1927) Breton wrote: ”I maintain that graphic as well as verbal automatism - without damage to the profound individual tensions which it is capable of manifesting and to some extent of resolving - is the only mode of expression which fully satisfies the eye or ear by achieving rhythmic unity....”

20.For example Breton´s poem "Free Union” is full of classic surrealist imagery, but its theme is constant and consciously directed, and its 'metre´, thou irregular, is controlled and balanced:

“My wife with her wood-fire hair
With her thoughts of heatsparks
With her hour-glass figure
My wife with her figure of an otter between the tiger's teeth
My wife with her cockade mouth, her mouth a bouquet of final stars.
With her teeth white mousetracks on the white earth
With her tongue of cloudy amber and ground glass.”

21.Pierre Reverdy: "Nord-Sud", March 1918.

22. A. Breton: The Second Surrealist Manifesto, 1929.

23. Max Ernst: "Au-dela de la peinture," (1936). The 'technique of decalcomania´ developed by Oscar Dominquez in 1935 and incorporated into Surrealism (the idea of which was described, as Max Ernst pointed out, by Leonardo da Vinci) is to spread paint or ink over an irregular surface, producing areas of varying colour which inspire the painter to interpret them as forms to be endlessly filled out and transformer. It is not true, as Uwe Po Pchnede says in "The essential Max Ernst", (1972) that: "These transformations do not owe their origin to psychological insights; Max Ernst is spurred on by the diffuseness of the original forms, which can be played with to produce the unexpected." Rather, as in the principle of Rorschach tests, the forms a subject "sees" in random shapes and textures is related to unconscious dynamics.

24. As Herbert Read says in "The Meaning of Art"(1931): "The aim of the surrealists... is not to pain access to the unconscious and to paint its contents in a descriptive or realistic way; nor is it even to take various elements from the unconscious and with them construct a separate world of fancy; it is rather their aim to break down the barriers, both physical and psychical, between the conscious and the unconscious, between the inner and the outer world, and to create a super-reality in which real and unreal, meditation and action, meet and mingle and dominate the whole of life."

The art of Max Ernst for example, is an imaginative exploration of nature - through the opening up of psychic processes in the vision. It is not unreasonable to view this as a 20th C counterpart to Romanticism. Breton's words are similar to Coleridge's ideas on poetic imagination: "...the future resolution of these two states which in appearance are so contradictory, that of the dream and that of reality, into a kind of absolute reality, (is)... surreality..." . I cannot agree therefore with Charles Edward Gauss ("The Aesthetic Theories of French Artists[1]", (1949)) when he writes in an otherwise interesting essay:

"The synthesis is one in name only; it is only a new label for reality. Though the rational and irrational, the mental and material are identified in surreality.... all that we can find there are the irrational, the marvelous, the illogical, the unreal... If the surreal were a truly dialectical synthesis it would not be coextensive with the antithesis from which it proceded (i.e. the irrational)."

25.Peter Sedgwick: "R.D. Laing´s self, symptom and society," in "Laing and Anti-Psychiatry" (eds. Hobert Boyers and Robert Orrill, 1971).

26. A. Breton: "Surrealisme et la Peinture",(1927).

27.The extreme hostility toward Da-da and Surrealist "art" on the part of some of the European bourgeoisie in the 1920s is certainly partially explicable in these terms. An alternative psychological formulation of this phenomenon is given by Ernest Becker in "The Birth and Death of Meaning"(1971): the symbolic self that emerges through socialization eliminates those perceptions which, in any particular society are experienced and identified with anxiety.

28.R.D. Laing: Preface to the Pelican Edition of "The Divided Self" (1965).

29.An alternative view of psychosis, quite compatible with Laingian existential psychology, is given by Ernest Becker in, for example: "Mills' Social Psychology and the Problem of Alienation", in "The New Sociology" (ed. I.L. Horowitz, 1964): "The strain between self and body... is reflected in the difference between experience available in words, versus the experience which is funded in the total organism, the lived experience that forges a unity in the individual. Schizophrenia is the microcosm of the failure to forge this unity, the failure of the self to come into being substantially in a hard world of things. Man is basically a body... subserved by a mind, but the schisophrenic makes heroic efforts to reverse this formulation…. the plethora of role vocabularies of motivation, the profuse symbol-world that the dweller in modern complex society cannot control in any self-satisfying manner, is precisely the problem of schizophrenia....a profuse world of words, images, and objects, sensations which cannot be controlled, or ordered. Why not? Simply because the active organism has not developed the habit of taking a firm stance toward the external world; the individual has not learned the secure development of his initiatory powers in relation to ranges of external problems."

30.Max Ernst: op.cit.

31.As in the tone of the following from "The Quinquagenary of Hysteria" by L. Aragon and A. Breton in "La Revolution Surrealiste", (Mar. 1928):

"Hysteria is a more or less irreducible mental condition characterised by the subversion of the relations which are established between the subject and the moral world with which he believes himself able to cope, outside every delirious system... Hysteria is not a pathological phenomenon and can be considered in every respect a supreme means of expression."

32.A. Breton: "Le Surrealisme et la Peinture," (1946. rev. ed.).

33.Dali's demonic summonings can be contrasted with, for example, the dark, hideous 'biblically vengeful´ figures in Max Ernst's paintings of "The Angels of Hearth and Home". These were consciously intended as impressions of the growth of Fascism in Europe. .

34.Article by Jacques Rigaut in "La Revolution Surrealiste" (Dec. 1929. First appeared in "Litterature," Dec. 1920). Rigaut in fact killed himself with a revolver in 1929.

35. S. Dali, in "Le Surrealisme au Service de la Revolution", No.2. (1930).

36. Jacques Lacan: "The Insistence of the letter in the unconscious," in "Structuralism" (ed. Jacques Ehrmann, 1966).

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. A. Breton: "Le Surrealisme et Is Peinture."

40. Cf. Artaud's call to "tilt reality".

41. A. Breton; op.cit.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Where objects are commodities, and time is money.

45. S. Dali: "La Conquete de l´irrational, (1935).

46. Erich Fromm: "The Creative Attitude," in "Creativity and its Cultivation" (ed. H.H. Anderson, 1959).

47. Henri Bergson; "Creative Evolution". The same idea is expressed in Aldous Huxley's "Doors of Perception" where he writes: "the Dharma-body is in the hedge at the bottom of my garden," that is, everything reflects "Being" when properly attended to.

48. Quotation from Arp in Hans Richter: "Da-da", (1965).

49. Cf. Gauss, op.cit.: "The theory of the surreal as the superindividual... is akin to that of the "collective unconscious" put forth by C.G. Jung and the Zurich school of psychoanalysis..."

50. As I argue later, the timeless Unity of the cosmos is approached through different, though compatible, avenues of thought or experience in the theory of

Relativity (Energy), Taoism (the Tao), dialectical materialism (Nature), and Buddhism (the One).

For the Surrealists art that expressed this Unity was inseparable from the process of social liberation. The celebration of this vital energy is quite different from the Futurists' identification with a demonic, explosive force; the differences in political, ethical and aesthetic orientation are therefore reflected also in their cosmologies - certain apparent similarities not withstanding.

51. The Bhagavad Ghita.

52. From the Brihad-Aranka Upanishad and the Supreme Teaching in the Upanishads (translated and selected by Juan Mascaro, 1965).

53. Robert Desnos: “Death: The Oaken Rampart” in "La Revolution Surrealiste" No. 2 (1925). Note that the simultaneity of past, present and future is a facet both of Einstein’s science and Zen experience.

54. Non-rational notions about experience and the cosmos can be compatible with rational ideas, even though they are not interchangeable in the terms they employ (cf. Schutz’s "provinces of meaning"); thus for example non-rational notions about the universal levels of the unconscious derived from experience do |not necessitate their direct acceptance into the discourse of scientific psychology. The enthronement of one mode of understanding - analytical rationalism - as supreme, is a concomitant of our historical epoch. A higher state of knowledge would rest upon a synthesis of cognitive, emotional, and intuitive knowledge - each supreme in its own sphere cf validity but answerable and relateable to the others. Note the earlier quotation from Aragon. The alignment of the self to the pulse of the universe, has its rational counterpart in the Marxist notion of identifying oneself with the historical process. The dialectics of Taoism and Marxism work on different levels, but converge.

55.A. Artaud: "Letter to the Buddhist Schools.’’

56.From the Katha Upanishad, op.cit.

57.Artaud, for example, was the originator of "living theater" - theater which attempts to come off the stage and into "life” to make the [!]audience” initiators of real historical drama.

58.Georg Lukacs: “History and Class Consciousness", (Trans, 1971).

59. From "La 'Revolution Surrealiste", No.2. Jan, 1925.

60.Jacques Prevert: "Hard Times” (trans. By L. Ferlingnetti).

61.Same translation. The fact that the imagery is not very "surrealistic’' in tbss poem is not paradoxical. There was in fact much less uniformity of surrealist poetic ’method® and style than Breton´s theorizing might suggest.

62.For example, Alfred Willener: "The Action image of society" also Maud Mannoni: "Psychoanalysis and the May Revolution" in "Reflections on the Revolution in France: 1968" (ed. Charles Posner, 1970). At the same time aspects of

surrealism have become common currency in dominant commercial culture, e.g. in advertising though transformed in implication.

63. An example is Theodore Roszak's book "The making of a Counter Culture", (1969). While quite validly attempting to bring revolutionary politics "up to date" for "technocratic capitalism", Roszak seeks to assume that the fundamentals of Marxist intellectual analysis are no longer valid. In so thinkine he falls slap into the gravest form of capitalist ideology available: the idea that technology in itself is to blame for alienation and dehumanized society. He can therefore only offer pessimism or an (objectively) futile Utopianism.

64. Thus, dissatisfaction with the forms of institution and thought characteristic of Capitalism, has been translated into rejection of social institutions and intellectual analysis in all forms. Anarchic rebellion is seen as transcending revolutionary praxis.

65. Claus Mueller: "Notes on the Repression of Communicative Behaviour" in "Recent Sociology No.2" (ed. Dreitzel, 1970).

66.Ibid.

67.Jurgens Habermas; "Technology and Science as ´Ideology´" in "Toward a Rational Society", (1971).

68.There is a tendency among neo-Marxist writers on technocratic capitalism (such as the Frankfurt School) to view contemporary ideological control over thcuyht and behaviour as fundamentally new. In actuality however, the process of distorting communication, maintaining impoverished and obsolete public symbolisms, etc. is common to all periods of Capitalism. Their analyses are valuable nevertheless in elucidating the exact form through which class domination occurs under advanced capitalism - the form which the surrealists aimed to challenge in an appropriate manner.

69.P.F. Strawson: "Meaning, Truth, and Communication" in Minnis (ed.), op.cit.

70.Claus Mueller: op.cit.

71.A. Willener: "Images and Action". Paper given to the SSRC Conference on the Occupational Community of the Traditional Worker (1972).

72. For this and the following discussion, see the outline of an "emancipatory aesthetics" at the beginning of Part VI.

73."... this is a receipt within everyone's reach which demands to be incorporated into the ´Secrets of the art of Surrealist Magic´ and can be reformulated as follows:

How to Open at Will the Window into the Most
BEAUTIFUL LANDSCAPES IN THE WORLD AND ELSEWHERE"

A.Breton "Le Surrealisme et la Peinture." Instructions on how to make surrealist landscapes with ink follow.

Further References

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PART V

China: the sung dynasty and taoist landscape painting

PARS *1*

This section discusses Chinese landscape painting in relation to the development of property relations and urban manufacture in the Sung dynasty. It is not simply a comparison with the issues dealt with in Part II, i.e. the rise of landscape painting within developing western capitalism, although it does allow a contrast which heightens the understanding of western capitalism. It attempts to uncover cultural tendencies which had implications for socialist modernization in China (discussed in Part VI), at the same time as drawing together orientations of thought and sensibility which, like Romanticism in the West, can be ´explored' for their significance to the world socialist movement; a conscious human project in which man must draw from his collective heritage those strands which will guide him and transform him into a fully conscious and fully feeling, autonomous human being. The partially conscious search of human beings in varied times and places for harmonious existence in nature, is a major concern of this study; as is the variety of forms in which they may find it - depending on the historical specificity of the particular part of the planet in which they happen to live.

Before embarking upon an analysis of the partial development of capitalist relations in the Sung dynasty and the emergence of certain sensibilities towards Nature which were inter-related with it, I shall attempt to portray in outline the important general features of Imperial China. Following Marx, Weber and many writers since I consider Chinese society between the 3rd C BC and the 19th C AD as representing an historical socio-economic formation within which a specific node of production (sometimes termed the Asiatic mode of production) predominated. Although significant changes are discernible within this two thousand year-long period, its structural continuity justifies its being typified in general terms, in the same way as historical analysis distinguishes Feudalism and Capitalism in western Europe.

Both Marx and Weber(1) subjected Imperial China to structural analyses, and essentially for the same reasons. Apart from its intrinsic interest and importance, it provided an excellent historical comparison with western Europe in the analysis of the rise of Capitalism in the West; being a highly developed society which did not transform itself into a mode of production based on manufacture and capital in spite of long periods of stability, it allowed the process of early capital accumulation in the West to be clearly elucidated through contrast with it. What follows now is similarly an outline of the socio-economic structure of Imperial China, largely in terms of those features which prevented capitalism from ever reaching a point where a total transformation of the traditional system could occur.

The characterization of dominant social relations in Imperial China entails the examination of patterns of landowning, family organization, the State officialdom and prevailing ideological structures of belief, simultaneously. The unification of China under the Ch'in dynasty in the 3rd C BC saw the emergence of a state form distinctly different from that of the monarchies under Western Feudalism. The

Imperial State gained control over a huge area of land which it held through its governmental bureaucracy. This was a centrally appointed, ruling elite; officials were sent to areas usually far from their homes, could be removed immediately, and normally held particular posts for only a certain number of years. The development of this kind of state has been attributed to certain ´factors' specific to China, but a conception of it as inevitable in retrospect is of course deterministic. Rather, given an identifiable set of circumstances, certain historical outcomes can be seen as having been impossible, whilst the actual outcome should be considered as one of perhaps many possibilities - not as absolutely conditioned. Nevertheless, these ´factors' do go a long way to explaining the Chinese State's emergence. One is that the geographical situation of China is one which, if it is to be effectively farmed, requires the construction of large irrigation schemes and transport systems. Such public works, requiring large-scale organization of labour, could hardly have been undertaken by local rulers of the characteristic type within Euopean Feudalism.(2) If a powerful, centralized State could organize such projects, this would tend to lead other classes to accept its sovereignty - indeed, to be concerned for its continued existence. Thus, from very early days, questions concerning the State and how it should rule occupy a central place in Chinese thought; the material welfare of the State was identified with cosmic harmony and justice.

The structure of the officialdom can also be seen as a viable way for the earliest Emperors to cope with local power in the hands of extended kinship groups. Thus:

"According to Weber, the strength of these kinship groups originated in the independent power of tribal chiefs or princes who were believed to possess supernatural or superhuman qualities (charisma) that entitled them to the exercise of authority. These qualities and hence the right to rule were thought to be hereditary in the male line.....

"Thus the Chinese emperors had to contend with a hereditary nobility that possessed great local power on the basis of kinship ties but that did not at the same time constitute a relatively united status group as it did in the West."(3)

In Feudal Europe, on the contrary, there were hereditary nobilities but they were not leaders of kinship groups that included the peasantry. The kings maintained (uncertain) power through constantly shifting alliances with the nobility. Local power was virtually absolute provided the lords fulfilled their obligations and showed allegiance to the king. The king relied upon the military service of self-equipped knights, whereas the Emperor maintained the only legal army in China. The members of prominent hereditary landowning families competed for official offices to maintain or extend power, wealth, and prestige. Thus the collective interest of the landowning class except in times of disintegration and rebellion was orientated towards maintaining the Imperial Government. Such a system was

extremely self-perpetuating, and very effective in preventing any other class from ascending to political power.

The early unification of the state with a centrally organized officialdom in China ensured that the struggle for political power was directed toward the attainment of office. Offices were gained through success in the official examination system - based essentially on Confucian scholarship - which further reinforced a single ruli ng-class with a consolidated ideology. There was relatively little structural division within the ruling-class (as in Western Feudalism between lords and monarch) which an urban manufacturing class could exploit in its advance toward political autonomy and then more extensive power. Indeed, merchants and manufacturers who made fortunes would frequently use them to become landowners and provide a member of their family with the education required to pass the official examinations. Thus, a nascent "bourgeoisie" would tend always to become assimilated into the traditional ruling-class.

The relationship between landowning and office-holding was complex. In fact the two were interdependent, that is the wealth, and power of the ruling-class of China rested wholly on neither land owning nor bureaucratic control. The land owner received a fixed portion of the product of the labour of the peasants on his land (in rice or grain). In the absence of a system of feudel obligations in the Western sense, this expropriation of the agricultural surplus was actually rent, the peasants being share-croppers. The landlord depended on the Imperial bureaucracy to guarantee his property rights and to enforce the collection of rents.(4) The bureaucracy siphoned off much of the agricultural product through taxes, the collection of which was organized through a hierarchy of tax collectors. Each tier was responsible for passing up a certain quantity of rice or grain to the official above him - up to the Emperor himself - and was able to extract wealth for himself by collecting more than he passed on. This pattern of action was formally illegal but socially accepted, and was the foundation upon which the highest officials amassed great wealth - far more than landowning or even commerce could in itself procure. Every great land owning family strove to ensure that at least one of its members became an official.

The wealth expropriated by the bureaucracy rested therefore on land-owning, but the latter depended on the bureaucracy. Fortunes gained in the bureaucracy were used to extend individual land ownership, while landowners depended on the bureaucracy to maintain the status quo, and to construct water-control systems.

Crucial to the Chinese system was the family. In the absence of primogeniture, a family's fortunes would become endlessly divided unless wealth obtained in the bureaucracy was invested in new land. The family thus linked landowning to the bureaucracy. The quasi-mystical significance attributed to the extended family or kinship group, and the practice of ancestor worship sanctioned in Confucianism,

also prevented the formation of urban communities like those at the end of the European middle-ages. In China, cities never acquired political autonomy. Rather than constituting legally independent districts, the cities consisted of several "village districts" reflecting kinship groups or clans. Town residents maintained their links with their village of origin, in which the worship of family ancestors took place. This militated against the citizens' political solidarity - guild organisations for traders and craftsmen were based on kinship groups, which instead of binding together to resist the feudal baron as in the West, sought independently to gain favours from the Emperor and his officials.

Lastly, Confucianism as the dominant religion or world-view served to perpetuate the status quo and was orientated against the development of an urban manufacturing class beyond a limited degree. Confucianism stressed familial piety as the principle governing all human relations, thus strengthening a form of family in all classes of society which worked to maintain the status quo. The tendency to distrust persons outside the extended family while favouring those within it was antithetical to the development of an urban market economy, and contrasts with Christianity which in the West could encourage a brotherhood of citizens to shape new political forms in the urban communes, and foster an ethic of equal treatment in trade. The comparison here is between Confucianism and medieval Catholicism - the latter being more amenable to urban development, as Marx pointed out. The contrast of Confucianism with Puritanism must be made with caution, for the latter arose in the West only after capital accumulation had partially evolved. From the 16th C on it may have provided an efficacious world-view for the entrepreneurial class in Europe, as Weber thought - but this was as a new urban middle-class system of beliefs. In China, Confucianism was a system of beliefs stemming from the ruling-class - conservative and disdainful of business and the accumulation of wealth beyond that which was considered necessary to support a dignified gentleman's life. As such, it reinforced the existing order; but this does not in itself explain why a manufacturing class did not develop a new world-view in opposition to it. The latter point can only be understood in the total context of the social, economic, political, and religious structure of China - of which Confucianism was an integral part, both a reflection and a reinforcement; to see Confucianism as a "force" in itself is to splinter the inter-relations within an integrated whole.

Having outlined the essential features of Imperial China and the reasons why urban capitalism could only develop within limits - in "pockets" whose further expansion was made impossible by the structure of Chinese society - we move on to the circumstances of the Sung dynasty (960-1279 AD), in which urban capitalism developed to one of its farthest points before the period of western intervention. The Sung dynasty was marked by an unprecedented development of trade, manufacture, large cities and a money market. Partial industrialization occurred, in which coal became widely used in the production of iron and steel in quantities unsurpassed

even in 19th C China. The scale of production in individual enterprises was also probably unequalled anywhere in the world until the 19th C.(5) Chinese junks, equipped with balanced rudder and compass, became the best ships on the seas; Chinese merchants became dominant in many areas, including Japan. By the 11th C ten times as many copper coins were being minted as in the 8th C.(6) There were several cities with populations of one million or more. All over the Empire there evolved cities with populations of hundreds of thousands, having arisen from commerce unlike the older cities which had developed around civil and military administrations:

"Moreover, even inside the older cities the order and neatness imposed by earlier administrations broke down. Trade, no longer confined to segregated quarters, spread into many parts of the city, and shops appeared everywhere. The hours of business, no longer regulated by officials, extended far into the night. The inner walls that used to divide the city into wards came down, and the house gates of rich commoners, not just titled families, began to open on main streets. City pleasures and services grew."(7)

Landowners frequently turned their peasants into tenants who paid rent and produced for the market, while the former took up residence in the towns:

"The Tang dynasty (618-907) capital of Changan had been a four-square walled city dominated by imperial and princely palaces and great Buddhist monasteries, a great monument to imperial dignity in which traders were kept out of the way in large walled markets under close official supervision. Commercial prosperity had come after the city's establishment as a capital. But by contrast Kaifeng (capital of the Northern Sung) was an important strategic, commercial and communications centre which had grown into a capital city. In such a community the prestige of the merchant class was bound to rise, and in the face of their great wealth and ostentation and their desire to combat social discrimination, it was impossible to retain the sumptuary laws determining the dress to be worn by different classes and they had to be repealed. Rigid class distinctions continued to break down as the great landowners became more deeply involved with the industrial and commercial world when some of their number were able to develop large-scale mining or metallurgical operations on their estates, like the great land-owners in the mining areas of England."(8)

The partial emergence of capitalist relations of production in the Sung dynasty was accompanied by changes in the state. The most significant are the reforms introduced by Wang an-Shih (1021-1086). Wang´s reforms bear a complex relationship to socio-economic and ideological developments, entailing contradictory reactions towards the developing market economy. On the one hand his reforms indicate an attempt to rationalize the state to accommodate trade, manufacture and the market, on the other

to curb the power and wealth of merchants and turn it to the advantage of the whole society. Thus, Osvald Siren describes the reforms as "closely related to the ideas of modern western socialism," yet Wang was clearly a Confucian, wishing to re-establish what he considered to be the moral society of the Chou period - albeit within a new context. Concomitant to economic and political developments is the emergence of complex structures of thought and sensibility in the Sung dynasty, the most important being neo-Confucian thought,(10) Chan Buddhism, and certain developments in science.(11) These represent the ongoing development of systems of thought originating centuries earlier - systems which were never mutually exclusive, but which rather merged, mutually influenced and inter-ramified with one another in such a way that the labels Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism convey an inaccurate picture of different "religions" as co-existent but distinct entities. The object of analysis must be to elucidate the dialectical development of structures of ideas and sensibilities, in a complex interaction within forms of thought and between these and socio-economic developments.

During the Sung dynasty landscape painting became the central genre of high culture. In it is to be found the expression of complex and contradictory ideas and feelings. In the course of what follows I shall attempt to unravel the most significant aspects of these in relation to the integral whole of Sung dynasty culture and society. This attempt cannot hope to provide more than a skeleton, but it is hoped that the right bones will be exposed to allow some insight into the issues which this work as a whole is attempting to grapple with. In particular I will try to draw out those partially formulated ideas and attitudes which show a structural "anticipation" of Maoist thought. For it seems clear to me that pre-modern China contained certain seeds of knowledge which, under conditions imposed upon it by Western interventions have allowed a humanistic Marxist social reconstruction to he undertaken in a way that is more subtle than anywhere else in the contemporary world. For not only did Imperial China, especially in the Sung dynasty), have an organic, dialectical world-view, but political thought constantly struggled with the problems of a synthesis of the utilitarian and the moral in the role of the state. The idea of correct political action being that which is spontaneously aligned with the Tao, of the good state being one which worked as an unseen influence on the people - not as a tyrant manager - complements perfectly Mao′ s ideas of correctly phased development, of a state that mobilizes and steers but does not rule.(12) The ancient ideas of a society in harmony with nature, of man 'being himself' - being fully man as a mountain is a mountain, were expressed within a ruling class that was still the exploiter of the people.(13) In the 20th C, the advent into China of western science and technology, and Marxism, has allowed these old ideas to be placed on rational terms, based on a scientific comprehension of history and society, and enacted in reality. Whether China remains a place where the people try to rule themselves or not, it seems to me that it now occupies a very special place in world history.

Landscape painting in the Sung dynasty expressed a mode of experience closely bound up with Chan Buddhism, called "Zen" in Japan - an orientation of being which represented a synthesis of Taoist and Buddhist tendencies, yet which also transcended its precursors. Speculations on the nature of the Buddhist Absolute gave way to concern with the human being´s experience of the One - in particular the idea of sudden, total Enlightenment, an opening up of the whole self to the Cosmos. Yet the Absolute was a Taoist unity (whereas Buddhism generally tended to maintain the dichotomy of matter and spirit) - dynamic, natural. Landscape painting expressed the alignment of the painter with Nature (and induced the same state in the viewer) - Nature which was both real and imbued with immanent power and meaning. At the centre of the Chan vision of nature was the mountain: the significance attached to mountains was a culmination of increasingly subtle ideas and sensibilities which had their origins in primitive Chinese society: "By hazardous ascents up mountains the early priest-kings renewed their contact with Heaven and fed that mysterious inward power by which they ruled."(14)

Mountains were also of particular significance in the animistic beliefs of the Chinese peasantry - the common people's Taoism of spirits and gods:

"In popular belief the mountain is the body of the cosmic being, the rocks its bones, the water the blood that gushes through its veins, the trees and grasses its hair, the clouds and mists the vapor of its breath - the cosmic breath, or cloud-breath, which is the visible manifestation of the very essence of life."(15)

In the Sung dynasty the divinity of mountains was transformed into a mode of experience that was both intuitive and rational, rather as with the English Romantic poets:

"A painter creates by ´establishing the idea (meaning)´ and his work is the 'trace' he leaves of the idea. But painting is not to be described as a purely subjective process. It is the idea rather than the man which leaves the trace: the human mind has combined with a corresponding part of creative nature which lies outside the painter, or at most includes him in a greater unit. Some spoke of the quintessence of landscape art (naming that differently - ´spirit resonance', 'structuring spirit') as something existing objectively in nature, which it is the artist's business to discern and convey into his painting. Others, writing in the Northern Sung period, would say that the 'structuring spirit' is a mode of perception supplied by the artist's mind, without objective existence apart from the artist."(16)

The artist's creativity is a manifestation of Nature. The painting marks the reunification of man in nature. The actual act of painting is one in which the observed forms of nature are felt to move the hand - a notion which the origins of Chinese painting in calligraphy made extraordinarily apt. The representation of

nature is not a realism in the western, external sense, but in a deeper, but very material sense. Su Tung - p'o wrote:

"My writing is like spring-water in abundance; it issues everywhere, no matter what the ground may be. Over the level ground it flows quietly murmuring, covering with ease a thousand li in a day. When it comes to mountains and stones, it winds around them and takes on their colour. Really, it is not to be defined. All I know is that it keeps on moving when it must move and ceases when it must cease."

The contours and striations of rocks, the waves, ripples and currents of water and the twists and billows of mist and cloud, allowed the linear, calligraphic nature of Chinese paintings to explore the endless, seamless, intricate web of nature - the Tao. Such an orientation of feeling bears complex, contradictory relationships to the totality of Sung dynasty China. It is significant that the attention of Chinese artists to nature usually accompanied periods of turmoil or unrest. Such was the case with the development of nature poetry during the collapse of the Han dynasty, and with the development of landscape painting and nature poetry during and after the collapse of the Tang.(17) Thus an absorption in nature reflects an escape from social chaos, simultaneously to a deep emotional urge for harmony. Chinese nature poetry is essentially a throwing upon nature of melancholic, lonely feelings; the experience of nature's seasonal changes interpenetrates with powerful introspective emotions which, as in English Romanticism are disturbed and mysterious - impossible to define other than by reference to the wind, mountains, rivers and the moon. Typical of this kind of poetry is that of Tu Fu (712-70), who wrote from exile in a dying T'ang dynasty:

"The autumn wastes are each day wilder:
Cold in the river the blue sky stirs……

Though the dates are ripe let others cut them
I'11 hoe for myself where the mallows run to seed…..

Easy to sense the trend in the drift of life,
Hard to compel one creature out of its course.
In the deepest water is the fish's utmost joy,
In the leafiest wood the bird will find its home.
Age and decline are content to be poor and sick,
Praise and blame belong to youth and glory
Though the autuan wind blows on *my* staff and pillow
I shall not weary of the North Liountain's ferns."(18)

In the Sung dynasty poets and painters of nature were frequently recluses, living far from the cities or the court, many in Buddhist or Taoist monasteries. There is much

to suggest that one of the immediate impulses for this tendency was a typically romantic antipathy to growing manufacture, commerce and the importance of money. This reaction is at once escapist and rebellious, conservative and radical. There was in both the Buddhist and the Taoist tradition a tendency toward hermit-like withdrawal, supercilious pessimism toward society, and the wish for personal communion with nature. But at the same time there also existed a revolutionary, to which the periodic state-purges of the Buddhist monasteries millennial testify. Joseph Needham(19) repeatedly draws out the political connotations of Taoism, as being in opposition to Confucian political orthodoxy on many planes. Thus, from very early days Taoism posited a simple, egalitarian society against feudal hierarchy. The idea of hsii (emptiness) in Chuang Tzu is a readiness to receive all things; clearing the mind of:

"...private as opposed to public interest, and personal prejudices or preconceived opinions as opposed to what may be observed in the whole range, omitting nothing, of natural phenomena.....

“For Confucianism and indeed all other schools this was a frontal attack. It was part of the relativistic attitude cf Taoist thought.... and Taoist texts never tire of insisting that the human (and the individual human) is not the only criterion." (20)

Not only are all phenomena of equal value to the development of knowledge, but since truth lies in the process of the Tao, it shows no favouritism toward the upper classes. History may sweep them away - they have no monopolistic control on it.

Benevolence in tune with the Tao may not be in accordance at all with the morality of a ruling class at a particular place and time(21) The processes of nature and history do not conform with immediate, limited ideas of kindness:

“Is then the world unkind?
And does it treat, all things
Like straw dogs used in magic rites?....

The omnipresent Virtue will take shape
According only to the Way….

The crooked shall be made straight
And the rou.oh places plain;
The pools shall be filled
And the worn renewed;
The needy shall receive
And the rich shall be perplexed.

So the Wise Man cherishes the One,
As a standard to the world:
Not displaying himself,
He is famous;
Not asserting himself,
He is distinguished;
Not boasting his powers,
He is effective;
Taking no pride in himself,
He is chief

Because he is no competitor,
No one in all the world
Can compete with him." (22)

The likenesses in this to Marxist thought, Maoist ideas of revolutionary leadership - and more generally to "socialist morality" - hardly need to be spelled out. Above all, the Taoist cosmology is organic and dialectical to an extent that no other cosmology before Marxism achieved, anywhere in the world. Indeed, Needham suggests that Leibniz - the first Western organicist - developed his philosophy partially through the study of Sung Neo-Confucian doctrines (translated by the Jesuits). Later, Hegel declared quite clearly that he had been influenced by Taoism. Perhaps then, the history of human dialectical consciousness is a single, world history.

The ideas and sensibilities expressed in Sung landscape painting represent a constellation of impulses, crossing over and affecting one another, related to a particular instant in a dynamic process. They represent a continuation of high cultural tradition; they also represent the traditional tension between Taoism and Confucianism - between the interests of the people and those of the ruling classes. However, the revolutionary impulse toward an egalitarian, harmonious society is deflected into an esoteric, individual communion with nature. The impossibility, in the context of Sung China, of a society collectively in harmony with nature led the desire for it into a passive aestheticism. Beyond this, Sung landscape is a response to partial capitalist industrialization: both an aristocratic conservative response to 'vulgar' commercialism, and a radical response to the alienation brought about by property relations, money, and urbanization. The partial emergence of capitalism gives rise to alienated experience to a degree in which (as in the West) the total overcoming of alienation can be conceived - at least in the imagination. Yet this is blocked, since the structure of Chinese society holds a check on the further development of capitalism. In distorted forms, organic existence can be envisaged however; the idea that spontaneous, authentic being and action could also be controlled, social action becomes the content of the society's highest form of art. And then again - yet another contradictory aspect of Sung landscape reflects the

development of bourgeois society in a positive sense. The Chan experience of all objects as possessors of the Dharma – the idea that the Totality can be expressed in the microcosm of a leaf, a bird, or a bamboo shoot – is also a reflection of an urban bourgeois tendency to regard all objects with interest. As in 15th C Flanders, there is a spiritualized expression of "bourgeois familiarity" by contrast to an aristocratic hierarchy of virtues perceived within different objects, natural or human.

It is not unique in human history for the "high" esoteric art of a ruling-class so to express a revolutionary sensibility. We have already discussed the English Romantics; consider also Mozart's "Marriage of Figaro" - a microcosm of class society, male domination, and the inevitability of struggle against them, in which the resolution is a barely concealed hymn to a future state of human equality - in a form so elegant and refined as to make the 18th C aristocratic salons seem like dog-houses in contrast to it: its beauty was far beyond the understanding of the Viennese aristocracy. And so with Sung landscape painting. Its immediate content evaded the famines and grinding toil that were the experience of the masses; the dream-soaked vision of the painters for whom "the boundaries between the seen and the unseen universe melted away in paintings which reflected the beauty of the boundless through a few strokes of the writing brush,"(23) did not grapple with the hard business of building an economy in harmonious metabolism with nature. Yet its vision of the absolute beauty in nature, its sense of harmony of feeling and thought, expression and reception, and its rejection of a mechanistic universe structured by three dimensions of space and segmented time(24) - this is an experience finally compatible only with a society producing use-values, in which the forms of nature and of human creation and relationships between people are sacred(25). From the experience of Sung landscapists, sensibilities can be distilled of validity to the modern movement towards world socialism - no less in Maoist China than in the capitalist West. Here is yet another moment of the historical interaction between China and the West: the transition of Western Capitalism to Socialism must entail in certain crucial senses an orientalisation of western sensibilities.

PART V. NOTES AND REFERENCES

1.Weber probably did not know Marx´s work on China, since most of it is in the "Grundrisse" which was not published in Weber's lifetime.

2.This is argued by Marx, Weber and Wittfogel.

3.Reinhard Bendix: "Max Weber. An Intellectual Portrait", (1959).

4.Barrington Moore Jr.: "Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy", (1966).

5. Raymond Dawson: "Imperial China", (1972).

6. John T. Meskill: "An Introduction to Chinese Civilisation", (1973).

7. Ibid.

8.Raymond Dawson: op.cit.

9.Osvald Siren: "Chinese Painting", (1956).

10.Neo-Confucianism as a synthesis of Confucian and Taoist thought, had implications for science, politics and philosophy. For it "the nature of the universe is, in a sense, moral, not because there exists, somewhere outside space and time, a moral personal deity directing it all, but because the universe has the property.of bringing to birth moral values and moral behaviour , when that level of organisation has been reached at which it is possible that they should manifest themselves" Joseph Needham: "Science and Civilization in China"(1956). As a Neo-Confucian, Wang An-Shih thought government "should establish various systems to regulate the life of the people toward the realization of a moral society.... 'These regulatory systems... are institutions, primarily government institutions to control the bureaucrats and government-initiated institutions to mould the behavioural pattern of the people. Wang definitely looked upon the institutional or external control of man's moral life as being more effective if not more important, than moral self-cultivation, the personal or internal control of the individual,...although his ultimate goal was still the Confucian ideal of a moral society in which ethical values would

be fully realised. (James T.C. Liu: "Reform in Sung China", (1959))

Partly because of the conservative resistance of the ruling-class, and partly because Wang's pre-scientific understanding of social processes led to contradictory and unpredicted consequences ensuing from his policies, the Reforms failed and were fully repudiated after Wang's life-time. Nevertheless, they indicate a remarkable premature attempt at consciously directed social transformation along ethical - rational lines. The sense of the Tao being something not beyond human involvement, but something which, if understood, could be aligned with and made one with human intention, is the positive counterpart to the other Taoist tendency to turn away from society. It is also interesting (and surely significant) that Wang wrote poems in the Chan spirit:

| A stone bridge, a thatched cottage, a crooked ford;
Swiftly, swiftly the water flows between its two banks.
A bright sun, a warm breeze, the breath of the wheatfields;
This green shade and peaceful turf are better than the time of flower.

(Wang An-Shih: "Early Summer", trans. by Robert Kotewall and Norman L. Smith)
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Among Wang's reforms were the re-organization of state finance and taxation; state loans to farmers; the attempt to reduce corruption and to improve the standard of the bureaucracy through increasing the salaries of the lower echelons; introducing science and political theory into the state examination system; and the partaking of the state in manufacture and trade, transforming it from a parasitic role to an active one.

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11. Joseph Needham in "Mathematics and Science in China and the West" (Science and Society, vol.20, 1956) argues that Chinese science never attained an experimental-deductive orientation because there was nothing "to bring to fusion point the formerly separated disciplines of mathematics and nature-knowledge." It was the development of mercantile capitalism in the West that allowed the bringing together of the craftsman and the scholar, practical knowledge and mathematics. however, the synthesis embodied in Galileo entailed a mechanistic world-view, in a significant sense inferior to the Chinese organic and dialectical cosmology.

The step toward an experimental natural science in China could not be made; but the West having once achieved it, Chinese thought is better attuned to go beyond the atomistic mechanism of the Newtonian era, and into the unified cosmology of Marx and Einstein.

12.Thus, in Maoist praxis ethics and political effectiveness are inseparable. There is no question of the callous pragmatism summed up in the phrase: "the means are

justified by the ends."

13.This has ,to be qualified by noting that many of the Chan landscapists, especially in the Southern Sung period, were monks living simple lives in monasteries. That they were not greatly acclaimed or recognized by the official court art is evidenced in the fact that most of their paintings seem to have been taken to Japan by Zen Buddhists, who took their inspiration from the Southern School of Chan Buddhism rather than the "courtly" Northern school.

At the same time, the Chinese ruling-class is particularly paradoxical in that its thought (even the most orthodox) always concerned itself with ideas of the just social order, good rulers who care about the people, etc. Ernest Mandel in his chapter on “The Asiatic Mode of Production” (in “The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx”, (1971)) notes; "In the table of ruling classes known to history it is certainly the closest to the primitive functions of the "servants of the comunity" and the farthest from the bourgeoisie of today."

14. Arther Waley: "'An Introduction to the Study of Chinese Painting", (1923).

15. Michael Sullivan: "The Birth of Landscape Painting in China", (1962).

16. William Watson: “Style in the Arts of China”, (1974). The conscious ambiguity as to whether the power of nature experienced exists as such, or whether it is simply the human mind that invests nature with this power - a nature whose “reality” can never be known exactly - is a constant tension in English Romanticism also, especially in Wordsworth and Shelley.

17. Chu-Twing Li: "Chinese Art" in John T. Meskil1,op. cit.

18. Tu Fu: from "The Autumn Wastes", transl. by A.C. Graham (1965).

19.Joseph Needham; "Science and Civilisation in China", (1956).

20.Ibid.

21."It was when the Great Tao declined/That ’benevolence´ and ’righteousness´ arose," Lao Tzu, no.18.

22.Lao Tzu, transl. by R.B. Blakney, (1955). Quotations from nos. 5, 21 and 22.

23.Osvald Siren; op.cit.

24.See Part VI for a discussion of Chan Buddhist perceptions of the object, time and

space.

25.Thus in China as in the West it is possible to apply the Hegelian analysis (taken over and reformulated by Marx) which seeks to "illuminate historical contradictions by objectifying cultural symbols as alienated forms of free self-conscious life"...
(Trent Schroyer: "Toward a Critical Theory for Advanced Industrial Society" in "Recent Sociology: No.2" ed. Hans Peter Dreitzel, (1970)).

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PART VI

Transformative praxis and the politics of technology

According to Marxist theory a capitalist society is essentially an historically specific socio-economic formation in which a particular mode of production predominates. On the most abstract and general level this mode of production can be defined as one in which capital, concentrated as the privately owned property of a capitalist class, is continuously brought into relation with formally free labour, in such a way that surplus value is realised by capital when the goods labour produces are exchanged. From this surplus value, the capitalists replenish the raw materials and machinery etc. used up in production; the rest - profit - maintains the capitalists' standard of living and increases their capital which is constantly re-invested in new production. The contradictions inherent in this system (between classes and between the ever-developing forces of production and the social relations of production) constitute the dynamic whereby capitalist society transforms itself, and must eventually give rise to a new mode of production and social organization. Now, for Marxism, a society is both an objectively given social formation with a specific historical structure, and a number of individual human beings living in specific social relations and acting in the world according to conscious and unconscious motivations and beliefs(1). Men are born into historically created social relations and as such are ´bearers' of objective instances; they are also the active agents that act out and change a given economic system. That is, the Marxist analysis of society unites the objective and subjective: structure and consciousness are two faces of the same coin. Marx, if it needs to be said again, was not an ´economic determinist´. An economic system entails active human beings with specific formsof consciousness. The concept "mode of production" is an analytical abstraction from phenomenal reality - one which allows a scientific understanding of history. As such it cannot "cause" anything - it is the essential reality of a particular society, in terms of which the whole life of the society is intelligible. Implicit in Marx is the understanding of any society as an infinitely complex, dynamic "totality"; the analytical abstractions - means of production, relations of production, and consciousness - allow the understanding of historical change as occurring through the continual dialectical interaction between them(2). (On the subjective level this process is that of historically created human beings coping with contradictions and new experience through innovation - in technologies, institutions, and ideas.) But each term implies the other. No one is the ´final cause´ - such an idea is ultimately a theology" (3); the statement that the economic system is in the "last analysis" the primary factor merely means that socio-historical understanding must always return to it.

Thus, the transformation and eventual supercedence of capitalism is simultaneously the result of the contradictions operating in the system and the actions of the human beings making up the system. One is not the reflection or cause of the other; one is the other. Marx's thought about Capitalism was largely concerned with understanding how the self-conscious action of the proletariat might he inter-related with the political- economic analysis of the workings of the capitalist system.

The various contemporary social theories and the debates between them can be seen as extensions of the fundamentally irreconcilable debate between Marxian and Weberian analytical perspectives. For Weber, the process of "rationalization" - the bureaucratisation of power and administration, the specialization of productive tasks, intellectual faculties etc., - though initiated through the rise of capitalism in Western Europe, becomes the untranscendable form of social organization not only in the West but in all parts of the world that undergo industrialization. The two 19th C thinkers whose significance, according to Weber, would pervade the history of the 20th C were Marx and Nietzche. The first laid down the basis of a rational comprehension of history, of a human self-consciousness of what society had become and why. The second faced the reality of the "modern world" with a stoical, justified pessimism. The suffocating, fragmented existence created by capitalism (and implicitly any kind of society brought about through capitalism and industry making of the world henceforth a single, global history) could be transcended only by the individual, and only by certain, "special" individuals. Through art, through religion, or through philosophy individuals may enter into a deep connection with their experience, may arrive at profound understandings of self, society, and nature. But never will such understanding become fused with actual activity in society; never will aesthetic knowledge be united with political action; never will theoretical understanding reciprocate with self-directed historical transformation.

Most 20th C art and philosophy in the West has reflected this perspective. From Kafka to T.S. Eliot the world is experienced as untransformable, even though the individual may attain (and even this is unsure in Kafka) a mysterious and tremendous salvation which is the utter negation of society and history. The counterpart to this experience is the understanding of world industrialization as a single modernization process, in which traditional agricultural societies are turned into inexorably similar forms of rationalized, atomized, automated, hierarchical, urbanized, industrial societies. National variations remain, whilst cultural "pursuits" allow an ever-increasing development of privatised individualizations, but the real process of history is in the economic-technical development of ever more efficient means of organizing technological production. Hence the theories of "convergence" of industrial societies, of the emergence of a global technocracy, and of the end of ideology holding real meaning in social, economic, and political development.

For Marxism however, the alienated forms that social production, technological development, and much human experience take on under Capitalism, are aspects of that concrete form of society which emerged first from the self-transformation of Western European Feudalism. The development of Capitalism, first in Western Europe and then elsewhere turns history for the first time into a single inseparable world history. Yet there never was a single world capitalist system, for Third World "socialist" revolutions were engendered by the contradictions of international

Capitalism at the fringes of expanding Capitalism; revolutions which have been followed by a variety of types of noncapitalist industrializations.These industrialisations have been shaped by their locations within the context of world capitalism; modern history is the contradictory history of Capitalism even though Capital as such never thrust through to every corner of the earth. Different patterns of industrialization are not to be conceived of as so many national variants of a single "modernization" process whose final form is untranscendable. Rather, industrialisation within the capitalist mode of production has taken on a variety of forms, characterized either by the domination of a liberal bourgeoisie, or by the preservation of an aristocratic-military state aligned with a weak bourgeoisie, whilst Soviet industrialization took place under State direction and control, through a planned economy enacted by a subject population. The similarity of forms between western Capitalism and the Soviet Union are due not to "convergence" but to the Soviet Union's failure to develop a truly reflexive, self-transformative "socialist" industrialisation as the first, and also a "backward" nation, attempting to close its borders to Capital.

China in attempting a "socialist" industrialization started, like the U.S.S.R. from an essentially pre-capitalist mode of production (Russian Feudalism in the first case, the Asiatic mode of production in the second) partially penetrated by Western Imperialism and Capital. Self-transformative development, i.e. development through the collective ownership and control of the means of production and surplus labour, has been a partial reality in China, though certainly not "pure", i.e. a state stands partially over and above the masses, as is inevitable in circumstances of "socialism in single countries" within world Capitalism. This has been possible because l) China was able to learn from the experience of Soviet industrialisation under the Bolsheviks, which has also swhed further light on the real nature of Capitalism, 2) because, as an ally of the Soviet Union at first, the Chinese had less reason to fear imperialist intervention in the years immediately following the Revolution (and was able to benefit from Soviet technological assistance), and 3) because the structure of pre-revolutionary society was less antithetical to socialist construction in China than in the U.S.S.R. In particular, after the expropriation of the landlords there was no capitalistic "kulak" class in China to match that in Russia; whilst traditional Chinese culture was in many ways more adaptable to Marxism than was Orthordox Russian culture.

Thus instead of N.E.P. and Forced Collectivization, in China we have the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Instead of a proletarian state organising the proletarianization of the peasant majority, (the ambiguous situation which the Bolsheviks found themselves in and were unable to adjust to when the expected revolution in Europe did not occur), the Chinese revolution has seen itself as an essentially national peasant revolution.(4) Though, like the USSR, socialist construction began with a technologically backward, overwhelmingly peasant

society, the industrialization process in China is perhaps more different from the USSR and the West than the latter are from each other. Whereas the Soviet economy can be largely comprehended through the categories of bourgeois economics,(5) the Chinese system cannot. It becomes indeed the practical critique of Weberian thought, proving that technological development does not inevitably determine certain forms of social organization; showing that technology has an apparently determining effect only within given social relations of production. The type and immediate context of any technological innovation are themselves functions of the total societal organization within which a specific technology has been evolved. (Cf. the limited, ideological nature of such managerial sociology as that of Bechhofer,(6) Joan Woodward(7) etc., who theorize in vacuum about technologies determining shop-floor behaviour).

The Chinese experience is the practical counterpart to the neo-Marxist critique of technocratic ideology (in Marcuse, Habermas, Chomsky, Tourraine, etc.), through which technology itself is seen as legitimating, even necessitating existing relations of production as did the "free market" according to "laissez-faire" ideology. The theory of Galbraith, for example, according to whom Knowledge has become the major factor in production in western societies, surpassing Capital, such that the holders of such knowledge become the major power-holders – not only fails to see that holders of knowledge are beholden to those who can buy their skills (Capital), or control them (the State), but that the knowledge itself is not neutral as it is framed in its totality within capitalist society's interests, definitions, theories, etc. Thus it is not simply that science under Capitalism is directed towards specific types of research rather than others, but that the very nature of the enterprise called science, and the theoretical cosmology within which scientific "facts" exist, is totally bound up with the historical reality of capitalist society, as was Christian theology under Feudalism. Technocratic ideologies (Western and Soviet) implicitly deny that knowledge always exists within historically locateable, constantly changing theory: experiments, facts etc. exist in relation to concepts. The same apparent experiment can prove two totally different theories; viz. the weighing of chemicals before and after a chemical reaction proved the law of conservation of mass in the 19th C whilst with more sensitive instruments it now proves the law of conservation of energy, since Einstein has arrived at e = mc2 through mathematics.

It has been the great tragedy for humanity that socialist revolution has not yet come about in western capitalist society, in spite of a century of depressions and wars.(8) Socialist constructions outside the West have struggled to effect social reorganizations that simultaneously transcend Capitalism and attempt to appropriate the historical gains of Capitalism, in the face of continuous threat of submergence and encirclement - through war, the market, and capitalist ideology. The complex, contradictory nature of the contemporary world is viewed through Weberian eyes as illustrating the Utopian nature of Marxist thought. Very effectively the forms of

advanced capitalism and the semi-socialist non-western societies can appear to bear out the inevitability of alienated society, the untranscendable nature of the historically specific, concrete forms of Capitalism. And yet, no matter how advanced Capitalism is presented as a "pluralist democracy", a “mixed economy", the contradictions within it bring about the consequences that Marxist analysis alone can comprehend. No matter how "Communism" is made to appear the evil threat to "democracy" and the cause of all its problems, the tempo of Marxist-inspired world revolution gathers height. No matter how Capitalism presents itself as the "end of history”, the reaction against it increases on all levels, without necessarily being accompanied by political consciousness. If, under Capitalisn, both mental and physical labour is commodity, such that all skills, capacities, and personality tend to be forced into a homogeneous, externally defined normality, so that the individual becomes an appendage of his saleable capacity, so existence within Capitalism strains more and more for authenticity, for work in which co-operation between unique personalities creatively makes use-values or explores ideas and feelings beyond the prescriptions sanctioned by dominant ideologies; even though such straining is threatened with insecurity and anxiety, driving the sane to become insane, the "normal" to appear "abnormal". Even though the fragmentation of art from politics, feeling from practice, the divorce of individual salvation from human history appear realistic responses to “the world”, yet in actuality they are ever more irrational and self-denying of history, the struggling development of human capacities for cooperation in the processes of reproduction of life and for self-affirmation in inter-human relations and work, the identification of the entire self with the active-historical process of transformation and the real possibility of transcendence of alienation - all within a felt closeness to the total process of nature - are the only orientations beholden both to intellectual analysis and life-affirming experience.

Marxism appears to non-Marxist approaches as the imposition of a dogmatic interpretation upon "reality". Empiricism in particular completely evades all issues of epistemology and the nature of knowledge. Resting upon an extraordinarily naive notion of science, it imagines that "facts speak for themselves", rather than that one or another theoretical slant always points up some "facts" rather than others. Thus, in modern physics, theory sets up an experiment in the light of the working theory; parameters are narrowed down in order to comprehend processes in constrained circumstances. Science is never the collation of "facts" from "reality", free of theoretical presuppositions guiding the observation and selection. Knowledge always progresses through a continuous dialectical relation between theoretical abstraction and concrete observation. Indeed empiricism does impose a theory upon the "reality” it observes (as also do approaches guided by an imagined, plurality of outlooks), even though its theory is implicit and unscrutinized. In actuality, a specific though unformulated theory informs empiricist investigations, causing certain aspects of "reality” rather than others to be seen as “facts”. These facts

necessitate the broadening of the implicit theory, etc. etc. in a continuous reflexive process which is, however, distorted because unconscious. It is simply that empiricist theory is bad theory, being unable to conceive dynamic relations between phenomena and the total historical context within which phenomena develop. The voluminous literature on the "Affluent Worker" and related issues, is an example of empiricism resting essentially upon a peculiar reading of Weber, being unable to focus on phenomena within a total dynamic context and thereby make sense of them. It does not perceive that what appear "measurable", "testable", and "provable" etc. are "facts" which are created through a conceptual framework which is in actuality a reflection of a dominant ideology of Capitalism in expansion, i.e. in relation to the question: "is the new working class becoming "embourgeoised", "is there an increasing "equality" or "mobility" in "modern society"? Since ideological perspectives are unperceived - given a reading of science as neutral and objective - "facts" appear to strike the eye due to neutral qualities rather than due to ideological predispositions.

Instead of comprehending dynamic changes in sections of the working class within post-war capitalist expansion (during which process poverty was also re-created) empiricist sociology can only echo an ideology of advanced capitalism. Even when the researcher personally holds "radical" views about inequality, the monotony of manual jobs etc., the implicit though inconsistent underlying theoretical perspective is that of Western society seen as a "democratic pluralism". It is the multiplicity of superficial conflicting interests and behaviours that appear ´real´, rather than the underlying historical processes - the dominant contradictions between Labour and Capital which are expressed in a complex, ever-changing multiplicity of forms. Nationalism, intra-class conflict etc. cannot be seen by Weberians or empiricists as distorted manifestations in consciousness of a deeper contradiction.

Thus Ralph Dahrendorf's "pluralist society" (as in "Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society" (1959)) bases itself on a Weberian analysis of phenomena.(9) Marxism is dismissed as a dogma bearing no relation to western industrial society. The vision which Dahrendorf erects of "modern society" is a return to Hegel's metaphysical political economy: the modern State is the incarnation of Democracy. How it emerged, or when, from bad old capitalist society is a mystery; it is certain however that no further fundamental transformations can occur within this pluralism of interest groups - other than a collapse into "totalitarianism".

The association of workers in Trades Unions to further economistic interests within a society whose whole form is determined by Capital, becomes a phenomenal group of individuals furthering their "interests" (structured by what?) in ways analogous to those of the capitalists. The institutionalised conflict between the capitalist state and private corporations is seen to be evidence of a "mixed economy", of the coexistence of socialist and capitalist systems of production. The historical emergence of a new

type of state within advanced capitalism, which mediates investment of Capital (e.g. in State Housing which uses loans from private Finance, and is built by private building companies) and which attempts to stave off slumps by consciously stimulating production or demand (even though such policies may be negatively reacted to in the immediate by private enterprise), and which provides for Capitalism social services, appropriate education, etc. maintains an appropriate labour force and instutionalizes forms of social control which private enterprise can no longer maintain on its own - this cannot be understood without an historical analysis of Capitalism which does not confuse it with one particular, concrete form it takes on (e.g. 19th C "laissez-faire" liberalism).(10) The vision of society arrived at by Dahrendorf (as also by Talcott Parsons) is no more than an arm-chair dream, and a superb dogma.

It is remarkable how much of contemporary "scholarship" can be seen as an attempt to avoid the implications of Marxism - which latter is crudely understood of course. Take for example the ideas of Ernst Gombrich, considered one of the top cultural historians in Britain. Talking about structural analyses of cultural forms he says: “I believe that the patterns they describe for us are also partly a product of their own abstractions.”(11) Whereas presumably, Gombrich´s method is not based upon theoretical abstractions but, like empiricism, merely looks for things "as they are". Gombrich is evidently unaware that all knowledge is "in the mind”, and that science simply seeks at any time and place to develop the most adequate possible framework of explanation. Later in the same discussion, Gombrich protests against “patterns which explain everything through race or through society, through the processes of production...." Rather, he argues, cultural tendencies are like the turbulence caused by currents of water in a narrow tube: "You cannot map out in advance how exactly the currents of water…will flow. And the same is probably true of the movements of the mind.” For Gombrich therefore one must either see structural interpretations as mechanical determinisms, or we must concede absolute freedom for the spirit. That the conceptual elucidation of complex inter-relations between different aspects of human experience and activity is neither one nor the other, he cannot grasp. He does not see that because a future historical development cannot be exactly predicted one does not have to deny that the processes involved can be rendered intelligible, either in hydrodynamics or society. For Gombrich, as for Karl Popper, there is either positivistic science, which must predict specific "effects" resulting from any constellation of "causes”, or else history is "open”, i.e. random.

It must be conceded, as has been noted already, that much "Marxism" has confused the abstraction from concrete reality in such a way as to result in simultaneously a metaphysical and a determinist theory. For true Marxism, the history of a real society is a concrete, self-transforming, specific reality; an infinitely complex, always unique, dynamic totality. The concept "relations of production" is an abstraction from real history. It is a "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" in

Whitehead's terms to conceive of the same "relations of production" as existing as a concrete entity in two societies, or in one society at different points of time, i.e..as the same element occurring in two different patterns. Later in this chapter it is argued that this epistemological error took the form of Bolshevik ideology, wherein the "productive forces" are seen as neutral things which must be developed; wherein the laying down of a "socialist economic base" becomes reified, and therefore something the state does, not the entire self-conscious, active society. Rather, concrete reality at any time is made up of infinite types of society, how many depending on the level of analysis. The abstract analysis of e.g. Capitalism must always return to concrete societies. The recognition of the nature cf dialectical analysis makes reifications and determinisms impossible, and of course excludes all notions of pan-historical stages etc, cf. Gordon Childe's remark in "Social Evolution" "evolution and differentiation go hand in hand".

The Marxian mode of analysis allows an understanding of the historical process within which it itself develops in a manner that is more adequate than other modes of analysis; guided by it human action in any society can align itself so as to optimally direct that society's movement and therefore, through complex mediations, the entire world toward global society controlled by self-conscious human agents. The self-transforming dynamic structure of western capitalist society - now predominantly unconscious of its self-directed movement - generates within itself oppositional tendencies unpredictably within different sections of its subject population; in their piecemeal assimilation, accomplished through the system's cyberrntic-like feedback responses(12) oppositions are separately neutralized, yet cumulatively they are partially responsible for the transformation of the system of domination, though not in ways that can be predicted in advance. Real, historically self-conscious collective action is a possibility of the future, as also is world conflict between nation-states, either between the West and the non-capitalist world, or between rival national capitals in the face of ever-growing pressure on Capital's realization of profits. For the former possibility, an historically unprecedented mass consciousness must emerge: on a level which was not essential in e.g. the Chinese Revolution where the masses could engage in organized, but

only partially conscious struggle under the conscious direction of a minority. The nature of Western Capitalism is one in which transference of power will have to be accompanied by deep, mass consciousness(13), because all pre-existing administrative institutions etc. would not be destroyed through revolution and the individuals making them up would have to concur with socialist policies and be consciously orientated toward abolishing Capitalism, because the struggle would be unlikely to be a basic one for food and shelter, and because of the totally interwoven, interdependent nature of urban industrial Capitalism, which would tend to perpetuate its forms even under a revolutionary government, were mass analytical awareness and emotional conviction not highly evolved.

For Marxism, objective knowledge which arises in contradictory forms within the capitalist epoch, is at one and the same time knowledge orientated towards the ever-growing emancipation of the human race. Thus it is knowledge not only for the 'working class' as it presently exists but for the creation of a society of full human beings. The investigation of reality as it "is" and as it "ought" to be can for the first time in human history be united: ethics and science are related aspects of one synthesis - human knowledge.

Objective knowledge is not absolute knowledge; it is the best glimpse of it which is possible in a particular historical context. Objective knowledge with respect to a specific historical context is antithetical to the systems of belief which dominate the epoch and which serve to maintain the existinr human order.(14) Galileo was as ; arxism has been up till the present day; suppressed; ignored or Distorted, /both in v/estern capitalist society and in countries purportedly ordered according to Marxist ideas/- hven in China ths existing level of social development has been seen by Mao as sometimes requiring deliberate distortion of Marxism in order for it to be applicable to the consciousness attained by the people.(15)

Marxism as a universal system of understanding has not yet come into being for more than a relative handful of people in the world. Yet unless (as in all these considerations) the human race blows itself off the face of the earth before enough time has elapsed, Marxism must surely prevail, just as Galileo did in his time and Einstein in his. For it is not only a question of a moral persuasion; human beings whether ignorant of Marx or not are going to struggle against inequality, unemployment, and all features of a capitalist organization of humanity, or any other kind that perpetuates such features until they are eliminated. Marxism, because it is

capable of enlargement and interrnal self-transformation, could guide human behaviour towards the creation of a society of equality, full employment, one in which war would be a laughable idiocy of the past, etc. - even if it were forgotten that Marx laid the basis of this knowledge! There will be contradiction and disagreement about means to attain the obvious ends of human progress, until conditions have allowed a universal objective understanding of social and economic principles. But thought, as a moment of human praxis, will always be in continuous transformation, never a completed body of ideas. As agreement over basic principles of social self-determination grew, new polemics and controversy would arise on their deeper meanings.

Numerous arguments are raised against this. There will always be greed, competitiveness, envy, it is asserted. Yet does not psychology and anthropology teach us all the time about the circumstances of up-bringing which draw out these characteristics? Would not continued experimentation allow us to evolve a full, human self not in conflict with a full, human society? There is no universally accepted definition of what Utopia would be, say others. But I consider it plainly true that from Buddha and Jesus Christ, to Kant and Beethoven, and in Romanticism, Taoism, Surrealism and Marxism - which I have discussed in these studios - the essential yearning has been for an harmonious society in which equal yet unique, fully developed creative beings live maximally happy and fruitful lives. Oppositions to this Utopian image are surely related to ignorance or psychological ill-health.

Objective reason is not mere calculating, analytic rationality. It is a synthesis of the most profound intellectual understanding, the deepest feelings and the enlightenment of the soul. The interpretation of history and society lies within some larger cosmology; as in every period of human history, the ethics, morality and ends of individual lives must be seen in relation to views about Man and the wider interpretation of the Universe. I have tried to show that in Romanticism, Marxism, and Taoism the kernels of such a cosmology are to be found - arising within capitalism (or coming to it from outside as highly relevant to it). The historical shift from capitalism to socialism will be accompanied by the growth of a cosmology which overcomes the split between positivist, mechanical materialism and theological idealism. Dialectical understanding sees ultimate reality as a Unity: Matter is Divinity. Just as Nature is One for Taoism and Romanticism,(16) modern physics shows that 19th C Materialism is meaningless - God <u>is</u> the Universe. It is a unity which is Energy (in the sense of e = mc2 , and in the sense intended by William Blake). It is timeless and ultimate, beyond Good or Evil, without cause or end (as far as we can know). However, in the forms of Becoming which are habitated by man, there are dualities, conflicts, happening in "time". As human beings move from the enslavement of time in urban capitalist society, they will live more in contact with Being: understood through Einsteinian physics, or Buddhist

and Taoist meditation, or through the Romantics' "Imagination". As they move from an experience dominated by the object as a commodity, an exchange-value - they will cease to be tyrannized by the surface utilitarian perception of things located in specific time and space, as in Newtonian physics. Perception will probe below the surface of things which are use-values, things made by free human labour (as genuine artists have long intended their works to be - for themselves, and for all human beings); so also will be the deep perception of phenomena in a Nature harmoniously interacted with by conscious human beings. The essence of things will be known and felt in a full, direct relationship to them.(17)

The misunderstandings of various kinds which Marxism has met with over the last century are due most essentially to the inability to grasp dialectical thought. Dialectical thought looks at reality as process and change through infinite interaction in an infinitely complex totality. Concepts are arbitrarily bounded images which never relate exactiy to any given "fact" or "thing". The concepts used in dialectical thought are those analytical abstractions which at a given place and time are most adequate to understanding the processes of reality. Criticisms of Marx have always rested upon the error of forcing dialectical ideas into positivist, mechanical materialist frameworks; his concepts have been criticized for not fitting in a one-to-one fashion to reality, or for not allowing "predictions" in a positivistic sense. The most significant example of the misunderstanding of Marx is in Max Weber´s scientific work - the analysis of the dialectical inter-dependences between systems of belief, economic practises, and political organizations in dynamic social formations is substantially Marxist, though Weber considered it a refutation of Marx. Only in his attempt to isolate belief systems and political systems does he lapse slightly into positivist explanations; for example in the "Protestant Ethic" he tends sometimes to see his analytical abstractions ("ideal types") as reified "things" existing in cause and effect relationships rather than in infinite dialectical contextual relationships (of which the 'elements' exist only for the level of analysis being applied, disappearing on more detailed levels where a new multiplicity of component ´elements´ are found in dynamic interaction). And in his work on China there is a tendency to view Confucianism as a force acting in isolation, in place of an understanding of ideas existing within political, cultural and economic structures. Thus to contrast Puritanism with Confucianism in isolation is to ignore context; Confucianism was a belief system within a ruling class for whom technological and economic innovation was undesirable - it was both structured by and allowed the acting out of particular social reality, the structure of which depends on no single "final cause".

Where Weber analyses modern capitalism, he becomes completely undialectical. The splitting up of "economic", "political" and "military" power completely distorts the nature of a social formation, in which differential power exists between classes by virtue of differential relations to the means of production - exercised through

political, military and other systems. Like Karl Popper, he forces Marx into a positivist determinist on the one hand and a prophet on the other. He then becomes the very thing he criticizes himself: a technological determinist with respect to the future of "industrial society" and a moral "subjectivist" in the actions he recommends to individual human beings.

Most modern ideologies and obscurities in social thought ostensibly stem from Weber, no matter how much based upon limited understanding of his thought. First: the positivist attempt to establish one-to-one causal relationships between "phenomena[11] in society, and the quest to construct ahistorical "laws'. Second; the implicit technological determinism in theses about the convergence of industrial societies and hence the end of human history as dialectical process. Third: the replacement of science as that pursuit which makes reality intelligible through concepts such as mode of production, with the pre-occupation with phenomenal organization. Changes in the nature of the social groups within a changing, modern capitalism: separation of ownership from management, the emergence of the "affluent worker" etc. become the major realities to be considered. And lastly, the huge and ridiculous theoretical edifice constructed by Weber in order to protect a "value-free" science. The problem of science and ethics is dealt with only satisfactorily by Marxism. Human history is natural; as soon as man became conscious; history began within a human genetic structure already laid down a million years ago. The possibility of comnmnication and transmission of knowledge (which means simultaneously the use of tools - ideas being symbolic tools), laid the basis of a process in which constant innovation would arise out of contradictory human situations, themselves brought about by men's actions. A particular society in any time or place is the product of its historical development: empiricism and positivism project a distorted reflection of the needs, consciousness, experience and behaviour of human beings in a particular historical instant in terms of value-free, absolutes. The study of the processes of human society is inevitably the study of changing ethical ideas, ideas with which the investigator is necessarily involved. The study of a particular society is the study of history in action. It cannot be separated from "normative" considerations, because all systems' of ideas are linked to the historical interests, and intentions .of social classes and the socio-economic systems which appear necessary to them.

Instead of dialectical thought - the scientific mode of analysis for our historical context - Weberians prefer 19th C positivism or empiricism. They do not seem to understand that even physical sciences have moved, from positivist to dialectical forms of knowledge. Einstein's physics is the study of process, not of static, isolated relations of cause and effect. "Models" used in modern physics are well understood as being abstractions useful for visualizing processes; nuclear physicists no longer work with reified concepts in a simplistic empiricism. Rather than work within a unified science of the cosmos and human history which is in the procsss of being

born, social scientists hang on to ghosts in the machine: abstract ahistorical laws, determinisms of one sort or another. "Marxists" themselves cannot climb out of positivist frameworks: Althusser clings on to ''infrastructures" determining "superstructures" which have a "degree of autonomy". China is fortunate in having a cultural tradition, a cosmology in Taoism, which has long realised reality (both human and cosmic) to be dynamic, interactional process - concepts about which are humanly created abstractions, static representations of movement. Hence the capacity for Maoism to grasp dialectics, to view society as changing itself, to transcend the positivism and manipulative utilitarianism of capitalism and the Soviet state.

In this study, I have tried to show that a new world science is emerging - dialectical science - which will re-synthesise the physical and human sciences, philosophy, cosmology, and aesthetic or intuitive "knowledge". In the west, a major tendency toward dialectical understanding is to be found in Romanticism, especially in Shelley. For him the Imagination grasped the movement of reality, the unity of analytical and ethical knowledge. In his terms, he had discovered Truth in a very real sense.

Just as there were "flat-earthers" living for a long time into the modern era of western society, so the old notions from positivism and dualistic(18) theologies etc. struggle to live on in our time. But unless the consequences of this historical epoch's thought and experience annihilate the human race - through nuclear explosion, radiation, pollution, starvation, or other ecological upsets of the planet, the new knowledge will prevail.

PART VII

Consciousness, nature and becoming

Revolutionary praxis rests upon the elucidation and understanding of the contradictions inherent in capitalist society, accompanied by and inter-related with action which uses this knowledge to further the revolutionary movement towards a "socialist" society.(1) There is a tendency in certain forms of Marxism to conceive the appearance of a revolutionary situation as no more than the effect of "objective laws" bearing on the forces and social relations of production. The ideas and orientations of emotion and sensibility of the human beings involved in the transformation of society are then no more than mechanical reflections of the objective economic factors - if they are accepted as existing at all. Here it is proposed that tendencies in ideological orientation and the more intangible aspects of human experience - emotional and ethical "orientations of being", necessitate analysis in their own right and in their inter-relationships with economic realities. From the four centuries in which Capitalism has existed in the West we should be able to elucidate those tendencies in thought and sensibility which are "progressive", i.e. consciously or unconsciously orientated toward the supercedence of Capitalism and its replacement by an emancipated society. We should be able to elucidate those collective tendencies in contemporary thought and feeling which are similarly disposed, and attempt to synthesize an emancipatory orientation - intellectual and aesthetic - of relevance to the present historical situation. This section is a faltering attempt to do that.(2)

The "emancipatory orientation" I am attempting to construct takes its form from the convergence of several cultural tendencies - a convergence which seems significant to me in my historical context. My "synthesis" therefore relates to my circumstance just as the cultural orientations I am drawing on relate to their social origins. The orientations I am considering - structures of feeling, thought and cosmic interpretation - are certain elements of the Romantic Aesthetic born of England and Germany in the period 1780- 1830, Marxism (19th C and contemporary), Taoism and Zen Buddhism (which are evidently finding a place in certain segments of contemporary western society), and certain tendencies in post-naturalistic western painting and post-Newtonian physics.

The importance of the Romantic Aesthetic can be led into via Marcuse's discussion of the revolutionary significance of art :

" .. .it is...the catastrophic element inherent in the conflict between man's essence and his existence that has been the centre toward which art has gravitated since its secession from ritual. The artistic images have preserved the determinate negation of the established reality - ultimate freedom." (3)

Art is the process by which form and beauty are moulded from passion and instinct, from ugliness and chaos in the experience of individuals and in society as a whole, and in which hope and optimism triumph, however painfully, over despair and suffering. Ernst Cassirer writes:

"By tragic poetry the soul acquires a new attitude toward its emotions. The soul experiences the emotions of pity and fear, but instead cf being disturbed and disquieted by them it is brought to a state of rest and peace.... We live through all our passions feeling their full range and highest tension... But the tragic poet is not the slave but the master of his emotions.

"To give aesthetic form to our passions is to transform them into a free and active state. In the work of. the artist the power of passion itself has been made a formative power." (4)

But then Cassirer identifies himself with the bourgeois with the bourgeois withdrawal of Art from Life in the following statement:

"…art turns all these pains and outrages, these cruelties and atrocities, into a means of self-liberation, thus giving us an inner freedorn which cannot be attained in any other way."

This is the tendency described by Marcuse:

"The great artist may capture all the pain, horror, all the sorrow and despair of reality - all this becomes beautiful, even gratifying by the grace of the artistic form itself....art keeps alive the pain and horror and the despair, keeps them alive as beautiful, satisfying for eternity. Thus a catharsis, a purification really occurs in art which pacifies the fury of rebellion and indictment and which turns the negative into the affirmative...stored in the great treasure house of culture which will go underground in times of war to come up again when the slaughter is over." (5)

But Marcuse also describes a genuine revolutionary aesthetics, which follows from the first part of the quotation from Cassirer but opposes the second:

"Has the time come for uniting the aesthetic and the political dimension, preparing the ground in thought and action for making a society a work of art?... In the very

complete sense of a controlled experimentation with nature and society in order to give nature and society their aesthetic Form, that is to say the Forrn of a pacified and harmonious universe?...Art...could free the perception and sensibility needed for the transformation. ...Is beauty perhaps meant to be the sensuous medium for a truth otherwise and still unaccomplished; namely that harmony between man and nature, matter and spirit, freedom and pleasure, which indeed would be the end of the prehistory of man? Hegel in his "Philosophy of Fine Art" has a vision of a state of the world in which unorganic as well as organic nature, things and men partake of a rational organisation of life, in which aggression has come to rest in the harmony between the general and the particular. Is this not also the vision of a society as a work of art, the historical realization of art?"(6)

Shelley also had a conception of poetry as a revolutionary force in society:

"….what is called poetry in a restricted sense, has a common source with all other forms of order and of beauty according to which the materials of human life are susceptible of being arranged, and which is poetry in a universal sense."(7)

What does it mean to claim that poetry is a force in the emancipation of society? In the first place it is the imagination which is the impulse counteracting the tyranny of reason in capitalist society:

"The discipline of aesthetics installs the order of sensuousness as against the order of reason... .Operating through....the play impulse the aesthetic function would ’abolish compulsion, and place man, both morally and physically, in freedom.´ It would harmonize the feelings and affections with the ideas of reason, deprive the ’laws of reason of their moral compulsion', and 'reconcile them with the interest of the senses.´" (8)

It is the absence of imagination in the mode of social organization which allows 'technical reason' to follow the dictates of a particular economic rationality, mechanical routine and political pragmatism; the consideration of human happiness and freedom is banished. Shelley had the same insights about Capitalism 150 years ago; the following is an extraordinary indictment of class society, division of labour and mechanization of industry:

"We have more moral, political and historical wisdom that we know how to reduce into practise; we have more scientific and economical knowledge than can be accommodated to the just distribution of the produce which it multiplies. 'The poetry in these systems of thought is concealed by the accumulation of facts and calculating processes. There is no want of knowledge respecting what is wisest and best in morals, government, and political economy, or at least what is wiser and better than what men now practise and endure.... We want the creative faculty to imagine that

which we know: we want the generous impulse to act that which we imagine; we want the poetry of life; our calculations have outrun conception; we have eaten more than we can digest. The cultivation of those sciences v/hich have enlarged the limits of the empire cf man over the external world, has, for want of the poetical faculty proportionally circumscribed those of the alternal world; and man, having enslaved the elements, remains himself a slave. To what but a cultivation of the technical arts in a degree disproportioned to the' presence of the creative faculty, which is the basis of all knowledge, is to be attributed the abuse of all invention for abridging and combining labour, to the exasperation of the inequality of mankind? From what other cause has it arisen that the discoveries which should have lightened, have added a weight to the curse imposed on Adam?" (9)

It is the imagination that emancipates society; it is poetry which pervades the structure of free institutions. And it is aesthetic perception, artistic creation as a mode of being and acting, which links art to a free society. The process of revolutionary transformation has been termed "imaginaction" by Alfred Willener.(10) This conveys the idea of progressive re-synthesis of world-view, the breaking down of old images of society to form newer ones which entail the practise of imaginative possibilities leading to socio-economic emancipation. Such a process relies on the communication of newly-formed images of the social situation from one group to another group which is able to apply this to its own experience, and then extend it.

The same conception lies behind Paulo Freire's idea of an emancipatory literacy education in the Third World, in contrast to the parcelling-out of pre-defined "knowledge" inherent in oppressive education:

"Learning to read and write ought to be an opportunity for men to know what speaking the word really means; a human act implying reflection and action. As such it is a primordial human right and not the privilege of a few...Speaking the word is not a true act if it is not at the same time associated with the right of self-expression and world-expression, of creating and re-creating, of deciding and choosing and ultimately participating in society's historical process.

"In the culture of silence the masses are "mute", that is, they are prohibited from creatively taking part in the transformation of their society and therefore prohibited from being. Even if they can occasionally read and write because they were 'taught[1] in humanitarian - but not humanist - literacy campaigns, they are nevertheless alienated from the power responsible for their silence." (11)

Society is made up of individuals. A free society is one in which each and every one of its individuals is free, having the absolute dignity of a unique human being. Inferior or superior status should he inconceivable, for no-one is comparable to

another person; he is complete, incomparable, answerable only to his own existence. When individuals experience themselves and are experienced as unique and incomparable, then there is equality. When everyone is whole, feeling existence and the cosmos as Joy, then there is freedom.

Society rests upon the labour of its individuals. If the organization of labour is repressive, the society is unfree. Now artistic creativity is the archetype of unalienated, autonomous, fulfilling labour. Inrt, the subject has a maximum of self-determination because of his carefully developed self-discipline:

"The Genius of Poetry must work out its own salvation in a man: it cannot be matured by law and precept, but by sensation and watchfulness in itself. That which is creative must create itself." 12

"The work of true genius dares want its appropriate form, neither indeed is there any danger of this. As it must not, so genius cannot, be lawless; for it is even this that constitutes its genius - the power of acting creatively under laws of its own origination."(13)

The more Apollo reigns, the more Dionysius can dance. The more refined is an idividual´s or a society's intellectual and ethical control, the more free play can be granted to non-rational, spontaneous inclination:

"The order of beauty results from the order which governs the play of imagination. This double order is in conformity with laws, but laws that are themselves free: they are not superimposed and they do not enforce the attainment cf specific ends and purposes; they are the pure form of existence itself. The aesthetic 'conformity to law´ links Nature and Freedom, Pleasure and Morality."14

The existence of every human being could be creative and aesthetic in a way qualitatively the same as that of an artist; for as Dewey claimed, "art is a strain in experience rather than an entity in itself."(15) And:

"We do not have to travel to the ends of the earth nor return many millenia in time to find peoples for whom everything that intensified the sense of immediate living is an object of intense admiration.... Domestic utensils, furnishings of tent and house, rugs, mats, jars, pots, bows, spears, were wrought with such delighted care that today we hunt them out and give them places of honour in our art museums. Yet in their own time and place, such things were enhancements of the processes of everyday life. Instead of being elevated to a niche apart, they belonged to display of prowess, the manifestation of group and clan membership, worship of gods, feasting and fasting, fighting, hunting, and all the rhythmic crises that punctuate the stream of living.... Art was in them, for these activities conformed to the needs and

conditions of the most intense, most readily grasped and longest remembered experience. But they were more than just art, although the aesthetic strand was ubiquitous....

"The labour and employment problem of which we are so acutely aware (in capitalist society) cannot be solved by mere changes in wages, hours of work and sanitary conditions. No permanent solution is possible save in a radical social alteration, which effects the degree and kind of participation the worker has in the production and social disposition cf the v.'arss he produces. Only such a change will seriously modi *fy* the cor.t-r.t ayrerianoe i rrc v;hi ch creation of objects made i'cr use enters. .nd this modification cf the nature of experience is the finally determining element in the aesthetic quality of the experience of things produced. The idea that ths basic problem can be solved merely by increase of hours of leisure is absurd, Such an idea merely retains the old dualictic division between labour and leisure.....

The psychological conditions resulting from private control of the labour of other men for the sake of private gain, rather than any fixed - psychological or economic law, are the forces that -uppress and limit aesthetic quality in the experience that accompanies processes ojp production."

Thus it should be that creative, self-fulfilled individuals play in anarchic spontaneity; they would blend to make a harmony in a society having the Form of beauty and freedom. External restraint is not necessary where individuals act in accordance with a "spontaneity (which) promotes the susceptibility of the mind to moral feeling."(17) Such a spontaneity entails acting on the promptings of the "true self" rather than the "false self"(18) Selfishness of the first sort is healthy; it recognizes and values its own unique essence, and recognises but does not envy the uniqueness of others. SeIfishness of the second sort, however, entails greed and lust for power; strives for spiritual fulfillment, beauty and freedom for itself and therefore for all others. selfishness of the second sort, however, entails greed and lust for yov.'er; these, by their very nature deny wealth and power to others. The two kinds of self are seen by Shelley thus:

"Poetry, and the principle of Self of which money is the visible incarnation, are the God and mammon of the v/orld...

The cultivation of poetry is never more to be desired than at periods when, from an excess of the selfish and calculating principle, the accumulation of the materials of external life exceed the quantity of the power of assimilating them to the internal laws of human nature." 19

The "false self" is for Laing the conglomerate of social roles foisted onto the

individual. It is the 'normal´ state in our society, and is "the abdication of ecstasy, the betrayal of our true potentialities."(20) In as much as this entails the urge for self-aggrandisement$_s$ it is common to many individuals; the "true self" however is unique to the individual, though dedicated to supra-individual values; love, truth, beauty, freedom. The distinction between the values followed by the "true" and the "false" self is made by Shelley also:

"There are two kinds of pleasure, one durable, universal and permanent, the other transitory and particular...In the former sense, whatever strengthens and purifies the affections enlarges the imagination, and adds spirit to sense, is useful....(the latter is merely) that which banishes the importunity of the wants of our animal nature, the surrounding men with security of life,...and the conciliating such a degree of mutual forbearance among men as may consist with the motives of personal advantage." 21

This latter ´pleasure´ describes ¨progress¨ as it is understood within capitalist terms.

Artistic creation is the archetype of self-fulfilling being, in which all the diverse human faculties are integrated in the individual's interaction with the world (as in Marx´s notion of unalienated experience), on which he projects his unique, "true" self:

"There is initially a discrepancy between the inner world of personal perception and perception of the outer world....the disparity between the two produces a state of organigmic tension which can be reduced in at least one of two ways: either the person alters his personal world of perception (needs, judgements, etc.) to correspond with the external, social environment, or the person alters or reorganizes the environment congruent with his personal world, which may be a new organization. The former results in social conformity. The latter may result in creativity....the resulting reorganization (is)...unique or uncommon, and relevant as a new and workable solution to a problem." 22

Art is the Form of true communication. It speaks from one soul to another; it cannot lie. It erodes distinctions and privileges of inequality and hierarchy. An authentic artist makes his private experience, the reverberations of his soul, public and creates a new symbolism to offer new possibilities of experience to others:

"In the end, works of art are the only media of complete and unhindered communication between man and man that can occur in a world full of gulfs and walls that limit community of experience....

"Communication is the process of creating participation, of making common what had been isolated and singular; and part of the miracle it achieves is that, in being communicated, the conveyance of meaning gives body and definiteness to the

experience of the one who utters as well as to that of those who listen

“Expression strikes below the barriers that separate human beings from one another...art...is the most universal and freest form of communication...Art is the extension of the power of rites and ceremonies to unite men...art weds man and nature." 23

Art is the archetypal activity which holds life as an end in itself; there is no means-ends separation as in the calculating rationality governing technocratic society and alienated labour. Fulfilling labour would be akin to Coleridge’s description of reading poetry:

"The reader should be carried forward, not merely or chiefly by the mechanical impulse of curiosity, not by a restless desire to arrive at the final solution, but by the pleasurable activity of the journey itself." 24

The aesthetic orientation takes the whole of life - that of an individual and of society - as a totality, whereas within industrial capitalist society, according to Schiller:

“...enjoyment is separated from labour, the means from the end, exertion from recompense. Eternally fettered only to a single fragmont of the whole, man fashions himself only as a fragment; ever-hearing only the monotonous whirl of the wheel which he turns, he never develops the harmony of his being, and, instead of shaping the humanity that lies in his nature, he becomes a mere imprint of his occupation, his science.” 25

The happiness and fulfillment of individuals are the keys to a harmonious society; only when the true self is fulfilled can the false self - and greed and power - be forsaken. Despair, resentment and insecurity negate the potential concern for others in a person; to love others requires love of oneself and one's life. Social revolution depends upon widespread intellectual awareness - the attainment of "consciousness" in all its dimensions; this entails the transcendence of cynicism and the development of an elevated concern, a conviction, from which alone action can spring. To turn again to one of the greatest revolutionary poets:

"...nor is it for want of admirable doctrines that men hate, and despise, and censure, and deceive, and subjugate one another...The great secret of morals is love... A man, to he greatly good, must imagine intensely and comprehensively, he must put himself in the place of another and of many others; the pains and pleasures of his species must become his own. The great instrument of moral good is the imagination; and poetry administers to the effect by acting upon the cause." 26

The state of creative, spontaneous being, following the promptings of the true, not

the false self allows absolute freedom to the individual; the domination of one man by another would be unthinkable. For:

“…right action is freedom
From past and future also."27

The same idea was expressed by the surrealist Louis Aragon:

"..a being who...can only identify himself with the idea, surpasses his own self. He is the moral being...who wants only what should be... Thus freedom appears as the true foundation of morality...There can be no freedom in any act which turns against the idea of freedom. One is not free to act against it - that is, to act immorally." 28

In Marx, such a state of being is that of the unalienated man, with his "communist essence" fully developed within the self-transformative praxis of human history. In aesthetic terms, it is creativity being subject to its own, not external, laws. In Taoist thought, the natural spontaneity of a person leads inevitably to "correct" and therefore sociable action, for it is always in phase with the rhythm of the universe, the Tao:

"The profound yet humble vision of China's seers and sages taught them that religion is the tree of which art is the blossom and wisdom the fruit, that the good life is one which reveals at its close beauty matured as wisdom. That is why all China paid homage to old age. It also taught them their place in Nature, not as lords of creation or petty tyrants despoiling and defiling, but as members of the Fellowship of Life." 29

In Taoism man is felt to be part of the seamless unity of nature:

"…nature in both whole and part is not regarded as being moved by any external agency. Every movement in the endless knot is a movement of the knot, acting as a total organism, though the parts, or loops, of the knot are not looked upon as passive entities moved by the whole. For they are parts only figuratively divided from the whole for purposes of recognition and discussion; in reality, the loops are the knot, differences within identity like the two sides of a coin, neither of which can be removed without removing the other. Thus all art and artifice, all human action, is felt to be the same as natural or spontaneous action."30

Similarly, for dialectical materialism human labour is seen as nature acting on itself through man. The transformation of capitalist society into a classless, socialist society entails the rational reconstruction of both human relations and men’s relations to nature. According to Habermas(31) the revolutionized social relationships of production would entail a consciousness of "communicative

interaction" with rather than "manipulation of" Nature, exposing and superceding the ideology of Science and Technology ("technical reason" or ”"pragmatic consciousness" according to which technological progress must occur within existing relations of production or not at all. To supercede this entails the re-affirmation of man as subject using technology to his ends, not being mastered by it. Integral to this consciousness is the unification of means of production and labour, i.e. classless society, the attainment of which requires penetration of the mystification of capitalist ideology and breaking through the "distorted communication" inherent in existing alienated society. Man will then be naturalized and nature humanized; the alienation of man from himself and from nature, characteristic of capitalistic class society, will be replaced by a harmonious metabolism between man and nature, with human production under the control of human consciousness.

That there is no duality of nature, and man or human consciousness, is central for both Marxism and Taoism. The notion of unalienated, creative labour taking its place within a harmonious nature, is equivalent to human spontaneity being aligned with the Absolute. This non-duality is illustrated by Taoist art: there is not seen to be conflict between natural accident and human intent; the landscape painter lets the ´feeling' of nature work through him and inspire the movements of his brush:

"...if he can develop a natural, sincere, gentle and honest heart, then he will immediately be able to comprehend the aspects of tears and smiles and of objects, pointed or oblique, bent or inclined, and they will be so clear in his mind that he will be able to put them down spontaneously with his paint brush...

“…..When I am responsive and at one with my surroundings and have achieved perfect coordination of mind and hand, then I start to paint freely and expertly..”32

As a result of this attitude, Taoists take a piece of rock, untouched by man, and regard it as a work of art as much as if it had been shaped by an artist. For the artistic imagination seeks the form of nature itself. "The aesthetic conformity to law links Nature and Freedom.”(34)

And:

"Once it has really gained ascendancy as a principle of civilization, the play impulse would literally transform the reality. Nature, the objective world, would then be experienced primarily, neither as dominating man (as in primitive society), nor as being dominated by man (as in the established civilization), but rather as an object of contemplation." 35

In Western art, the yearning for an harmonious relationship between man and nature

in contradistinction to that prevailing under Capitalism and commodity production, became a developed "vision of nature" in 19th C Romanticism. As I suggested earlier, this "vision" had its precursor in 15th C Flemish painting.
The Taoist or Zen Buddhist "vision of nature" is attained when the abstract ego is inactive; the mind perceives in an "empty stare", without making boundaries and categories within nature. The self and nature are unseparated. This is the mystic perception, by no means unique to the East:

"Poetry lifts the veil from the hidden beauty of the world, and makes familiar objects be as if they were not familiar....

“It makes us the inhabitant of a world to which the familiar world is a chaos. It reproduces the common universe of which we are portions and percipients, and it purges from our inward sight the film of familiarity which obscures from us the wonder of our being. It compels us to feel that which we perceive, and to imagine that which we know." 36

Here is another description of the aesthetic communion of man and nature:

"As soon as beauty is involved, the prime fact that is to be observed is a sort of inter-penetration between Nature and man....

“Man, when he feels the joy of beauty, does not only enter with the things of nature into that relationship of intentional or spiritual identification which constitutes knowledge... in connection with aesthetic feeling there is always, to some degree, a sort of invasion of Nature by man.” 37

The following excerpts from a Zen Buddhist poem illustrate the process of self-discipline which allows freedom and creativity: enlightened receptivity to nature among human beings is social revolution. But revolution does not entail the duality of revolutionaries (subject) acting on society (object). It is the action of individuals who are subject and object, transforming themselves. Persons liberate themselves; through communication and collective effort they transform the institutions of which they are a part. Revolution must be broad-based and total, not the enactment of policies dictated by a political elite:

” 'Taming the Bull'

The whip and rope are necessary
Else he might stray off down some dusty road
Being well trained, he becomes naturally gentle.
Then, unfettered, he obeys his master.

“When one thought arises another thought follows. When the first thought springs from enlightenment, all subsequent thoughts are true. All is one law, not two. This unity is like salt in water, like colour in dyestuff. The slightest thing is not apart from self.”

´Riding the Bull home´

Mounting the bull, slowly I return homeward.
The voice of my flute intones through the evening.
Measuring with hand-beats the pulsating harmony, I direct the endless rhythm.
Whoever hears this melody will join me.

’In the World!

Barefooted and naked of breast, I mingle with the people of the world.
My clothes are ragged and dust-laden and I am ever blissful.
I use no magic to extend my life;
How before me, the trees become alive.

I visit the wineshop and the market, and everyone I look upon becomes enlightened."(38)

The Sociology of Knowledge interprets systems of ideas historically, that is in relation to the complex processes of transformation in socio-economic formations. It conceives of knowledge as practical: not the result of passive speculation outside of space or time nor as a self-contained process internal to thought, but as a symbolic counterpart to human activity upon nature and within society. Its analysis of the historical present inevitably flows into a consideration of systems of ideas in relation to desired tendencies of social-political development. Epistemological enquiry fuses with the elucidation of "appropriate" ideas for predisposing action toward human emancipation.

Simultaneously with a Sociology of Knowledge we can posit a Sociology of Sensibilities. Human experience/states of being explored in religion, art etc. could be interpreted historically, while those tendencies which exist at present in fragmented or partial forms but which are orientated towards the form of experience which appears from our standpoint as compatible with classless society, should be drawn into synthesis. Such a project attempts to talk about feelings in terms of concepts. But it is not the mere description of ideal experience in a Utopia, since it strives to grapple with the practical emergence of certain strands of sensibility in western

capitalist society.

A social-economic structure allows of and makes dominant certain ideas, attitudes, emotional sensibilities etc. which are refracted into everything from the basic senses of meaning in existence, into the most everyday living orientations towards colours, shapes, people and things. In the analysis of existence at all levels, and of the inter-relations between these levels, some "understanding" of the social world is possible. Dominant sensibilities are intermingled with their antitheses; the latter can be developed and broadened through conscious reflection. Thus, much of this study has been concerned with the analysis of certain types of concern for/experience of nature which have been mobilized in specific socio-historical contexts. It has striven for a dialectical, not a determinist, explanation. Hence, for any present moment, the human beings embrace is not a mere reflection of deeper causes, but can be subject to human choice. The writings of such people as Alan Watts and R.D. Laing seem to be struggling for a language to undertake such a broadening of experience, whilst various groups of people in western society are attempting to live out their existence according to the same partially conscious vision. It has already been argued that it is a mistake to regard such attempts as "idealist"; self-conscious praxis should be simultaneously in economic-political action and in the exploration of feelings. It was the imaginative insight of Max Weber in his "Protestant Ethic" thesis to see that not only a system of ideas, but an "experiential-tone" could - if propitious to social - economic circumstances - hold efficacy for historical development. In our context, united with historical analysis, the guided development of sub-intellectual experience holds a new dimension of human possibility.

A brief attempt is made here to draw together the picture and feeling of an emancipated psyche out of strands in existential psychiatry, the psychology of sexuality, and Zen Buddhism. The underlying idea is one which requires a huge amount of work by many people. This may not even be a right first step - but I hope the significance of such an enterprise is made apparent.

Both historically and metaphorically, man's alienation from nature is synonymous with consciousness. Man as a social being has had to suffer repression: up to the end of neolithic society collective authority restricted non-conforming individuation; class societies since have been based on systematic exploitation and oppression:

"...prior to this Fall was a realm where behaviour and experience were identities - every man did what he was." 39

The restoration of a unity of man in nature, mediated by a technology under conscious, collective control, entails existentially the linking of authentic intention with act:

"In doing this he has to maintain his selfcentredness, his existing himself from the subjective centre of his being outwards into the world. Should he lose his grasp on the centre of himself he loses himself to others and this means losing himself to himself, or rather from himself." 40

This implies the need for an integration of consciousness, such that the individual's orientation to his world is neither governed by repressed, unconscious, fragmented elements, nor dominated by his own powers projected onto the outside world and appearing as autonomous entities. The unification of all human faculties and perceptions into a conscious totality is the only insurance against the will to dominate and the acquiescence toward illegitimate authority. The rational appraisal of what a person must do, balanced with the urge for fulfillment in an existence which requires the reciprocal fulfillment of others, is possible for the fully conscious, integrated human being. This human being is engaged in active expression of his faculties towards the world; his faculties are thereby continuously and dynamically developed. The relationship is therefore not a stasis, but an ever-enriching self-becoming. The deeper the self-understanding, the greater the understanding and concern for others; the greater the self-development, the less the need for specialization of human functions among all-rounded individuals. The stronger the self, i.e. no longer with its subjectivity emptied into an object form of being-in-the-world, the greater the emotions unleashed towards people and things; and the deeper the exploration of beauty in human beings and nature.

The emancipated self is not an immanent, ahistorical essence to be discovered beneath an historically accreted alienation - though this is the implicit notion of naively transported Eastern mysticisms and in Laing's later writing. Rather, it is a self-transforming structure, a becoming, in history, a deepening of sensual, intellectual, and emotional faculties which unfurl as the ever-further satisfaction of needs develops them. Yet it is not purely a dream of a future mode of existence either; for intimations of experience that is whole are and have been attained in a wide variety of historical situations. Nor does this fly in the face of biology; whatever "instincts" were evolved by the human species prior to its becoming a symbolic, social animal have since then always been mediated through specific socio-cultural structures. The positing of pure instincts, urges etc. in relation to human beings in society(41) is indeed a reductionist theology.(42) There is no way of conceiving man´s biological substratum rid of symbolic socialization. This does not mean human beings could become "anything" - no doubt biological limits exist to what they could be. But human tendencies towards, say, self-assertiveness can be directed, into either socially responsible initiative and creation or aggressive exploitation. Which, depends on the dominant character formation of the society, the dominant mode of being-in-the-world induced within it.(43)

Marcuse, in “Eros and Civilization”, explored the conception of an emancipated existence through an analysis, in Freudian terms, of sexual repression under Capitalism. “Surplus repression” is for him the degree of repression maintained through capitalist economic and political domination that exceeds what is minimally required for civilization to continue given the existing potentials of technology, knowledge, and human development in general. The kind of sexual repression maintained under Capitalism is conceived in terms of the "performance principle" - a notion developed from Freud's "reality principle". For Freud, the "pleasure principle" - unrepressed sexuality - has to come to terms with the reality principle, the necessarily repressive nature of civilization. Marcuse enlarges on this notion, by insisting that the "performance principle" under Capitalism goes beyond the reality principle which a rational organization of society would necessitate. Furthermore, there is not a single, general reality principle; Marcuse's performance principle is the specific, qualitative type of repression developed and maintained by Capitalism. This repression is a 'genital tyranny', a desexualization of the pregenital erotogenic zones. Libido is concentrated in one part of the body - the genitals - leaving the rest of it to be externally exploited as an instrument of labour. This idea of a sort of instrumental genitality, conceives the human being under Capitalism as a manipulated machine; sex is limited to the functional necessities of reproduction whilst the body in general is bleached of a generalized eroticism, an authentic sensuous experience.

Work within the instrumental domination of nature and society is thus linked to the dualism of mind and body, and the dualism of mind and matter in general. The opposite, emancipated condition would entail a total receptivity to the sensuous world of nature, an awareness of the body of the sort that is explored in some kinds of Theatre Workshop and in Yoga practices, and a free sexuality experienced with the entire body. Unalienated labour - an expression of the concrete individual's being-in-the-world from his authentic interior onto the external world - would be linked to a unified experience of mind/body and mind/matter: the experience of the unity of nature.

This feeling for nature, rather as for Taoism, Zen, and Romanticism, would be of a continuous flux within and between self and nature - a unity of that which changes and that which is changed; unity of the "substance" and the "form", that is, the laws of change; experience of self and society as part of the flux, a becoming in total dialectical relationship with nature. By contrast to Western man who in Alan Watts’ expression experiences himself as a "skin-encapsulated ego", in authentic experience man would feel himself as a moving point of intersection in an infinitely complex system of changing structural relationships. Sensuous and "spiritual" experience would be united in an interpenetration between the self and the forms of nature - in a total receptivity to colour, shape, sound, and movement. Subjective experience would take on infinitely varied tones - just as no two poems by Shelley or Tu Fu

convey identical experience; intuitive perceptions of nature, like a multitude of windows onto the cosmos - are alternately harsh or glorious, fearful or ecstatic etc., in the same way that compatible scientific-philosophical analyses explore reality on different levels and therefore are permeated here with optimism, there with pessimism. The essential base-line experience of nature, however, for the unalienated, authentic being, would bear out a synthesis of knowledge and feeling, intellect and intuition; the understanding of nature derived through Taoism, Dialectical Materialism and Einsteinian physics would coincide with the experience of the Romantic poet, the Taoist, and the Zen mystic. The self would be situated creatively within the processes of history snd nature, with alienated theological dualities of matter and divinity, creator and created, overcome.

As with ideas, so with feelings; the historical process once understood leads us to synthesize the forms of experience - related to forms of production - that are objective resolutions to existing contradictions and also represent human freedom and fulfilment. Hence an experience of nature which harmonizes with a dialectical, unifying science, and which is reciprocal to an emancipated, classless society - is one whose features we have seen in partial forms in Flemish landscape, English Romanticism, Taoism and Surrealism. It is an experience of nature as neither good nor evil, neither divine nor material, neither hostile nor benevolent. It is as a process, in which unity is transformed into multiplicity and back to unity dialectically; what it is is ultimately a mystery - but, just as it can be understood through Einsteinian physics, so it can be felt through love. As man reconstitutes himself as an authentic being through his self-understanding, so he re-locates himself within the process of nature through his understanding and his feeling. In phase with it, he experiences it in ecstasy: not permanently, but underlying his life he experiences the 'visionary gleam.'

The aim of human existence is not, therefore, to attain a state of individual mystical communion with nature, in order to remain in it forever. This has been an orientation emerging from historical circumstances in which it has not appeared possible for humanity to find itself in harmony with nature in its concrete collectivity. There has always existed another orientation in mysticism, however, which has believed that the individual should alternate between the communion with nature and the practical struggle within human institutions.(44) In social existence all perceptions are through symbolic structures - indeed the self that perceives is a symbolic structure, imposing a form on "reality" through its mode of perception.(45) The transcendence of this, in mystical awareness, is a dissolving of the ego, a direct meeting with "reality" which is no longer perceived through symbolism. To remain in this state is to return to the inert oneness of a stone, and to cease being human. To pass through it is to understand the nature of thought and language so that reification of it can be defended against; so that a base-line can be held of the "isness" beneath the symbolic structures through which we must live: symbolic structures, from which

however we can make some choice as to which we appropriate.

The awakened Zen experience of a 'timeless present' is analagous to the psychoanalytical notion of existence free of neuroses, in which latter the present is dominated by memories or psychic distortions from the past, and fear for the future (manifested either in avoidance or frantic groping). This should not be interpreted as passive acquiescence to any reality tfcat presents itself, a mindless flowing with "whatever happens." It is rather the appropriate, balanced orientation of self within the processes of history and nature.

As Alan Watts writes:

"This is not a philosophy of not looking where one is going; it is a philosophy of not making where one is going so much more important than where one is, that there will bs no point in going.....

For if we open our eyes and see clearly, it becomes obvious that there is no other time than this instant, and that the past and the future are abstractions without any concrete reality.

Until this has become clear, it seems that our life is all past and future and that the present is nothing more than the infinitesimal hairline which divides them, from this comes the sensation of 'having no time', of a world which hurries by so rapidly that it is gone before we can enjoy it. But through ’awakening to the instant' one sees that this is the reverse of the truth: it is rather the past and future which are the fleeting illusions, and the present which is eternally real. We discover that the linear succession of time is a convention of our single-track verbal thinking, of a consciousness which interprets the world by grasping little pieces of it, calling them things and events. But every such grasp of the mind excludes the rest of the world, so that this type of consciousness can get an approximate vision of the whole only through a series of grasps, one after another….. the timeless,’original mind´... deals with life in its totality and so can do ever so many 'things' at once." 46

The 'eternity in an instant' is shorthand for non-dualistic experience. It is a total engagement with all things and all activities, through the balanced experience of the senses, the intellect, the emotions and the intuition (or the imagination).47 This is:

"….an awakening which does not involve the extermination of human passions.... We have already noted the peculiar trust in human nature which...these philosophies professed. However, not exterminating the passions does not mean letting them flourish untamed. It means letting go of them rather than fighting them, neither repressing passion or indulging it. For the Toist is never violent, since he achieves his ends by non-interference (wu-wei), which is a kind of psychological judo." 48

Similarly, psychoanalytical health rests on the unrepressed integration of all "instincts", experiences, and faculties - free of projections, compulsions etc.; this fine control of self-consciousness means that the most powerful feelings are possible where violence and chaos are absent. In Wilhelm Reich's early writing, for example, full libidinal liberation is the precondition for the healthy social being:

"Freud tended to regard the unconscious animal depths in man with distrust. He portrayed the id, as 'a cauldron full of seething excitations', and the unconscious as peopled with hideous spectres and murderous desires. Reich did not deny the existence of this unconscious, in all its ugliness, but it remained for him the distortion of a more basic reality which was essentially healthy. His confidence in the instincts was practically unlimited. He ultimately came to think of the human personality in terms of a three-tiered model. At the deepest level were man's "natural sociality and sexuality, spontaneous, enjoyment of work, and capacity for love." When these wholesome instincts were repressed, as in our sex-negating culture, a second layer arose 'the Freudian "unconscious", in which sadism, greediness, lasciviousness, envy, and perversions of all kinds' held sway. This layer was in turn covered over and kept in check by the characterological superstructure, 'the artificial mask of self-control, of compulsive insincere politeness and of artificial sociality.'" (49)

The epoch of urban capitalism from the 15th C up till the end of the 19th C, was accompanied, as a generalization, by a mode of apprehension of space as continuous, infinite and three-dimensional, in which objects take a fixed position related to others by causal connections. Time is necessarily a separate dimension, measurable and segmented, by anology to space. This organisation of the categories is typified in Newtonian physics, Cartesian co-ordinate geometry and a post-Renaissance naturalistic artistic vision with 3D perspective. This mode of apprehension is associated with the dominant features of urban existence and a money economy:

"...no one object deserves preference over any other. This mood is the faithful subjective reflection of the completely internalized money economy....money becomes the most frightful leveller. For money expresses all qualitative differences of things in terms of "how much?".... irreparably it hollows out the core of things, their individuality, their specific value, and their incomparability. All things lie on the same level and differ from one another only in the size of the area which they cover...

...the technique of metropolitan life is unimagineable without the most punctual integration of all activities and mutual relations into a stable and impersonal time schedule." 50

Around the turn of the 20th C Einstein's Relativity, and anti-naturalistic tendencies in the arts presented a challenge to these dominant conceptions of space and time. Einstein showed that time is on a continuum with space, that "space-time" is four-dimensional. The fantasy-world of the Surrealists represented a similar construction of space-time. Now, in 15th C landscape painting we can find tendencies that both reflect the developing mode of apprehension associated with urban capitalist society, and pose an opposition and alternative to it. Thus, in landscape painting as in all Renaissance art the reflection is found in its empiricism (and its "equalization" of objects), 3D perspective, and its realism ("trueness to nature", concern with Newtonian causality). The opposition is found in what I called before the "romantic" element in 15th C Flemish landscape (the aspiration toward a non-duality of man and nature) and what might be termed the "mystical vision." The religious concern for nature in the early landscapists results in a vitalization of space - no longer is there the older Christian duality between "matter" and "spirit" - spirit pervades nature.

In the other major world civilization where the painting of nature became the central concern of art - China, it was linked to Taoism and Chan Buddhism. The congruence of Taoism with Marxism has already been discussed but I think the relevance of the former to contemporary western society is enhanced when it is remembered that Taoism was the philosophy or religion of the people, and was often closely associated with peasant revolts against the orthodox Confucian ruling class. As with 15th C Flemish landscape and 19th C Romanticism, Chinese landscape painting expressed the unity of man and nature. In it reality is perceived as undifferentiated and unboundaried, forming a timeless unity with the human self. Time is not a succession but an eternal present. Space is part of this - perspective does not fix the viewer in a determinate position, and the ultimate mystery of space is conveyed in the way mountains and trees emerge out of atmospheric mist. Dream and reality, man and nature, are fused into one.

Here lies the significance of the profound involvement of the Expressionists (especially Van Gogh), the Cubists, and the Surrealists with Omental art. For what is central to these art movements is the rejection of the fixed bourgeois perception of the object, in space and time. Cezanne devoted his life to re-perceiving the object - redefining its boundaries and seeking its essence beneath appearance, just as Chinese painters of mountains sought the super-reality behind their appearances, and shrank from too concrete a materiality.(51)

André Breton, in a re-statement of Marx wrote:

"The objects which assume their places within the framework of the Surrealist exhibition are above all likely to lift the prohibition resulting from the over-powering repetition of those objects which meet our glance daily and persuade us to reject as illusion everything that might exist beyond them." 52

And Bachelard wrote:

"….there is more to be found in the hidden real than in the immediate known quantity."

As a final reference to Zen Buddhism and space:

"In the West, we are taught to perceive and to react to the arrangement of objects and to think of space as "empty"...the Japanese... give meaning to spaces...Skill in handling spaces is epitomized in the 15th C Zen monastery garden of Ryoanji.. .Walking through the darkened, paneled main building one rounds a bend and is suddenly in the presence of a powerful creative force - fifteen rocks rising from a sea of crushed gravel... One is overcome by the order, serenity, and the discipline of extreme simplicity. Man and Nature are somehow transformed and can be viewed as in harmony…. The grouping is such that no matter where one sits… one of the rocks...is always hidden... They believe that memory and imagination should always participate in perceptions."(53)

As Chinese landscape painting conveys the absolute dynamism of nature, so: "The whole method of impressionism....is bent, above all... on stressing that reality is not a being but a becoming, not a condition but a process."(54)

There is also an extraordinary likeness between Einstein and the Taoist or Buddhist world-view. For Einstein, there is no duality of Creator/Created nor between matter and energy. The Universe is God. This is the antithesis to the Western bourgeois dualism of mechanism versus idealism or spiritualism, as is what I called the 'mystical vision' in landscape painting. Under Capitalism: "... the elimination of God from the conception of Nature corresponds (to) an elimination of man from technique".(55) Einstein's world-view is nearer to the concept of the Tao as that which is everything and that which changes everything - "heaven" and earth are unseparated. And it is similar to Marxism: the process of history *is* its meaning.

Human history occurs within and as part of nature. In the process human societies evolve a variety of different forms of mediation with nature, i.e. modes of

transforming nature into social values. These different modes of production entail specific social relations and organizations. The dominant conceptions of and sensibilities towards nature are related to - in a dialectical interaction, not a mechanical determinism - the form of social mediation with nature which predominates at any time and place. All conceptions of nature are therefore social, yet the existence of nature outside of human consciousness is assumed. This is an *a priori* assumption - the major one for Marxism - which is necessary to maintain a consistent explanation of reality on the basis of contemporary human knowledge.(56)

Sciences of nature are therefore human fictions, appropriate to the successful mediation with nature in any given socio-economic organisation. Science, and the tensions within it are always related to the cosmologies and conceptualizations that predominate in all dimensions of society. The supercedence of one scientific paradigm by another cannot be conceived a priori as a movement toward a closer contiguity between mental construct and "nature itself". Indeed, the emergence of bourgeois science entailed the loss of the organic world-view of the middle-ages - which we can now wish to re-adopt, albeit in a new form. Yet the static laws of Renaissance science allowed of the harnessing of natural forces to production and a more effective control over the world. How can we assume then, that the most appropriate science to our time - in terms of both the apparent intelligibility it offers, and in its effectiveness in application for the achievement of aims - involves a closer understanding of nature? Perhaps we cannot; but we can wager on the greatest likelihood: that in the overall evolution of human thought and practise, from simple to complex, there is a progression towards greater proximity of subject to object. The progress is not a step-by-step mechanism, for it is not free from off-shoots, blind alleys, retreats, dispersions. In particular, the development of more complex world-views may see phases in which a single partially coherent view is fragmented. Until a new one is consolidated, the state of human knowledge may seem to have regressed. At any rate the existence of some sort of evolutionary progression (though dialectical, not mechanical) is a better wager than the agnosticism of Levi-Strauss and others, who would see all human cultures - complexes of beliefs, thoughts, practices - as so many structural possibilities for existence, none "better" nor "worse" than any other, but changing from one form to another meaninglessly.

"Meaninglessly" slips out here, but the use of the word is significant. The Marxist conception of history and nature does lead to a notion of human purpose - a surprising reversion to teleology in science. For if man progressively understands his own and the world's nature more deeply, he must also come to see what he should do to exist for himself and within nature. In other words, the possibilities for human existence, laid down by the biological and cultural evolution of man and by the processes of nature, become clear; unless man is perverse or masochist, he will try to seize these possibilities. And if he were either of these former, one would

suppose he would not develop a deeper understanding of reality. Put differently, if man comes to understand the reasons for all that makes misery of life, and his thought offers alternative forms of living, this is not far removed from asserting that it is the purpose of man to create an harmonious form of society. If the development of ever more powerful productive forces is accompanied by deeper historical, social, psychological, ethical and aesthetic knowledge - then the real possibility arises of the majority of human beings appropriating this accumulated potential knowledge and collectively asserting the implications of the knowledge in their lives. Under Capitalism, there can be no doubt that human awareness rises enormously on nearly all dimensions. But knowledge is fragmented, split away from the social tasks of production and social interaction, and confined to circumscribed contexts and human minorities. Meanwhile the rapid, frantically unsettling technological changes institutionalized within Capitalism splinter human experience and activity into the highest forms of alienation history has developed; to re-integrate knowledge, to expose the potential lying underneath the chaos of phenomena, to assert the pattern beneath the mixed-up jigsaw puzzle, is the meaning of socialist praxis.

Scientific conceptualizations of nature accompany specific modes of appropriating nature, specific forms of labou- process. In the transformation of the bourgeois mode of production into the socialist mode of production, the science of nature moves from a static, mechanistic world-view - Newtonian or positivist laws - toward a conceptualization of infinitely dynamic and interactional processes of nature. Einstein's Relativity and nuclear physics are moments in the historical process of the transformation of consciousness. They are not the "true" vision of nature, nor the vision that can be predicted as being that which will be edified under socialism. It is rather that their significance to human praxis must be conceived historically, as anticipatory aspects of a post-bourgeois science, whose implications for thought outside of science will become gradually clearer. Just as the critical analysis of contemporary Capitalism generates a vision of Socialism as its dialectical opposite - a vision which will be transformed with human history, i.e. a necessary vision to us now but not a blue-print or *fait accompli* for the future, so we can posit a dialectical science of nature; even though its further realization will be something we cannot visualize now.

Confusion is sometimes found as to whether the 'dialectic' actually exists in nature or whether it is merely a mental conceptualization of nature developed within society. The dilemma is often hinged to the question as to whether there is a dialectic of nature at all, or only of society. The position argued here is as follows: all thought is an activity of human subjects, and is therefore relative to and restricted by the socio-historical conditions within which it emerges. This is the case for both natural and social science; there is no distinction between them on this matter. To argue that the dialectic is "objective" in the sense of existing outside of the human mind, if this is meant to mean that it is an absolute 'law´ which cannot be

transcended by further historical development, is clearly incompatible with dialectical materialism. Rather, the dialectical interpretation of nature and society is the most appropriate and adequate to the contemporary stage of human development; yet, in concluding this, it is obvious that dialectical processes are more than simply "in the mind." Dialectical thought has developed in man who has evolved from nature. It evolves an ever-greater approximation of subject to object; further knowledge will not refute, but transcend present dialectical knowledge. Thought does not create mere fictions about nature, but comes to penetrate its actuality as it recognizes its roots in nature.

The dialectical consciousness calls upon a fusion of the intellect, intuition and emotions. This synthesis is not the end of history in a Hegelian sense - for it will be superceded as the conditions which it helps to bring about call for reformulations of thought and experience. The criteria for its validity, in the present context are its capacity for making the world comprehensibly intelligible and "experienceable", its consistency, and its "workability" - not in the pragmatic sense of allowing predictable manipulations of things and persons, but in the sense of its assistance in the practise and experience of self-liberation through the identification of the self in the processes of history and nature.

The search for a unifying science of nature and society must not be confused with the collapse of history into nature brought about by "vulgar marxism" and later through Stalinism.(57) There, the "laws" of historical development are seen as subsumable within the "laws of nature": outside of the human will, determinist, mechanical. This ideology is the counterpart to Soviet technocratic society - as is value-free positivism in the West.

The synthesis of natural and historical science posited here is of a different kind. It is the conceptualization in both of dynamic process that calls for the unity - in contradistinction to empiricism, positivism etc. which attempt to encapsulate parts of
processes in the conception of them as static "things".(58) For empiricism concepts relate to their "object" in an exact, fixed, one-to-one manner. As an ideology of the status quo it claims a "hot-line" to nature as theology claimed a hot-line to God in feudal society. In a unified dialectical science history is not dissolved into nature; as conscious agents human beings comprehend the process of history simultaneously to the struggle to become what they are not.(59) The science of nature is linked to a kind of ethical disposition and feeling for nature which calls upon the human agent to "flow with the Tao" in active, but appropriate, effort - a striving to fulfil a vision of the imagination. Rational notions about man are seen to be linked to a wider cosmology; i.e. a proposition about any aspect of the world is if followed through, found to be interlinked with propositions about every other aspect. In other words, consistent world-views, like "religions", are totalizing. These are also found to be

answerable to certain orientations of all other human faculties - the intuitive, sensual, and emotional. What has been called the mystical or visionary perception of nature should be integrated within a cosmology of nature and political praxis. It must be made quite clear that no sort of millenialism is implied here. The relationship being mysticism and politics which we find in late medieval peasant uprisings for example - characterized by mass hysteria and autocratic prophets, is not the synthesis posited here. Rather, the optimum blend of human faculties should be mutually strengthening and integrative, ensuring tolerance, understanding, patience and caution - yet also relentless effort and uncompromising criticism of social contradiction. It can have nothing whatever to do with the imposition of a minority's vision upon society, but is a strand of generalized experience interwoven with a mass democratic movement.

"It is but one step from seeing a vision of unity and love to reaching the conclusion that unity and love ought to be realized in the everyday world.... one can take the next short step and conclude that indeed the unity and love one has perceived in a mystical interlude will be realized. And it is yet another short step to decide that if the world will not cooperate in the implementation of one's mystical vision, then one will rally a band of saints to impose that vision on the world..."61

This "warning" is one that should hardly be required for the present discussion. The "certainty"62 or joy of experience in mystical identification does not warrant blind, arrogant authoritarianism. It is a hopefulness, a strength that puts deepest reality before immediate impinging needs and wishes, but is not removed from the concrete:

"...there is a strain, a predisposition in the ecstatic experience toward hopefulness, indeed toward overwhelming hopefulness, a hopefulness that is latent in the structure of human existence."63

This experience does not contradict rational science. If physics sees the ultimate unity of the universe as energy, human intuition can experience it non-intellectually.64 This is imposing human feeling upon the cosmos no more than Relativity imposes the human mind upon it.65 Man always feels and thin now he can choose which feeling and which thought he embraces. Mystical awareness is not only compatible with ^insteinian physics? it appears appropriate to transformative praxis when the analysis of Romanticism, Surrealism, Taoism etc. is brought to bear upon contemporary experience.

Marcuse argues that the form of science practiced in the west is orientated toward and appropriate to the technocratic manipulation of human labour and nature under advanced capitalism. To the extent that Soviet science is also defined in scientistic.terms, it is a reflection of the degree to which the organization of society

is still alienated in the Soviet form of socialism. The counterpart to scientistic ideas about nature, in feelings, is the orientation of callous disregard for nature as mere "thing" to be sliced up as required. Dialectical science, as the intellectual framework orientated to and compatible with Socialism, would conceive of man as interacting with nature in a process that transforms and evolves the potential within both. At the roots of such a science would be the conscious intention of emancipation; the experience of a "soul" within nature would correspond with the abstractions developed by science. Such experience can be found in a variety of mysticisms throughout world history, from which the mystifications can be dispensed with in order to arrive at the kernel of experience appropriate to unalienated consciousness. Within Taoism and Romanticism, tendencies which arise as antitheses to alienated social realities (inter-mixed with tendencies that reflect and express alienation), can be brought into a world transcendence of mystifications.

One of the issues which has been central to this work is the relationship between scientific cosmology, human ethics, and "non-rational" orientations to existence within the "cosmos". Whereas pre-modern cosmologies, i.e. religions in the narrow sense, have taken it for granted that beliefs about the nature of the universe are inseparably related to ethical imperatives in life and particular modes of experience* modern science /within capitalist ideology/ is believed to be "non-moral", or value-free, in the sense that cosmological paradigms are supposed not necessarily to entail particular human orientations outside of science.

I have attempted to show that at all stages of development, modern (i.e. post-Renaissance) science has rested upon particular philosophical premises and assumptions, and has been closely related to social and ethical predispositions whether these links have been consciously acknowledged or not. "Science" has evolved within a specific social totality$_s$ consisting of specific, but dynamic socio-economic, religious and aesthetic structures. The most advanced conceptions prevailing now with respect to the nature of matter, space and time, should also be expected to link logically with particular non-scientific human orientations - in all dimensions of thought, feeling and activity. If science attempts to present that mode of explanation of natural processes, which is the most logically consistent, the most all-embracing in allowing intelligibility, and the most efficacious when applied to nature (i.e. action based upon theory gives rise to expected consequences) - that is possible at a given stage of human development, then it should be possible also to evolve the "structure of sensibilities" to nature and time which is most "appropriate" to our particular human context.

It is not possible to enter here into a thorough investigation of modern physics. All that can be done is to point out some of the fundamental cosmological ideas which emerge from nuclear physics and the theory of relativity, and to show their implications for the unitary mode of consciousness which this study urges toward.

The essential conception of nature from the 16th C to the 19th C was that of a three-dimensional volume of space, with time a separate continuum. In this volume there existed matter, made up of indivisible, solid particles which occupied definite volumes and shapes in space. The "material" basis of nature was therefore conceivable as a static volume of impenetrable particles. These particles possessed inertia, in virtue of which they would either move with uniform velocity in a straight line or remain stationary. Such uniform motion or rest would persist until affected by impact with other particles. Collisions between particles, changed velocities and directions of motion, and changing combinations between particles, explained the phenomena of nature. The "laws" of gravity, motion, transformations of combinations of particles i.e. chemical reactions etc. were conceived as eternal mathematical relationships. These mathematical "laws" which underlay all natural phenomena were the "ideal" structure of the universe. In Renaissance cosmology the mathematical laws were expounded as if they were Platonic forms; nature was like a machine that worked according to unchanging laws. These laws were written in the language of mathematilcs by a Divine Creator - God.

By talking of a basic cosmology which dominated Western thought for nearly four centuries, we must not over-simplify. In fact the cosmology was continuously transformed through major philosophers and natural scientists. Furthermore, the notion of a single systematic conception of nature existing at any time is a myth; Collingwood(66) shows that there were a number of competing notions within "classical physics", that inconsistencies and contradictions were well known and were manifested in fierce controversies. Similarly now, at the forefront of all natural scientific theory there is debate over interpretation. The fact that this is the case for Marxism is therefore no reason to consider it any more "inexact" than other sciences. Essentially however, the static view of a mechanical nature operating according to eternal laws is the general cosmology which we can now see as corresponding to the epoch of urban, bourgeois capitalism.(67)

Collingwood also shows that this cosmology did not suddenly break down with the advent of 20th C discoveries in physics. The tendency toward an evolutionary natural science, conceiving nature in terms of progressive transformation, begins with Hegel (68):

"The question was: How are we to find a changeless and therefore knowable something in, or behind, or somehow belonging to, the flux of nature-as-we-perceive-it? In modern or evolutionary natural science, this question does not arise, and the controversy, between 'materialism´ and 'idealism', as two answers to it, no longer has any meaning'."(69)

According to Collingwood it was the impact of historical thought that transformed

cosmology in general:

"...historians...had found themselves able to think scientifically, about a world of constantly changing human affairs. The historical conception of scientifically knowable change or process was applied, under the name of evolution, to the natural world."(70)

In the 19th C the theory of evolution brought into being a new concept: life. This entailed the comprehension of a vital process; no longer could nature be seen as a machine in which everything that happens is due to 'efficient' causes - a machine whose 'final cause' is some agent outside of it - God. The view of life as self-transforming activity which requires not only location in space, but also in time, prepared the ground for the vision of nature as activity and change in modern physics. According to the electron theory:

"...the chemical atom is not an ultimate corpuscle but a constellation of electrons... Thus we get back to a single physical unit, the electron; but we also get a very important new conception of chemical quality, as depending not upon the merely quantitative aspect of the atom, its weight, but upon the pattern formed by the electrons that compose it. This pattern is not a static pattern but a dynamic'pattern, a pattern constantly changing in a definite rhythmical way....

This idea of rhythmical pattern as a link between quantity and quality is important in the modern theory of nature not only as providing a connection between those hitherto unconnected notions, but, what is more important still, as revealing a new significance in the idea of time. If an atom of hydrogen possesses the qualities of hydrogen not merely because it consists of a certain number of electrons, nor even merely because those atoms are arranged in a certain way, but because they move in a certain rhythmical way, it follows that within a given instant of time the atom does not possess those qualities at all; it only possesses them in a tract of time long enough for the rhythm of the movement to establish itself....

The old idea of matter was that first of all a given piece of matter is what it is, and then, because it enjoys that permanent and unchanging nature, it acts on various occasions in various ways. It is because a body, in itself or inherently, possesses a certain mass, that it exerts a certain force in impact or in attracting others. Eut now the energies belonging to material bodies not only explain their action upon each other, they explain the extension and the mass of each body by itself..... Hence not only chemical qualities but even physical and quantitative properties are now conceived as a function of activity. So far from being true that matter does what it does because first of all, independently of what it does, it is what it is, we are now taught that matter is what it is because it does what it does....a new similarity has emerged between matter on the one hand and mind and life on the other; matter is no

longer contrasted with mind and life as a realm in which being is independent of acting and logically prior to it, it resembles them as a third realm in which being is at bottom simply acting." 71

The theory of relativity holds that the universe is a fourdimensional space-time continuum. The ultimate constituents of the universe are therefore a single infinite plurality of point- instants, or object-events.

"Unlike Newton, the modern physicist recognizes no empty space. Matter is activity, and therefore a body is where it acts; and because every particle of matter acts all over the universe, every body is everywhere." 72

The infinite inter-relatedness of every point-instant in the universe in the aspects of both space and time, is something that has been intuitively understood through certain Eastern cosmologies for centuries.73 The experience of the infinite is portrayed analytically by Alan Watts thus:

"To denote the infinite at all in terms of thought we shall have to 'outline' it by the limitations of space and time, calling it the sizeless or spaceless and the timeless, We shall have to try to think of the infinite as having no size at all, so that, regarding it from the standpoint of space, we shall be able to say that the infinite exists in its entirety at every point of space. Or, to put it in another way from the standpoint of the infinite every point of space is absolutely here, for there is not a different infinite at every place. In yet another way, we can say that there is no space or distance between the whole infinite and anything at all.

The eternal or timeless must be understood in the same way. Eternity is immediately present at every moment of time, or, from the standpoint of eternity, every moment of time, past, present, or future is. absolutely now. 4t a given moment of time several separate points in space, such as the five fingers, may be seen at once. 3o from the one 'moment' of eternity, the eternal Now, all separate points of time are simultaneously present." 74

The modern cosmology, as formulated by philosophers like Alexander and Whitehead, is characterised by a re-introduction of teleology or 'nisus'i, effort on the part of nature towards the realization of something not yet existing. In the physical world there are various orders of being, each consisting of a pattern composed of elements belonging to the order next below it; point- instants form a pattern which is the electron, electrons form an atom with chemical qualities, atoms form a molecule with new qualities etc. Organic life represents a new pattern composed of inorganic elements, whilst mind or consciousness is a further peculiar kind of activity emerging from the gathering together of vitafl activities into a higher complexity. The universe is thus a hierarchy of organic complexes, each being a totality with an

emergent quality beyond the mere summing together of the elements of which it is composed. Plach level of organic complex must be comprehended in its own terms; i.e. the disciplines of history (or sociology), psychology, biology (or physiology), chemistry and physics cannot be reduced downwards nor simply extrapolated upwards.

For Alexander, the cosmic evolutionary process has reached the stage of mind. The next higher order of quality,.as yet unrealized, is deity. Mind is capable of formulating a higher form of mentality into which it is consciously endeavouring to convert itself. Now, if a philosopher of modern physics in the 20th C can assert that the best sense he can make out of what is known about the universe, is through the notion that mind is striving toward the realization of God, is it not indicative that Marx is generally condemned as a new theologian for conceiving that human society is working toward the realization of a qualitatively new mode of existence? Here, at any rate, it is suggested that the convergence of scientific, philosophical, mystical-cosmological, and aesthetic knowledge in the last part of the 20th C, points to the view that human consciousness and action might and should orientate itself toward the realization of a new emergent pattern, as part of the entire cosmic process.75 As consciousness (which is synonymous with society) evolved out of biological life, so emancipated society in which ideas correlate universally with social reality to the degree made possible.by the advancement of thought - must emerge out of what Marx called "pre-history."76

"In ancient and medieval cosmology the ideas of matter, life, and mind were so fused together as to be hardly distinguishable; the world, qua extended, was regarded as material; qua moving, as alive; qua orderly, as not intelligent. The thought of the 16thC and 17thC expelled its soul from the world, and created modern physics by conceiving the orderly movements of matter as dead movement. There was already implicit in this conception a contrast with living movements, but modern biology was as yetunborn, and Descartes xeliberately tried to think of animals as automatic, that is, to explain biological facts as automatic, that is, to explain biological facts in terms of the new physics. Even in Hegel, the division of his cosmology into theory of nature and theory of mind betrays a relic of the Cartesian dualism and shows that biology was not yet a third division of science with principles of its own….

Nature, for Whitehead, is not only organism, it is also process. The activities of the organism are not external accidents, they are are united into a single complex activity which is the organism itself. Substance and activity are not two, but one. This is the basic principle of Whitehead´s cosmology, a principle grasped by him with unusual tenacity and clearness, and taught to him, by his own account, by modern physics with its new theory of matter. The organism is undergoing or pursuing a process of evolution in which it is constantly taking new forms and

producing new forms in every part of itself."77
Human history occurs within nature, from which it came into being. Experience of and thought about every aspect of nature is inseparably interwoven with experience of and thought about self and history.Yet a single, unitary consciousness does not deny that each level of "reality" has its own integrity, for which specific forms of analysis or emotional orientation are appropriate. It is from nature that human history began; it is towards nature that it is now moving. Underlying man´s self-consciousness is his apprehension of the entire process of nature.

Human praxis orientated toward social transformation and emancipation is activity guided by ever-deepening consciousness of self and society. In the endless interaction between thought and actions the horizons of both are made to recede, whilst the two become nearer an un-split, integrated mode of existence. It has always been clear to Marxists that exact blue-prints for a future society cannot be laid down prior to its emergence; the immediate future may be conceived concretely, but fades into abstract notions for the beyond. Historical experience has shown the discrepancy between prior visions and fulfilled experience, whilst Maoist praxis - resting upon abstract principles constantly re-applied to changing circumstances - has effectively displayed the ideological dogmatism inherent in holding to inflexible schema.

Yet Marxism in the West succumbs to capitalist ideology if it fears to speculate at all upon the forms socialism may take on. The struggle for a new society cannot remain agnostic - it must hold an image of what it strives for, even though this image must remain open to re-evaluation. The dehumanized capitalist order must be seen alongside a vision of socialist society, derived from critical analysis; this is in the nature of dialectical reason as opposed to empiricism. In the same way, psychiatry that conceives "health" in terms of a statistical average observable in a particular society, or from the perspective of the dominant morality of the society, is both intellectually unsound and orientated to maintaining existing social forms. "Health" can only be conceived in terms of unalienated, socialist interaction and experience. Engaged thought must not be frightened by accusations of "pipe-dreaming" thrown at its attempts to lay the basis of socialism in consciousness. It must probe - though humbly - to push back the horizons imposed by the phenomenal, by the tyranny of apparently concrete reality. What follow here are no more than scattered notes in this direction.

A socialist society would be one in which production is for use-values - i.e. goods needed and desired by society. The pre-conditions for this are democratic (consumers') institutions to discuss and ascertain what and how much should be produced, and democratic producers' institutions to decide how to produce them (choices of raw materials, sizes of plant, organization of labour etc.). Production would no longer be for exchange-values realized in the market, which entails all the

characteristics of Capitalism: crises, wastage, alienated autocratic organization of labour, unemployment etc. The problem is essentially to create a balanced dialectic between grassroots democracy (workers' control in all fields of production) and the central planning necessary to coordinate production, to avoid waste, unemployment etc. etc. The Soviet model of central allocation of ’quotas' to enterprises is not an answer: not only does it maintain the characteristics of capitalist production in alienated labour (specialization, organization from above) and managerial control, but leads to obvious wastage of human and natural resources where enterprises are concerned only to (apparently) fulfil their quotas. This is not yet socialism; it is the re-organization of capitalist production to eliminate over-production crises, wastage ensuing from anarchic investment patterns, and unemployment. State ownership of the means of production is not in itself an establishment of a 'socialist base.’ The factors inherent in capitalist society whichrevent realization of ’potential economic surplus’ (in Paul Baran's terms) are not to be remedied by central planning alone - in fact new wasteful contradictions arise, and the human reality of production is little changed (i.e. workers remain divorced from involvment in the production process)$_6$ The real socialist base means a mass social mobilization, a vital interaction between grass-roots involvement and central planning$_p$ the nature of which depends on the existing stage of development in the productive forces, the nature of the particular society etc. - Maoism being the appropriate form of such a dialectic for the conditions of China. The same principles, however, in different forms, would apply in any socialist society.

A basic issue for a socialist society, one in which production is no longer for commodities, in which socialised labour produces with collectively owned means of production, is the consideration of what kind of labour brings about the "all-round development of the individual”, one which abolishes the dichotomy between work and leisure replacing it with creative (and nevessarily productive) existence, one in which technology is used by a conscious collective humanity in the harmonious mediation between society and nature in production. Does this socialist labour lie in maximum automation, reducing necessaiy labour-time to an absolute minimum, leaving the majority of time for cultural and intellectual development - producing plays, making films for a collective media system, discussing economies and polities, experimenting with community life, etc? It seems rather that socialist labour is committed to fulfilling labour, in which the reduction of necessary labour time is balanced with fulfillment in work, in which intellect and culture penetrate work.

The first idea seems to be represented in microcosm in urban hippy life - one day a week at work as a taxi driver or in a factory, the rest spent drawing, talking, listening to music, writing poetry, or arranging collective "happenings". This is not ultimately a fulfilling life. Firstly, the one day of monotonous work still has a conditioning effect on the whole mentality, and second the serious urge of human beings seems to be to work hard at something important. After some years as an "all-round" hippy

some individuals become serious poets or painters, and others direct their creativity into crafts, teaching, film-making or whatever. Others will degenerate into nothing. It seems that all-round development must focus on work - make it artistic and intellectually stimulating. Into work must be brought social awareness and constant intellectual application of all fields of knowledge and experience. The automation/free time solution seems to offer a vacuum - for what will people think, create, experiment?

In “Eros and Civilization" Marcuse followed through simultaneously the implications of these two notions of socialist labour in relation to sexual repression. On the one hand extensive automation might reduce the working day to a minimum. The vast reduction in time and energy devoted to work would permit greater intensity and variety of erotic expression; the necessarily alienating work which remained would maintain a "basic repression" of sexuality.

On the other hand the new society rid of a capitalistic "performance principle", might allow a "non-repressive sublimation" in imaginative, playful work. This notion seems far more satisfactory than the quantitative, mechanistic notions implicit in the idea of automation allowing a release of libido. Indeed, automation should not be conceived simply as a time-saving device, for this maintains the separation of the means from the ends of labour and the dichotomy of work and leisure. Automation should be utilized selectively as an extension of man’s powers - as the accumulated knowledge of society appropriated by man as conscious subject. Automation applied according to ideas of efficiency in a narrow sense, implies managerial control and its embodiment in the tyranny of time. "79

In an essay called "Technology and Liberation"80 Eccleshall shows how Marcuse's dichotomy between work as the world of necessity (and therefore necessarily repressive) and play as absolute spontaneity and indeterminacy, leads his speculations upon the liberated society into a utopian playground in which the appropriation of nature is left to a technical elite:

“.....he is so eager to create the material basis of freedom - understood as spontaneity or play - that he is prepared to countenance practically any measure, including occupational specialisation, to bring it about without considering what institutional arrangements are necessary to prevent a new form of technocracy from emerging.....

“Instead of seeking to abolish work by transmuting it into something it cannot be while it remains an expression of the need to live, we would do better to reject the notion that it is intrinsically oppressive and instead focus attention on how it might become an activity that evokes the creative potentialities of its participants. A more fruitful exercise would be to consider the structural reforms of basic institutions

which are needed to transcend all alienated modes of existence: the decentralisation of political control, the abolition of the distruction between the general categories of mental and manual labour etc. - reforms which can only be precipitated by those presently denied self-determination in the sphere of work. If we really do require a handbook for guidance we would do well to turn from Roszak and Marcuse to Marx's "Grundrisse" where the outline of a more satisfactory philosophical anthropology is wedded to an attempt to spell out how technology provides the material basis for work as a non-alienated activity.

The replacement of living by dead labour heightens ths contradictions of capitalism because although wealth is still measured in terms of labour-power expended, its creation is increasingly dependent on the application of science and technology to the production process. The transformation of productive work into technical labour and the reduction of the amount of time spent in the realm of necessity because of automation provides the basis for the formation of a new subject who, equipped with scientific and other aptitudes, can relate to the production process as a virtuoso."81

Quite rightly, Eccleshall criticizes Roszak for being undialectical:

"Roszak's conception of man is less one of a being who simultaneously modifies himself and the environment through his own mediating activity than one of a creator of values which once produced, gain objective existence and subjugate their creator. Hence structural changes assume incidental significance in his programme for it seems that the attainment of the appropriate mental vantage point is sufficient to dispel all contradictions. Roszak's response to the contemporary scene, whereby mind is identified as the agent of liberation, is by no means unique, for it links with a dominant strand of thinking of the current youth movement, especially prevalent among those who have gravitated Eastwards.. It amounts to the celebration of inwardness in which each is conceived as a potentially ethereal monad who, once having attained communication with his/her true self through introspection or vacuous contemplation, cannot but respond to that which is essential in those with whom he/she happens to have contact…. what is absent from the theory is any understanding that the human self must fabricate the objective conditions of its autonomy through a collective recreation of the social world." 82

Now Eccleshall is right to criticize the form in which an "appropriate mental vantage point" is visualized by Roszak and the Zen-influenced youth movement. But a major theme of this study is to show the need for a synthesis of intellect and feeling, Marx and Zen. The human experience embraced in collective praxis must be considered if the process is not to be visualised coldly and mechanically. Thus Roszak and others are getting at something in saying:

"Only those who have broken off their silent inner dialogue with man and nature,

only those who experience the world as dead, stupid, or alien.... could ever turn upon their environment and their fellows with cool and meticulously calculated rapacity....”(82)

Of course it is wrong to think that individuals, through the power of their souls' communion with the cosmos, can mysteriously change the world. Yet the alignment of the self with the processes of the universe - through the intellect and the intuition - is the basis for sustained praxis in the world; the deep joy which Eccleshall rather mocks as "a sense of rapturous wonder emanating from an awareness of being absorbed into a cosmos throbbing with vitality and significance", may be a precondition of the struggle for liberation after all.

Of course, too, it is wrong to conceive this self as an unchanging essence "deep within" each individual. It is rather the vision - at which experience can sometimes hint - of human existence in harmonious metabolism with nature. Eccleshall rejects the idea of harmonious interaction with nature, considering the Frankfurt School to be revisionist in this respect. The relation of man to nature in unalienated society will still be "the technical control of the environment so long as humankind has to appropriate reality in order to survive.”84

In this study the opposite is argued. Positivism or mechanistic science deals with static laws of nature and society - laws which allow of the manipulation of both. It is the dominant world-view of the urban bourgeois epoch. Dialectical science makes intelligible the processes of nature and society, in both of which the reflecting human being participates; it is a science of the emancipatory interaction or mediation between man and man and woman and woman, and man (and woman) and nature.

The society in harmonious metabolism with nature is a dynamic society, in constant self-transformation and deepening self-consciousness. It should not be conceived as a static Utopia rid of all "problems." New contradictions (or old ones newly perceived) would require continuous imaginative experiment. The search for a delicate balance between global rationality and local uniqueness, decentralised production and global distribution and communication, desirable order and unpredictable excitement, would continue forever. Neighbourhoods would seek stimulating, colourful and varied ways of combining maximum individuality with the rational integration of living and labouring activities. Individuals could design and adapt their "houses" to their particular needs; autonomous servicing would as far as possible bring the processes of human mediation with nature within ths immediate experience and control of individuals (e.g. photo-cells converting the sun's energy into electricity, the use of home sewage to mike cooking gas). Privacy and individuality need not be in conflict with the community, in which all needs and activities would be perceived and catered for as inter-related dimensions of life. The

rift between life and art would be closed, as the creation of aesthetically beautiful things would become synonymous with producing for social need: objects, houses, performances, and the pattern of life in its totality. Living in close proximity to unadulterated nature need not be incompatible with the availability of "urban" amenities.

A full society would ever cultivate the imagination, new forms of creation, new sources of rich experience; facilities for travel, excitement and experimentation. Tendencies operating against this could be investigated and resisted. For the rational society is not one governed by the "reason" of capitalist society - one which calculates and dissects the many fragments of economic activity, knowledge, and experience within an over-riding insanity; it is one in which the bases of economic organization are rational so that the emotional, spiritual and intuitive life can flourish rather than be trodden down and mutilated. A society in which every human being could be familiar with nuclear physics, the human sciences and the arts of the world, and all people are potentially interested in these if not repressed of the curiosity and creativity every human being is born with, would not be one in which feelings were suppressed by a sterile, ordered efficiency. Nor is it one where many people would prefer to destroy than to create. There would never be a lack of issues requiring analysis and imagination to cope with; ever better forms of transport (efficient, interesting, comfortable), better and more creative forms of communication and entertainment, communities that were ever more self-determining whilst also integrated into global society.

An harmonious society under conscious, human control would be in harmonious unalienatsd metabolism with nature. This was the metaphysical yearning of the Taoists and Romantics - yet it could become a concrete reality. For all such yearnings in the past there was no possibility of their attainment for society as a whole. Communion was individual or within small groups. Shelley's poetry, Taoist painting and literature, are the expressions of such communion before they are universally possible. They are glimpses of a light which all humanity may know in the future. Doomed to individual communion, these testimonies are rent with pain.

An harmonious metabolism between society and nature will be an experienced closeness with nature, an existence felt as within it. No urban habitation need be far from uncontaminated nature. So on every level: man will not pollute nature in a socialized economy - where, for example, production of vehicles, the construction of roads or whatever, and building in general are not separate processes driven anarchically by the profit-motive. He will work with nature in all respects, from using natural antibodies and eating natural food, to learning more about natural feeding rhythms in babies. Technology will not alienate him from Nature, but allow him a closeness to It on a new level; through an evolved consciousness bringing him, a part of Nature - for so long alienated from It - to

know Itself through him.

"I am the eye with which the Universe
Beholds itself and knows itself divine;
All harmony of instrument or verse,
All prophecy, all medicine is mine.
All light of art or nature; - to my song
Victory and praise in its own right belong."85

85

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1).This is to repeat what has already been asserted: that Marxism is not a determinism but a continuously reformulated mode of analysis. On the basis of analysis, human beings as conscious active agents can strive to act within society - reflectively - in order to further envisaged aims. Praxis is the constant movement between and growing approximation of thought to action.

2.)The various "episodes" of Part VII (which are divided by spaces in the print) were written at different times over a period of three years. They therefore represent different styles and modes of expression - different "moments" of a constant transformation in language and analytical perspective. It would be impossible to rewrite every section in order to impose uniformity of style, not only because the task would be endless but because supercedence is not a simple ladder-like ascent: the overall concerns have remained the same throughout the period of my writing this work, and earlier formulations may have nuances which a re-formulation can lose. Real iconsistences I leave the reader to iron out; otherwise I make no apologies for my view of knowledge as an endless web or spiral of exploration - not a ladder leading from imperfection to perfection.

Having said this, there are some points I would like to add to the introductory paragraphs of Part VII. Essentially, my theme is that revolutionary praxis should concern itself as much with feelings as with ideas. A Marxist intellectual history analyses ideas in dialectical inter-relation with socio-economic change; it should do likewise with sensibilities. And just as past ideas are relativized, i.e. the kernels of "truth" are analytically separated from aspects which are untenable from a contemporary perspective - so with orientations of feeling. Thus, some of 18th materialist philosophy is taken over into dialectical materialism while much is relegated to the status of historically constrained bourgeois ideology. The same is true of religious or emotional experience towards Nature - and a sensibility towards Nature appropriate, relevant, and dignified in our context can be explored. As with ideas, the maximally objective feelings available to us are not absolute, but relative to the present struggle for human emancipation. As with ideas they are constantly transformed through conscious action upon nature and society.

As reality changes - partially due to strategies formulated according to existing ideas and sensibilities - the analysis of it also changes, in continual dialectical interplay. More highly conscious action follows, and so on. The formulation of theory at any time however, although constrained by the circumstances pertaining at that time, holds inevitably a "vision" of a future state of society as a base line - even though this vision will change as we change. The norm underlying all thought is not the present world (as it is for empiricists and positivists], but a conception of a future, harmonious society. It is in relation to this, which is an objective notion for a Marxist, that "exploitation" means something defineable. Likewise, the analysis of alienation entails the positing of an unalienated authentic human being of the future.

Only on the basis of such a perspective can contemporary reality be scrutinised (and judged).

Much of this Part is concerned with a vision of the unalienated man's experience and in relation to this, an intimation of the sort of feelings we should cultivate - along with social-political analysis - in order to orientate ourselves toward the harmonious society of our imagination. It must be stressed however, that I am not trying to describe the pattern of feelings appropriate to contemporary western conditions. I am delineating certain aspects, in the abstract, of what the concrete myriad of ideas and experience might be like. These general characteristics would clearly take on different tones in relation to specific regional or national cultures; hence the tendencies portrayed here relate not specifically to any particular society, nor need the issues be seen as confined to western societies. Furthermore, the level of consciousness considered here should not be seen as more important than, but complementing, all other dimensions of "radical culture" which are integral to political movements, in varied forms in different places. Cultural praxis, whether on the level of esoteric philosophy and aesthetic experience, or of a specific lived-out daily culture of a national (or regional) working class, seeks to draw out traditional tendencies that can be situated in revolutionary frameworks and actively develop them towards intentions and experiences that force the transcendence of existing social relations.

The consideration of orientations of sensibility appropriate to socialism is, therefore, on a general level in this study. Their development in particular countries, regions, social groups etc. will take on varied specific forms; thus, for example, the externalization of repressed emotions, the cultivation of expressiveness and sensual sensitivity to colour, shape, smell etc. takes on a very definite political significance in "protestant" or "anglo-saxon" cultures.

3. H. Marcuse: "Soviet Marxism."

4. Ernst Cassirer: Chapter on Art in "An Essay on Man."

5. H. Marcuse: "Art in the One-Dimensional Society" in "Radical Perspectives in the Arts." Ed. Lee Baxandall.

6. Ibid.

7. Shelley: "A Defense of Poetry."

8 H. Marcuse: “Eros and Civilization." (Quotes from Schiller: "The Aesthetic Letters”.

9). Shelley: op.cit.

10). A. Willener: "Images and Action." Paper given to SSRC Conference on the Occupational Community of the Traditional Worker, Sept. 1972.

11). Paulo Freire: "Cultural Action for Freedom."

12). Letter of John Keats.

13). From Coleridge's: "Essays and Lectures on Shakespeare."

14). H. Marcuse: "Eros and Civilisation."

15). J. Dewey: "Art as Experience."

16). Ibid.

17). Kant: "Critique of Judgement."

18). R.D. Laing's terminology in "The Divided Self."

19. Shelley: "A Defence of Poetry."

20. Laing: op.cit.

21.Shelley: op.cit.

22)."Creativity: a Transactional Approach." Paper by I.A. Taylor presented to the American Association for the Advancement of Science. The mechanical separation of reality into an individual,"personal" world and an external "social environment" is of course an inadequate formulation here.

23)J. Dewey: op.cit.

24).Coleridge: op.cit.

25).Schiller; "Aesthetic Letters."

26).Shelley; op.cit.

27).T.S. Eliot: "Four Quartets."

28). Louis Aragon: "Ethical Sciences: Free to you!"

29).Foreword by L. Cranmer-Byng to "An Essay on Landscape Painting," by Kuo Hsi.

30). Alan Watts: "Nature, Man and Woman."

31). Jurgens Habermas: "Toward a Rational Society."

32). Kuo Hsi: "An Essay on Landscape Painting."

33). Kant: op.cit.

34. H. Marcuse: "Eros and Civilization."

35).Ibid.

36). Shelley: op.cit.

37 Jacques Maritain: "Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry."

38. "Bulls" by Kakuan in "Zen Flesh, Zen Bones," compiled by Paul Reps.

39 Jan B. Gordon: "The meta-journey of R.D. Laing" in "Laing and Anti-Psychiatry", eds. Robert Boyers and Pobert Orrill (1971).

40. David Cooper: "Psychiatry and Anti-Psychiatry," (1970).

41. Here, as always, I use the word "man" generically. It may be;; sexism in the very language we use that the only abstract word for our species connoting its generic and historical nature is the same as that for a member of the male sex. Yet I cannot help using it; "human beings" indicates the totality of concrete individuals, while "humanity" has become a meaningless moral abstraction.

42. This applies to most attempts to relate the findings of ethology to human behaviour, from Konrad Lorenz and Desmond Morris to Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox. Thus for example the biological evolution of pre-social man favoured the development of agressive behaviour more than in many other mammals. Human history on the whole has certainly borne the signs of this pre-history. Yet physical violence in wars, for example, has not always existed and does not now exist all the time. It is ideology - reducing the historical to the natural - to refer to human nature in explaining wars, which can always be analysed in relation to social-political-economic processes. The word "agression", implying an instinctive form of behaviour, has no meaning for the human species.

43. See Erich Fromm: "Man For Himself," (1949).

44. In fact Alan Watts ("Psychotheraphy East and west," 1961) argues that "maya", the veil of illusion to be thrown off through mystical contemplation, really refers to alienating social institutions that prevent authentic and transcendent experience, not the entirety of nature and society.

However, the notion that physical substance - occupying fixed position in space and appearing to possess qualities which are perceived by the senses - is illusory and that underlying it is a single cosmic energy, is not so absurd in the light of modern physics.

45. That is, all knowledge is within frameworks of conceptualisation that abstract from the infinitely complex, dynamic processes of nature and society.

Science attempts to develop that framework which makes the world maximally intelligible through logically consistent propositions and concepts. Thus, all concepts are mental fictions, of which however some at any historical moment are more persuasive than others Concepts are in constant process of becoming, in dynamic, reflexive, relation with the world. The process is active and interactional, since theoretical predispositions inform all observation or experiment, whilst the latter affect the world observed. The world impinges upon consciousness through complex mediations - physical, physiological and mental. This is not a passive process, but an active structuring, synthesizing of information by the mind - largely through categories of perception and conception, which are themselves transformed in perception.

No science is therefore "neutral", since "facts" are contingent upon, or exist withing the framework of, pre-existing theory. In the last analysis theory is aligned to the socially defined goals of the science in question. (See Jonathan Slack: "Class struggle among the Molecules," in "Counter Course: A Handbook for Course Criticism", ed. Trevor Pateman (1972). Yet historical evolution is dialectical, hence strands of scientific theory which surpass capitalist science in general emerge from within capitalism. These should be furthered, and their implications explored publicly as with all other tendencies toward the supercedence of capitalist forms of social institution, interaction, and knowledge.

46) Alan Watts: "The Way of Zen" (1957).

47). I do not wish to make a rigid categorization of these faculties, since they overflow one in to the other and do not exist separately. Sharp definitions would be impossible, and would imply the existence of ahistorical, immutable human faculties; I use the terms somewhat poetically. What I wish to <u>say</u> becomes clear, I

hope, from this work as a whole.

48). Alan Watts: "The Way of Zen."

49). Paul A. Robinson: "The Sexual Radicals," (1969). Reich's formulation allows health and the structure of the unconscious to be conceived in historical terms; "normality" is an historical potential not a projection of contemporary norms nor a presocial, biological essence. Reich's 'natural sociality' is analogous to Marx's 'communist essence´ as that which pertained prior to classes and that which could be redeveloped as history comes under conscious human determination.

50). George Simmel: "The Metropolis and Mental Life."

51). Cf. Rene Grousset on Chinese art, quoted in Herbert Read: "Art and Society."

52). Andre Breton: "Le Surrealisme et la Peinture."

53). Edward Hall: "The Hidden Dimension."

54). A. Hauser: "The Social History of Art."

55). Sombart: "Kapitalismus."

56). Cf. Alfred Schmidt: "The Concept of Nature in Marx":

"The fundamental materialist tenet could be summed up as follows; the laws of nature exist independently of and outside the consciousness and will of men. Dialectical materialism also holds to this tenet, but with the following supplement: men can only become certain of the operation of the laws of nature through the forms provided by their labour-processes." I would only modify this by talking of the processes rather than the laws of nature, since the most advanced scientific conceptualizations of our time project such a "form" (i.e. of process) upon nature, or see this "form" in nature.

57).See the Appendix to A. Schmidt, op.cit. where the non-Marxist nature of Stalinism is admirably explored. I do not however agree with him that Maoism represents the same vulgarization; Mao's dialectic of nature - stemming from pre-revolutionary Chinese thought - is not one of detenninist laws at all. (See Mao-Tse-Tung: "On Contradiction").

58). Cf. Alan Watts: "Psychotherapy East and West": "...conceptions of entities and 'stuffs,' whether mental or material, have become obsolete. Whether it is describing chemical changes or biological forms, nuclear structures or human behaviour, the

language of modern science is simply concerned with changing patterns of relationship."

59). And in the fulfilment of a conscious, classless society the historical process would become something else; it would no longer be anything other than human thought and act - now become free.

60). Norman Cohn: "The Pursuit of the Millenium," (1957).

61). Andrew M. Greeley: "Ecstasy: A Way of Knowing," (1974).

62). Why the intuitive perception of the cosmos is imbued with meaning for cosmic and human history is obviously difficult to translate from intuitive to rational modes of communication. One can, however, say that the experience is real, and that it is compatible with rational analysis. To Einstein they were inseparable. Two quotations attempting to grapple with this problem may be apt:

"The evidence is not such, and in the nature of things can never be such that an arithmetical formula or a scientific experiment can generate assent. Ultimately one must choose: one must make an act of faith either for Graciousness or malignancy and live one's life as though one or the other were true." (Greeley; op.cit.).

"Quite apart from the question of whether these analogical relationships (i.e. projections of human experiences onto the cosmos) have the least objective reality, or whether they are purely fanciful and arbitrary constructions, we merely cite them as examples of the fact that in some of our more ancient and stable societies every department of life is designedly related to the ultimate meaning and nature of the universe. Man, his institutions, his arts, his labour, is seen as a microcosm inseparably bound up with the macrocosm, an integral part of the universe in which he lives. But the constant and almost unconscious assumption cf modern thought in the Aest, largely produced by the artificial circumstances of urban life, is that *man* is- in some way isolated from his universe, and is able to analyse and criticize it as if the resulting judgements bore no reflection on his own nature. A philosopher can assert that the universe is without any objective meaning, seemingly unaware of the fact that his very idea, as part of that universe must also be without meaning." (Alan Watts: "The Supreme Identity," (1950)

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To repeat my position: I claim validity for ecstatic experiences which confirm meaning in the cosmos and human history, in that dialectical analysis of the history of sensibilities points to its appropriateness to contemporary reality, as it does with Marxian ideas. It is not crudely argued that man has at all times and places had such experience, but that an historical movement towards such knowledge is real to man as is a yearning for the fulfilment of social needs.

63. Ibid

64. Ibid.: “we can see the ecstatic experience not as something totally and completely different from our ordinary, prosaic human experience, but as simply one end of a continuum that we might call nondiscursive insight into the nature of the Real."

Greeley, quite reasonably it seems to me, argues that a conviction of hopefulness is "built into the structure of the human condition.” This can be meant in the same way that Marxism posits man as a being that strives to satisfy and develop needs. The form in which this "human nature" is manifested is culturally relative. As Greeley says: "What is different about Eastern and Western mysticism is not so much the experience itself as the meaning system which creates the religious context of the experience and whose symbols are used afterwards to describe it." The implications of such experience need not be now what they were for the Zen monk Basho in 13th C Japan, who left a crying baby to starve as this was part of a process he did not understand.

Greeley also points out that different cultural systems and patterns of socialization etc. predispose people more or less to mystical experience; it is thus quite as easily incorporated into social theory and transformative praxis as is, for example, co-operative rather than competitive behaviour.

65. Ibid.; "Mysticism is knowledge; it is an act of knowing by which a person breaks through to what he thinks is the basic structure of the universe."

66. R.G. Collingwood: "The Idea of Nature," (1945).

67 A relation is clearly found between the idea of natural laws bearing upon the movement of fixed objects in space, and the capitalist market with its "laws" which determine the movements of commodities - within a bourgeois conception of society as made up of a plurality of separate interacting individuals. This is only one form of relation however; I am not suggesting a simple projection of economic realities upon cosmic Weltanschauung.

68. The shift from philosophies of Being to philosophies of Becoming is also traced in Lovejoy's: "The Great Chain of Being'."

69). Collingwood: op.cit.

70). Ibid.

71). Ibid.

72). Ibid.

73. Thus can the infinite be known in the cry of geese or the shimmer of light on a lake.

74). Alan Watts: "The Supreme Identity;" (1950).

75). The intuitive counterpart to this intellectual understanding is the racist experience of human becoming within a dynamic universe.

76). This also entails a new level of human adaptation to the natural environment. Whilst he was evolving in the forests of Africa, and later whilst expanding throughout the Savanna and into new terrestrial habitats, Man was still adapting physiologically to the environment. Historical development since has entailed increasing deliberate control over the environment, with probably little further biological adaptation. The zenith of human control under capitalism has led to terrestrial ecology going out of control. To survive, the human society superceding capitalism must adopt a new conscious adaptation to the ecological system of v/Mch man is a part. (See J.L. Cloudsley-Thompson: "Environment and Human Evolution" in "Environmental Conservation," Vol. 2, No.4, Winter 1975.)

Human history has been the evolution of so many forms of social-economic organisation, resting upon the potentials laid down genetically in human pre-history. Prior to Capitalism, the mediation between society and nature has been through partially conscious regulated economies. Capitalism has allowed a fantastic degree of control and manipulation of nature, through its development of science and technology, but this is haphazard and blind because the capitalist system is anarchic. A degree of planning is possible within Capitalism, but it is piece-meal, a type of negative-defensive response to symptoms of a chaotic system. If part or all of the planet is not to be destroyed, Capitalism must be transformed into a rationally planned economic system - based on the conscious regulation of production through a systematic integrated consideration of resources, available labour, human needs, ecological side-effects etc. Science and technology, first developed under Capitalism, must be used within a regulated "metabolism with nature", the economic regulation of pre-capitalist societies must be reinstated in terms of mass technological production.

Capitalist ideology insists that the movement toward a planned economy means a swing towards "totalitarianism"; whereas in reality the possibilities for genuine democracy, personal freedom, human intellectual awareness etc. are made very much greater. This ideology obscures the particular reasons for the form of society which emerged in Stalinist Russia, and ignores the fact that European fascism arose

out of capitalist crisis and helped to bring Capitalism out of crisis.

77). Collingwood: op.cit.

78). Paul Baran: "The Concept of the Economic Surplus" in "Marx and Modern Economics, "Ed. David Horowitz, (1968).

79). In other words socialism is not merely the equalisation of remunerations for occupational skills which have been developed through capitalism; it is not the replacement of a capitalist management by workers councils; and it is not a mere change of emphasis in technologies used. It is a total redefinition of labour - the transcendence of specialization of stills, hierarchical organisation, and capitalist forms of technology.

But writers like Andre Gorz ("The Division of Labour" (1966)), who accuse western Communist Parties of reformism because they appear to support the division of labour in welcoming groups into the proletarian movement that are part of the technocracy, miss the mark. Such 'skilled workers' according to Gorz are produced by capitalism; they perform artificial tasks hinged to the maintenance of capitalism. This is true, but the same is ultimately true of all occupations under capitalism. Gorz advocates a sort of manual proletarian chauvinism, not conceiving that all non-owning strata are potentially a part of the process of revolutionary transformation, and that praxis starts from existing reality in order to transcend it, not from an abstract reality which would exist if present society was not the outcome of capitalist development.

80). Bob Ecleshall: "Technology and Liberation," in Radical Philosophy Eleven, (Summer 1975).

81). Ibid.

82). Ibid.

83). Theodore Roszak: "Where the Wasteland Ends," (1972).

84). Bob Eccleshall, op.cit.

85. Percy Bysshe Shelley: "Hymn of Apollo."

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